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Enhancing the knowledge of the financing of organised crime is an 
indispensable component of more effective and smarter approaches to 
prevention and investigation. Accessing capital is a significant constraint 
for some criminals when they seek to become big players in illicit markets 
for goods and services,1 yet the processes and structures involved in the 
financial investment of criminal markets are largely under-researched. 
Whilst there is general information available regarding the level of financing 
required for a criminal group’s operations in specific illicit markets – for 
example, the illicit drugs market is relatively well documented and there 
is a reasonably sound understanding of the pricing available along the 
entire value chain of operations, from production prices, smuggling and 
wholesale prices, middle-level dealing, to retail distribution,2 as well as 
with costs of the business3 – this is not the case with a number of 
other illicit markets such as organised VAT fraud, illicit excisable goods, 
smuggling/trafficking in human beings, counterfeiting of goods and money, 
payment card fraud, and trafficking in stolen vehicles, etc.
To enter a criminal market at the wholesale level, organised criminals 
may need significant financial resources including, but not restricted to, 
credit facilities. Their need for financing concerns every level of organised 
crime. However, while millions (upfront and/or on credit) may be needed 
to enter the cocaine market at wholesale level, participation at the retail 
level requires only modest resources. The same applies to manifestations 
of organised crime that do not require entrepreneurial characteristics and 
are based on predatory activities. For example, small criminal groups may 
need only several tens of thousands of euros to launch an international 
banking fraud.4 The entry costs for many e-crimes are insignificant.
Various financial mechanisms and opportunities are available for criminal 
actors to fund new or existing illicit activities. However, fairly little has 
been done in terms of systematically analysing or targeting individuals or 
processes that are mainly involved in the financing of criminal structures 
and organised criminal activities. The financing of organised crime is 
the type of horizontal issue that several analyses as well as threat 
and strategic assessments – analyses and assessments that have been 
previously criticised us unreliable sources of information on organised 
1 G. Dean, I. Fahsing, and P. Gottschalk, Organised Crime: Policing Illegal Business Entrepreneurialism 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
2 See Matrix Knowledge Group, The Illicit Drug Trade in the United Kingdom (Home Office Online 
Report, London, 2007). P. Kopp, Economie de La Drogue (Paris: La Découverte, 2006).
3 J.P. Caulkins et al., “What Drug Dealers Tell Us About Their Costs of Doing Business”, Journal 
of Drug Issues 29(2) (1999): 323-40; K. Moeller, “Costs and Revenues in Street Level Cannabis 
Dealing”, Trends in Organised Crime 15, no. 1 (2012): 31-46.
4 See R.T. Naylor, “Towards a Theory of Profit-Driven Crime”, British Journal of Criminology 43, no. 1 
(2003): 81-101, for a deconstruction of profit-driven crime into its inherent characteristics.
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crime5 – often skip, focusing instead on the proceeds of crime, criminal 
assets and/or money laundering.6 Official and informal financial services 
may all be used to finance organised criminal operations in one way or 
another. 
Previous research has shown that financiers are often behind the financing 
of large-scale trafficking of commodities such as cigarettes or drugs.7 Yet 
despite the influence of these financiers, they remain outside the scope 
of analysis of organised crime being done at EU level, where such 
information is largely omitted. Although considerable research has been 
conducted on the proceeds of crime and the financial management 
of several organised criminal activities, the financing of terrorism8 and 
money laundering, little has been done in terms of analysing or targeting 
individuals, structures and processes that are involved in the “preceeds” 
of crime,9 especially on crimes unconnected with the financing of 
terrorism. Little has also been done in terms of analysing whether 
criminal entrepreneurs engage in a process that disguises a legitimate 
source of funds that are to be used for illegal purposes, a process that 
has been defined as “reverse money laundering.”10
Following these observations, a number of academics and law-enforcement 
officials from across Europe were contacted in order to gather information 
regarding the respective situations in their countries. It was established 
that many faced a similar situation, where some operational knowledge 
on the issue existed, yet (excepting the Netherlands) analytical units 
had not given much specific attention to it. Therefore, an interest 
was expressed to gather this knowledge at the EU level, as well as to 
exchange knowledge and experiences with partner countries where this 
issue has been paid more attention.
5 P.C. van Duyne, “OCTA 2006: The Unfulfilled Promise”, Trends in Organised Crime 10 (2007): 
120-28; P.C. van Duyne and T. Vander Beken, “The Incantations of the EU Organised Crime 
Policy Making”, Crime, Law and Social Change 51 (2009): 261-81.
6 See UNODC, The Globalisation of Crime (Vienna: UNODC, 2010); UNODC, Estimating Illicit 
Financial Flows Resulting from Drug Trafficking and Other Transnational Organised Crimes (Vienna: 
UNODC, 2011); Europol, SOCTA 2013. EU Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment (The 
Hague: Europol, 2013); NCA, National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime (London: 
NCA, 2014); R. Dubourg and S. Prichard, Revenues, Economic and Social Costs and Criminal Assets 
(London: Home Office, 2009).
7 See, for example, K. von Lampe, Provisional Situational Report on Trafficking in Contraband 
Cigarettes, 2005, http://www.organized-crime.de/AOC-DLV18-vR3.pdf; J.P. Caulkins, B. Gurga, 
and C. Little, “Economic Analysis of Drug Transaction ‘Cycles’ Described by Incarcerated 
UK Drug Dealers”, Global Crime 10, no. 1/2 (2009): 94-112; CSD, Serious and Organised Crime 
Threat Assessment 2010 – 2011 (Sofia, 2012); A. Rusev, P. Gounev, and T. Bezlov, “European 
Lessons from the Bulgarian Serious Organised Crime Threat Assessment”, in Human Dimensions 
in Organised Crime, Money Laundering and Corruption, ed. P.C. van Duyne et al. (Nijmegen: WLP, 
2013), 95-120.
8 A. Silke, “Drink, Drugs and Rock’n'Roll: Financing Loyalist Terrorism in Northern Ireland – Part 
Two”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 23, no. 2 (2000): 107-27; M. Levi, “Combating the Financing 
of Terrorism: A History and Assessment of the Control of ‘threat Finance’”, British Journal of 
Criminology 50, no. 4 (2010): 650-69.
9 M. Levi, “Preceeds of Crime”, Criminal Justice Matters 81, no. 1 (2010): 38-39.
10 S.D. Cassella, “Reverse Money Laundering”, Journal of Money Laundering Control 7, no. 1 (2003): 
92-94.
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Criminal enterprises, regardless of whether they operate in an entirely 
illegal market (drugs) or compete in a market with numerous legal players 
(cigarettes), at some point of their life cycle face many of the same 
dilemmas and financial limitations that are typical for legal businesses. 
Criminal entrepreneurs may need external financing under any of the 
following circumstances:
• to start their business, launch new products or cover new areas; 
• to meet recurring financial needs (e.g. purchase of goods, payments 
to “employees” and contractors, bribes to political or law-enforcement 
authorities);
• to cover any incidental or, on some occasions, regular expenses (legal 
expenses, fines, loss or confiscation of goods, restructuring of debts, 
securing collaterals for certain deals);
• to support the potential vertical or horizontal expansion of their 
enterprise.
 
Access to financing in the world of legitimate businesses is directly 
dependent on the risk associated with each particular enterprise. In an open 
market in which there is no risk per se to either party from participation 
in commerce, the estimated risk determines the cost of financing and the 
variety of financial investment and other “resource mobilisation” options 
available.11 For instance, outside of fashionable advance technology sectors 
where huge gains are possible, mature and established companies with 
proven quality products and services enjoy a lower cost of capital and a 
greater choice of financial resources in comparison to start-up businesses 
or businesses without proven track records. Risk is also driven by a 
number of macroeconomic factors: overall economic stability in a country, 
reliability of the national financial and legal system, and development 
prospects for a certain market or industry – all of which may translate 
into lower costs of capital. For example, manufacturers in Romania or 
Greece may find it much more difficult and expensive to finance their 
businesses than similar manufacturers in France or Germany. At a micro 
level, the cost of financing and variety of sources available are driven 
by the expected ability of creditors and investors to secure the return 
of their funds – these guarantees include the quality of collateral that 
businesses can provide and their leverage ratio, but also the efficiency of 
the respective legal and administrative framework.12 
In the world of criminal entrepreneurs, the same correlation between risk 
and cost of financing may exist, but risk assessment is much more difficult 
to implement and verify. Financing options are affected by factors such as: 
• Differences in the level of hostility of the environment in which 
criminal entrepreneurs operate. In some less economically developed 
11 Dean, Fahsing, and Gottschalk, Organised Crime: Policing Illegal Business Entrepreneurialism, 8.
12 BDO, Ambition Survey (Brussels: BDO, 2012).
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countries with high levels of corruption it is not easy to determine 
whether it is the licit or the illicit businesses that operate in a more 
hostile environment.
• The relative illegality of the product sold and service provided. 
For instance, cigarettes constitute a commodity for which there is 
a very large, receptive market, which involves “voluntary transfers” 
and “an implicit notion of fair market value”,13 and is, therefore, 
received well (compared to heroin, for example) by large parts of the 
population. Similarly, the entrepreneurs operating in the sex market 
are more widely accepted by the public and the authorities than are 
entrepreneurs specialising in contract killings.
• Consequently, the level and extent in which a criminal enterprise is 
embedded in the so called “upperworld”14 – the sphere of legitimate 
transactions – is also a factor. The more embedded a criminal market 
is in the upperworld, the easier it is for financial sources to be found 
(e.g. VAT fraud vs heroin).
• The relative inability of the illegal entrepreneur to advertise their 
business and compete openly.
• Difficulties in recruiting talent. Except where there is a plausible 
lawful rationale for the activity (like for boiler room salespeople or 
for “money mules” through whose accounts money is laundered), 
criminal entrepreneurs (unlike legal entrepreneurs) cannot legitimately 
advertise positions and recruit the best employees or collaborators; 
something that may affect the success and profitability of the 
enterprise.15
• The range of skills required create barriers to entry which do not 
exist in other markets (for example, producing counterfeit DVDs, 
which is a relatively easy task, as opposed to hunting tigers or 
elephants for their body parts).16
• The degree of transparency/opacity of operations (e.g. excise goods 
vs. the illegal arms trade).
• Information leaks by actors related or unrelated to the criminal 
enterprise (employees, disillusioned and sacked employees, customers/
clients, competitors, family members, etc.). The possibility of information 
leaks increases the bigger and more successful the enterprise becomes. 
Thus, criminal entrepreneurs can be the victims of their own success, 
which is generally not the case with legal entrepreneurs, unless they 
expand beyond their ability to judge and control their environments, 
or are unable/unwilling to delegate.
• The level of violence of a given criminal market (e.g. though still not 
as common as popularly believed, Class A drugs trafficking is generally 
associated with more violence than credit card fraud or the illicit 
cigarette trade);
13 Naylor, “Towards a Theory of Profit-Driven Crime”, 85.
14 E.R. Kleemans and H. van de Bunt, “The Social Embeddedness of Organized Crime”, Transnational 
Organized Crime 5, no. 1 (1999): 19-36; K. von Lampe, “Organised Crime Research in Europe: 
Development and Stagnation”, in European Crime-Markets at Cross-Roads: Extended and Extending 
Criminal Europe, ed. P. van Duyne et al. (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2008), 17-41.
15 P.C. van Duyne, “The Organisation of Business Crime”, in The Organisation of Crime for Profit, 
ed. P. van Duyne et al. (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2006), 177-205; Brå, Where Did All 
the Money Go? (Stockholm, 2007).
16 B. Moyle, “The Black Marker in China for Tiger Products”, Global Crime 10, no. 1/2 (2009): 
124-43.
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• The priority given by law enforcement to those participating in 
a particular market (for instance, hard drugs), and the respective 
penalties – both perceived and actual – which affect expected and real 
risks. Real risks affect incapacitation via imprisonment; expected risks 
affect general and special deterrence via willingness to participate.
• Differences in the visibility of the criminal activities themselves. For 
example, the street-selling of cigarettes vs the street-selling of heroin.
• The willingness of victims or affected bystanders of a criminal 
market to take action and/or report criminal enterprise-related 
activities to the authorities. For instance, victims of fraud are generally 
more willing to report criminal activities to the authorities than are 
individuals living in an area in which the trade of cannabis is rife.
• The degree of centralisation of markets – more centralised markets 
command better financing options than fragmented markets. This is 
related to the ability of the criminal entrepreneur to have an overview 
of the operation and several financial aspects. Skinnari, in her study 
on the financial management of drug crime in Sweden, for example, 
found that some drug dealers found it difficult to make financial 
management of drug trafficking more efficient because, in many 
instances, they were not aware of what all business-related expenses 
in their scheme were.17
• The ability of the illegal entrepreneurs to use information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) to facilitate their business (for 
example, offline trade in counterfeit medicines vs online trade in 
counterfeit medicines). Online entrepreneurs require less financing 
than offline entrepreneurs.18
• The strategies and efforts made by law enforcement authorities, 
including frequently mutating technologies against illegal enterprise, 
and their intended and unintended consequences accounting for 
the “shifting terrains”19 that criminal entrepreneurs respond (or 
attempt to respond) to. Such strategies can have substantial financial 
implications.20
In general, it can be expected that capital in criminal markets is readily 
available when the potential for profit is high and the perceived risk 
is low. However, the nature of the criminal enterprise follows from the 
requirements of continuous criminal transactions,21 and these transactions 
depend heavily on how economic, social and cultural relations are 
articulated in particular national and local contexts. 
17 J. Skinnari, “The Financial Management of Drug Crime in Sweden”, in Cross-Border Crime Inroads 
on Integrity in Europe, ed. P. van Duyne et al. (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2010), 189-215.
18 A. Hall and G. A. Antonopoulos, “License to Pill: Illegal Entrepreneurs’ Tactics in the Online 
Trade of Medicines”, in Economic and Organised Cross-Border Crime in Times of Crisis, ed. P. van 
Duyne, P.C., Antonopoulos, G., Harvey, J., Maljevic, A. & von Lampe, K. (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal 
Publishers, forthcoming).
19 D. Hobbs, “The Firm: Organisational Logic and Criminal Culture in a Shifting Terrain”, British 
Journal of Criminology 41 (2001): 549-60; M. Levi, “Breaking the Economic Power of Organised 
Crime Groups. Paper Presented at the CIROC (Centre for Information and Research on 
Organised Crime)” (Amsterdam, October 16, 2002). 
20 J. Caulkins and P. Reuter, “How Drug Enforcement Affects Drug Prices”, Crime and Justice: 
A Review of Research 39 (2010): 213-71; see also Brå, Where Did All the Money Go?
21 D.C. Smith, “Illicit Enterprise”, in Handbook of Organised Crime in the United States, ed. R.J. Kelly, 
K-L. Chin, and R. Schatzberg (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994).
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Generally, licit enterprises secure external capital through borrowing, 
equity financing, or reinvestment of past internal profits. This raises the 
question about whether such options also exist in criminal markets. Are 
there black market banks and investors? And, if so, how do they differ 
from their legal counterparts? Peter Reuter has conceptualised the key 
distinctions existing between legal and illegal enterprises in accessing 
credit.22 The most important difference arises from the separation of 
the ownership from the management in the modern (large) firm, which 
provides for the independence of the organisation from its owner and, 
therefore, can contribute to a legal entity’s survival and longevity. This is 
because independence from the owner creates the necessary conditions 
for establishing the existence of external credit markets. These credit 
markets are then able to rely on the fact that even if the individual owner 
is not in a position to repay his debt, they can claim their payments or 
collateral from the firm itself – if it still remains solvent. Moreover, though 
it is important not to overestimate the integrity of accounting rules and 
compliance levels, existing legal regulations assure some standardised and 
detailed record keeping, which provides the lenders with evidence about 
the assets and financial flows of the borrower. Though this does not offer 
immediate protection from fraud, legal requirements for detailed record 
keeping also ease access to equity financing because the investor can 
monitor the expenditure and profits. Detailed record keeping also means 
that establishing the market value for the ownership of an enterprise is 
easier. Further on, in legal markets, lenders can rely on the legal institutions 
to recover their claim in case borrowers fail to meet their contractual 
obligations, provided that there are sufficient assets remaining and that the 
money has not been laundered elsewhere or simply spent recklessly.
In contrast, many illegal enterprises are inextricably linked to individual 
criminal entrepreneurs and, therefore, an entrepreneur’s disappearance, 
imprisonment or death can easily deprive the lender or equity shareholder 
from his claim or share of the profit; such was the case of Dutch 
“underworld banker” Willem Endstra where his alleged lack of repayment 
and collusion with police led to his death.23 Wholly illegal enterprises 
are thought seldom to keep detailed records as this carries risks if they 
are raided and searched.24 Some individuals, however, sometimes do 
keep records, especially if they may be looking for something to trade 
with prosecutors25 or if they need to satisfy their superiors who may 
22 P. Reuter, The Organisation of Illegal Markets: An Economic Analysis (Washington, D.C.: National 
Institute of Justice, 1985); see also L. Paoli, “The Invisible Hand of the Market: The Illegal 
Drugs Trade in Germany, Italy, and Russia”, in Criminal Finances and Organising Crime in Europe, 
ed. P. van Duyne, K. van Lampe, and J. Newell (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2003), 
19-40.
23 P. Gottschalk, Entrepreneurship and Organised Crime (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2009). An 
infamous gangster, Willem Holleeder, served 6 years in prison for blackmailing him, and a 
Dutch tycoon, Paarlberg, was jailed for 4.5 years and ordered to pay a fine of €25.7 million to 
the state for tax fraud and laundering the proceeds of Endstra’s blackmail (http://www.nltimes.
nl/2013/03/19/e25-7m-fine-after-holleeder-cohort-convicted-of-fraud/).
24 See, however, S. Levitt and S. Venkatesh, “An Economic Analysis of a Drug-Selling Gang’s 
Finances”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, no. 3 (2000): 755-89; M. Soudijn and S.X. Zhang, 
“Taking Loansharking into Account: A Case Study of Chinese Vest-Pocket Lenders in Holland”, 
Trends in Organised Crime 16 (2013): 13-30; S. Barley, “The £50m Drugs Gang”, The Gazette, 
September 13, 2014.
25 M. R. Soudijn and P. Reuter, (in preparation) “Cash and Carry: The High Cost of Currency 
Smuggling in the Drug Trade between the Netherlands and Colombia”.
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take extra-legal actions if they consider themselves cheated.26 Setting 
aside any cynicism about the quality of audits in the licit sector, this fact 
means lenders do not have access to reliable public information about 
the capacity of the criminal entrepreneur to repay his debt, or about 
the accurate disbursal of profits, creating the scope for tension between 
lenders and operators. Furthermore, the lack of justice institutions that can 
guarantee protection of the contractual agreements for the lenders and the 
shareholders raises the uncertainty and risk in collecting back their money. 
The exception is where Mafia-type associations are able to perform this 
function (at a cost) or even combine it with financing crime as a vertically 
integrated firm – something that makes sense primarily when they can also 
guarantee freedom from criminal process and confiscation, without which 
the downside risks of integration become substantial.27
Furthermore, due to the need for most criminal enterprises to have several 
links in the chain, their reliance on trust and the problems associated with 
networking means starting new business opportunities is more difficult 
than in the licit sphere – even if the rewards are more lucrative. The 
need within the sphere of criminal entrepreneurship to select partners 
carefully, and for those that are selected to prove their position further – 
either by cost-discriminating signals (those that are costly for an impostor 
to supply/show their commitment beyond question) or through previous 
credentials – increases the costs and difficulties even further.28
All of the above constraints are supposed to substantially decrease the 
criminal enterprise from accessing external capital and, therefore, Reuter29 
argues (based on the evidence collected of thirty years ago) that they must 
rely exclusively on the reinvestment of profits in order to grow. Having said 
that, social network analysis of criminal networks has identified “black” 
investors as key nodes in criminal operations.30 However, these analyses 
tend not to elaborate on their specific roles or the mechanisms of financing 
involved. Furthermore, research in various European countries suggests the 
existence of a specific overlapping between legitimate and criminal 
entrepreneurship, when, for example, so called “oligarchs” move money 
between their legal and illegal businesses.31 How common this legal-illegal 
26 With organised VAT fraud there is even “legitimate” accounting although this does not, of 
course, mean that such “black” accounting records are available for external audit.
27 Obchak is the mutual fund to which all members of a criminal organisation (in Russia and Baltic 
Sea Region) must donate part of their earnings, performs such functions. See I. Abramova, “The 
Funding of Traditional Organised Crime in Russia”, Economic Affairs, March 2007, 18-21; R. Pullat, 
“Criminal Hierarchal Structures: Models of Organised Crime in the Baltic Sea Region”, SIAK-
Journal – Zeitschrift Für Polizeiwissenschaft Und Polizeiliche Praxis 2 (2009): 24-30. Obschak is discussed 
in more detail in the chapter on drug trafficking in Estonia in this report.
28 D. Gambetta, Codes of the Underworld: How Criminals Communicate (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2009).
29 P. Reuter, Disorganized Crime: Illegal Markets and the Mafia (Cambridge, Ma: MIT Press, 1986).
30 C. Morselli and C. Giguère, “Legitimate Strengths in Criminal Networks”, Crime, Law, and Social 
Change 45 (2006): 185-200; M. Kenney, “Architecture of Drug Trafficking: Network Forms of 
Organisation in Colombian Cocaine Trade”, Global Crime 8, no. 3 (2007): 233-59.
31 CSD, Organised Crime in Bulgaria: Markets and Trends (Sofia, 2007). for discussions of the relation-
ships existing between legitimate and criminal entrepreneurship see also Ruggiero V., “Criminals 
and Service Providers: Cross-National Dirty Economies”, Crime, Law and Social Change 28, no. 1 
(1997): 27-38; G. A. Antonopoulos and N. Tagarov, “Greece: The Politics of Crime”, in Corruption 
and Organized Crime in Europe: Illegal Partnerships, ed. V. Gounev, P., & Ruggiero (Oxford: Routledge, 
2012), 125-43; P. van Duyne et al., eds., Corruption, Greed and Crime Money: Sleaze and Shady 
Economy in Europe and Beyond (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2014).
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business interconnection is within different regions of Europe and beyond 
is unknown: but to the extent that some crime entrepreneurs with interests 
in drugs, clubs and the sex trade may find common attitudes and values 
among some financial services “wheeler-dealers” with surplus wealth, it 
would not be surprising to find such investment access there too.
Finally, it is important to note the degree to which the availability of 
internal re-investment funds is likely to be affected by lifestyles and the 
profitability of different segments of particular crime trades. Drawing on 
150 cases from the Dutch Organised Crime Monitor, Kruisbergen et al.32 
note the following:
“The skewness of the profit distribution differs per drug market and 
is related to the logistic nature of the trade chain. In the case of 
cocaine there is a big distance between the production locations on 
the one hand and the markets on the other. The successful bridging 
of that distance constitutes the most important and lucrative step 
within the total chain of the cocaine market. Therefore, the person 
who has the contacts and/or the ability to arrange for a successful 
importation of this drug is the top earner.
“Contrary to the production of coca leaves, the production of 
synthetic drugs is not restricted to one…region.33 In addition, in the 
case of synthetic drugs the distance between production and the 
(European) market is much smaller. With respect to the synthetic drug 
trade, the trade chain consists of the following three links: the raw 
materials, which are much harder to obtain now than in the early 
days of xtc production; the production, which requires equipment 
and knowledge; and (international) market channels. 
“The relation between these links is more equal, making the profit 
distribution less skewed than it is in the case of the cocaine trade 
(although the export of for instance xtc is far more profitable than 
the domestic market is).
“The distribution of criminal profits is not a static fact; actors may try 
to increase their own share at the cost of others. In the context of the 
drug trade, increasing one’s share of the profits often seems to boil 
down to shutting out, deceiving or robbing one’s ‘business partners’. 
In the context of human trafficking and extortion, however, the 
profit is chiefly added to by increasing the pressure on the victims… 
Thus, we almost never encountered collective ‘business reserves’ or 
a collective kitty, while both investments and profits are extremely 
individualised.”
These Dutch research observations are, of course, subject to changes in 
market demands and in techniques of production. For example, artisanal 
32 E.W. Kruisbergen, H. Van de Bunt, and E.R. Kleemans, Georganiseerde criminaliteit in Nederland. 
Vierde rapportage op basis van de Monitor Georganiseerde Criminaliteit [Fourth Report of the Organized 
Crime Monitor] (Den Haag: Boom Juridische Uitgevers, 2012), 300-301.
33 Nor, actually, is the production of cocaine restricted to one region. See e.g. F. Thoumi, Illegal 
Drugs, Economy and Society in the Andes (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2003).
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drugs and 3D printing reduce transportation requirements and thus both 
costs and certain types of risks. The growth of generic online markets 
like Silk Road and specific product markets like DarkMarket (for “stolen” 
or rather duplicated financial and personal data) has reduced search 
time for offenders, and the development of Bitcoin and suchlike crypto-
currencies has offered risk-mitigation strategies for the identifiability of 
financial transfers (though value volatility creates other risks, and they are 
not as untraceable as some may believe). Thus, analyses of the financing 
of crime are always provisional.
The broad aim of the present report is to examine the sources, 
mechanisms and approaches behind the financing of organised crime, 
through collecting and analysing empirical data in order to enable more 
effective investigations of organised crime and money laundering. Bearing 
in mind the time and financial (as well as evidential) limitations that 
prevent the authors from offering an exhaustive account of every organised 
crime activity, a decision was made to analyse three manifestations of 
organised crime: an illegal market of an illegal commodity (cocaine); 
an illegal market of a legal commodity (tobacco products); and VAt 
fraud. The study is based on the assumption that the aforementioned 
illegal markets are part of the body of knowledge widely defined as 
“organised crime”, and are empirical manifestations of such crime.34 
The aim of the study presented in this report includes the following 
specific objectives:
• Take stock and examine the various forms and sources of financing 
of organised crime activities/markets;
• Identify the criminal and legal structures behind financing; 
• Examine the possible interlocking relations between criminal structures 
and business and legitimate financial institutions;
• Examine cash flows in criminal enterprises;
• Examine the logistics and processes with which organised crime 
structures settle their payments and manage financial transactions; 
• Examine the costs of doing illegal business;
• Examine profits from organised criminal activities, profit sharing among 
participants in illicit businesses, and the areas in which these profits 
are invested and re-invested; 
• Examine access to capital in critical moments.
• Examine specifics related to financing of OC activities across the EU 
countries;
• Examine specifics related to financing of organised criminal activities 
across the different criminal markets;
• Examine the possible cross-financing issues and other financial interplays 
related to terrorism;
34 See von Lampe, “Organised Crime Research in Europe: Development and Stagnation”.
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• Examine the role of loan sharks as well as other forms of underground 
banking as a possible source of criminal capital.
The study covers financing and financing-related aspects of organised 
crime in 27 EU member states.35 Forms of organised crime financing 
outside the EU were also taken into consideration to an extent, in the 
context of the cross-border reach of organised crime networks operating 
in the EU (e.g. source and transit countries for illicit commodities). 
Specific markets in 10 member states (Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, France, Greece, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and the UK) were explored 
through detailed case-studies. The methodology section that follows 
explains in more detail the sampling approach and logic employed. 
The overall methodological approach of the study presented in this 
report includes a broad collection and use of a diverse set of both 
secondary and primary data. The data collection for the study was based 
on four key elements:
• Published literature: this included research reports by academics, 
research institutes, governments, national and international law 
enforcement reports (EUROPOL, INTERPOL, National Crime 
Agency, etc.), reports by international organisations (UNODC, FATF), 
professional associations, and/or private companies that are either 
affected by specific manifestations of organised crime (e.g. British 
American Tobacco, national tobacco companies) or commissioned 
to conduct research on a specific market by a client (e.g. KPMG). 
The available literature reviewed was in a variety of languages such 
as English, Bulgarian, Italian, Dutch, Greek, French, Spanish, Russian, 
Estonian, Swedish, and Czech.
• Media sources in almost all member state languages were consulted.
• Survey and follow-up interviews with officials: a survey was carried 
out with law-enforcement, judicial, and other government officials 
in all 27 member states. The follow-up interviews, which were 
conducted in order for clarification and additional information about 
issues mentioned in the survey to be obtained, were done over the 
phone or in person where this was possible.
• Country studies (case studies) were carried out for Bulgaria, UK, Italy, 
Greece, France, Belgium, Estonia, Czech Republic, Sweden and Spain. 
The countries were selected based on the preliminary data obtained 
in the earlier stages of the study. For some countries more than one 
market was examined. Each case study was based on interviews, 
official and unofficial data, a literature and media review. In addition, 
the data collected in the survey and follow-up interviews phase of the 
study were used. The help of locally based academics and researchers 
35 All EU member states minus Croatia which joined the EU after the commencement of the 
project.
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was solicited for all country case studies. The respondents involved 
in interviews as part of the country case studies included law-
enforcement, judicial, and other government officials, academics and 
researchers, criminal entrepreneurs and other knowledgeable experts 
such as investigative journalists. In total, 206 interviews were conducted. 
The average length of the phone interviews was approximately one 
hour, and for the face-to-face interviews roughly two hours.
The methodological approach followed led to the production of the current 
report. The report also utilises the overall research in developing practical 
guidelines for investigation and tackling of organised crime financing. The 
guidelines have been compiled into a specialised manual, developed 
via collaboration with law enforcement and judicial experts. In order to 
facilitate the process, a specialised workshop was organised in Trento 
(Italy) in September 2014 to collect additional opinions and feedback. The 
overall methodological strategy followed is summarised in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Methodological approach
Phase & activities Outputs
Model Approach for
Investigating the Financing of
Organised Crime Activities
Final report
19 country profiles on 
financing of OC:
•	 7	country	reports	on	cocaine	market
•	 8	country	reports	on	illegal	tobacco	market
•	 4	country	reports	on	organised	VAT	fraud
Presentations	based	on
analysis	of	survey	and
follow-up	interview	data	on
the	financing	of	the	cocaine	market,
illegal	tobacco	trade	and	VAT	fraud	in	EU
Concept briefs	on	9	markets
DEVELOPMENT OF INVESTIGATIVE 
MANUAL PHASE
•	 Reviewing	existing	examples	for	investigative	
manuals
•	 1	expert	workshop
INCEPTION PHASE
•	 Desktop	research
•	 1	seminar	in	Sofia	(Bulgaria)	for	generating	ideas	
•	 Observations/hypotheses
MAPPING
•	 Selection	of	the	three	markets	to	be	looked	at	in	
more	detail
•	 Survey	questionnaire	and	follow-up	interviews	
(27	member	states)
CASE STUDY PHASE
•	 Country	case	studies	(10	member	states)
•	 Additional	literature	review	on	financing	of	
organised	crime	(cocaine,	tobacco,	VAT	fraud)	
in	the	10	countries
•	 Additional	in-depth	interviews	in	the	10	countries
FINAL REPORT DEVELOPMENT PHASE
•	 Overall	data	analysis	&	validation
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Desktop research
The relative lack of specific studies examining the financing of organised 
criminal activities forced the research team to broaden the scope of 
the review. The initial desktop research was utilised to gain a better 
understanding of the business models in general of the 9 pre-selected 
illicit activities that cover a relatively wide range of manifestations of 
organised crime. These organised criminal activities included: 
• Heroin market
• Cocaine market
• Amphetamine-Type Stimulants (ATS) market
• Illicit tobacco market
• VAT fraud
• Human trafficking for sexual exploitation
• Facilitated illegal immigration
• Loansharking
• Counterfeiting of commodities
Key sources of information for the desktop research included the existing 
academic research dealing with issues such as the size, structure and 
social organisation of criminal markets. Reports by institutions including 
the UNODC and EUROPOL, reports by governmental institutions in the 
EU member states relating to organised crime (e.g. OCTA reports), annual 
situation reports on specific organised crime activities (e.g. the trafficking of 
human beings or drugs), and reports under specific projects and initiatives 
and policy analyses published by non-governmental organisations were 
also used as sources of information. Such documents, where available 
and accessible, were also a source of some data about revenues and 
costs of doing business. Reports from non-governmental institutions were 
also reviewed within the desktop research phase of the project. 
In addition to the above grey and academic literature reviews, a review of 
available internationally comparable official statistics and surveys relevant 
to financial aspects of organised crime were used (e.g. drug supply 
indicators, money laundering statistics, etc.). Given data limitations, they 
were reviewed for insights and validity. Finally, media sources from all 
member states were consulted. Media sources are a very convenient 
and highly accessible source of the purely “technical” information they 
provide, which assisted the researchers in making inferences about an 
organised crime-related issue. Given the possibilities of legal action for 
defamation if they are mistaken, some (non-tabloid) media sources, 
especially stemming from an investigative journalistic context and/or 
dealing with a social issue or phenomenon, are very useful and fairly 
reliable for research of this nature. 
The result of this initial desktop research were 9 briefs with the purpose 
to present how different criminal enterprises function, the typical cash 
flows of the criminal enterprises at each level (production, wholesale, 
retail) and where possible the expected need for financing of new and 
existing activities. The development of the concept briefs captured a 
wide possible spectrum of specifics such as:
Inception phase: 
desktop research 
and expert meeting
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• Illicit goods/services markets (drugs) vs markets for goods that are not 
per se illegal (tobacco);
• Commodity markets (drugs) vs service markets (facilitated illegal 
immigration);
• Markets (illicit tobacco) vs predatory profit driven OC activities (VAT 
fraud).
Expert meeting
The data gathering process, which began with observations based on the 
review of the available literature and media sources, provided the concept 
framework for further data collection. This was also supplemented by an 
expert seminar that was organised in Sofia (Bulgaria) in May 2013. The 
expert seminar included all project partner experts, as well as experts 
from law enforcement agencies and prosecution services from different 
EU countries. The seminar’s aims included:
• probing the recurring statements in the media that the financial crisis 
has turned organised criminals into major financiers;
• testing whether there is much evidence that loan-sharks have become 
more powerful and active in financing crime as a result of the 
economic downturn;
• probing the role of organised crime in financing business enterprises 
(as substitutes to banks) in order to conceal proceeds and earn more 
money to finance its activities;
• testing whether asset confiscation and anti-money laundering legislation 
have made it more difficult for criminals to invest the proceeds of 
crime in legitimate economies, therefore making criminals more willing 
to re-invest in illicit businesses.
Overall, the seminar was utilised as a tool for collecting preliminary 
data, generating ideas about the topic, as well as about the instruments 
used towards the collection of additional data, and identifying suitable 
interviewees for the next phases of the project. Most importantly, the 
seminar assisted the research team in selecting 3 manifestations of 
organised crime that the next phases of the research study would focus 
upon, given the time and resource limitations that prevented us from 
researching all organised criminal activities. As mentioned, these markets 
are: the cocaine market; the illicit trade in tobacco; and VAT fraud. 
The main goal of this phase was to map the existing official knowledge 
and information on the financial aspects of the three aforementioned 
markets. The scarcity of existing data pre-defined the explorative approach 
of the current study which was undertaken in two stages: (a) a survey 
and (b) follow-up interviews. 
Building on the initial desktop research, the concept briefs produced 
and the expert seminar, the questionnaire for the survey was developed 
and appropriate participants in all 27 member states were selected. The 
raised observations were used as a starting point when developing the 
interview questionnaires, as they would also outline the existing gaps in 
Mapping phase: 
survey and follow-up 
interviews
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knowledge regarding the financing of organised crime (and specifically the 
three selected markets). The survey questionnaire had specific sections 
devoted to collecting additional information about the financing of OC 
crimes related to the 3 market case studies and addressed some of the 
following issues:
• Business models and cash flows in criminal enterprises; 
• Size and source of capital needed for entering or operating in a given 
market and market level; 
• Costs of operating in a given market and market level – costs for 
purchasing illegal commodities/maintaining service provision, costs for 
specialised services (transport, store, financial, law, protection and 
violence services, etc.), corruption fees;
• Profits and reinvesting in criminal businesses – how often and how 
much?;
• Profile and number of financiers/investors in each country;
• Known sources for acquiring financing for entering a criminal market, 
expanding activities (e.g. entering a higher level of the market), closing 
a big deal on the black market (e.g. smuggling a container of illicit 
cigarettes) or coping with cash flow problems (due to emergencies 
such as police interception, competition, etc.);
• Mechanisms and logistics behind the financing of OC activities; 
• Legitimate businesses investing in criminal enterprises;
• Role of loan-sharks and underground banking in providing finances to 
OC enterprises; 
• Possible links of OC activities to terrorism.
Each research partner was responsible for covering 9 EU member states 
and identifying potential respondents through their informal networks 
and official communication with the relevant governmental and law 
enforcement institutions. The research partners also coordinated and 
facilitated the completion of the survey questionnaire by sending reminders 
and providing support to the respondents when needed:
University of trento teesside University
Center for the Study
of Democracy
Italy UK Bulgaria
Spain Sweden Romania
Portugal Denmark Slovakia
Malta France Czech Republic
Austria Ireland Poland
Germany Cyprus Slovenia
Luxemburg Finland Estonia
Belgium Greece Latvia
The Netherlands Hungary Lithuania
Approximately 8-10 participants from the authorities were approached in 
each EU member state. These were individuals who were members of 
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intelligence analysis units (of the police, financial police, border agencies, 
tax and customs authorities, etc.), public prosecutors or officials with a 
strategic oversight of the phenomenon of organised crime in a country. 
Of the 252 questionnaires that were sent to the authorities, 83 were 
returned (33% response rate). 
The second step of the data collection in this phase was the follow-up 
interviews. The interviews were done via telephone because this was 
the most effective and cost efficient approach, bearing in mind the 
number of countries and experts to be covered. The goal of the follow-
up interviews was to enhance and broaden the information collected via 
the survey. The respondents were approached and invited to clarify and 
elaborate on the details provided, as well as to illustrate the information 
with cases from their practice. Of the 83 participants who returned 
the questionnaire, 19 agreed to provide fuller accounts in a follow-up 
interview (approximately 23%). 
In 10 countries (Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, 
Greece, Italy, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom) more in-depth 
research was carried out on at least one of the selected markets. These 
countries and the specific markets were determined by the initial stages 
of the research, as well as evidence from the literature review and the 
availability of locally-based researchers who could perform face-to-face 
interviews with knowledgeable actors involved in the criminal businesses 
and beyond. Each country study was based on:
• Review of the existing official and unofficial literature, and media 
sources;
• Analysis of the available national official statistics;
• Analysis of the data obtained from the survey and the follow-up 
interviews (these types of data were made available to the country 
researchers by the research partners);
• In-depth interviews with country officials and other knowledgeable 
actors such as investigative journalists and business people, as well as 
criminal entrepreneurs. These interviews – apart from issues relating to 
the structure of the markets focused upon and market entry – covered 
the sources of organised crime financing, settlement of payments, 
costs of doing business, profits and profit-sharing, access to capital in 
critical moments, loansharking and its links to organised crime, as well 
as the possible link between organised crime and terrorism.
In-depth interviews with 225 participants were conducted in all 10 
countries. For this phase of the study, the team identified the respondents 
in three main ways. Firstly, during the course of the literature review 
and media research when specific officials from neuralgic posts of law 
enforcement agencies and the judiciary who appeared in reports or 
media accounts were approached. Secondly, a number of potential 
participants – both officials and criminals in prisons – were identified 
through official correspondence with government, judiciary and law 
enforcement bodies. Through a method of snowballing sampling, 
respondents working for the authorities recommended other potential 
Country case studies
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interviewees. Thirdly, in the planning of seminars/workshops that were 
part of the study, personal contacts and trust, especially with law 
enforcement officers, was established in order to be able to gather 
sufficient information. Three of the project partners are law enforcement 
agencies with sufficient contacts and relations that we took advantage 
of when this was deemed necessary. Finally, a number of participants 
(and this is primarily the case with active criminal entrepreneurs) were 
identified from previous work in the field of organised crime and/or 
financial crime in which the country researchers were involved. On 
some occasions these criminal entrepreneurs introduced acquaintances 
or collaborators to the researchers. 
The main objective of the research team at this phase of the study 
was to develop a sample that could provide detailed accounts and 
information on the financing of organised crime specifically relating to 
the three selected markets. The list of respondents included:
• Government and law-enforcement officials – e.g. officers from counter 
organised crime units (analytical units, drug units), officers from 
financial crime units, customs officers, tax officers;
• Representatives of the judiciary;
• Actors from legitimate businesses;
• Investigative journalists;
• Academics and/or independent researchers; 
• Criminal entrepreneurs specialising in the cocaine market, the illegal 
tobacco market, and/or VAT fraud.
The introduction of semi-
structured interviews protocol 
used during this phase of the 
study was identical for all 
interviewees. Specific modules 
for the different types of 
interviewees (experts vs. criminal 
entrepreneurs) were developed. 
Experts with broader or more 
general knowledge, such as 
academics and journalists, 
were interviewed on several 
sections of the questionnaire, 
while other interviewees felt 
comfortable answering only 
specific questions. All questions 
were open, and interviews 
lasted between 1 and 2 hours, 
some even longer depending 
on the amount of information a participant could provide as well as the 
talkativeness of the participant.
Таble 1. background oF interviewees
Background
Number of 
interviewees
Government and law enforcement officials 148
Representatives of the judiciary 25
Legitimate business people 12
Investigative journalists 2
Academic and independent researchers 5
Criminal entrepreneurs 33
total 225
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The methodological approach outlined above, and in particular the 
reliance on qualitative measures and opinions of a non-representative 
sample of interviewees is a significant drawback to the methodology 
which the authors are well aware of. In addition, official data including 
data derived from interviews with members of the authorities is the 
result of law enforcement activity, which in turn depends upon resource 
restrictions, the competency of agents, organisational priorities, and 
wider political priorities.36 Very often – as this study also revealed at all 
phases – information and details about financial aspects of organised 
crime are irrelevant to the prospect of successful prosecution, and 
as such are not collected, excluded or ignored. In addition, official 
accounts limit the scope of an organised criminal’s identity to that of a 
one dimensional “criminal” drained of cultural context; something that 
might have numerous implications in terms of the important financial 
information that is available.37 
Similarly, as reflected upon by almost all researchers who have conducted 
interviews with organised criminals, such interviews have numerous 
limitations. There are issues of generalisability, and one can never be 
absolutely certain about validity, although cross-checking and member 
checking significantly contributed towards eliminating untruthful accounts. 
In addition, there is also the issue of representativeness of the sample. 
In many instances researchers used a method of snowballing sampling 
to identify participants, thus limiting the sample to the researcher’s own 
personal network and, as a consequence, the scope of the findings.38 
Finally, although media sources are used as sources of technical information 
about organised crime, they should be treated very cautiously for a 
variety of reasons. Not only do they most often refer to those cases 
which the authorities came across, thus ignoring cases of successful (non-
apprehended) organised criminals and/or uninterrupted schemes, but 
they also tend to present the issues relating to the actors of organised 
crime or the activity/market itself in a sensational and morally charged 
manner; something that has limited analytical value. Finally, sources like 
Lexis-Nexis (and other search engines) from which material is drawn, 
depend on the researcher providing keywords, a process which may lead 
to the exclusion of reports that are peripherally relevant but extremely 
important for the wider context of the study.39
Nevertheless, the methodological triangulation throughout the phases of 
the study, and the consultation of both official and unofficial sources of 
information has created a net that has captured what was identified as 
36 See J. Kinzig, Die rechtliche Bewältigung von Erscheinungsformen Organisierter Kriminalität (Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot, 2004); M. Levi, “The Making of the UK’s Organised Crime Control 
Policies”, in Organised Crime in Europe: Concepts, Patterns and Control Policies in the European Union 
and Beyond, ed. C. Fijnaut & Paoli, L. (Dordrecht: Springer, 2004), 823-51.
37 D. Hobbs and G. A. Antonopoulos, “How to Research Organised Crime”, in The Oxford 
Handbook of Organised Crime, ed. L. Paoli (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 96-117.
38 See S. Zhang and K.-L. Chin, Characteristics of Chinese Human Smugglers (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2004); M. Levi, “Qualitative Research on Elite Frauds, Ordinary Frauds 
and ‘Organized Crime’”, in Handbook of Qualitative Criminology, ed. M. Miller and Copes, H. 
(New York: Routledge, 2015), 215-35.
39 See Y. Jewkes, “The Media and Criminological Research”, in Doing Criminological Research, ed. 
P. Davies, P. Francis, and V. Jupp (London: Sage, 2011), 245-61.
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the most important aspects of organised crime financing, at least within 
what is plausibly known and verified.
The findings of the study have informed two levels of analysis presented 
in this report:
• a general overview of the financing of the cocaine market, the illegal 
tobacco market, and organised VAT fraud in Europe;
• national-level analyses of the three criminal markets in a number of 
countries. Specifically, the cocaine market and its financial aspects are 
covered in Bulgaria, Estonia,40 France,41 Greece, Italy, Spain, and the 
United Kingdom. The illegal tobacco trade is examined in Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Greece, Italy, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom. Organised VAT fraud is covered in Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Bulgaria, and Spain.
40 The reports on Estonia and Bulgaria have a bigger scope and focus on the drugs market in 
general.
41 The report on France focuses on cocaine and cannabis markets.
Consumption and supply of drugs are topics directly linked to both 
security and health issues at the European level. Both impact on EU 
relations with third countries directly (i.e. drug trafficking throughout 
Europe) and indirectly, in regard to the link between drug use and 
broader issues such as social stability, development, and the involvement 
of organised crime groups (OCGs). In regard to the latter, it has been 
estimated that about one third of all OCGS active in the EU are engaged 
in illicit drugs production and distribution; whereas the multi-billion 
drug markets remain particularly competitive and profitable for criminal 
entrepreneurs.42 For example, though this figure could not be tested, it 
has been argued that the income of the ‘Ndrangheta on a yearly basis 
is around €44 billion, 62% related to drug trafficking.43
In particular, the cocaine market is central to the global drug problem, 
representing one of the largest and most profitable markets, requiring an 
assessment of its patterns and dynamics. Thus, analysing the financing 
mechanisms behind cocaine trafficking could constitute a step further 
for counter action and prevention carried out by law enforcement and 
relevant institutions in the EU.
Cocaine powder (a hydrochloride salt, HCI) is manufactured from coca 
cultivated in the Andean-Amazonian region of South America, while the 
global production of coca is concentrated in three countries: Bolivia, 
Colombia and Peru. “Most indicators, including cultivation of coca bush, 
manufacture of cocaine, seizures of cocaine and prevalence estimates in 
the major consumer countries, suggest that in recent years the cocaine 
market has, on a whole, been declining. The finding reflects the situation 
in North America where the cocaine market declined significantly over 
the period 2006 – 2012, and, to a lesser extent, in Western and Central 
Europe, where the cocaine market appears to have stabilized following 
many years of growth.”44
Data available on coca bush cultivation and manufacture show a declining 
trend starting from 2010 and continuing up to 2012, driven mainly by 
declines in coca bush cultivation in Colombia (25% less in 2012 compared 
to 2011) and in the estimated production of cocaine (309 tonnes in 2012, 
the lowest level since 1996).45
42 Europol, SOCTA 2013. EU Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment.
43 Europol, Threat Assessment. Italian Organised Crime (The Hague, 2013).
44 UNODC, World Drug Report 2013 (Vienna, 2013), 37.
45 UNODC, World Drug Report 2014 (Vienna, 2014).
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For a time, North America, and Western and Central Europe have 
represented the two major consumer markets for cocaine and at present 
they account for about half of cocaine users globally. Nevertheless, in 
more recent years, “the extent of cocaine use seems to have been 
contained in both of these well-established markets.”46
Comparisons with estimates for previous years (2004 – 2005), underline 
an increase of the prevalence of cocaine consumption also in other 
EU and non EU markets such as Africa, Asia, Oceania, Latin America, 
Caribbean, Eastern and South-eastern Europe. In 2012, data show a 
stable trend in cocaine use which “remained high in North and South 
America (1.8% and 1.2% respectively), Oceania (1.5%) and Western 
and Central Europe (1%). While there has been an increase in cocaine 
use in North America (between 2011 and 2012) […], prevalence of 
cocaine in Western and Central Europe declined from an estimated 
1.3 per cent in 2010 to 1.0 per cent in 2012”47, due mainly to a slight 
decline in the largest consuming countries: Spain, Italy and the United 
Kingdom. 
These estimations are in line with 
data provided by EMCDDA48 at 
the European level. Generally, 
cocaine is considered to be 
the most commonly consumed 
illegal stimulant after cannabis, 
with prevalence in use of 
14.1 million or 4.2% of adults 
(15-64) during their lifetime; 
3.1 million or 0.9% of adults 
(15-64) in the last year and 
2.2 million or 1.7% of young 
adults (15-34) in the last year. 
With reference to the same 
young adult population (use in 
the last year) and the countries 
with the highest prevalence, a 
reduction in cocaine consump-
tion is registered, after a peak 
in 2008, in countries such as 
Denmark (2.4%), Italy (1.3%), 
Spain (3.6%) and the United 
Kingdom (3.3%). Conversely, 
an increase is underlined for 
countries such as France (1.9%) and Sweden (1.2%), especially starting 
from 2000.
46 UNODC, World Drug Report 2013, 38.
47 UNODC, World Drug Report 2014, 35.
48 EMCDDA, European Drug Report 2014. Trends and Developments.
Таble 2. countries with highest prevalence oF cocaine use in the eu
Country
Prevalence estimates – General population
Lifetime, adult
(15-64),%
Last 12 months, young 
adults (15-34),%
United Kingdom 9.0 3.3
Spain 8.8 3.6
Ireland 6.8 2.8
Denmark 5.2 2.4
Netherlands 5.2 2.4
Italy 4.2 1.3
France 3.7 1.9
Germany 3.4 1.6
European Union 4.2 1.7
Source: Authors’ elaboration on EMCDDA, European Drug Report 2014. Trends and 
Developments, 2014.
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In many cases, cocaine entering Europe is smuggled by sea using container 
shipments, or through deliveries by air or postal services, as well as using 
drug couriers (i.e. swallowers). A high percentage of the total volume of 
cocaine seized on the way to Western Europe was detected on board 
boats or vessels, hidden in freight or in vessels structure. While most 
cocaine arrives by sea, a large number of smaller shipments are detected 
at airports or in the post.
The number of interceptions of 
cocaine directed to Europe has 
increased since the mid-1990s, 
growing faster from 2004 to 
2007 and 2009, but declining 
since then. After a peak in 
seizures in 2006 (120 tonnes) – 
reflecting confiscations in Spain 
and Portugal – the total amount 
dropped to lower levels in 
2009, while stabilising around 
half of the amount of 2006 in 
the period 2010 – 2011.49
Cocaine seizures are higher in 
North America and in Western 
and Central Europe. In the 
latter regions, the amount 
of cocaine seized increased 
starting from 2009, reaching 
71 tonnes in 2012. Declines 
in the quantity of cocaine 
seized are higher in the 
Iberian Peninsula, particularly 
in Portugal (period 2006 – 
2007), and more gradually in 
Spain (2006 and 2011), while 
higher seizures of cocaine are 
reported in Belgium in 2012 
(19 tonnes) (Figure 2).
The quantity of cocaine seized 
in countries such as Finland, 
Latvia and Lithuania remained 
limited during the period 2010 – 2012, since they seem to serve as entry 
points for cocaine directed to the Russian Federation. In contrast, larger 
individual seizures were registered in the ports of Bulgaria, Romania and 
Greece.50
49 EMCDDA and Europol, EU Drug Markets Report. A Strategic Analysis (Luxembourg, 2013).
50 UNODC, World Drug Report 2014; EMCDDA, European Drug Report 2014. Trends and 
Developments.
1.2. MAIN ENtRY POINtS tO EUROPE: SEIZURES AND FlOWS
Figure 2. Quantity oF cocaine seized in soMe 
european countries, 2012
Source: Authors’ elaboration on EMCDDA, European Drug Report 2014. Trends and 
Developments.
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Although, due to the lack of data, accurately mapping the routes of 
cocaine trafficking is challenging, three main sea routes used by traffickers 
to import cocaine from South America to Europe have been identified: 
• Northern route that crosses the Caribbean and the Azores to reach 
Portugal and Spain; 
• Central route from South America through Cape Verde or Madeira 
and the Canary Islands; 
• African route starting in South America and reaching West Africa to 
direct cocaine mainly to Spain and Portugal (Figure 3).51
Besides the more traditional entry points of cocaine into Western and 
Central Europe (i.e. Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands and Belgium, acting 
also as countries for further distribution of cocaine), the Black Sea and the 
Balkans have become places for the diversification of cocaine trafficking 
routes. The slightly increasing number of interceptions in some countries 
of this area (i.e. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Romania, Greece, Slovakia and Turkey) during the period 2001 – 2011 
(from 0.1% to 1.8% respectively) underline the possibility of a diffusion 
of cocaine in countries previously almost unaffected.52
Greece represents a key entry point for cocaine directed to South-eastern 
Europe, and has some of the largest port seizures among all the countries 
51 UNODC, The Transatlantic Cocaine Market.
52 EMCDDA and Europol, EU Drug Markets Report. A Strategic Analysis.
Figure 3. global cocaine Flows, 1998 and 2008
Source: Authors’ elaboration on UNODC, The Transatlantic Cocaine Market (Vienna, 2011).
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in the region. Although, seizures have been on the decline (from 1 tonne 
in 2004, to 500 kg in 2011 and 200 kg in 2012), this trend does not 
correspond to a decline in cocaine trafficking due to the detection of 
laboratories for second extraction and the impact of the financial crisis. 
From Greece, traffickers have different options but official data suggest 
that they tend to follow a northward route through FYROM and Bulgaria. 
From Bulgaria, cocaine transits through Romania and Hungary to be 
further directed to Western and Central Europe. Indeed, trucks and 
personal cars transporting cocaine from Thessaloniki reportedly cross 
Bulgaria with the logistical support of local organised crime groups.
Cocaine also arrives at ports of the Black Sea (via transhipments) directed 
to Western Europe, as indicated by seizures in Constanta (Romania), 
Varna and Bourgas (Bulgaria) as well as at the Bulgarian port of Rousse 
on the Danube river. As for the South-eastern European countries on the 
Adriatic coast, as reported by international bodies and law enforcement 
in Italy, a key role seems to be exercised by the ports of Montenegro, 
Croatia and Slovenia which are used as hub for cocaine trafficking to 
Western Europe.53
Recent trends indicate that former communist countries around the Baltic 
Sea are becoming central points for cocaine trafficking as well, with 
seizures of cocaine in 2010 in the port of Riga (Latvia), port of Klaipeda 
(Lithuania) and Tallinn airport (Estonia). Although being occasional seizures, 
53 UNODC, The Illicit Drug Trade through South-Eastern Europe (Vienna, 2014).
Figure 4. general cocaine traFFicking routes in western 
and central europe
Source: Authors’ elaboration on UNODC, The Illicit Drug Trade through South-Eastern Europe (Vienna, 2014).
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the indication is that this area is already used for cocaine smuggling. 
Another feature of this recent development is the increasing use of 
Eastern Baltic nationals as couriers at the local level and in other areas 
of Europe and Latin America. The same trend has been registered in 
regard to the employment of Polish, Estonian and Lithuanian nationals 
for trafficking cocaine both in Europe and the Americas.54
The European cocaine market is dynamic and fragmented, involving the 
interplay of various OCGs that, in most cases, collaborate in a more or 
less stable way, as to carry out cocaine trafficking operations, sharing 
at the same time loads, risks and costs. The few studies conducted 
so far55 as well as the data from the country studies in the current 
report (Bulgaria, UK, Italy, Estonia, Spain, France, Greece) consistently 
underline the presence of fluid, horizontal and loose criminal networks 
within the European cocaine market that have replaced the traditional 
hierarchical organisations. The former, having high levels of flexibility 
and adaptability in regard to business opportunities and contingencies, 
are structured into independent nodes – connected by key individuals 
(brokers) – with specific roles and duties along the trafficking chain: 
managers coordinating group activities, persons organising logistics (recover 
and purchase of vehicles and equipment) or dealing with the recovery of 
drugs/money. Brokers are crucial, since in charge of connecting potential 
partners, buyers and suppliers, employees and employers and having 
skills of networking extremely functional to the cocaine business.56
Depending on the OCGs involved, relationships within networks may 
be based on ethnic, family, kinship, or friendship ties, useful to create 
business partnerships and acting at the same time as a guarantee of 
trust. The latter is fundamental for the smooth running of cocaine 
trafficking operations (Italy, Greece). Family bonds for example, are 
particularly important within Albanian and Italian OCGs; while friends 
and acquaintances can be either acquired during periods of detention 
54 EMCDDA and Europol, EU Drug Markets Report. A Strategic Analysis, 47.
55 J.S. Benson and S.H. Decker, “The Organisational Structure of International Drug Smuggling”, 
Journal of Criminal Justice 38 (2010): 130-38; Kenney, “The Architecture of Drug Trafficking: 
Network Forms of Organisation in Colombian Cocaine Trade”; F. Calderoni, “The Structure of 
Drug Trafficking Mafias: The ‘Ndrangheta and Cocaine”, Crime, Law and Social Change 58 (2012): 
321-49; P. Kostakos and G. A. Antonopoulos, “The ‘Good’, the ‘Bad’ and the ‘Charlie’: The 
Business of Cocaine Smuggling in Greece”, Global Crime 11, no. 1 (2010): 34-57; D. Zaitch, 
Trafficking Cocaine: Colombian Drug Entrepreneurs in the Netherlands (Studies of Organized Crime) 
(London: Springer, 2002); D. Zaitch, “From Cali to Rotterdam: Perceptions of Colombian 
Cocaine Traffickers on the Dutch Port”, Crime, Law and Social Change 38, no. 3 (2002): 239-66; 
N. Dorn, M. Levi, and L. King, Literature Review on Upper Level Drug Trafficking (Home Office 
Online Report 22/05, 2005); Matrix Knowledge Group, The Illicit Drug Trade in the United 
Kingdom; G. Pearson and D. Hobbs, Middle Market Drug Distribution, Home Office (London: 
Home Office, online report, 2001); F. Desroches, “Research on Upper Level Drug Trafficking: 
A Review”, Journal of Drug Issue 37 (2007): 827-44.
56 Kostakos and Antonopoulos, “The ‘Good’, the ‘Bad’ and the ‘Charlie’: The Business of 
Cocaine Smuggling in Greece”; Zaitch, Trafficking Cocaine: Colombian Drug Entrepreneurs in the 
Netherlands (Studies of Organized Crime); Europol, SOCTA 2013. EU Serious and Organized Crime 
Threat Assessment.
1.3. MARKEt StRUCtURE AND KEY ACtORS
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or encountered in the establishments of the “night-time economy” (Italy, 
UK, Greece, Estonia).
At present, several OCGs are involved in cocaine trafficking from the 
countries of origin in South America to Europe, resulting from the increased 
liberalisation of the cocaine market. Indeed, if on one side Colombian 
OCGs have become more fragmented into different partnerships, on the 
other some European groups have been able to settle as main importers 
and wholesalers serving both their national territories and other European 
countries.57 At the same time, the retail level, as underlined by some 
country study reports (France, Italy, UK) is more fragmented and is 
managed by both native and foreign criminal entrepreneurs. The same 
OCGs can act as importers and wholesalers and also sell cocaine as a 
retailer. Nevertheless, it is more common that the retail part is managed 
by foreign individuals that can be either competitive to local OCGs or 
recruited by them.
In regard to importation and wholesale (the high level of the trafficking 
business), three main factors have contributed to the involvement of 
certain European OCGs, which over time have become competitive 
actors to the more traditional importers such as the Colombians:
• the geographical position of the countries (in terms of trafficking 
routes) allowing the importation of cocaine almost directly, as well as 
the proximity to key cocaine markets;
• the establishment of trusted relationships with suppliers in South 
America (i.e. Colombians and Mexicans);
• the availability, ownership, and/or the control of strategic infrastructures 
and transit points (e.g. import-export companies, sea ports, customs) 
facilitating large-scale cocaine trafficking (Spain, Italy, Bulgaria).
In particular, Spanish and Italian OCGs have nowadays a well-established 
relationship with Colombians, who have been active in importing huge 
quantities of cocaine to countries such as Spain, the Netherlands, France 
and the United Kingdom.58 
In Spain, alliances have existed between Colombian and Spanish (i.e. 
Galician) OCGs since the initial phase of cocaine trafficking to Europe, 
facilitated by the similarity of language and culture and the expertise 
of Galician groups in other illegal smuggling activities (e.g. illicit tobacco 
trade). Colombians were used to import cocaine in shipping containers 
from Venezuela, Brazil or the Caribbean countries, being in charge of 
production, while Venezuelans took care of transportation and Spanish 
groups of transferring the cocaine to the coast. Nowadays the situation 
has changed and Colombians are well settled into the local cocaine 
market, controlling the global supply chain (Spain).
Similarly, Italian organised crime groups (especially the ‘Ndrangheta and 
Camorra) hold trusted and stable relationships with South Americans 
57 EMCDDA and Europol, EU Drug Markets Report. A Strategic Analysis.
58 Ibid.
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(Colombian and Mexican cartels) to import huge quantities of cocaine 
(from several kilos to tonnes via container shipments) to be further 
distributed to other European countries and throughout the territory of 
Italy. “In 2007, the Camorra located in Naples, was reported to have 
begun trafficking cocaine to Italy from Spain, as well as directly from 
South America. [Both Camorra and the ‘Ndrangheta] are most heavily 
involved in the Italian cocaine trade. More recently, the Sicilian Mafia 
has also got involved, getting support from [these groups] to bring 
cocaine into the areas under its control.”59 Nevertheless, among Italian 
OCGs, the ‘Ndrangheta is considered to be the strongest and most 
competitive group, since benefitting from ramifications almost worldwide 
(due to the presence of family members and affiliates), exercising a 
quasi-monopolistic position within the European and international 
cocaine market (Italy).
Serbian-Montenegrin OCGs have a similar role as they have recently 
started to be involved in large-scale cocaine trafficking operations at the 
EU level. Cocaine is imported from the Southern Cone countries in South 
America to the Balkans, exploiting legal commercial routes, and from 
there throughout Europe. In particular, these groups have established 
contacts in the supply countries, managing their own trafficking networks 
and investing profits in the legal economy of the Western Balkans and 
other EU countries. Among Eastern OCGs, the Bulgarians have turned 
more recently into large-scale cocaine importers from South America to 
Western Europe, and in some cases through joint ventures with Spanish, 
Italian, Colombian and Greek criminal entrepreneurs.60
The main transportation method in large-scale cocaine trafficking 
operations is in shipping containers followed by road transportation, 
especially within EU. This way, cocaine is hidden in various commercial 
products or in the structure of containers or trucks. In many cases, 
OCGs own legitimate businesses associated with logistics, transportation, 
import and export of various commercial products (France, Bulgaria, Italy, 
Greece, Spain). 
On a smaller scale, cocaine is trafficked with commercial flights from 
South America reaching major airports within EU. In this case methods 
include either hiding cocaine in luggage, as it occurs for example with 
Estonian couriers, or transporting it via drug mules (i.e. swallowers).61 
The latter are particularly used by African OCGs (i.e. mainly Nigerians), 
that import lesser quantities of cocaine employing numerous drug 
mules. West Africans have settled in several EU cocaine markets (UK, 
France, Germany, Switzerland, Spain, Italy and Portugal), while managing 
importation of cocaine in virtue of contacts with South Americans and 
links with European groups (e.g. Balkan and Italian OCGs) located in 
West African countries. 62
59 UNODC, The Transatlantic Cocaine Market, 40.
60 EMCDDA and Europol, EU Drug Markets Report. A Strategic Analysis.
61 See also J.P. Caulkins, H. Burnett, and E. Leslie, “How Illegal Drugs Enter an Island Country: 
Insights From Interviews with Incarcerated Offenders”, Global Crime 10 (2009): 66-93.
62 UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa: A Threat Assessment (Vienna, 2013).
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Although the cocaine market at the EU level is fragmented into the 
interplay of different actors, common financing patterns can be underlined. 
First, the need in most cases is to have some start-up capital to enter 
the cocaine business; second, the coexistence of legal and illegal sources 
of financing that are invested to arrange cocaine trafficking at all levels 
of the operation (high/medium/low segments); third, the importance 
of social capital, in other words the relations with trusted individuals 
acting as guarantors of cocaine transactions on the side of buyers and 
suppliers; finally, the presence, especially at the high level, of financial 
joint ventures, in which different criminal groups participate in cocaine 
trafficking operations providing part of the total amount needed (Italy, 
Bulgaria, UK, Spain).
Sources of capital
Sources of capital to initiate and sustain cocaine trafficking operations are 
flexible, diverse and mutating, and depend on the circumstances, quality 
of contacts and the level of operation of criminal entrepreneurs. In the 
majority of cases, entering the market is facilitated by social capital. 
This way, it is possible to gradually acquire credibility, and money to be 
reinvested into subsequent cocaine deals. 
Trusted contacts or intermediaries in virtue of ethnic ties, family or 
friendship bonds are of higher importance at the lower levels of the 
trafficking chain as they allow entrepreneurs to receive cocaine on 
credit. This seems also to be valid in particular circumstances involving 
large scale cocaine smuggling (Italy, UK). It is the case, for example, 
of the ‘Ndrangheta which at first exploited previous contacts gained 
through heroin trafficking during the 1990s, and built their credibility as 
reliable and solvent traffickers at the national and international level, thus 
being able at present to import huge quantities of cocaine without any 
payment in advance.
Nevertheless, the most common source of financing is illegal capital 
acquired either from cocaine trafficking or other criminal activities, with 
the latter related to the level at which criminal entrepreneurs operate. In 
particular, lower segments usually finance cocaine deals through minor 
crimes such as robberies, thefts, burglaries; while medium/high segments 
perpetrate more risky and highly profitable activities ranging from extortion 
racket, loansharking, sexual exploitation and prostitution to tobacco 
smuggling and human trafficking (Italy, UK, Estonia, France, Greece).
In both cases, acquired capital is reinvested into subsequent cocaine 
trafficking operations as well as into the legal economy. Indeed, especially 
high level criminal entrepreneurs run legitimate businesses that may 
represent a source of financing of cocaine trafficking as well as means to 
launder the profits gained (Italy, UK, Spain, Estonia, France, Greece). For 
instance, a criminal group involved in the importation of large amounts 
of cocaine into the UK via Spain and Amsterdam relied not only on 
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cocaine trafficking but also on manufacturing and supplying amphetamine, 
cannabis cultivation, with some individuals holding legitimate companies 
such as fitting centres, fruit and vegetable shops, hotels, public houses. 
As a result, a net differentiation among sources of financing of cocaine 
trafficking appears particularly difficult, as underlined by the country 
reports (Italy, Bulgaria, UK).
At the same time, legitimate and illegal funds loaned by external financiers 
represent another source of capital to enter the cocaine business. Legal 
entrepreneurs investing capital for a share of the profits but remaining 
outside the trafficking operations, individuals using personal savings, or 
money borrowed from friends are just some examples (Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Greece, UK). 
Raising capital is, in most cases, managed among more OCGs or families/
clans of a same OCG in the form of financial joint ventures present at 
all levels of the cocaine market, although more common in regard to 
high level criminal entrepreneurs dealing with the importation of huge 
quantities of cocaine. The reason for such practices is in the opportunity 
to share among partners the risks related to cocaine trafficking operations, 
but also to secure additional financing if needed (Italy, Bulgaria).
Settlement of payments
In addition to functioning as a start-up means for entering the cocaine 
business, social capital is also fundamental when settling payments by 
allowing cocaine deals to go ahead even if criminal entrepreneurs have 
at their disposal less money than needed (Estonia, Italy, Bulgaria, UK, 
Spain, France).63
Cash up-front appears to be the preferred way to settle cocaine 
payments (e.g. purchase prices are lower), especially at the initial phase 
of business relationships among criminal entrepreneurs since trust has 
yet to be built. This way, cash functions as a guarantee of the deal 
(cocaine is delivered after the payment) and the use of hostages as 
collateral is avoided (Italy, Bulgaria, Spain, Estonia, France). Three main 
recurrent methods for settling payments of cocaine have emerged in 
regard to the majority of OCGs and criminal groups operating at the 
EU level: advanced payment, revolving credit and multistep payment 
arrangements.
Advanced payment. This scheme involves mainly large-scale cocaine 
trafficking operations, regarding agreements between producers/importers 
and wholesalers. Buyers proceed with a payment in advance and receive 
the load of cocaine later, under a rule which is usually 50% payment 
(France, Bulgaria, Italy, Estonia). 
The sum paid in advance functions as a guarantee of the commitment of 
buyers and is used to cover costs of transportation and other expenses 
63 See also L Korsell, D Vesterhav, and J Skinnari, “Human Trafficking and Drug Distribution in 
Sweden from a Market Perspective – Similarities and Differences”, Trends in Organized Crime 14, 
no. 2-3 (2011): 100-124.
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(e.g. bribes to officials). Furthermore, it ensures a kind of loyalty: the 
customer will more likely return to the same supplier acquiring a new 
quantity of cocaine. Similarly, in smaller scale trafficking operations, 
drug couriers or drug mules for example, usually receive part of the 
payment for their services in advance and then receive the rest after the 
consignment of the drug (Bulgaria). 
Revolving credit. In this arrangement cocaine is paid once part or the 
whole load is sold by the buyers. When trust is well-established and 
business relationships well-tested, this settlement of payments is used 
among criminal entrepreneurs involved in large scale cocaine trafficking 
operations. In exceptional cases, the drug can be delivered also on full 
credit, as it occurs with the ‘Ndrangheta in virtue of its strong credibility 
within the international cocaine market (Italy). At the same time, revolving 
credit represents the most common form of payment at the lower levels 
of the trafficking chain (Estonia). Indeed, street dealers (either employed 
in cocaine markets controlled by OCGs or in not controlled areas) 
receive cocaine on credit, being compelled to repay the sum of money 
earned in a short time (Estonia, Italy). 
Multistep payment arrangements. In general, these arrangements are 
used by large-scale cocaine traffickers where payments between buyers 
and suppliers are accomplished in different phases and are carried 
out via bank or cash transfers (involving also certain money laundering 
operations) (e.g. in Bulgaria). A typical case is provided in the chapter 
on cocaine trafficking in Greece in this report, where the payment of 
between 1.5 and 3.2 tonnes of cocaine amounted to $4,100,000 and was 
paid in three stages:
• at the first stage it was paid an amount of $1,350,000 before the 
loading of cocaine; 
• at the second stage, an amount of $1,350,000 was paid as for the 
delivery and transiting of cocaine; 
• at the third stage, another $1,400,000 was paid after the delivery of 
the loads at the final destination and as a bonus for the success of 
the trafficking operation.
 
Payments of cocaine are made mainly in cash. It is the most used 
method of payment since it is less risky compared to financial 
transactions that could be intercepted (Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, UK, 
France, Spain). Indeed, some interviewed experts (Italy, Greece) have 
argued that traffickers prefer euros to dollars, as the former is available 
in high denomination notes which is extremely functional to cross 
border transportations. Cash payments require money couriers who 
are particularly trustworthy and who are not involved in the cocaine 
trafficking operations (Italy, Greece). Cash is transported by cars, trucks, 
airplanes, concealed in bags, false bottoms, and in most cases through 
means of transportation used for cocaine. It can be delivered directly 
to either producers/suppliers in South America or to their intermediaries 
located in other European countries, which in turn are in charge of the 
final delivery (Italy).
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Non-cash settlement of payments – usually used by criminal entrepreneurs 
in small-scale trafficking operations – rely on money transfers (Western 
Union, etc.) (Bulgaria, Greece, Italy) or compensation-type money transfers 
such as the hawala (Spain, Italy). The former allows multiple transactions 
of money on a daily basis by different individuals, kept below the 
amount limit imposed by law and guaranteeing the anonymity of senders. 
The latter is based on a network of intermediaries located in different 
countries with no tangible traces of money transactions, which are settled 
and communicated to hawaladars using small papers (Italy, Spain). 
Legitimate means are also used for cocaine payments. In this case, 
transactions occur between legal companies or registered shell companies, 
and are possible when cocaine is smuggled concealed in container 
shipments with other commercial products (Spain, Italy, Bulgaria). 
Payments are also settled with valuable goods or services both at the high 
and low levels of the trafficking chains (Greece, Italy, Bulgaria, Estonia). 
For example, stolen products or gold and diamonds can be offered. At 
the same time, in kind payment occur as well, with reference to cases 
where services (e.g. transportation, recruitment) are paid with part of the 
cocaine smuggled (Estonia, Bulgaria). An example is when suppliers offer 
a kilo of cocaine and, in turn, receive a number of couriers (Estonia). In 
general, this practice that can take different forms, seems to allow the 
sharing of risks linked to the trafficking operation among players; while 
decreasing the possibility of money to be intercepted by law enforcement 
(Bulgaria). It is not currently possible to know in what proportions of the 
illicit trade such barter arrangements exist.
When OCGs operate at the high level of the cocaine market and via 
trusted relationships with suppliers, retaliation is not the rule since new 
agreements may take place. Nevertheless, in many cases, especially at lower 
levels insolvent buyers as well as their family members can face serious 
consequences (Estonia, UK, Italy). As indicated in the chapter on Estonia, 
criminal entrepreneurs at first apply various sanctions, especially financial 
ones, amounting to around 20% of interest rate for the operation. 
Costs of doing business
There are variations in the costs sustained by OCGs and criminal groups in 
organising cocaine trafficking operations that depend on several factors: 
• the price at which cocaine is purchased in the producing countries 
underlying the importance of the quantity acquired and the type 
of relationship with suppliers (i.e. the larger the quantity purchased 
the lesser the price per unit; well-established relations vs. occasional 
operations);
• the place in which the drug is purchased at the wholesale level (i.e. 
South America vs. European countries);
• the scale of the trafficking operations and the logistic employed/
required (i.e. number of actors involved, means of transport);
• the level at which criminal entrepreneurs operate within each local 
market.
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The average price per kilo of cocaine at the wholesale level in the 
producing countries (i.e. cocaine of unknown quality in Peru) in 2010 
was estimated by UNODC64 at $947, while coca paste (farm-gate price) 
at $784. Prices have started to increase from 2006, while decreasing to 
lower levels in 2010. These estimations are in line with prices reported 
by the country studies in the current report, with purchase price of 1 
kilo of cocaine in South America ranging between €600 to €3,000 (UK, 
Italy, Greece), although also higher prices were found (Spain).
If cocaine is acquired at the wholesale level in any EU country, final 
prices per kilo are particularly higher and increase in respect to the 
number of passages cocaine has undergone along the trafficking chain 
(i.e. logistics), the place in which criminal entrepreneurs buy the drug (e.g. 
in South America or any EU country managing the whole importation 
process, or in their native country from another criminal group that has 
imported cocaine), and purity (around 90% at the wholesale level) (Italy, 
UK, France). For example, a retail dealer in Bulgaria would need €4,000-
€9,000 start-up capital to buy 100-200 grams of cocaine.
Countries with the highest wholesale prices of cocaine per kilo in 201065 
were the UK ($76,897), Greece and Finland ($59,612), Italy ($53,593), 
Germany ($53,496) and Switzerland ($52,554), followed by Spain ($45,034) 
and France ($39,741). More recent estimates from the country reports 
underline quite different wholesale prices per kilo of cocaine: €40,000-
€53,000 in the United Kingdom; €40,000-€45,000 in Bulgaria; €36,000-
€44,000 in Italy; €32,000-€34,000 in Spain; €40,000-€50,000 in Greece 
and €30,000 in France.
Besides costs sustained by criminal entrepreneurs in purchasing cocaine 
in South America or in other EU countries, other costs at the importation 
and wholesale levels involve human and material resources that vary. 
If the import-export company is owned by traffickers, or cocaine is 
imported using the “rip-on, rip-off”66 method, costs are lower and mainly 
related to the transportation of cocaine within the EU. If the traffickers 
need to open a new commercial channel (i.e. cocaine trafficking route) 
expenses rise since several containers with legal merchandise need to be 
sent first (Italy, France, UK, Greece). 
Although there are cost differences among the studied countries in 
respect to the structure of each national cocaine market, there are also 
common features. These reflect the role and importance of individuals 
within the trafficking chain and consist mainly in fees-for-services (i.e. 
sum of money or percentages on the value of the load recovered/
transported), rather than regular salaries (the only exception to this rule 
can be found at the retail level, as explained below). Furthermore, in-
kind payments do not represent a usual method for members/employees 
remunerations, except at the high levels and when a cocaine business is 
64 UNODC, World Drug Report 2012 (Vienna: UNODC, 2012), 40.
65 UNODC, World Drug Report 2012. Statistical Annex. Prices (Vienna: UNODC, 2012), 1.
66 The method “rip-off, rip-on” consists in sending cocaine in bags introduced in container 
shipments with the support of accomplishes in charge of inserting the drug at departure and 
extracting it at destination.
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at the initial phase. Bribes paid to officials emerge as a common expense 
needed to ensure the success of the trafficking operations.67 Overall, 
costs can include the following:
• transhipment services: €10,000 to set up an import-export company 
or $1,500,000 to create a maritime company (Italy, Greece); payments 
to complicit legal entrepreneurs owning import-export companies at 
30% of the value of the load at the EU price or €50,000 for each 
supply; transhipment service costing €10,000 per container (Italy).
• Drug brokers: earning from 3-4% up to 10% of the value of the load 
at the EU price (Italy).
• Drug couriers: these individuals can be paid per trip with cash 
or with a percentage on the value of transported loads (at the EU 
wholesale price). Prices of couriers may range from €600-€1,300 per 
job (UK) to €4,000-€6,000 per kilo transported within EU (Italy).
• Drug mules: swallowers are paid per trip with travel and accommodation 
expenses covered at about €2,000/€3,000 (Bulgaria, Italy), so that an 
OCG operating with 10-15 drug mules has to secure around €18,000-
€22,000.
• Money counters and collectors: they may receive €400 to €650 per 
day or 2-3% of an international transaction (UK).
• Money couriers: earning around €1,000 (salary and expenses) per 
trip (UK).
• Bribes to officials are lower in the producing countries and usually 
between €1,000 and €5,000 per load (Italy, France), and higher in 
EU destination/transit countries, €10,000 per container (Italy).
• Fees for protection: in order to ensure the security of the trafficking 
operations and the recovering of cocaine in the destination countries, 
traffickers may need to pay fees to other OCGs, in the form of a 
share of profits of the deal at around 10% (Estonia).
Once cocaine is imported, OCGs encounter other costs related to the 
management of the retail level, including fees to individuals in charge of 
storing the drug or cutting and packaging the doses, paying street dealers 
or couriers delivering cocaine to the former, while in some cases covering 
also expenses for gasoline, mobile telephone cards, etc. (Bulgaria, Italy). 
In cocaine markets which are under the control of OCGs, as in Italy, 
street dealers receive prepared cocaine doses and they are paid with 
regular salaries, facing no particular expenses. At the same time, other 
costs (on a monthly basis) are related to running cocaine markets such 
as paying chemists for cutting cocaine (€10,000), warehouse keepers 
(€7,500), armed sentinels (€6,000), money collectors (€10,000-€15,000), 
street dealers (between €2,000-€6,000 depending on the location).68
Profits, profit sharing and investments
Drug trafficking clearly constitutes the largest income for OCGs operating 
worldwide and cocaine trafficking plays a key role in this. Nowadays, 
67 See also Korsell, Vesterhav, and Skinnari, “Human Trafficking and Drug Distribution in Sweden 
from a Market Perspective – Similarities and Differences”.
68 These estimations are based on a sample of three Italian markets located respectively in 
Scampia and Afragola – neighbourhoods of the city of Naples and the city of Bari.
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the value of the global cocaine market appears to be lower than it was 
during the 1990s, when prices were much higher and the US market 
was strong. There is significant dispute over estimates of the size and 
economic value/profits from drugs markets, especially outside the US. In 
1995, the global market was estimated at $165 billion, a value that was 
reduced by over a half by 2009. In particular, in the same year, both 
North America and Western and Central Europe registered 86% of the 
total amount of the global cocaine market, respectively 47% and 39%. 
Indeed, whilst the North American market narrowed over the last two 
decades, the European one has expanded. “Nonetheless, the US market 
remains the largest globally, but the market of the countries of Western 
and Central Europe ($33 billion at retail level in 2009) is – in economic 
terms – now nearly as large as the US market ($37 billion in 2009).”69 
Furthermore, in 2009, out of the $85 billion in income from global 
cocaine retail sales, traffickers were estimated to have gained some 
$84 billion (99%). In particular, the “largest gross profits were reaped 
from cocaine sales in North America (around $34 billion), followed by 
countries of West and Central Europe (around $23 billion).”70
The percentages of profits vary and increase throughout the trafficking 
chain. Farmers in the Andean region take 1% of the proceeds from the 
cocaine sales in Europe, while OCGs that ship the cocaine from this 
69 UNODC, World Drug Report 2011 (Vienna, 2011), 124.
70 Ibid., 125.
Таble 3. estiMates oF gross proFits Made by cocaine traFFickers 
by region, 2009
Region billion $ as% of GDP
South America, Central America, Caribbean local market 3 0.1
Export to North America* 6 0.2
Export to Europe** 9 0.3
Subtotal South America, Central America, Caribbean 18 0.6
North America (USA, Mexico, Canada) 34 0.2
West and Central Europe (EU-25 and EFTA) 23 0.1
West and Central Africa (local demand and export to EU 0.8 0.2
Other 8 0.04
total trafficking profits 84*** 0.1
       * Trafficking from producing areas in the Andean region to Mexico.
      ** All trafficking to transit countries ($4.9 billion) and from transit countries to Europe ($6.1 billion) of which 70% ($4.3 billion) 
is assumed to generated by trafficking groups from South America and the Caribbean; gross profits for trafficking to Europe 
are higher as prices in Spain (the main entry point to Europe) are much higher than prices in Mexico (the main entry point 
into North America).
     *** The difference between the total size of the global cocaine market ($85 billion) and gross trafficking profits ($84 billion) is 
income of farmers; farmers are estimated to earn less than $1 billion.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on UNODC, World Drug Report 2011.
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area to entry points (usually Spain) gain 25% of the final sales value. A 
further 17% is produced in shipping the cocaine from the entry points 
to the wholesalers in the final destinations located in Europe. The 
highest profit is gained in the destination countries. In 2009, “expressed 
as a proportion of GDP, the cocaine profits were rather small (0.2% of 
GDP in North America and 0.1% in West and Central Europe). Profits 
from international trafficking to North America and Europe [amounted] 
to some $15 billion, [and] cocaine-related profits generated in South 
America, Central America and the Caribbean from trafficking cocaine to 
North America and West and Central Europe amounted to some $18 
billion, equivalent to 0.6% of the total GDP of South America, Central 
America and Caribbean”.71
Huge profits are made by OCGs due to significant differences in the 
costs of purchasing and price of selling of cocaine that exist between 
South America and EU countries. For instance, when cocaine is imported 
to the UK – costing around €2,700 per kilo in South America, €10,400 
in the Caribbean, €41,000 at the wholesale and €70,000 at the retail 
levels in the UK – mark-ups are respectively 550%, 280%, 292% and 
89%. Nevertheless, profits margins may depend on several factors – 
availability of cocaine in a given market, the retail prices (which differ 
among EU markets), quantity acquired, quality of the drug (i.e. level of 
purity), and risks taken/encountered (seizures and arrests) (UK, France, 
Italy, Bulgaria).
Mark-ups are fairly consistent at the higher levels of the operations 
(i.e. importation and wholesale) while decreasing along the trafficking 
chain (Italy, UK, Estonia, Bulgaria). At the retail level, profit margins are 
mainly related to cutting cocaine (if acquired at a good level of purity) 
but still remain low (Italy, UK, Bulgaria). Examples provided by criminal 
entrepreneurs selling cocaine at this level include €1,300 per month at 
the peaking of cocaine deals (UK) and higher revenue of €10,000 selling 
140 grams per week (Bulgaria).
Profits are not distributed equally to all members but depend on the 
role and the position within networks and the risk taken within cocaine 
trafficking operations. Thus, drug brokers or traffickers that invest capital, 
in charge respectively of contacting suppliers, organising the logistics and 
transportation on one side and financing the operations on the other, 
receive high shares (Italy, Greece). Revenues are also divided among 
OCGs according to their initial investments; while other individuals 
(mainly employees such as couriers, drivers, drug mules) are paid with 
lump sums per service provided (UK, Italy). 
How profits are invested depends on their scale: criminal entrepreneurs 
operating at the retail level, gaining lower revenues, use them for 
personal expenses (e.g. luxury items, lavish life style, gambling) or to 
acquire further quantities of cocaine, keeping at the same time part of 
the money aside (Bulgaria, Italy, UK). At higher levels (importation and 
wholesale), investments are more diversified. In most cases, part of the 
71 Ibid.
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profits is used to finance subsequent cocaine trafficking operations as 
well as other criminal activities, such as tobacco smuggling, trafficking 
of other drugs (e.g. cannabis, amphetamines), human trafficking, arms 
trafficking, loan sharking. Part of the revenues is also invested into the 
legitimate economy through different money laundering techniques (Italy, 
Bulgaria, Spain).
Investments are made in real estate (e.g. hotels, pubs, restaurants, discos, 
shopping centres, logistics, etc.) or legitimate companies; some of these 
are used in cocaine trafficking, as for example import-export companies, 
shipping companies, etc., and to continue laundering profits (Italy, Greece, 
Bulgaria). In this regard, legal entrepreneurs in financial difficulties 
became particularly vulnerable to OCGs due to the economic crisis. 
Indeed, the latter offer loans at high interest rates as to acquire gradually 
a business with a solid reputation and history, since the legitimate 
owners, sooner or later, will not be able to repay back the accumulated 
debts (Italy, Spain). In some cases “a merger is proposed […] with the 
aim of isolating and de facto excluding from any decisional function the 
partner in difficulty, at the same time exploiting his good name and 
honest face”.72
In general, in the acquisition of legal assets a key role is exercised by 
complicit individuals that may range from straw men, family members to 
whom the properties are registered to professionals such as bankers and 
lawyers who facilitate the entering of proceeds into the legal system as 
well as their further use (Italy, Bulgaria).
Access to capital in critical moments
Critical moments – members or employees arrested, seizures of loads or 
stealing by competitors – have a lot in common with the initial stages 
of operation in terms of financing needs (Bulgaria, Italy, Estonia, UK). 
Criminal entrepreneurs at the high level need to ensure the safety of 
trafficking (fees to competitive OCGs, bribes to officials), and need to 
ensure consistent funding to continue the cocaine business. Financial 
resources are indeed invested in legal businesses/properties that may 
serve as substitute capital, while cash is also moved into off-shore bank 
accounts, or bank and/or home-made safe deposit boxes (Italy, Greece, 
Bulgaria). 
In case of arrest of high level OCGs members, detention seems not 
always to function as a deterrent or incapacitation. Indeed, criminal 
entrepreneurs may still run the trafficking directly from prison via third 
persons (e.g. family members, affiliates, trusted accomplices). Furthermore, 
it is even more likely that new contacts useful for future cocaine trafficking 
operations would be established. When affiliates or external employees 
are arrested, the coverage of expenses related to legal assistance as well 
as family maintenance is guaranteed so as to obtain silence and loyalty 
(Greece, Italy, UK). 
72 Europol, Threat Assessment. Italian Organised Crime, 16.
46 Financing	oF	organised	crime
Social capital can help people re-enter the cocaine business. Criminal 
entrepreneurs (usually middle-low segments) can receive the drug on 
revolving credit or loans from other OCGs to be paid back at some 
percentage of interest (Italy, Bulgaria, Spain). For example, a UK trafficker 
was jailed for six years. Once out, he started to buy cocaine on credit 
from an old associate, although at first at a higher price. But, when 
trusted relationships are lacking, the possibility to restart cocaine deals 
is acquired by committing minor crimes (e.g. thefts, robberies), providing 
services (e.g. transportation) or selling/exchanging personal assets (e.g. 
cars) (UK, Italy). Overall, despite critical moments, at all levels of the 
cocaine market criminal entrepreneurs seem to be able to continue with 
their criminal activity without facing particular problems.
The illegal trade in tobacco products is a manifestation of organised crime 
with a long history that has only relatively recently begun to receive 
academic and law enforcement attention. The following four schemes 
characterise the illegal tobacco trade over the last three decades: 
• Bootlegging – buying an amount of cigarettes and tobacco that 
exceeds customs regulations. Bootlegging schemes, which abuse cross-
border shopping, involve individual entrepreneurs and small groups of 
entrepreneurs smuggling small quantities of cigarettes and/or tobacco 
while visiting other countries with relatively cheaper cigarettes.73 
According to the European Commission,74 approximately one-third of 
EU citizens who travelled to another EU country in 2008 returned 
with cigarettes of a lower price, with over 60% of Irish, British and 
French travellers engaging in the process. There is no indication as to 
the extent to which these cigarettes were re-sold on the black market 
(as opposed to being bought for personal consumption), however, 
the aforementioned figures are indicative of the extent to which the 
phenomenon of cigarette bootlegging is involved in a process of 
decentralisation. 
• large-scale smuggling of untaxed tobacco products diverted from the 
licit international market. This type of smuggling is dependent upon 
an interaction with legal businesses who (wittingly or unwittingly) 
participate. This scheme is, therefore, embedded in legitimate business 
processes.75
• Counterfeiting is the manufacturing of fake tobacco products. A 
significant source country for counterfeit cigarettes destined for the 
EU market is China. After aggressive and effective crackdowns against 
cigarette smuggling and domestic distribution channels, the Chinese 
illegal cigarette industry shifted to exporting large numbers of counterfeit 
Western brand cigarettes to black markets abroad. This included 
targeting markets in the EU, most notably the UK. China emerged as 
a leading supplier of counterfeit cigarettes in the EU and beyond as 
a result of the contradictions of their economic reform process and 
of external licit and illicit forces that worked together toward opening 
up the Chinese tobacco sector to the outside world.76 Moreover, 
73 See R Hornsby and D Hobbs, “A Zone of Ambiguity. The Political Economy of Cigarette 
Bootlegging”, British Journal of Criminology, no. 47 (2007): 551-71.
74 European Commission, Survey on Tobacco. Flash Eurobarometer (Brussels, 2009).
75 K. von Lampe, “The Trafficking of Untaxed Cigarettes in Germany”, in Upperworld and Underworld 
in Cross-Border Crime2, ed. P. van Duyne, K. von Lampe, and N. Passas (Nijmegen: WLP, 2002), 
141-61.
76 A. Shen, G. A. Antonopoulos, and K. von Lampe, “The Dragon Breathes Smoke’: Cigarette 
Counterfeiting in the People’s Republic of China’”, British Journal of Criminology 50, no. 2 (2010): 
239-58; K. von Lampe et al., “The Changing Role of China in the Global Illegal Cigarette 
Trade”, International Criminal Justice Review 22, no. 1 (2012): 43-67.
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in recent years there have been reports about counterfeit cigarettes 
being produced in countries such as Ukraine, Poland, Bulgaria, Spain, 
and Greece, and closer to destination markets within the EU.
• Other sources include legally manufactured cigarettes which are 
stolen from legal premises (retail markets, supermarkets, kiosks etc.) 
before they are introduced into the illegal market77 and online sales 
of legally produced tobacco products. Furthermore, a significant 
phenomenon has emerged relatively recently, which involves legally 
produced tobacco products manufactured in the free zones of Eastern 
and South Eastern Europe, UAE, Malaysia and South Africa, that are 
readily available to illegal marketers (also known as “illicit whites”). 
The most known case in the European market is that of Jin Ling, a 
brand legally manufactured in the free zone of Kaliningrad (Russia), yet 
destined for the EU illegal market. With packaging resembling that of 
Camel, Jin Ling is one of the most seized brands in the EU.78 
A variety of methods have been employed in an attempt to quantify 
the illegal trade in tobacco products in Europe. They include customs 
seizure data, smoker surveys, empty pack and cigarette butt collection 
analyses, household surveys relating to the consumption of tobacco 
products and governmental and trade monitoring data.79 These various 
data sets highlight a great deal of diversity relating to illegally traded 
tobacco markets and consumption patterns across different EU countries. 
For example, in Latvia there is a 28.8% illicit share of the overall tobacco 
products national market present, whereas in Slovakia only 1.7% of the 
overall national market is made up of illegal tobacco products. The EU-27 
average is 10.5% (Figure 5),80 which is slightly lower than the global illicit 
trade (11.6%).81
The share of contraband and counterfeit cigarettes in the EU increased 
by 60.8% between 2006 and 2010.82 The most important reasons 
for this were considered to be the increase in excise rates, alongside 
VAT and special consumption taxation in several countries which – 
in light of the reduction in the public’s buying power (particularly 
after the economic recession in the Eurozone in 2008) – led to a 
77 G. A. Antonopoulos, “Cigarette Smuggling: A Case Study of a Smuggling Network in Greece”, 
European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 14, no. 3 (2006): 239-55.
78 S. Candea et al., “Made to Be Smuggled”, in Tobacco Underground, ed. ICIJ (Washington D.C.: 
Centre for Public Integrity, 2009), 13-24.
79 See F. Calderoni, “A New Method for Estimating the Illicit Cigarette Market at the Subnational 
Level and Its Application to Italy”, Global Crime 15, no. 1/2 (2014): 51-76.
80 KPMG, A Study of the Illicit Cigarette Market in the European Union. 2013 Results.
81 L. Joossens et al., How Eliminating the Global Illicit Cigarette Trade Would Increase Tax Revenue and 
Save Lives (Paris: IUTLD, 2009); see also L Joossens and M Raw, “From Cigarette Smuggling to 
Illicit Tobacco Trade”, Tobacco Control 21 (2012): 230-34. For a general review of evidence, see 
P. Reuter and M. Majmundar (eds.), Understanding the U.S. Illicit Tobacco Market: Characteristics, 
Policy Context, and Lessons from the International Experience, (Washington D.C.: National Academies 
Press, 2015).
82 KPMG, Project Star. 2010 Results, 2011.
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sudden decline in consumer affordability. In addition, according to 
the available evidence, inflows from non-EU countries accounted for 
the bulk of illegally traded cigarettes in Mediterranean and Eastern 
border European Union member states.83 There was also a further 
small increase (0.6%) from 2010 to 2013.84 However, in subsequent 
years significant and varied changes in the consumption levels of illicit 
tobacco products (specifically cigarettes) have been noted in different 
countries, with some countries presenting increases and other decreases 
in consumption (Table 4). 
The aforementioned figures 
need to be treated cautiously. 
Illegal markets involve economic 
activities that are intended to go 
unnoticed and thus unrecorded 
in the official statistics. Although 
some data are produced and 
presented here, a number of 
factors might have skewed the 
statistics. For example, the 
intensity and success/failure of 
law enforcement operations or 
the weakness of the methods 
adopted to collect data impact 
on the figures. Therefore, measu-
83 Ibid.
84 KPMG, A Study of the Illicit Cigarette Market in the European Union. 2013 Results.
Таble 4. changes in the consuMption oF contraband and counterFeit 
cigarettes in select eu countries, 2013 coMpared to 2012
Source: KPMG, A Study of the Illicit Cigarette Market in the European Union. 2013 Results.
Country Increase% Country Decrease%
Greece +4.4 United Kingdom -6.2
Hungary +3.9 Italy -3.8
Bulgaria +2.7 Austria -3.4
Cyprus +2.4 Latvia -1.8
Malta +2.3 Sweden -1.7
Figure 5. share oF illegally traded tobacco products 
as part oF overall consuMption in the eu, 2013
Source: KPMG, A Study of the Illicit Cigarette Market in the European Union. 2013 Results (London, 2014).
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ring the actual extent of the illicit market in tobacco in the EU (and 
elsewhere) is extremely difficult. 85
Tobacco-related criminal conduct is often presented by media, law 
enforcement and industry accounts in the rhetoric of “transnational 
organised crime”, a phrase with much mystique and threatening 
imagery.86 However, the available evidence from a variety of European 
contexts shows that a substantial part of the distribution market, with 
the exception of big importers in some countries (e.g. Bulgaria), is 
covered by somewhat older, lower middle-class, individuals who are 
not hardened career criminals and are not involved in a diverse set of 
criminal activities.87 Instead, most are action-oriented individuals, who 
in most instances act for their own personal interests in this market 
alone. The closer one gets to a cigarette smuggler, the more the 
stereotypical image of an “organised criminal” dissolves. Illegal cigarette 
entrepreneurs are often “unusual suspects” who do not fit the profile 
of an archetypal smuggler.88 The composition of a typical group of 
transporters – the groups most involved with the authorities – is better 
understood in the context of varied and networked relationships of 
individuals keen on securing a share of the market. Generally, these 
individuals do not form structured organisations characterised by a 
sophisticated division of labour. At the core of collaboration between 
and among these entrepreneurs often lie family or kinship relationships, 
as well as relationships forged within legal businesses (e.g. employer-
employee, business partners, etc.).89 Violence and threats of violence 
are rare as they attract unnecessary attention and are deemed bad 
for business. However, although entrepreneurs involved in the trade 
do not use violence as an integral part of their illicit tobacco trade 
schemes, there are instances in countries such as the UK, Greece and 
Germany, where they have become the victims of extortionists who 
impose informal taxes on their profits. In addition, there are cases in 
which legal retailers are forced by illegal suppliers to sell contraband 
tobacco products in their legal businesses (Sweden) and extremely rare 
cases in which threat of violence is sometimes used to ensure share of 
profit by investors (Austria).
85 See P. Reuter and M. Majmundar (eds.), Understanding the U.S. Illicit Tobacco Market: Characteristics, 
Policy Context, and Lessons from the International Experience, (Washington D.C.: National Academies 
Press, 2015).
86 See National Audit Office (UK), Progress in Tackling Tobacco Smuggling (London, 2013).
87 See P. C. van Duyne and G. A. Antonopoulos, The Criminal Smoke of Tobacco Policy Making: 
Cigarette Smuggling in Europe (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2009).
88 G. A. Antonopoulos, “Cigarette Smugglers: A Note on Four ‘Unusual Suspects,’” Global Crime 8, 
no. 4 (2007): 393-98. 
89 K. von Lampe and P.O. Johansen, “Criminal Networks and Trust: On the Importance of 
Expectations of Loyal Behaviour in Criminal Relations”, in Organised Crime, Trafficking, Drugs, ed. 
S. Nevala and K. Aromaa (Helsinki: HEUNI, 2004), 102-13.
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Overall (excluding actors such as corrupt public officials,90 political elites 
or extortionists that are not involved in the business per se), the major 
players in the illegal tobacco business can be distinguished according to 
the following categories:
• Manufacturers. For the majority of EU countries manufacturers are 
based outside the country. However, there are a small number of 
countries where merchandise is legally produced in the country before 
being fictitiously exported and re-introduced into the country of origin 
and its illegal market. These manufacturers can operate a legal or 
illegal business in a similar vein to the cases of Chinese counterfeiters 
mentioned above. Some illegal manufacturers own mobile production 
facilities, which are installed for brief periods of time in various 
countries (primarily in Eastern and South-eastern Europe) (Bulgaria, 
Poland).
• Importers and wholesalers.91 Similar to other illegal trades, import-
ers and wholesalers are the entrepreneurs who have the capital 
to invest in the illegal cigarette market. Importers and wholesalers 
tend to absorb most costs relating to the business and the risks 
associated with it (for example, seizure or loss of the merchandise, 
transportation between/among countries, and bribes to officials). 
Although the available evidence largely suggests that there is very 
little “commodity hopping”, it not unusual for this type of entrepre-
neur, at this level, to be involved in cigarette smuggling alongside 
the smuggling of other commodities such as fuel, medicines or 
alcohol fraud.
• Retailers. This category includes individuals who regularly travel 
(tourists, students, etc.) driven by the price disparities between/among 
countries. These individual smugglers could be labelled as occasional 
smugglers, presented with a one-off smuggling opportunity during a 
trip abroad, or regular smugglers who see a business opportunity 
and become more frequently involved in tobacco smuggling whilst 
travelling abroad. This category also includes small (legal) shop-
owners and street-sellers. For some retailers, such as those who 
own a legal business selling cigarettes or other commodities, the 
illicit trade in tobacco products is a means of increasing income or 
covering losses encountered in their legal business (Greece, Spain). 
For some other retailers, and specifically those involved in street-
selling (very often migrants struggling to find legitimate work) socio-
economic marginalisation is the common characteristic and the 
illicit tobacco trade is one of the very few employment options 
available.
90 Although, it should be mentioned that in some cases these corrupt officials have been active 
participants in the illicit tobacco business. The intensive involvement of State Security officers 
in the Bulgarian tobacco business in the 1980s, for example, is considered a decisive factor for 
the evolution of the tobacco smuggling networks in the 1990s.
91 In some pieces of work (e.g. Antonopoulos, “Cigarette Smuggling: A Case Study of a Smuggling 
Network in Greece.”) the term “pusher” is used to connote a mid-level wholesaler being linked 
to street-sellers or other retailers.
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Sources of capital
Start-up capital is perhaps the most critical issue in the financing of 
the illegal tobacco trade. This is because once a smuggling operation 
is up and running it can generate sufficient profit to allow further 
investment in schemes in a number of self-financing cycles (Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Greece, Netherlands, UK). Start-up capital is required to 
enter the illicit trade in tobacco and the amount can depend on 
the quantity or quality of the merchandise a criminal entrepreneur 
desires to trade or can trade in. There are a wide range of financial 
sources used to initiate tobacco smuggling operations. The first concerns 
small scale smuggling/bootlegging, which usually involves funds from 
legitimate work and savings (Italy, Greece, UK). These are the types 
of funds that are the least remarkable because virtually anyone with 
a small amount of capital can become involved in the business via 
this source of finance, from holidaymakers and immigrants, to students 
and those whose legitimate work includes international travel (e.g. 
transportation, import-export industry). Usually in these instances, small 
amounts of money are invested in the illegal tobacco trade because 
small-scale entrepreneurs cover a minor market share in their specific 
locality. Moreover, in some cases these small-scale criminal investors/
entrepreneurs invest less than they could as an intentional detection 
avoidance tactic, in order to circumvent both the attention of the 
police and local extortionists (see UK).
The second source identified in this study relates to funds from 
legal businesses that belong to, or are managed by, illicit tobacco 
entrepreneurs. Industries such as transportation, the construction and 
food industries and establishments catering to the night-time economy 
(pubs, bars, clubs) are prominent as a financing source in large-
scale smuggling. It is interesting to note that grey profits from legal 
businesses (e.g. defrauding customers, black labour or tax evasion) have 
also been noted as means of investment in the illicit tobacco business 
(Sweden, UK).
In a large number of cases legitimate businessmen invest funds in 
“financing consortia” or “conglomerates.” By grouping together their 
investments and spreading the risk, larger quantities of tobacco can 
be imported with a reduced financial risk per individual investor if the 
merchandise is seized by the authorities or lost (Bulgaria, Germany, 
France, Hungary, Sweden, UK). In Bulgaria, oligarchic groups involved 
in large-scale schemes use political and judicial influence to protect 
their investment. Some investors stick with such a conglomerate for a 
prolonged period of time, some drop out after a few importations, and 
some are involved in a single importation. Usually there is a core set 
of investors who know each other through their involvement in various 
other legal (and occasionally illegal) projects who are better positioned 
in the scheme because they know brokers and other strategic individuals 
involved in the whole process (Bulgaria, Greece, Sweden, UK). Other 
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similar conglomerates are facilitated by ethnicity (Czech Republic, UK). 
Thus, in essence, social capital is as important as financial capital, 
especially in large-scale smuggling networks.
Another source of funds for the illicit tobacco business is other illegal 
activities and businesses, although this is a rather uncommon source. 
This study came across individuals heavily involved in drug dealing, fuel 
smuggling, theft, extortion schemes, the illicit pharmaceutical trade, and 
counterfeiting (Greece, Italy, Romania, Sweden, UK). Once they have a 
profit from cigarettes they invest in cycles (Belgium, Sweden). There are 
also illegitimate financing consortia in which 2-3 criminal entrepreneurs 
similar to the legal businessmen mentioned above invest a sum towards 
importing a load of cigarettes and then share the profit on the basis 
of the investment. In some countries, the type of illegal activities and 
businesses as sources of capital in the illicit tobacco business is often 
dependent on the level of smuggling. For example, in France wholesale 
smuggling is funded by gambling and extortion, and small-scale smuggling 
by frauds, small-scale drug dealing and thefts and receiving. Loans from 
criminals and/or loan sharks are extremely rare in the illegal tobacco 
business (Sweden, UK). Finally, some entrepreneurs have multiple funding 
sources, which amalgamate some of the sources that are mentioned 
above or include some ingenious ways of making money such as setting 
up a raffle.92
With reference to the background of investors involved in the illegal 
tobacco trade, it is difficult to provide a typical profile due to the openness 
and low entry threshold of this particular market as well as local and 
national peculiarities. In some cases the supply chain is so fragmented 
and diverse across countries, that it makes it extremely difficult for the 
authorities to obtain information on the background of financiers (Spain). 
However, when it comes to large-scale smuggling, entrepreneurs are 
usually legal businessmen with links to legal manufacturers and others in 
industries that are functional for tobacco importation, i.e. transportation, 
import-export company owners (Bulgaria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, 
Netherlands, UK). However, legal business people whose legal portfolios 
are irrelevant to the tobacco industry are also present (e.g. Vietnamese 
textile trades in the Czech Republic; also Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, UK). Criminals involved in a variety of illegal activities also invest 
in the tobacco trade, although by no means are they typical tobacco 
entrepreneurs (Bulgaria, France, Italy, Romania, Sweden, UK). In Bulgaria, 
the Czech Republic, and France the links among investors are facilitated 
by ethnic links, business links (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, 
France, Ireland, Netherlands, UK), familial and neighbourhood links (UK), 
and links established in prison (Greece, UK). 
Settlement of payments
Usually small-scale smugglers/bootleggers of illicit tobacco tend to use 
a variety of suppliers including duty-free shops or legal retailers in 
foreign countries with lower prices for cigarettes and tobacco. In this 
92 See the UK chapter in this report.
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case, there are no special arrangements with regards to payment. The 
merchandise is purchased legitimately via credit card or cash up-front. 
In large-scale schemes, cash is the typical method used for payment 
of a large quantity of illicit tobacco and in most of the cases there 
is exchange of merchandise with money (Germany, Greece, Romania, 
UK). In some cases, there is pre-payment for a load (Bulgaria, Germany, 
Lithuania), and in extreme cases, guarantees are offered in the form of 
other assets (e.g. a boat, UK) and commodities such as drugs (Bulgaria, 
UK). In one case in Bulgaria, cocaine and heroin were provided for a 
load of cigarettes. Credit is rather rare in the tobacco business at the 
European level, although it is present in some contexts. The provision 
of credit is facilitated by trust among actors involved and, specifically, 
the broker who may be able to vouch for the trustworthiness of the 
entrepreneur receiving the merchandise. Credit is more prevalent at the 
importation/wholesale level and after years of frictionless collaboration 
between and among entrepreneurs in both legal and illegal schemes. 
The nature of the business relation (consolidated vs. non-consolidated) is 
integral in the cases in which credit exists, most frequently with cash in 
advance, particularly if the business relationship is new.
In order to settle payments a number of actors facilitate the process. 
This includes brokers (Ireland, UK, Greece, Germany, Hungary) who can 
be members of a close-knit ethnic group, which was reported in both 
the Czech Republic and France. Brokers get paid towards the upper 
level (wholesale/importation level) of the business and their fee may be 
standard (e.g. a couple of thousands of pounds/euros per importation), or 
in the case of large deals, they can be paid 1% of the profit made by an 
importer (UK). Other important actors involve commercial money transfer 
services (Austria), and cash couriers/money collectors (Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Germany, Latvia, UK). Money couriers sometimes work 
for a number of unconnected schemes, and they are hired because of 
the trustworthy reputation they have built over time (Germany). When 
money couriers/collectors are involved they charge a fee, which varies 
depending on the scale of the project as well as the context in which 
the transactions take place (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, 
Ireland, UK). For example, in Belgium the fee is 10% of the collected 
amount, in the UK it is 0.5%, in the Czech Republic it is 1-2% of the 
total amount and in Germany 3-5%. There was a case in Hungary in 
which money couriers/collectors were paid with merchandise instead 
of a fee. These data are based on a limited range of known examples, 
and what accounts for this market variation in fee levels is not well 
understood: all that is clear is that this is not an area where the Single 
European Market regulations apply.
At the EU level bank transfers are rarely used to settle payments and 
are a rather atypical feature of the illicit tobacco trade (Greece, Spain). 
In Bulgaria, however, at the level of importation of illicit whites and 
raw tobacco by legal tobacco manufacturers producing cigarettes for 
the illegal market, a great deal of the payments are carried out through 
the legitimate financial system – either through money order services or 
bank transactions. It is after the tobacco is imported in the country that 
business transactions are settled in cash.
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Towards the lower echelons of the business in Sweden, legal retailers 
can be intimidated into selling contraband cigarettes by suppliers. These 
retailers simply sell the cigarettes and hand over the money to the sup-
plier. In these cases, settlement of payment resembles extortion rather 
than normal business strategy.
Costs of doing business
The costs of doing criminal business depend on a variety of factors: the 
scale of the scheme and its logistical complexities, the country of supply 
and the distance from the consumption/destination country, the legality 
and number of different suppliers per scheme, the number of actors 
involved, the assumption of the risks involved, and a number of ad hoc 
unforeseen expenses.
Buying and producing the merchandise. Usually small-scale smugglers/
bootleggers buy and sell relatively small quantities of cigarettes and 
tobacco obtained primarily from legal retailers. However, occasionally, as 
is the case with slightly bigger schemes, they will be obtained through 
illegal suppliers (UK). For small-scale schemes, buying the merchandise 
depends on the legal prices of tobacco products in the particular 
country in which the merchandise is purchased. For large-scale schemes 
(importation/wholesale) costs depend on the legality of the merchandise 
imported. For instance, a container of legally produced cigarettes is more 
expensive than a container of counterfeit cigarettes, which in turn is 
more expensive than a container of illicit whites.
In order to cut down the costs associated with importing cigarettes 
and tobacco from China, Eastern Europe and other producing countries, 
illegal factories have begun to be identified in a number of EU 
countries.93 These factories are not present in every EU country and the 
costs associated with production vary considerably. Costs can depend 
on the scale of the scheme and the differential sophistication and 
resulting costs involved in, for example, renting a warehouse with 
a long-term or short-term horizon (Belgium vs the UK). Costs also 
depend on the amount required to purchase and install the essential 
tobacco manufacturing machinery required to begin production, which 
varies significantly depending on its source. For example, manufacturing 
machinery that was seized by the German authorities cost €500,000, 
machinery found in Latvia cost €150,000-200,000, in Belgium €220,000, 
and in a case in the UK as little as £7,000. Finally, the costs associated 
with the production of tobacco products depends on whether cigarettes 
(legal, counterfeit or illicit whites) or hand-rolling tobacco is being 
produced (Bulgaria, UK). Less start-up capital is required in order to 
establish illicit tobacco factories that simply pack tobacco. Furthermore, 
costs can include repayment of loans, as was the case with one legal 
tobacco manufacturer in Bulgaria.
93 Equipment for these illegal factories is widely available from closed factories in Eastern Europe. 
Part of the problem is that in many countries (especially in Eastern Europe) when illegal 
factories are shut by the authorities, the confiscated equipment is not destroyed but sold on 
public auctions in order for revenues to be secured (see further the chapter on Bulgaria in this 
report).
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transporting the merchandise. Transportation fees naturally vary on 
the basis of the distance covered and the risk of seizures or arrests 
associated with specific entry points. However, it is not impossible 
for the transportation fee to be significantly different for an identical 
distance covered and possible risk. For example, some entrepreneurs 
invest in their own vans and lorries (Belgium, Netherlands, Sweden, 
UK). Furthermore, when the illegal tobacco trader is the owner of 
a legal transportation company, the illegal business is facilitated 
logistically by his existing legal business, resulting in less transportation 
expenses. This also allows additional control over the operation. In this 
case, drivers might not even be aware that they transport contraband 
merchandise. Costs are also affected by the presence of a cover load 
(Greece, UK).
Storing the merchandise. In many cases tobacco products are simply 
kept in the trader’s house or the houses of relatives and friends. In 
wholesale cases, smaller industrial spaces or warehouses are rented to 
store and/or repackage the merchandise. On average, renting a 1500m2 
warehouse costs approximately €2,000 per month (Greece, Sweden), 
although on numerous occasions entrepreneurs rent significantly cheaper 
and smaller premises costing as little as £25 per week (UK).
Payment to actors in the tobacco business including “runners”94 (in cases 
of small-scale smuggling) (UK), brokers (Hungary, Italy, UK), couriers 
(individuals who are trusted with transporting merchandise and/or 
money), minders who accompany money couriers, and retail/street sellers. 
Payments to actors involved in tobacco smuggling can differ enormously 
depending on their role and the size and scope of the operation.
Other costs in the illegal tobacco trade involve:
• bribes and other corruption costs (Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Italy, UK);
• political protection costs (Bulgaria); 
• security costs; 
• insurance, which is sometimes bought to protect entrepreneurs if their 
merchandise is seized or lost (Sweden, UK); 
• cash management costs; 
• informal taxation/extortion by criminals; 
• decoy expenses (expenses towards diverting the attention of the 
authorities and/or misleading legal suppliers of tobacco products (UK);
• criminal justice system-related costs (Bulgaria); 
• supporting the family members of imprisoned partners (Germany, Italy);
• bonuses for informants, sometimes in the form of merchandise 
(Germany);
• counterintelligence (Sweden); 
• “unforeseen circumstances” most often as a direct consequence of 
the unpredictable nature of the business and individuals involved 
(see UK).
94 In some contexts these are also referred to as “ant smugglers” – see further the introduction 
to the section on the illegal tobacco trade below.
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Profits, profit sharing and investments
In most EU contexts, information about quantities of illegal tobacco 
products sold and the value of the overall illegal market is either unavailable 
or insufficient. Therefore, with some exceptions, it is not possible to 
accurately establish the quantities and prices of illicit cigarettes that are 
exchanged at each level of the supply chain, or to estimate the cash flow 
and profits at each level of the process from importation/wholesale to 
middle-level to retail. There are a variety of reasons for this:
• The huge variations in taxation and prices in the legal market in 
each jurisdiction. This has a direct impact on prices in the illegal 
markets of said jurisdictions, consequently affecting demand, supply 
and the “maturity cycles” of the specific market;
• The diversity of smuggling schemes, decentralisation of the business 
and associated low risk and low entry threshold;
• The diversity in local transportation and storage costs for each type 
of smuggling scheme or context in which the scheme operates. 
For example, in two separate investigations in the UK, one driver/
transporter received £1,000 per successful channel crossing and the 
other £10,000.95
Profit margins from the illegal tobacco trade also depend on a number of 
additional variables. Firstly, they depend on the type of merchandise sold 
(i.e. non-tax paid merchandise vs illicit whites vs counterfeit products). 
Generally, counterfeit products tend to outweigh profit in all other 
types of smuggling, as they are very cheap to buy and have a very 
high mark-up. Legal tobacco products bought abroad from legal retailers 
appear to have the smallest profit margin.
Secondly, profits depend on the position of the illegal entrepreneurs in 
the supply chain (with profits reducing as the merchandise moves down 
the supply chain). A criminal entrepreneur involved in the retail market 
will make an average of 50 cent profit per pack of cigarettes in the UK. 
Generally, profits are bigger at the production, importation level and 
wholesale level, and these profits correspond to the amount invested 
(Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Romania, Sweden, UK). This was exemplified 
by one UK law enforcement agent: “if you put 20% to importation, you 
expect to get 20% of the merchandise that will reach the UK. Simple as 
that.” It is interesting to note that not all investors in the illegal tobacco 
market are actively involved in the trade. For those cases in which the 
financiers/investors are not directly active in the business, a 70:30 model 
is applied (Czech Republic), in which the investors obtain 70% of the 
profits even though they provide 100% of the start-up capital.
Other important actors in the illegal tobacco business – such as 
intermediaries involved in large scale schemes (Netherlands, Romania, 
UK) – profit individually from payments, salaries or fees, sometimes 
of a significant amount depending on the size of the scheme they 
are involved in. Smaller profits in the form of payments/fees are also 
95 FATF, Illicit Tobacco Trade (Paris: FATF/OECD, 2012).
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obtained by transporters, loaders, vehicle/vessel and warehouse owners, 
and corrupt officials (Italy, Lithuania, Romania, UK, Greece). Occasionally, 
some actors are paid via a mixture of cash and cigarettes, enabling them 
to make an additional profit themselves. This opportunity is dependent 
on ties of trust which are established via long term involvement in a 
smuggling scheme.
Profits can vary depending on the context of the sale, the amount of 
tobacco products sold, the current market conditions, and a number 
of additional peculiarities existing in different locales. For instance, at 
the retail level, the price of a pack of 20 cigarettes in Milan is higher 
than in Naples. At the retail level, variations in profit can relate to the 
low cost associated with marketing via word of mouth (Germany, UK), 
better prices and discounts to existing customers or those who buy 
large quantities (Bulgaria, UK), and the lower price of merchandise of 
deteriorating quality (Bulgaria, Greece). Finally, profits can depend on the 
size of an illegal entrepreneur’s customer base. Contraband products sold 
via legal businesses seem to facilitate transactions with more customers 
and lead to higher profits (Czech Republic, Ireland, UK). Local pubs in 
small localities are also used in the distribution of merchandise and this 
is often viewed as a guarantee of the quality (Ireland, UK). Finally, the 
internet has been found to be an up-and-coming and available platform 
for the marketing and illegal distribution of tobacco products in some 
countries, which can cut costs and increase profits for operations in a 
number of ways (Estonia).
Largely, although this is an illegal market in which safeguards do not exist, 
there is no need for financiers/investors to ensure their share of profits 
since the illicit trade in tobacco products is a rather pacified market 
(Greece). Instead, trusted relationships established and consolidated in 
legal businesses and lengthy legal projects are paramount. On rare 
occasions financers/investors ensure their share of profit through the 
threat of violence and use of violence (Austria), and through agreements 
with collateral including real estate, stocks, vehicles, and ownership 
share of a legitimate company (Czech Republic, Estonia). In the case 
of collateral, contacts formed via family or ethnic group are integral in 
facilitating the agreement.
Spending and investing profits from the illegal tobacco trade. Much of 
the profit made is simply spent on hedonistic pursuits and conspicuous 
consumption: nights out, gambling, buying luxury cars and bikes, boats, 
buying luxury clothes and jewellery, travelling to foreign countries, and 
so on. Profits are also invested in property or other assets, foreign 
currency and precious metals. Importantly, profits from the illegal 
tobacco trade are invested in legal businesses including bars, clubs, 
restaurants and pubs, hotels, transportation companies and, in the case 
of Greece, football and basketball clubs. In some cases, ethnic minority 
or immigrant entrepreneurs invest in legal businesses or property in 
their country of origin. For example, Vietnamese tobacco entrepreneurs 
based in the Czech Republic invest in Vietnam, and British-Kurdish 
entrepreneurs invest in Iraqi Kurdistan. Providing for or lending money 
to family members and friends for a variety of reasons including making 
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investments is not uncommon (UK, Sweden, Czech Republic, Greece). 
In the UK, there have also been illegal tobacco entrepreneurs investing 
in the enhancement of their existing legal businesses or in establishing 
or extending their legal business portfolios. There are very few examples 
of entrepreneurs who deposit money in accounts abroad (Sweden). 
Examples of investment in offshore bank accounts are rather atypical 
cases although they are present. In addition, money has been laundered 
in a variety of ways such as legitimate companies that are involved in 
the Stock Exchange and gambling (e.g. buying lottery tickets from people 
who have already won) (Greece).
Investment in criminal activities. Profits from cigarette smuggling are 
also re-invested in cycles in the illegal tobacco trade, often in order to 
upgrade and grow the particular business. Generally, there is very little 
commodity hopping among illegal tobacco traders. However, there are 
entrepreneurs who also invest in separate criminal businesses: counterfeit 
luxury clothes (Czech Republic), counterfeit medical products (Austria), 
alcohol smuggling (Sweden), cannabis, cocaine and crack cocaine 
businesses (Belgium, Spain, Greece, Ireland, Lithuania, Sweden, UK), 
stolen goods (Sweden), VAT fraud (Czech Republic, Spain), establishing 
illegal gambling dens (Sweden), and human trafficking (Lithuania).
Access to capital in critical moments
There are a number of critical moments in the illegal trade in tobacco 
which include:
• the merchandise and transportation means being confiscated by the 
authorities; 
• the illegal entrepreneurs being arrested and/or fined by the authorities;
• the merchandise being lost, destroyed/damaged or stolen by compe-
titors or others;
• times of sharp increases of the excise tax or times of political instability 
which require additional investment by criminal entrepreneurs (see the 
chapter on Bulgaria);
• the criminal entrepreneur wishing to retire while insuring himself 
against prosecution or media inquiries.
These critical moments require access to capital not only in order for 
entrepreneurs to re-enter the business and perhaps expand it, but also 
in order for some to discreetly and uneventfully retire from the business 
and/or cover legal expenses.
Excluding the common “rainy day” funds, which involve criminal 
entrepreneurs putting money aside in bank accounts or in safety deposit 
boxes for their retirement from the business, contingency funds as such 
are generally not present in the illegal tobacco market. However, the 
study highlighted two specific references to such a fund. The first refers 
to a UK case in the 1960s and 1970s, when bootlegging groups during 
the first few months of an operation diverted all proceeds into a fund 
that would cover future legal expenses (UK). The second concerns a 
contemporary Bulgarian practice, in which a number of master cases 
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from each shipment are set aside, and revenue from them is placed in 
a reserve fund, as an insurance against unexpected losses; such as those 
caused by inexperienced new entrants in the business and additional 
expenses at turning points of an operation.
If cigarettes and other tobacco products in small-scale schemes are 
confiscated at country entry points, entrepreneurs are able to re-enter 
the trade by re-investing money from their legal work and/or savings 
(UK, Sweden, France). Due to the low risk and high profit associated 
with the illegal trade in tobacco products, seized shipments are seen as 
more of an inconvenience because the money invested is relatively small. 
Therefore, entrepreneurs are able to re-enter the business with ease.
In relation to large-scale schemes, money from previous successful 
importations is re-invested. In some countries (e.g. UK) entrepreneurs 
take part in “bulk container rolls”, i.e. simultaneous importations of 
5-6 containers on the same day at different entry points throughout 
a country. The profit margins are so big that if only one container 
importation is successful there is still a considerable profit to be made. 
The high profitability of the illegal tobacco trade allows the entrepreneurs 
involved in importation/wholesale of tobacco products to enjoy relative 
security from the financially critical moments of the trade (Belgium, 
Greece, Sweden, UK). However, in critical moments, entrepreneurs 
have also been known to invest money from other illegal activities 
and personal savings, receive loans from official and unofficial credit 
institutions (Czech Republic), or – using their social capital – receive 
loans from acquaintances.
In Greece – although this is a rare occurrence and concerns the most 
successful and centralised structures – individuals involved in a large-scale 
tobacco smuggling scheme that are arrested have been known to get 
financial support from a business partner during their time dealing with 
the criminal justice system (e.g. hiring lawyers, offering money for the 
period of incarceration, and taking care of their family financially). They 
may also offer him/her a “welcome back gift” upon their release from 
prison. Loan sharks are generally not an integral part of the financing in 
the illicit tobacco business. There were very few cases in which retailers 
lack access to legal financing and resort to local loan sharks to receive 
money on credit to invest in tobacco products (UK and Sweden).
The value added tax (VAT) mechanism is central to the functioning of 
the European single market (i.e. the free movement of goods, capital 
and people). However, the administration of VAT taxation across different 
tax jurisdictions in intra-community trade proves vulnerable to fraudulent 
transactions due to a variety of factors. These include the current 
transnational tax arrangements in the EU regarding supply and acquisition 
of goods and services (the “destination principle”), the lack of a unitary 
legal framework within the EU, the fundamental principle laid down in 
the Lisbon treaty for the free movement of goods in the EU that in 
practice neutralises the border control regime on the flow of goods, and 
the ineffective cooperation between tax and law-enforcement institutions 
at national and EU levels.96
Under the destination principle of taxation, VAT is paid in the country 
where the goods and services are consumed.97 So when a VAT registered 
trader is purchasing goods and services from another member state, 
he would not pay value added tax on import and would only charge 
and account for VAT when he sells the same goods on the domestic 
market. Conversely, exporters apply zero VAT rate on exported goods 
and services and have the right to reclaim the VAT credit for their 
inputs.
Since 2006, the EU has worked towards a common VAT anti-fraud strategy 
and recently strengthened anti-fraud measures.98 In July 2013, two new 
directives were adopted by the Council: one on introducing a Quick 
Reaction Mechanism allowing member states an immediate reaction 
to a sudden and massive VAT fraud; and on the application of the 
Reverse Charge Mechanism in relation to supplies of certain goods and 
services susceptible to fraud (carbon emissions, mobile phones).99 Under 
this directive, member states have the option to apply this mechanism 
on a temporary basis and for a pre-agreed list of sectors/goods. The 
reverse charge mechanism entails that the liability for the payment of 
VAT is shifted from the supplier (as normally required by EU rules) to 
the customer. However, some member states are concerned that the 
application of a generalised reversed charge mechanism would result in 
96 K. Pashev, Fighting VAT Fraud: The Bulgarian Experience (Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy, 
2006). K. Pashev, “Countering Cross-Border VAT Fraud: The Bulgarian Experience”, Journal of 
Financial Crime 14, no. 4 (2007): 490-501.
97 Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added 
tax. M. Keen and S. Smith, “VAT Fraud and Evasion: What Do We Know and What Can Be 
Done?”, National Tax Journal LIX, no. 4 (2006): 861-87.
98 European Commission, Combating tax fraud and evasion. Commission contribution to the European 
Council of 22 May 2013. (Brussels: European Commission, 2013).
99 Council of the European Union, Council approves measures to tackle VAT fraud schemes. Press 
release 12627/13, Brussels, 22 July 2013.
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the fraud shifting to the last stage of the distribution link, instead of the 
first (as is the case with the missing trader).100
A range of goods and services are affected by organised VAT fraud 
schemes. Mobile phones, computer and electronic components 
have been used particularly often, because their small size and high 
price makes them very convenient for simulating high value export 
transactions.101 Other types of goods commonly involved in VAT fraud 
include railway vehicle components, scrap metal, precious metals, metal 
allocations, new and used cars, footwear, and mobile phone credits, 
among others.102 In recent years, VAT fraudsters have been targeting 
energy markets and the trade in carbon credits. Europol reports that 
fraudulent companies have managed to capture some 90% of all 
carbon credit transactions and defraud large amounts of VAT.103 Along 
with carbon emissions markets, other preferred targets for VAT fraud 
are cloud computing and VoIP due to the immateriality and the high-
speed transfer of goods.104 Fraud involving intangible goods is making 
use of large financial institutions who knowingly or not provide financial 
liquidity.105
VAT fraud can be interpreted in two broad categories, depending on 
whether the undue payoff consists of reduced tax liability (tax evasion) 
or embezzlement of VAT (failing to remit the VAT due and/or false 
claims of tax credit), or both.106 Another classification is based on the 
complexity of the scheme: whether the fraud involves only a domestic 
or an international (intra-community) component, a single operation or a 
carousel chain of transactions.107
Evasion and saving of VAT can take many forms, such as undervaluation 
of input and overvaluation of output to reduce tax liability, false 
classification of goods to take advantage of lower rates, declaring false 
quantities, false or no invoices, smuggling or economic actors operating 
entirely in the shadow economy.
Tax credit abuse, on the other hand entails pocketing large sums of 
undue VAT refund claims by fraudulent networks through a chain 
100 Ernst & Young, Assessment of the Application and Impact of the Optional “Reverse Charge Mechanism” 
within the EU VAT System (Brussels: European Commission, 2014). International VAT Association, 
Combating VAT Fraud in the EU. The Way Forward (Brussels: IVA, 2007).
101 FATF, Laundering the Proceeds of VAT Carousel Fraud (Paris: Financial Action Task Force, 2007).
102 Europol, EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment (The Hague: Europol, 2011).
103 Europol, SOCTA 2013. EU Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment.
104 M. C. Frunza, “Aftermath of the VAT Fraud on Carbon Emissions Markets”, Journal of Financial 
Crime 20, no. 2 (2013): 222-36.
105 Europol, EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment.
106 S. Fedeli and F. Forte, “EU VAT Frauds”, European Journal of Law and Economics 31, no. 2 (2011): 
143-66.
107 Ibid.
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of fictitious and real transactions and traders. It is recognised as an 
organised crime activity involving theft on a massive scale and a 
systematic criminal attack on the VAT system in EU member states.108 
The most common type of organised criminal VAT fraud is known as 
the missing trader intra-community (MTIC) fraud. It is recognised as one 
of the major organised crime threats in the EU affecting all member 
states.109
Within the classic missing trader fraud schemes a taxable person 
(“missing trader”) purchases goods from another country at zero VAT 
rate and subsequently re-sells the goods at VAT-inclusive price on the 
domestic market, without remitting the due VAT tax to the national tax 
administration. The scheme could be applied in a number of ways, but 
the most common forms are:
Acquisition fraud – the missing trader supplies the imported goods at 
the final consumption market and then disappears, embezzling all the 
due VAT debited. The missing trader usually sells the goods below their 
market value. This is the simplest form of the missing trader fraud as it 
involves a single operation.
Carousel fraud – the goods imported by the missing trader are sold 
through a chain of domestic companies (“buffers”) and finally re-
exported to another country applying zero VAT rate. Although the 
missing trader fails to remit the due VAT, the enterprise in the end of 
the chain (“exporter”) claims tax refund for input VAT paid. The scheme 
relies on multiple domestic and cross-border transactions, which makes 
tracing and counteraction more difficult, while at the same time allows 
for additional inflation of prices and therefore the tax credit claimed 
by the exporter. The situation is additionally aggravated when lack 
of border control between member states is taken into account, as 
this allows for entirely fictitious transactions with fictitious goods.110 
According to FATF the amounts of money involved and the complexity 
of the schemes means that it is restricted to organised criminal groups 
with high level of sophistication. Fedeli and Forte111 stress that the 
carousel may be launched due to expected profits from the initial 
stage (the supply side) or by expected gains at the final stages of the 
chain (demand side). A more complex scheme may consist of different 
elements, including a chain of undue VAT refund claims and missing 
traders followed by a regular sale at the end, a completely black chain 
where tax is directly evaded, a chain of undue rebate claims entirely 
on fictitious sales, as well as in combination with savings on direct 
taxes.112
108 D. Ruffles et al., “VAT Missing Trader Intra-Community Fraud: The Effect on Balance of 
Payments Statistics and UK National Accounts”, Economic Trends 597 (2003): 58-70. FATF, 
Laundering the Proceeds of VAT Carousel Fraud.
109 Europol, SOCTA 2013. EU Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment.
110 F. Borselli, Organised VAT Fraud: Features, Magnitude, Policy Perspectives (Rome: Banca d’Italia, 
2011).
111 Fedeli and Forte, “EU VAT Frauds”.
112 Ibid.
64 Financing	oF	organised	crime
Other common scheme is fictitious export. Under this scheme a trader 
performs an export transaction on paper, levying zero VAT tax and 
claiming VAT refund to the tax authorities, while at the same time selling 
the goods on the domestic market without sales invoices.113 The scheme 
usually involves corrupt customs officers who process the paperwork for 
the export transaction and assure the criminal entrepreneurs that the 
transaction shall evade administrative controls. A more modest version of 
113 Pashev, Fighting VAT Fraud: The Bulgarian Experience.
Figure 6. international vat carousel Fraud scheMe
Source: K. Pashev, Corruption and Tax Compliance. Challenges to Tax Policy and Tax Administration 
(Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2005).
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this scheme relies on overstating quantities, where these could be easily 
manipulated (e.g. sugar, grain, fuels).
Various other fraudulent schemes were also reported such as “invoice 
mills”,114 “crossed invoicing”, abuse of customs procedure for transit of 
goods, fraud with the margins of the sale of second hand assets. Among 
those, the invoice mill is one worth mentioning, although it is a less 
sophisticated form of organised VAT fraud. These mills are in practice 
providers of fictitious invoices to legitimate companies willing to diminish 
their VAT tax liabilities. The mills could be structured around legitimate 
accounting service providers or be run by entirely criminal networks and 
usually operate on a fee-for-service basis.
The estimation of the scale of organised VAT fraud presents a common 
challenge to all member states. The VAT gap is estimated as the 
difference between the tax that is actually paid and the tax that should 
be collected. It is used as a measure for tax non-compliance and 
revenue loss. However, the components of the tax gap might include 
not only organised crime tax fraud, but also conventional tax avoidance, 
bankruptcies, insolvencies, legal avoidance practices, errors, misreporting 
and miscalculations.115 Therefore, it is an indicator for the effectiveness 
of VAT enforcement and compliance measures, but it cannot be directly 
interpreted as an estimate of the organised VAT fraud.
VAT gap estimates are generally calculated based on two approaches: 
top-down and bottom-up. Top-down approaches are most commonly 
used, although it is the bottom-up approach that allows a more precise 
diagnosis of the size of different types of fraud and evasion. As Reckon 
stresses, bottom-up estimates start with identifying the types of fraud and 
then the proceeds for each of the components, which means such an 
approach relies on operational data held by national tax authorities.116 
The top-down approach, on the other hand, relies on macro-economic 
data on consumer spending to estimate the theoretical VAT liability and 
compare it to actual revenue.
The tax gap might be indicative, but it reflects more than the actual 
levels of VAT fraud. However, estimates of the volumes of MTIC fraud 
in EU have been made in some countries. HMRC in UK assessed that 
between 2006 and 2011, MTIC fraud accounted for 5.4% – 19.6% of the 
overall VAT gap, which equals £0.5-2.5 billion.117 The National Revenue 
114 Keen and Smith, “VAT Fraud and Evasion: What Do We Know and What Can Be Done?”
115 CASE, 2012 Update Report to the Study to Quantify and Analyse the VAT Gap in the EU-27 Member 
States.
116 Reckon LLP, Study to Quantify and Analyse the VAT Gap in the EU-25 Member States (London, 
2009).
117 HMRC, Measuring Tax Gaps 2012. Tax Gap Estimates for 2010-11 (London, 2012).
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Agency in Bulgaria estimated the volume of organised VAT fraud for 2011 
at €350 million.118 Borselli estimates the volume of VAT fraud in Italy 
at €5-9 billion. According to Europol,119 EU countries are losing €100 
billion annually due to MTIC fraud.120 This is a significant proportion of 
the estimated costs of organised crime within the European Union.121
The most recent EU-wide estimates of the VAT gap are available from 
an EU-commissioned study, covering the period 2000 – 2011 and 
2011 – 2012.122 The average data for 2000 – 2011 shows that the largest 
economies of Germany, France, Italy and the UK were the biggest 
contributors to the overall gap. Taken as% of the GDP, however, the 
countries with the largest VAT gap were Romania, Latvia, Greece and 
Lithuania.
In 2012, the overall VAT gap for the EU-26 was estimated at €177.2 
billion, or 16% of the overall tax liability. In 2012, the countries with 
the largest gap were Romania (44% of theoretical liability), followed by 
Slovakia (39%) and Lithuania (36%). In Finland, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg the gap is in the range of 5-6% of the VAT due. Thus, 
the data uncovers an interesting division between Western European 
countries and East and South East European countries, where the latter 
118 CSD, Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2010 – 2011.
119 Europol, SOCTA 2013. EU Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment.
120 Borselli, Organised VAT Fraud: Features, Magnitude, Policy Perspectives.
121 M. Levi, M. Innes, P. Reuter and R. Gundur, The Economic, Financial & Social Impacts of Organised 
Crime in the EU, Report to European Parliament, (Brussels, 2013).
122 CASE, Study to Quantify and Analyse the VAT Gap in the EU-27 Member States – Final Report (The 
Hague: CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, 2013); CASE, 2012 Update Report 
to the Study to Quantify and Analyse the VAT Gap in the EU-27 Member States.
Figure 7. vat gap in eu-26 as% oF total tax liability (2012)
Source: CASE, 2012 Update Report to the Study to Quantify and Analyse the VAT Gap in the EU-27 Member States (The Hague: CPB 
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, 2014).
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appear far more vulnerable and affected by this phenomenon. Looking 
at changes from the previous year, out of 11 countries that reduced 
their VAT gap in 2012, the most notable decrease was in Greece and 
Bulgaria, while the most notable increases took place in Poland, the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia.
Usually VAT fraudulent chains are depicted and analysed as a circuit of 
legal entities performing fictitious and real transactions between each 
other. However, behind any fraudulent chain of legal entities operates a 
group of individuals. While there are some analyses and estimations about 
the scale of the problem on the macro level (national and European), 
far less research focuses on the micro level – the individual perpetrators, 
the nature and size of their organisation, the division of profits between 
different actors, etc. To a large extent this could be explained by the 
many variations of the fraud schemes, the differences in scale from 
case to case, number and role of actors involved. Alternatively it could 
also reflect the lack of interest and/or difficult access in the academic 
community and the case-oriented nature of law enforcement efforts.
The most common type of VAT fraud – the missing trader chains – 
usually involves three main types of legal entities in terms of their 
function and role as actors in the scheme: the missing trader, the buffer 
enterprises and the broker. The missing trader is the key node in the 
chain and usually is a shell or short-lived company, which is formally 
controlled by “dummy managers” or “front men.” The buffer companies 
could be either bogus companies or compliant traders carrying out 
regular business. They take part in the scheme in order to inflate prices, 
make transactions harder to trace and obscure the link between the 
missing trader and the broker. The broker is a formally compliant and 
legitimate company, which stands in the end of the fraudulent chain 
and is the one that claims the VAT refund from the tax authorities. 
Apart from the listed more complex fraudulent chains may also involve 
transportation companies (to simulate movement of goods), companies 
operating VAT warehouses, providers of law and accounting services. 
Where the schemes involve export to non-EU countries, corrupt customs 
officers are also important key actors, who provide the necessary papers 
for the fictitious movement of the goods.123
Analysing the fraudulent networks on the basis of the individuals involved, 
three levels of participation in VAT fraud schemes can be identified.124 The 
first level is the core of the fraud scheme – the inner circle players, who 
are the actual organisers responsible for the design and the organisation of 
the fraud. Although they would usually get the lion’s share of the profits (or 
123 Borselli, Organised VAT Fraud: Features, Magnitude, Policy Perspectives; Pashev, Fighting VAT Fraud: 
The Bulgarian Experience.
124 A. Aronowitz, D. Laagland, and G. Paulides, Value Added Tax Fraud in the European Union 
(Amsterdam: Kugler Publications, 1996).
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so is expected), in most cases their names do not appear on any document 
or in the companies involved. The second level is the outer circle, where 
are involved actors with various roles – “straw men” who are only owners/
managers on paper and “front men” – people like accountants, lawyers, 
different professionals and ad-hoc players. For example a range of services 
provided by a lawyer to a crime group involved in VAT fraud might 
include creation and dissolution of corporate vehicles (i.e. front companies 
and shell companies), financial and tax advice, creating of false legal 
documentation, assuring credibility.125 The actors at this level are generally 
aware of the fraudulent nature of their activities. The third level of actors 
in a VAT fraud scheme consists of the facilitators, who in many cases 
might not be aware of the fraudulent scheme. The facilitators are legitimate 
businesses trading in real goods and services, which would purchase VAT 
free goods or services (buffer companies) or would accept false invoices 
in their bookkeeping.126 The third level participants would benefit from 
fees for processed invoices or from purchasing goods below the market 
price. Of course, proving awareness and intent in court is different from 
suspecting knowledge (or turning a blind eye) in the real world.
An analysis of large scale tax fraud cases in Sweden, including VAT 
fraud, conducted by the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention 
(Brå) found that with the principal actors or organisers have known each 
other and worked together for a long time; hence there is a certain level 
of stability of the cores of criminal networks.127 However, for the most 
risky parts of the schemes, the organisers use accomplices – or “fire-
walls” – to protect the scheme and key individuals.
Designing, starting and running a VAT-fraud scheme requires certain initial 
investments in order to cover costs such as setting up fictitious companies, 
purchasing goods, paying to VAT warehouse operators and shipping 
companies to simulate movement of goods across borders, corrupting tax 
and customs officials, paying for specialised services to accountants or 
lawyers. Whereas VAT carousel frauds on EU level may involve complex 
schemes operating with millions of euro, fraud schemes on national level 
such as the invoice mills could be set up with a minimal investment 
of a few thousand euros. Regardless of the scale and type of the VAT 
fraud, the fraudulent schemes require certain capital, raising questions 
about its sources and volume. Other financial aspects, which are key 
to understanding of the financing of VAT frauds, are the settlement of 
payments, structure and size of costs, profits and profit sharing.
125 D. Middleton and M. Levi, “The Role of Solicitors in Facilitating ‘Organized Crime’: Situational 
Crime Opportunities and Their Regulation”, Crime, Law and Social Change 42 (2004): 123-61. 
D. Middleton and M. Levi “Let Sleeping Lawyers Lie: Organised Crime, Lawyers and the 
Regulation of Legal Services”, British Journal of Criminology (2015), doi: 10.1093/bjc/azv001.
126 Aronowitz, Laagland, and Paulides, Value Added Tax Fraud in the European Union.
127 J. Skinnari, “Policing Large-Scale Tax Crime”, in Researching the Police in the Nordic Countries, ed. 
V. Houtari (Tampere, 2013), 67-74.
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Sources of capital
The organisers of VAT frauds use a variety of sources to acquire capital 
for setting up and running their operations. The start-up capital may come 
from both legitimate and illegal sources.128 The outcomes of the survey 
that informed the development of this report suggest that investments in 
VAT fraud schemes originate mostly from reinvestments of the fraud ring 
leaders that stem from criminal or legitimate proceeds, whereas external 
sources of financing are viable but less common option.
the ring leader as a financier (self-financing). The profile of the 
VAT fraud organisers proves to be diverse. Both legitimate businessmen 
and professional crooks specialised in swindles, tax frauds, excise and 
customs duty frauds were identified as ring leaders. Among legitimate 
businessmen two profiles emerged as typical. The first profile is of 
businessmen whose companies are having financial difficulties, and they 
are looking for high payoff investments even at the edge of the law. 
The other profile is that of high-risk entrepreneurs readily investing in 
high-profit “projects.” In Eastern Europe, the so called “oligarchs” were 
often mentioned as key players (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic). Most 
of them belong or have close ties to the old communist nomenklatura 
or secret services and have acquired their capitals through corrupt and 
shady practices in the beginning of the transition period in the nineties. 
Currently well-established businessmen with close ties to the political 
elite, they still tend to keep part of their business in the licit sector, while 
the other part is in the shadow economy.
The most common source of capital for initiating new VAT fraud schemes 
is through re-investing proceeds from previous fraudulent schemes. 
Following the initial investment, successful VAT fraud generates enough 
profits to sustain itself, if the players want to stay in criminal business. 
Proceeds from other criminal activities are also among the possible, 
although not so commonly invested in VAT frauds.
However, the research indicated that it is also not uncommon for 
legitimate businessman to invest part of their legitimate revenues or 
even personal savings to initiate a VAT fraud scheme. Apparently, 
grey revenues derived from conventional tax evasion also constitute 
an important source of capital for initiating VAT fraud. Grey economy 
practices such as use of undeclared labour, overstating inputs or 
undervaluing outputs, overstating loss due to normal spoilage or false 
declaration of loss due to decay/depreciation, appear to be an easy 
way to generate additional revenues through the legitimate business that 
could subsequently be invested in VAT fraud. This pattern of intermixing 
legitimate, grey and entirely criminal finances to initiate and perpetuate 
the criminal operations of the VAT fraud rings seems to be very typical 
for the oligarchs from Eastern Europe.
Furthermore, criminal entrepreneurs invest proceeds from other criminal 
activities. Various cases were reported in the countries studied, which 
128 FATF, Laundering the Proceeds of VAT Carousel Fraud.
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included use of money stemming from activities such as property crime 
(car thefts), extortion racketeering, drug trafficking, smuggling of goods, 
illicit tobacco trade, and loansharking. However, criminal investors coming 
from typical organised crime markets such as drug trafficking, human 
trafficking, extortion racketeering seem to be rather an exception in the 
VAT fraud field.
External sources of financing. In some of the cases reported, the VAT 
fraud networks do not have the financial capacity to initiate and sustain 
the fraudulent operations from their own resources and rely on external 
sources of financing. These could also be both legitimate and criminal 
sources of financing. Apparently, well-established entrepreneurs with 
legitimate businesses may acquire financing through licit channels such as 
obtaining a bank loan. Such a case took place in Bulgaria, where a ring 
leader of a big VAT fraud ring received €23 million in the form of bank 
guarantees and loans from a Bulgarian bank through two companies 
under his control. Other licit sources of financing could be subsidies 
from local or national government. There was a case in Spain in which 
a fraudulent scheme was initiated with EU funds provided for fishing 
companies. trade credits from manufacturers or big wholesalers, as 
well as advanced payments from the final consumers of the goods or 
services are another possibility to secure financing for a given project. 
Although most EU countries have introduced provisions sanctioning such 
practices, apparently proving intention and direct involvement of such 
actors remains a big challenge for authorities.
The normal business practices for acquiring external financing such as the 
described so far are generally accessible mainly to established legitimate 
entrepreneurs, whose companies have some proven track record. However, 
they are not accessible to new entrants in the VAT fraud business, as 
well as to criminal entrepreneurs. Thereby such actors may turn only to 
illegal (or “black”) financiers or investors. For example, FATF reports 
that participants in the fraud schemes cooperate with each other, so 
it is not uncommon for third level actors to borrow initial capital as a 
“business loan” from other people already established in the field to 
start their own scheme.129 Similar cases were reported in some of the 
countries analysed in this report (Belgium, Bulgaria, Spain). The profile of 
the black financiers identified was diverse – from people involved in VAT 
fraud to criminal entrepreneurs involved in drug trafficking, illicit tobacco 
trade, loansharking and entirely legitimate businessmen looking for high-
profit investments. Access to external financing through such means is a 
matter of social capital and reputation. Therefore, mainly actors who 
have already been part of VAT fraud networks and have gained a certain 
credibility manage to secure capital in this way.
Settlement of payments
When analysing the settlement of payments in the VAT fraud networks, 
two distinct flows of money need to be considered. The first flow of 
money comprises the payments between the corporate entities involved 
129 Ibid.
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in the fraudulent chain that are disguised to mimic legitimate transactions. 
These payments are typically settled through legitimate bank transactions 
and declared to tax authorities. This is why this flow of money can be 
labelled as the “clean money flow”. Conversely, the “dirty money flow” 
comprises the payments between the individuals behind the fraudulent 
chain – organisers, supervisors, proxy persons, buffers, straw persons, 
facilitators. According to the country case study reports, the payments 
between these actors seem to be settled usually in cash, although there 
could be certain exceptions to this rule (Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic).
Figure 8. exaMple oF settleMent oF payMents in a vat Fraud network
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
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The point of intersection of these money flows appears to be the account 
of the missing trader or – in some fraudulent scenarios – the account 
of one of the buffer companies. This is the in-and-out point where 
the criminal money feed the clean money flow at the kick-start of the 
fraudulent cycle. Conversely, the legitimate money feed the dirty money 
flow with the embezzled VAT that is cashed out at the end of the cycle 
(Bulgaria). Being the weakest node of the fraudulent chain, the missing 
trader’s account is a common target for law enforcement authorities. 
Therefore, leaders of VAT fraud rings employ a variety of risk mitigation 
strategies to conceal the origin of funds and nature of transactions and 
thus hinder detection and possible freezing or seizing.
The most common strategy involves declaring of false premises for the 
bank transfers to or from the missing traders bank account such as 
intercompany loans, consultancy fees, etc. Another common strategy is 
to create the bank accounts of the missing trader and the other actors in 
offshore or virtual payment platforms, which seems to be more common 
in Western European countries (Belgium, Spain). Usually all actors of a 
given fraudulent chain keep their accounts in the same bank in order 
to speed up the transactions (Bulgaria, Spain) and all payments between 
the corporate entities within the chain are ordered in a single day or 
in a matter of a few days (Bulgaria). Corruption of bank officials is also 
practised, as an additional safeguard when domestic bank institutions 
are involved (Bulgaria). Use of proxy persons to order bank transfers or 
withdraw cash is also reported (Bulgaria).
Costs of doing business
Costs for initiating and perpetuating organised VAT fraud are merely 
indicative for the initial capital needed to enter this criminal business. 
Two categories of costs have been discussed in relation to the setting 
up and conducting of VAT frauds. Most often, operational costs were 
discussed, whereas costs for purchasing the merchandise or services 
have in many cases not been taken into account. Operational costs are 
usually composed of expenses such as the incorporation of fictitious 
companies, payments to straw men, proxy men, accountants, supervisors 
and facilitators, corruption fees. Since these costs are relatively low, 
many law enforcement experts asserted that a VAT fraud project does 
not require substantial initial investments. However, others argue that this 
seems to be true only in part. Some fraud schemes such as the invoice 
mills and fictitious export do not involve acquisition of goods or involve 
acquisition of goods with minimal value, so the ring leader does not 
need to put forward large initial investment and several thousand euros 
would be sufficient (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic).
This is not the case with missing trader schemes for acquisition or 
delivery of real goods or services from or to other EU member states, 
where the ring leader needs to secure credit or funds to purchase them 
and also cover the logistical and transportation costs. The costs of the 
goods and the accompanying logistical and transportation costs are 
typically several times bigger than the operational costs (Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic). The scale of the merchandise costs depends on the 
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type of goods, as well as on the 
final recipients of the goods. 
If the goods are destined for 
the black market, then the ring 
leader may start with smaller 
quantities. Since in carousel 
fraud the goods are traded in 
a closed circuit over and over 
again, the fraud could also be 
started with smaller volumes. 
In such scenarios ten to fifty 
thousand euros would be 
enough (Germany). However, 
when the final recipient of the 
goods is some big retailer or big 
exporter, then the fraudulent 
network should be capable of 
delivering larger quantities of 
goods. This is why such MTIC 
fraud schemes require initial 
investment starting from a 
million to a few million euros, 
and could be carried out only 
by VAT fraud networks with 
substantial financial capacity 
(Bulgaria, the Czech Republic).
The case with MTIC frauds 
exploiting emission allowances 
is similar (Belgium). Previous studies of carbon emissions fraud provide 
a detailed breakdown of different costs associated with running the 
schemes as well as the final profit. An analysis of VAT fraud that took 
place between 2008 and 2009 via a French-based trading platform 
found that an initial investment of €100 million is multiplied through 
VAT carousels to €600 million, after 10 rounds.130 Out of the entire VAT 
pocketed, 20% was paid for brokerage fees, while around 7% of the 
profit went for management fees, exchange and capital cost. In the case 
of over the counter trade, the brokerage fees were higher at 24%. The 
remaining profit of 70% – 73% of the VAT cleared (market cleared and 
over the counter) went to private and offshore accounts.
Profits, profit sharing and investments
The profitability of organised VAT fraud depends on a number of factors 
such as the rate of VAT tax, the type of goods (in some countries the 
rate of the VAT is different for different goods), the type of the fraudulent 
scheme and the scale of the fraud scheme and the number of actors 
involved. The gross profit is usually equal to the amount of the VAT 
tax embezzled. The net profit is lower, as part of the proceeds is used 
to cover the business costs. Furthermore, most missing trader schemes 
130 Frunza, “Aftermath of the VAT Fraud on Carbon Emissions Markets”.
Figure 9. exaMple oF the distribution oF proFits and costs 
FroM vat carbon eMissions carousel Fraud conducted 
via an exchange Market and over the counter
Source: Frunza, “Aftermath of the VAT Fraud on Carbon Emissions Markets”, 226.
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involve selling goods below market value; hence part of the profit is used 
to cover for the discount offered to the final recipients of the goods or 
services (Belgium, Bulgaria). The average net profit reported by experts 
from several countries that participated in the electronic survey is around 
5-7% of the fraudulent turnover (Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Latvia). In 
fee-for-service based schemes like invoice mills, the profit equals the 
agreed fee for the fraud ring, which according to the reports amounts 
to 10-15% of the VAT cleared (Bulgaria).
Profit sharing schemes among the actors involved are subject to 
preliminary agreements between them. Various profit sharing schemes 
were reported, including actors such as ring leaders, supervisors, financiers, 
buffers and brokers. Rank-and-file participants of the VAT fraud rings, 
as well as facilitators usually receive a pre-agreed fee. The enforcement 
of these arrangements often involves intimidation and use of violence 
(Belgium).
The most common investment strategy regarding profits is re-investment 
in a new tax fraud project. Other investment strategies reported included 
both legal and illegal investments. Illegal investments were reported 
less often and were related mostly to swindles and other frauds. Legal 
investments included real estate, gold, and luxury goods. Investments in 
legitimate businesses were also reported – either businesses that could 
be used to facilitate future VAT fraud operations such as logistical 
and transportation companies (Belgium) or cash-intensive businesses that 
could be used for money laundering – hotels, night clubs, restaurants 
(the Czech Republic, Greece). Depositing money in offshore accounts as 
a contingency fund is also widely practiced (Belgium, Bulgaria).
The FATF in 2007 reported on schemes with more complex financial 
links between other criminal activities (e.g. drugs) and VAT carousel fraud 
that go in both directions with profitable results, for example, in Spain 
and Sweden.131 Evidence from the UK also suggested that the proceeds 
from VAT carousel fraud have led to further criminal activity.132
Access to capital in critical moments
Just like any other criminal business, organised VAT fraud often exposes 
the actors to the risks of being prosecuted and having their assets and 
money seized and confiscated. This also brings about various incidental 
costs such as covering for the loss of money and litigation expenses. 
Therefore they might need to secure capital in order to recommence 
business. Apparently, most fraudsters in such occasions rely on their own 
“rainy day” savings from previous criminal projects (Belgium, Bulgaria). 
In some cases they have to rely on their social capital and reputation 
to secure start-up financing, so advanced payments from customers or 
trade credit from their contractors abroad were reported as possible 
alternatives (Bulgaria). As with other elements of this study, however, 
the dark figure of unrecorded fraud and of unsuccessful investigations 
131 FATF, Laundering the Proceeds of VAT Carousel Fraud, 11.
132 Ibid.
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means that the actual proportion of these techniques remains uncertain, 
and there may be other financing mechanisms of which researchers are 
currently unaware.
However, despite these inevitable caveats about a very under-researched 
component of criminal activity, the authors believe that this report 
provides sufficient information and analysis to stimulate more academic 
and practitioner research on these important topics.

4. NAtIONAl CRIMINAl MARKEtS AND FINANCES: 
COCAINE tRAFFICKING
This section contains the results of the studies of cocaine trafficking 
in seven European countries. Based on original research involving law 
enforcement officials and criminal entrepreneurs, as well as existing 
literature, the studies analyse the financing of this kind of “business” 
against the background of its changing organisational patterns. Since 
cocaine constitutes only a small part of the drug market in Estonia and 
Bulgaria, the studies in these two countries have a bigger scope and 
focus on the drugs market in general. The chapter on France focuses on 
the cocaine and cannabis markets.
“Drug trafficking is a global illicit trade involving the cultivation, 
manufacture, distribution and sale of substances which are subject to 
drug prohibition laws.”133 Its evolution from disciplined, hierarchical 
structures into looser networks of collaborating criminal entrepreneurs 
provides both opportunities and challenges to researchers and law 
enforcement. The findings of the studies described in the following 
chapters indicate the implications of the business model for the 
management of the financial flows. The enterprise may be illegal but it 
requires good customer relationship management, adequate incentives 
and disincentives, analysis of investment opportunities, accurate logistics, 
etc. Understanding the corresponding management of the financial 
affairs of this enterprise would contribute substantially to designing 
effective enforcement policies.
The texts in this section reference a number of sources as they draw 
on numerous in-depth interviews with government officials, independent 
experts and criminal entrepreneurs. The sources have been coded in order 
to preserve their anonymity. The first two letters of the code indicate 
the country (e.g. GR – Greece), “E” indicates an expert, while “C” means 
criminal entrepreneur. The description of the background of the individual 
sources referenced can be found in the “List of interviewees in the section 
on cocaine trafficking” in the Annex.
133 UNODC, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug-trafficking/index.html
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Nowadays, cocaine trafficking is one of the most profitable criminal 
activities of Italian OCGs.134 After the 1970s and 1980s, in which heroin 
trafficking represented the main criminal business, during which time 
there were high numbers of heroin addicts while cocaine consumption 
was regarded as an elite phenomenon, the acknowledged health 
damages together with HIV emergency, caused a heavy drop of heroin 
consumption, thus opening renewed marketing opportunities for cocaine. 
Furthermore, the saturation of the cocaine market in the United States 
and the incoming return of heroin, created the need for Colombian 
cartels to expand cocaine distribution to new territories: “At the beginning 
of the last decade, there was the need to cross the Atlantic [and reach 
Europe] with tonnes of cocaine while inventing new strategies. The 
organisational and logistic system of cocaine needed new perspectives, 
rules and expertise.”135
In this mutating scenario, a key role was played by the ‘Ndrangheta, 
which at the beginning of the 1990s started to exploit previous 
contacts and routes developed during the heroin business together 
with Cosa Nostra, while reinforcing connections with Colombians in 
South America.136 Thus, Italy has gradually become the destination of 
huge quantities of cocaine, at relatively low prices in comparison to 
the 1980s so as to pervade the local drug market. Indeed, at present 
cocaine is widespread among different social classes; an elite drug 
turned also into a popular drug.137
“Cocaine is used by the person sitting next to you on the train, taken 
to wake up in the morning, or the bus driver bringing you home 
because in need to make some overtime. Cocaine is consumed 
by people very close to you, if not your father, your mother or 
sister, probably your son. If not your son, your boss at work, or his 
secretary to enjoy herself on Saturdays. If not your boss, it is his 
wife to relax herself, and if it is none of these persons, it would 
be the lorry driver which delivers coffee to your bar and consumes 
cocaine not to feel tired after many hours driving […], the park-car 
attendant to have energy in his feet, or the architect that has fixed 
your vacation villa.”138
Despite the existence of different influences on the Italian cocaine 
market, in terms of market extension (i.e. levels of demand and supply), 
134 V.R. Spagnolo, Cocaina S.p.A. (Cosenza: Pellegrini Editore, 2010); F. Sallusti, Estimating Cocaine 
Market in Italy. New Methodological Tools for Policy and Program Evaluation, 2013, http://www.
drugpolicyevaluation.eu/web/workstream/6; L. Giommoni, “The Retail Value of the Illicit Drug 
Market in Italy”, Global Crime 15 (2014): 27-50.
135 Rastello, Io sono il mercato. Teoria, metodi, e stile di vita del perfetto narcotrafficante, [I Am the Market. 
Theory, Methods, and Life Style of the Perfect Narco].
136 S. Becucci, “Old and New Actors in the Italian Drug Trade: Ethnic Succession of Functional 
Specialization?”, European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 10 (2004): 257-83; S. Bizzarri et 
al., Narconomics, ed. Tacconi M. (Rome: Lantana Editore, 2010).
137 R. Saviano, Zero, Zero, Zero (Milano: Giangiacomo Feltrinelli Editore, 2013); Spagnolo, Cocaina 
S.p.A.
138 Saviano, Zero, Zero, Zero, 1.
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routes and places of importation, as well as actors involved,139 the 
financial aspects of cocaine trafficking activities in Italy have not yet 
been investigated.
According to EMCDDA,140 Italy has high rates of cocaine use (i.e. 
lifetime prevalence, population aged 15-64 years old), placing it after 
the United Kingdom, Spain, the Netherlands, and Denmark.141 In 
particular, at national level (among the same population) cocaine 
represents the second illicit drug used after cannabis, as reported 
by the General Population Survey (GPS-DAP) carried out by the 
Department of Anti-Drug Policies.142 Prevalence of cocaine use is 
estimated at 0.60% in 2012 and 0.89% in 2010 (last 12 months prior 
to the survey). The slight decline in prevalence registered within the 
general population (-0.29), is not confirmed when considering users 
among the juvenile population (15-19 year olds; student population 
survey). Cocaine remains the second used drug after cannabis, but 
with a percentage in prevalence of 1.86% in 2012 and 2.05% in 2013 
(+0.19%). At the same time, wastewater analysis conducted in the EU 
in 2011,143 was consistent with prevalence data at European level144 
revealing higher rates of cocaine use in Italy, Belgium, Sweden, France 
and the Netherlands (Table 5).
At national level, and in regard to the general population, 12 tonnes of 
pure cocaine used per year are estimated (vs. 130 tonnes at EU level), 
a value that increases to 25-50 tonnes of cut cocaine (retail level).145 
Differences among patterns of use throughout the national territory 
(17 Italian cities analysed) emerge as well, with highest levels (doses/day 
per 1,000 people) in the cities of Rome, Naples, Turin, Perugia.146 Despite 
139 Reitox National Focal Point-Italy, 2012 National Report (2011 Data) to the EMCDDA: Italy, 2012; 
EMCDDA, European Drug Report 2014. Trends and Developments, 2014; EMCDDA and Europol, 
EU Drug Markets Report. A Strategic Analysis (Luxembourg, 2013); DCSA, Relazione Annuale 2013 
[Annual Report 2013]; Becucci, “Old and New Actors in the Italian Drug Trade: Ethnic Succession 
of Functional Specialization?”; Spagnolo, Cocaina S.p.A.; G. Barbacetto and D. Milosa, Le mani 
sulla città. I boss dell’Ndrangheta vivono tra noi e controllano Milano, [Hands on the City. Bosses of the 
‘Ndrangheta Lives Among Us and Control the City of Milan] (Milano: Chiarelettere Editore, 2011); 
F. Forgione, Mafia export. Come ‘Ndrangheta, Cosa Nostra and Camorra hanno colonizzato il mondo 
[Mafia Export. How ‘Ndrangheta, Cosa Nostra and Camorra Have Colonised the World] (Milano: Baldini 
Castoldi Dalai Editore, 2009); V. Tenti and C. Morselli, “Group Co-Offending Networks in 
Italy’s Illegal Drug Trade”, Crime, Law and Social Change 62 (2014): 21-44.
140 EMCDDA, European Drug Report 2014. Trends and Developments.
141 As underlined in the EMCDDA, European Drug Report 2014, data have to be interpreted with 
caution, and thus are indicative, due to methodological differences among countries within 
surveys.
142 Reitox National Focal Point-Italy, 2012 National Report (2011 Data) to the EMCDDA: Italy.
143 Wastewater analysis is a method “involving sampling a source of wastewater, such as a 
sewage influent to a wastewater treatment plant. This allows to […] estimate the quantity of 
drugs consumed in a community by measuring the levels of illicit drugs and their metabolites 
excreted in urine” (EMCDDA, Wastewater Analysis and Drugs: A European Multi-City Study, 2014, 1.). 
Data were collected every day for a week period in the month of March 2011. For further 
details on data collection and methodology see E. Zuccato and S. Castiglioni, “Consumi di 
sostanze stupefacenti nelle città Europee [Psychotropic Substances Use in European Cities]”, 
Ricerca & Pratica 28 (2012): 252-60.
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid.
146 The Italian cities included in the sample are Palermo, Milan, Bari, Naples, Merano, Pescara, 
Potenza, Verona, Cagliari, Bologna, Gorizia, Turin, Terni, Florence, Nuoro, Rome, Perugia. Data 
were collected every day for a week period in the month of October 2011.
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the limitations of the aforementioned estimations,147 reported prevalence 
and trends are somehow in line with the opinions of some experts 
(IT-E4, IT-E19, IT-E16), underlying a widespread use of cocaine within 
the national territory, especially in larger urban cities, with an increasing 
involvement of both youths at lower ages, and various social classes. 
At present, elite and popular markets of cocaine – of different qualities 
in terms of purity and prices – coexist (IT-E19). Nevertheless, as noted 
by one expert (IT-E15), the boundaries between the two are becoming 
blurred, since the need for cocaine pushes elite consumers to frequent 
more popular retail places.
Cocaine is imported to Italy through two main routes: a) directly from 
South America, mainly Colombia, via Ecuador, Panama, Venezuela, Brazil, 
Chile, and Dominican Republic) or via the countries of Western Africa 
such as Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Gambia, Senegal, Ghana, Togo, Benin, 
Nigeria; b) European countries – the Netherlands, Spain and the Balkan 
countries (Serbia, Montenegro, Albania). “The investigation evidence 
suggests Spain is the main transit country for cocaine to be further 
imported to Italy, both for large and small amounts” (IT-E23). Cocaine 
was the most seized drug in 2013, with a slow decline compared to 2012 
147 See EMCDDA, European Drug Report 2014. Trends and Developments; Giommoni, “The Retail 
Value of the Illicit Drug Market in Italy”.
Таble 5. coMparisons oF cocaine use, estiMated by wastewater analysis 
and national prevalence
Source: Authors’ elaboration on E. Zuccato and S. Castiglioni, “Consumi Di Sostanze Stupefacenti Nelle Città Europee [Psychotropic 
Substances Use in European Cities]”.
Wastewater analysis Epidemiological data
Level of use (mg/day/1000 inhabitants) Prevalence in use of young adults% 
(aged between 15-34)
High level of use
(1,000 – 2,000 mg)
– Antwerp (Belgium)
– Amsterdam, Eindhoven, 
Utrecht (The Netherlands)
– Valencia, Barcelona, 
Castellon (Spain)
– London (UK)
High level of 
prevalence use
(4-5%)
– UK
– Spain
Medium level of use
(500 – 1,000 mg)
– Paris (France)
– Milan (Italy) 
– Brussels (Belgium)
– Santiago de C. (Spain)
Medium level of 
prevalence use
(1-3%)
– Italy
– Belgium
– Sweden
– France
– The Netherlands
Low level of use
(>200 mg)
– Helsinki, Turku (Finland)
– Stockholm, Umea 
(Sweden)
– Budweis (Czech Republic)
– Oslo (Norway)
Low level of 
prevalence use
(>1%)
– Finland
– Norway
– Czech Republic
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(Table 9), followed by hashish 
and cannabis.148 Despite this, 
some experts have indeed 
suggested that at present the 
cocaine market has reached a 
level of saturation, indicating a 
stable trend during recent years 
(IT-E17).
As indicated by DCSA149 and 
experts as well, higher levels 
of police seizures in the 
areas shown in Table 10, are 
related to the following factors: 
a) presence of international 
transhipment ports, which is the 
case of the region of Calabria, 
and minor ports such as Genoa, 
Vado Ligure in the region of 
Liguria, and Naples and Salerno 
in the region of Campania; 
b) presence of urban cities 
and thus large cocaine markets 
(the city of Milan in the region 
of Lombardy and the city of 
Rome in the region of Latium); 
c) role as transit points (again, 
the cities of Milan and Rome, 
since cocaine flows from the 
North to the South and vice 
versa mainly involve these two 
places); d) proximity to borders 
(regions of Liguria and Trentino 
Alto-Adige); e) key positions as 
for example the case of Sardinia, 
with ports and many coastline 
locations where cocaine can be 
concealed, as explained by a 
recent journalistic inquiry,150 and underlined by one expert: “Sardinia 
is underestimated. Cocaine arrives not only at ports, but also via cargo 
ships anchored in the sea with fishing boats recovering the drug and 
transporting it to different locations along the coast. And the proximity 
to Spain, as well” (IT-E19); f) presence of OCGs that function as drivers 
in determining entry, transit and destination points of cocaine trafficking. 
Nevertheless, data on cocaine use and police seizures seem to represent 
the tip of the iceberg of the national cocaine market. As stated by some 
experts when one load of cocaine is seized others have entered the 
national territory (IT-E18, IT-E13).
148 DCSA, Relazione Annuale 2013 [Annual Report 2013].
149 Ibid.
150 N. Francalacci, “I pastori sardi come i trafficanti colombiani? [Sardinian Shepherds Like 
Colombian Traffickers?]”, Panorama, July 2012.
Таble 6. drug seizures in italy in 2013 and variation in% 
coMpared to 2012
Source: Authors’ elaboration on DCSA, Relazione Annuale 2013 [Annual Report 2013], 2013.
Drug 
Kg seized
in 2013
Variation%
Cocaine 4,971.75 -6.28
Heroin 881.85 -6.21
Hashish 36,347.15 65.84
Marijuana 28,821.21 33.89
Cannabis plants (n.) 894,874 -78.29
Synthetic drugs 97.20 42.26
Other drugs 951.20 122.03
Таble 7. italian regions with highest levels oF cocaine seizures
Source: Authors’ elaboration on DCSA, Relazione Annuale 2013, [Annual Report 2013].
Region Kg
Calabria 1,663.85
Lombardy 626.63
Trentino Alto-Adige 613.37
Liguria 554.11
Lazio 534.82
Campania 270.34
Sardinia 245.22
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Cocaine use in Italy is widespread, and the market is dynamic and 
fragmented due to the interplay of different actors that range from big 
OCGs, minor criminal groups, to groups of individuals either with a 
criminal background or not belonging to the criminal milieu. As stated 
by one expert (IT-E15), “contacts and capital are enough to enter any 
cocaine business”.
In particular, Italian OCGs are active along the three stages of cocaine 
trafficking (importation, wholesale and retail), although at different levels 
of operation. Due to the immigration flows of the 1990s, there are also 
foreign OCGs and criminal groups in this market which, except for a 
few cases, are mainly involved at the retail level. The latter have had to 
confront with the monopoly of Italian OCGs, while struggling to reach 
medium or high level positions.151 
Consistently, at the importation level actors can be identified in regard 
to three levels of the market: a) High segment – OCGs involved in 
large scale trafficking operations, which import cocaine directly from 
South America and act as wholesalers; b) Middle segment – traffickers 
importing lesser quantities of cocaine, usually from other European 
countries (Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium), and in some cases offering 
logistical support to large scale importers; c) low segment – criminal 
groups, or families, involved in small scale cocaine trafficking operations 
and active locally. 
As reported by experts, especially at the importation and wholesale 
levels, actors are structured into fluid, horizontal and loose networks 
made of independent nodes and connected by key actors, displaying 
specific roles and duties. Networks are based on contacts, intermediaries, 
brokers and include persons in charge of contacting suppliers, financiers, 
import-export companies, or responsible for arranging locations for storing 
cocaine, or acting as guarantors for the cocaine businesses; each belong 
to separate levels of cocaine trafficking operations and are not aware 
of each other (IT-E4, IT-E13). Connections among actors are created in 
virtue of joint ventures, where alliances and collaborations may vary 
depending on circumstances: “it can be one OCG or more OGCs 
joined together. For example, a group in the Netherlands mediating an 
importation from South America for an Italian group with the latter 
being unaware of suppliers, and the former supplying different groups 
at the same time” (IT-E8). 
Within these networks, trust is fundamental and is usually guaranteed 
either by family, ethnic, kinship ties, or friendship/acquaintanceship bonds 
(IT-E9, IT-E1). “It is more likely that, high level traffickers managing large 
scale importations of cocaine, have limited contacts based for example on 
ethnicity or clan membership. If the trafficker is Turkish, he will probably 
have a Turkish supplier or broker, and similarly for the Colombian or 
the Italian trafficker. Albanians, for example, trust each other in virtue of 
familial ties as well as clan membership. The latter, implying strict codes 
of conduct, reinforces fair conduct in the business” (IT-E1).
151 See also Tenti and Morselli, “Group Co-Offending Networks in Italy’s Illegal Drug Trade”.
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Acquaintances and friendships may form in different contexts, as 
reported by some experts (IT-E1; IT-E11), with prison being the favoured 
environment used to establish contacts for further joint ventures (IT-E24). 
Referring to Italian OCGs, a prosecutor at the DDA of the city of 
Naples152 has indeed addressed how the lack of rooms for prisoners 
serving sentences under art. 41bis (close confinement prison regime), 
has resulted in facilitating contacts among bosses that, in this way, get 
to know each other and have the opportunity to decide future joint 
ventures and alliances.
Importation and wholesale levels
High segment – large scale cocaine trafficking operations
At this level, a large part of the national cocaine market is managed 
by criminal entrepreneurs belonging to Italian OCGs, in particular the 
‘Ndrangheta, Camorra, and Cosa Nostra, although the latter act more 
as a partner of joint ventures exploiting routes and contacts of the 
former and providing in some cases logistical support.153 As for foreign 
OCGs, Serbian-Montenegrin traffickers, were able to settle in the national 
cocaine market despite the rooted presence and control of Italian OCGs, 
representing nowadays competitive actors as well. All these groups import 
significant quantities (several kilos to tonnes) of cocaine to Italy, in virtue 
of direct contacts with suppliers in South America, while at the same 
time exporting cocaine from Italy to other European countries to supply 
members or contacts (IT-E24). 
In particular, the majority of interviewed experts pointed out the strong 
and key role of the ‘Ndrangheta (defined as a quasi-monopolistic position), 
at national and international level, addressing the following factors:
• Its horizontal structure (IT-E14) – the presence of affiliates almost 
worldwide154 – activated when needed and displaying different roles: 
“During an eight month period of surveillance, a pizza chef in 
Miami conducted a normal life (pizzeria-home-family-pizzeria), until 
he received a telephone call from Calabria (Costa Ionica). This is how 
he was informed that the family was recruiting him, and from a pizza 
chef he turned into a cocaine trafficker” (IT-E18).
152 G. Tizian, “Mafie, la grande alleanza [Mafia, the Big Alliance]”, L’Espresso, July 30, 2013.
153 In the opinion of some experts (IT-E18, IT-E13, IT-E15), Cosa Nostra represents at the moment a 
“second level player” within the national cocaine market, as a result of the massive government 
counteraction started in the 1990s in response to the violent strategy adopted by this OCG. 
“After this time, Cosa Nostra was not able to further replace its previous contacts due to 
heroin trafficking, and nowadays seems dependent on the ‘Ndrangheta and Camorra for 
cocaine importation” (IT-E13); see also Spagnolo, Cocaina S.p.A.; Becucci, “Old and New Actors 
in the Italian Drug Trade: Ethnic Succession of Functional Specialization?”.
154 In particular, it is documented that affiliates of the ‘Ndrangheta are located in many European 
countries such as Spain, the Netherlands, France, Belgium, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
as well as in other non-European ones as for example Canada, United States, Venezuela, 
Colombia, Australia and countries in Africa (Forgione, Mafia export. Come ‘Ndrangheta, Cosa 
Nostra e Camorra hanno colonizzato il mondo [Mafia Export. How ‘Ndrangheta, Cosa Nostra and Camorra 
Have Colonised the World]; R. Sciarrone and L. Storti, “The Territorial Expansion of Mafia-Type 
Organized Crime. The Case of the Italian Mafia in Germany”, Crime, Law and Social Change 61 
(2014): 37-70.
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• Tried and trusted relationships with suppliers in the producing countries, 
also via trusted drug brokers.
• Huge availability of capital and strategic assets to carry out cocaine 
trafficking operations.
• The control, through own structures, of key points of cocaine transit 
and importation to Italy. It is the case, for example, of the port of 
Gioia Tauro (region of Calabria), and the “Ortomercato” (the central 
vegetable market) in the city of Milan. In line with collected data, 
it has indeed been documented the role of ‘Ndrangheta families 
(‘ndrine) in first controlling and then also acquiring, transhipment 
services or import-export companies operating in these places.155
Consistently, a similar strong and competitive position has been underlined 
by some experts (IT-E8, IT-E21, IT-E24) in regard to Serbian-Montenegrin 
OCGs, due to their paramilitary structure, the high availability of financial 
capital and the longstanding experience acquired with tobacco and arms 
smuggling during the post-Yugoslavia conflicts. At present, investigative 
evidence (IT-E21) suggests that these groups are increasingly becoming 
suppliers of Italian OCGs, since dealing with huge quantities of high 
purity cocaine, assuming on their side risks related to transoceanic 
transportation and storage, and further delivered at competitive prices 
on the Italian market.
Except for Camorra clans, which are also involved at the retail level, 
Italian and Serbian-Montenegrin OCGs act mainly as wholesalers. All these 
groups may import cocaine by sea directly from South America, or by road 
when importation is managed by intermediaries located in other European 
countries. This is the case of Serbian-Montenegrin groups that exploit the 
Balkan route, and further deliver cocaine through the border between Italy 
and Croatia or directly to the ports along the Adriatic coast; or of Camorra 
clans that import cocaine mainly via Spain, where stable affiliates reside 
providing logistics support, to the port of the cities of Caserta or Naples 
in the South of Italy (region of Campania), (IT-E8, IT-E25, IT-E12).
Import-export companies and transhipment services represent the main 
means used in large-scale cocaine trafficking operations. The companies 
may be either owned by OCGs or created ad hoc for few importations 
and registered to straw men. At the same time, the presence of complicit 
import-export companies offering services on a fee basis supporting 
the transportation of cocaine hidden with other legitimate products 
was reported by a number of experts (IT-E4, IT-E19, IT-E23, IT-E11, 
IT-E27). Furthermore, OCGs can rely on accomplices (e.g. customs agents, 
shippers) at the ports of departure and destination (and when needed 
of transit as well), facilitating both the shipping and subsequent recovery 
of containers, preventing controls and facilitating the overall trafficking 
operations. In particular, accomplices are necessary when cocaine 
operations are organised through the “rip-on/rip-off method”, i.e. these 
individuals are in charge of inserting and subsequently removing bags 
with cocaine loaded in containers (IT-E19, IT-E11).
155 See also Barbacetto and Milosa, Le mani sulla città. I boss dell’Ndrangheta vivono tra noi e controllano 
Milano, [Hands on the City. Bosses of the ‘Ndrangheta Lives Among Us and Control the City of Milan].
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Once cocaine reaches Italy, OCGs use storage places for second extraction, 
repackaging and further distribution. While Serbian-Montenegrin OCGs 
mainly supply buyers situated in the northern areas, especially in the 
region of Lombardy (IT-E21), Italian OCGs have wider contacts being able 
to supply different buyers throughout the country (IT-E10).
“We have investigated a small group of traffickers working for a 
family of ‘Ndrangheta organising several cocaine trafficking operations 
from South America to the ports of the region of Liguria. During 
the last importation, the drug was collected at the port and then 
transported to a storage place situated in another nearby region. 
There, we found 5 modified vehicles, previously sent to a garage in 
Spain to be equipped with false bottoms and returned back to Italy 
with an articulated lorry. A very professional work, false bottoms 
activated by remote control and impossible to discover through 
routine police control” (IT-E11).
Middle segment – medium scale trafficking operations
At this level of the national cocaine market both Italian and foreign 
OCGs are involved, organising smaller scale cocaine trafficking operations. 
In this case, importation occurs mainly in virtue of intermediaries (i.e. 
members or contacts) located in other European countries such as 
the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Albania, which, in turn, have links 
with suppliers in South America. These criminal entrepreneurs, who 
contribute to a significant part of the cocaine market, may either 
import via their own suppliers, or collaborate with Italian OCGs (e.g. 
the ‘Ndrangheta, Camorra, Cosa Nostra, Sacra Corona Unita) both as 
suppliers (offering logistical support) or customers, depending on the 
nature of joint ventures (IT-E21, IT-E10, IT-E16). Although some experts 
reported examples of Italian OCGs156 operating at this level (IT-E18, IT-
E10), in general it was pointed out that the middle segment concerns 
mainly foreign groups, such as Albanians, Tunisians, Roma, especially in 
the central regions of Italy (e.g. Tuscany, Marche, Umbria, Abruzzo), and 
Nigerians (IT-E8, IT-E4, IT-E14, IT-E13, IT-E15).
“The Italian cocaine market has its regional peculiarities. In the South, 
there is an inevitable mixture of major Italian OCGs and foreign 
groups, where the former have almost complete control. In the north, 
as for example in the region of Lombardy (the city of Milan), in the 
region of Liguria (the city of Genoa), in other medium and large cities 
where Italian OCGs are rooted and have their interests, a link, a 
point of contact has to be present. Other regions, cities and towns, 
especially in the centre, where Italian OCGs have no interest to 
expand their criminal activities, foreign OCGs can manage the cocaine 
business with almost no opposition. And, although the latter have in 
156 One example regard the Fasciani clan (IT-E18, IT-E22), operating in Ostia (administrative 
division of the city of Rome) as wholesalers and retailers, relying on own routes and contacts 
for cocaine importation. “Indeed, in this place they have a monopoly role based on direct 
contacts (native individuals of Ostia) residing in Argentina and other places worldwide. From 
Colombia and Spain, they import hundreds of kilos of cocaine, which is also distributed to 
different areas within the city of Rome” (L. Abbate, “Così funziona la mafia di ostia [This Is 
How the Mafia in Ostia Operates]”, L’Espresso, June 11, 2014).
86 Financing	oF	organised	crime
most cases their own supplying contacts and routes, they do not have 
yet the necessary know-how to compete at the same level” (IT-E13).
Among foreign groups, Albanians are considered second lead actors 
(IT-E13) since they are able to manage supply, transportation and 
distribution with high levels of organisation, similarly to Italian OCGs. 
“Laboratory analysis of cocaine seized to Albanian traffickers revealed 
refinement techniques which are different from the ones used by South 
Americans as to assume that at present the Balkan area functions as 
destination and storage but also of cocaine refinement” (IT-E21). This 
group, active at wholesale and retail levels157 rely on a wide network 
of affiliates (members of clans) residing both in different northern 
and central areas of Italy, and other European countries, such as the 
Netherlands, Spain (more recently) and Albania (where bosses usually 
reside). Cocaine is then imported via road or sea routes through 
different means: recruited drivers of lorries, false bottom cars, taxi, 
rented cars; skippers of sailing boats, yachts; complicit seamen or 
executive officers, or passenger ships with cocaine hidden in bags or 
cars (IT-E8, IT-E3, IT-E4, IT-E11, IT-E15).
“In one investigation we detected a German courier in need of 
money since addicted to gambling who lived on the border between 
Germany and the Netherlands. Approached by two Albanian traf-
fickers he was recruited to transport cocaine from the Netherlands 
to Italy, using his sister’s car. It was a medium size family group, a 
brother residing in the Netherlands organising purchase and trans-
portation of the drug and the boss (his brother) located in Tuscany, 
importing and selling cocaine at wholesale level” (IT-E2).
Nigerians import cocaine employing several drug mules (swallowers) 
transporting around a kilo of cocaine on each trip. For example, drug 
mules may leave from Nigeria, transit through the airports of Madrid, 
Amsterdam, London, Berlin, Frankfurt to reach major and minor Italian 
airports. Indeed, this group, considered to be highly competitive is 
particularly widespread due to: a) the existence of a transnational network 
of affiliates (family members formed in cells) being able to import cocaine 
from various locations almost worldwide; b) the presence of organised 
retail distribution spots in many cities and towns of Italy, from the North 
to the South. In the South, especially in places such as Naples, Caserta, 
Castel Volturno, where parts of the territory is controlled by Camorra 
clans, Nigerians are allowed to sell cocaine at street level for a fee for 
each kilo delivered (IT-E22, IT-E24).
Low segment – small scale cocaine trafficking operations
At this level of operation, different actors are involved belonging either 
to the criminal milieu or legitimate contexts, which in some cases may 
157 It has been underlined for example, that Albanians are the main wholesalers to Roma families, 
due to a well-established business relationship, with the latter supplying other families of the 
same ethnicity in the region of Abruzzo. At the same time, Roma criminal entrepreneurs may 
turn to other suppliers: direct contacts located in Spain and the Netherlands, or Calabrian 
or Neapolitan higher level wholesalers in regions such as Lombardy, Campania, Latium and 
Calabria (IT-E17).
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also join together to carry out small cocaine businesses depending on 
contacts and opportunities. The involvement of Dominican, Brazilian, 
and Colombians criminal groups (usually family-based) was underlined, 
importing cocaine from South America and Santo Domingo by way of 
drug mules travelling by plain, with a distribution model limited to their 
ethnic communities (IT-E5, IT-E11, IT-E13, IT-E12). At the same time, 
different cases were reported among the following:
• A domestic group of criminal entrepreneurs operating in the centre of 
Italy importing some kilos of cocaine per week thanks to contacts with 
intermediaries of an Italian OCGs (Sacra Corona Unita) and supplying 
around 400 customers in their town and surrounding areas (IT-E1).
• An Italian entrepreneur in the north whose woodwork business 
went bankrupt, collecting money from acquaintances and friends 
(other legal entrepreneurs) and importing cocaine directly from South 
America (Colombia) and the Netherlands through a small network of 
suppliers (in the first place) and intermediaries (in the second place). 
“Fortuitous occasions may facilitate involvement in small cocaine 
trafficking operation. In this case, an Italian man had a Spanish friend 
who in turn had another Spanish friend living in Amsterdam, the latter 
in contact with Dutch traffickers” (IT-E11).
• A group of acquaintances in the city of Milan consisting of a 
professional, two ladies and other three or four individuals, all Italians, 
met while on vacation were importing cocaine from Santo Domingo 
(10 kilos 2-3 times a year) with the oldest lady travelling with children 
and expenses paid by the group (IT-E15).
Retail level
“Besides wholesale distribution, each street dealer may be a consumer 
as well, thus in our country there is an endless number of retail channels 
guaranteeing a widespread distribution of cocaine” (IT-E17). At this level 
both Italian and foreign individuals are active, separated from the higher 
levels of the trafficking chain (IT-E8, IT-E5). “Nigerians, Moroccans, 
Tunisians, Albanians, Serbians, Croatians and Bulgarians. In the Italian 
criminal underworld, the melting pot so attended by European governors 
within the legitimate economy has been actually realised.”158 Indeed, 
the need during the 1990s of Italian OCGs to distribute huge quantities 
of cocaine turned into the creation of organised “drug supermarkets” 
(IT-E12), opened almost 24-hours a day, subsequently exported to a 
number of Italian cities: Milan, Turin, Genoa, Verona, Rome (IT-E23).
Nowadays, in regard to the different regions of the Italian territory and 
in line with the collected data, it can be argued the existence of three 
main types of open air cocaine markets located in central and suburban 
areas of cities and towns:
• Controlled markets managed by Italian OCGs (the ‘Ndrangheta, 
Camorra, Cosa Nostra, Sacra Corona Unita) where Italian and foreign 
158 Spagnolo, Cocaina S.p.A., 176.
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individuals are employed and paid regular salaries;
• tolerated markets where criminal entrepreneurs (mainly foreigners) 
operate under indirect control of Italian OCGs that require the 
payment of a fee for street dealing distribution; 
• Free markets – areas without the control of Italian OCGs, in which 
mainly foreign dealers are active and that acquire cocaine from 
suppliers located in different Italian cities. Depending on the areas, 
ethnicities are Serbian, Roma, Albanian, Maghrebian, Moroccan, 
Tunisian, Nigerian, Ghanaian, Senegalese (IT-E2, IT-E4, IT-E12).159 
At the same time, clubs, pubs, discos of the night-time economy 
in larger cities or towns represent places of distribution as well, 
together with more covert locations such as private apartments or 
houses (IT-E8).
Although the national cocaine market appears dynamic and fragmented, 
recurrent financing patterns can be found: the need to have start-up 
capital for entering the market; the coexistence of illegal and legal capital 
as sources of financing; the key role of social capital as start-up capital, 
the presence of individuals (i.e. facilitators) collecting and delivering 
money to suppliers.
Sources of capital for criminal operations. Profile of financiers 
in criminal operations
Social capital more than financial capital
Contacts and trust (i.e. social capital) and reputation represent, in most 
cases, important elements that allow criminal entrepreneurs to enter the 
cocaine market even without financial start-up capital. Indeed, it has 
been underlined by experts, especially at the high and medium levels of 
operation, the key role of trusted individuals functioning as guarantors 
of cocaine transactions on the side of buyers and suppliers. Thus, after 
having gained access, increased credibility and reliability are at the basis 
for continuing to operate in the cocaine market without the need of 
advanced payments. Similarly, at the lower level, cocaine is given on 
credit as start-up capital in virtue of acquaintances or friendships, also 
developed during periods of detention. Dealers can also benefit from 
ethnic or kinship links to receive drugs on credit or to be recruited 
within a structured cocaine market (e.g. controlled markets) where no 
initial capital is required.
The most cited example by experts, at the high level segment, is that of 
the ‘Ndragheta, which when entering cocaine business around the 1990s, 
was able to efficiently exploit previous contacts established through 
heroin trafficking (during the 1980s) managed together with Cosa Nostra 
(IT-E1). At present, the strength of this OCG relies in its undoubted 
reputation as credible traffickers, both at international and national 
159 See also Becucci, “Old and New Actors in the Italian Drug Trade: Ethnic Succession of 
Functional Specialization?”
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level, and the availability of direct contacts in South America via trusted 
affiliates or drug brokers, that in turn, enable this group to organise large 
scale cocaine trafficking operations without anticipating any financial 
capital (IT-E18, IT-E13).
“Roberto Pannunzi,160 who is well-known and esteemed in Colombia, 
is the one that contacts suppliers, negotiates the price of cocaine, 
establishes the quantities of cocaine to be distributed on the basis 
of the capital invested, decides the means of transport. With Barba, 
one of the main ‘commercial agents’ of Colombian narcos, he does 
not need either to sign agreements nor to pay a sum in advance. His 
word and a handshake are enough. In Bogotá they know he works 
for families of ‘Ndrangheta.”161
Recognised expertise, reputation and contacts have allowed some foreign 
OCGs to ascend from bottom to medium/high levels of the cocaine 
national market, as is the case, for example, of Albanian and Serbian-
Montenegrin groups (IT-E5; IT-E24, IT-E14). The former were able to use 
their credibility to become in a short time assistants of brokers, and 
trusted criminal entrepreneurs as to form joint ventures with national 
OCGs, employing for the retail level other ethnic groups (e.g. Tunisians 
and Maghrebians). The latter have gradually become reliable suppliers in 
the city of Milan for ‘Ndrangheta families. “An efficient cocaine agency” 
capable of importing cocaine and covering costs of importation and 
transportation, thus avoiding the need to wait for the proceeds of sales 
to customers.162
Illegal sources of financing and criminal careers
The availability of financial start-up capital appears to be of equal 
significance to social capital especially in the high and middle segments. 
When organising large/medium scale trafficking operations, some costs 
cannot be postponed as for example transport (i.e. couriers, drug mules, 
drivers) or corruption of officials, if needed. That is, OCGs operating at 
these levels usually already have financial capital to start and then sustain 
the cocaine business. 
160 Roberto Pannunzi and Pasquale Locatelli are considered the most important and influent Italian 
pioneering drug brokers, that at the beginning of their criminal careers were able to redraw the 
international schemes of cocaine importation, mainly from South America to Italy. Indeed their 
fundamental and innovative role consisted in paving the way to cocaine joint ventures in the 
form of associations among families of different Italian OCGs (e.g. the ‘Ndrangheta, Camorra, 
Cosa Nostra) managing the different orders (in huge quantities), the payments to suppliers 
and the further distribution, in virtue of their trusted contacts (both with Italian and South 
American OCGs) and credibility as businessmen (see also Saviano, Zero, Zero, Zero; Forgione, 
Mafia export. Come ‘Ndrangheta, Cosa Nostra e Camorra hanno colonizzato il mondo [Mafia Export. 
How ‘Ndrangheta, Cosa Nostra and Camorra Have Colonised the World]; Spagnolo, Cocaina S.p.A.; 
M. Mologni, “Processo in vista per Pasquale Locatelli. Saviano lo definì il broker della cocaina” 
[Upcoming Trial for Pasquale Locatelli. As Defined by Saviano, the Broker of Cocaine]”, 
La Repubblica, November 13, 2013).
161 Forgione, Mafia export. Come ‘Ndrangheta, Cosa Nostra e Camorra hanno colonizzato il mondo [Mafia 
Export. How ‘Ndrangheta, Cosa Nostra and Camorra Have Colonised the World], 58.
162 G. Anastasio, “Droga, il tramonto dell’Ndrangheta: A comandare ora è la mafia serba [Drug, 
the Decline of the ‘Ndrangheta: Now the Serbian Mafia Is in Command]”, Il Giorno, January 25, 
2014; Becucci, “Old and New Actors in the Italian Drug Trade: Ethnic Succession of Functional 
Specialization?”; Bizzarri et al., Narconomics.
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In particular, in the case of Italian OCGs which can be considered 
as high level criminal entrepreneurs, entering into the national cocaine 
market occurred in virtue of their long-standing criminal career, which 
in turn allowed for accumulating financial sources via other criminal 
activities. As noted by one expert (IT-E1): “cocaine trafficking offered the 
opportunity to invest money coming from loansharking, extortion racket, 
kidnapping, gambling and prostitution since at that time (during the 1980s) 
no laundering system was yet available.” At present, extortion racket and 
loansharking are considered by the majority of experts the main financial 
sources for cocaine trafficking, with the latter having become a source of 
financing as well. At the same time, capital coming from OCGs’ criminal 
activities is reinvested into the legal economy (e.g. acquisition of properties 
and goods), producing revenues and legitimate methods of payments that 
are used for cocaine trafficking operations (IT-E18, IT-E14).163
“For example, with reference to ‘Ndrangheta families, sources of 
financing appear blurred. The evidence is the huge availability of cash 
that allows them to buy tonnes of cocaine. Money comes either from 
legal properties or illegal activities. In the city of Bologna we have 
seized a supermarket, a hotel, cars, two garages, for a total value 
of around €4-6 million. The hotel was registered in a straw man’s 
name, a person with a clean record but close to an ‘Ndrangheta 
family. Each client of the hotel, unintentionally financed their criminal 
activities. Here, there are many businesses run by Calabrian affiliates, 
restaurants, pubs, bars, all representing a source of finance for cocaine 
trafficking” (IT-E15).
Besides, high level criminal entrepreneurs, the collected data suggest 
that different criminal activities are the source of capitals to be invested 
into cocaine trafficking, and this is valid for both individuals belonging 
to the middle/low segments. After having entered the cocaine market, 
the revenues acquired are the main sources used to sustain further 
trafficking operations. Sexual exploitation and prostitution, for example, 
has been the criminal activity for Albanians OCGs to gain capital at first: 
“A prostitute earns around €600-€700 a day, which multiplied for the 
working days in a month, is a significant amount of money for purchasing 
cocaine” (IT-E16). 
Other illegal sources of financing are used more or less by different 
criminal groups, or even individuals to finance small scale cocaine 
trafficking operations, such as the ones perpetrating armed robberies or 
burglaries allowing an immediate availability of cash to be invested into 
cocaine operations (IT-E13). “In one case, we prevented a person from 
committing a robbery. The intention was to have money to finance a 
cocaine deal, earning around €400,000-€500,000 and raise his living 
standard” (IT-E6).
At the retail level, criminal entrepreneurs need smaller amounts of 
money, but if operating outside a network of contacts need cocaine 
163 See also Barbacetto and Milosa, Le mani sulla città. I boss dell’Ndrangheta vivono tra noi e controllano 
Milano, [Hands on the City. Bosses of the ‘Ndrangheta Lives Among Us and Control the City of Milan].
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on credit that functions as start-up capital. After this initial phase, profit 
margins are reinvested to buy other quantities of cocaine, thus gradually 
expanding the business. “Tunisians can obtain 50 grams of cocaine on 
credit from middle suppliers, and after selling with good profit margins 
(i.e. cutting or selling 0.80 at a dose), start having a small capital to 
reinvest. After a short period (around two months) they are able to buy 
half a kilo” (IT-E5).
Legal sources of financing
Besides cases in which sources of financing for cocaine trafficking derive 
from legitimate business activities run by OCGs, legal capitals loaned 
by external financiers have been mentioned in two instances. The first 
concerns legal entrepreneurs (which in the opinion of the expert are 
numerous) owning small companies or commercial premises in the 
city of Milan that decide to make use of their contacts and invest 
dirty money into several cocaine deals, seen as the easiest and most 
profitable investment. They can make from €50,000 up to €200,000, 
and risks (e.g. load seizures) are covered by the right to collect profits 
on subsequent cocaine trafficking operations. “Some investors had 
to wait 2 years to have their money back, others only 3 months. 
There is no guarantee, since it depends on several factors: the quality 
of contacts, the capacity of traffickers, the routes of importation” 
(IT-E4). The second, regarding legal financiers who are running regular 
businesses and lending money to dealers at the initial stage. “Different 
street dealers referred that to start the cocaine business, were at first 
introduced to these people borrowing capital to be returned within a 
month” (IT-E5). At the same time, legal capital is also used to finance 
small cocaine trafficking operations when legitimate entrepreneurs are 
willing to increase their overall profits. In these circumstances, money is 
collected among a restricted group of individuals who – having the right 
contacts – are able to import and sell cocaine usually to acquaintances 
or friends (IT-E11, IT-E15).
Financial joint ventures
Raising capital is usually done among more OCGs, so as to share costs and 
risks. As contended by one expert (IT-E4), cocaine trafficking operations 
are first financial joint ventures, i.e. accepting to divide profits in virtue 
of fewer risks for each actor involved. In several cases, for example, 
‘Ndrangheta families join together with Camorra clans to finance a single 
cocaine deal, dividing the loads in respect to the initial investment 
(IT-E7). In this regard, a common modus operandi has been underlined 
at all levels of operation: the presence of individuals in charge of 
testing the interest of different buyers, collecting quotes offered by each 
participant, forwarding the order to suppliers via skype, email, telephone 
coded messages and, in most cases, also arranging importation (IT-E3, 
IT-E9).164 Italian OCGs, for example, rely on trusted drug brokers, 
individuals external to the organisation that arrange cocaine trafficking 
164 See also P. Campana, “Eavesdropping on the Mob: The Functional Diversification of Mafia 
Activities Across Territories”, European Journal of Criminology 8 (2011): 213-28.
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operations and work for different families or clans. Indeed, as explained 
in Rastello (2009), families of the ‘Ndrangheta or Camorra clans finance 
cocaine trafficking operations, open markets and control the retail level, 
but are not involved in logistics. Technical aspects are managed by 
professionals, reliable individuals capable of solving problems.
“A real narcos does not need any intermediaries. He manages 
relationships with Colombian, Bolivian, Mexican cartels to import 
huge quantities of cocaine […]. When the load is ready, from Toronto 
he starts to arrange meetings and negotiations to define the quotes 
of participation. It is at this point that he contacts the bosses of 
‘Ndrangheta families in Calabria, or their representatives in Canada. 
His job is not easy, it requires credibility and reciprocal trust among 
all the participants. These are affairs of millions of dollars that no 
notary can ratify. The ‘word of honour’ and ‘respect’ represent the 
only contractual bonds as a guarantee of one’s own undertaken 
engagements.”165
Access to capital in critical moments
Critical moments (e.g. arrest, seizures of loads, theft by competitors, etc.) 
have different impacts depending on the level of operation. OCGs, in 
virtue of large scale cocaine trafficking operations are able to make savings 
that allow them to continue the cocaine business. Financial resources 
are preserved using different means: reinvested in legal properties or 
deposited in bank accounts/safe deposit boxes registered to straw men, 
or even kept in cash and concealed in various places (e.g. warehouses, 
apartments, etc.). Furthermore, in case of arrest, individuals keep being 
connected to other members that not only provide legal and familial 
assistance, but also continue to run cocaine trafficking. One expert 
(IT-E26) related how some bosses of OCGs are capable to continue 
running the criminal activity although imprisoned, due to communications 
via third persons attending weekly meetings. Although OCGs have been 
heavily dismantled, in most cases trusted relationships with drug brokers 
or suppliers in South America represent the basis from which to restart 
after a period of detention and source support if capital is needed. 
Credibility and trust are the re-entry tickets to the business and for 
receiving cocaine on credit (IT-E21, IT-E3). At lower levels, contacts and 
trust appear even more important for starting the cocaine business again, 
under the condition to have been silent during detention. Street dealers 
can be reintegrated within the group where cocaine is provided at first 
on credit; in cases in which contacts are not available, minor crimes 
(robberies, thefts) function as sources of initial capital.
Overall, at all levels of the cocaine market criminal entrepreneurs are 
likely to continue with their criminal activity without facing particular 
difficulties (IT-E9, IT-E2).
165 Forgione, Mafia Export. Come ‘Ndrangheta, Cosa Nostra e Camorra hanno colonizzato il mondo [Mafia 
Export. How ‘Ndrangheta, Cosa Nostra and Camorra Have Colonised the World], 193.
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Settlement of payments
According to experts, trust is fundamental when settling payments among 
buyers and suppliers. In particular, the possibility to have less or no start-
up capital is correlated to the arrangements players make within cocaine 
trafficking operations. The ‘Ndrangheta, for example, has well-established 
credibility within the national and international cocaine market that 
can arrange trafficking operations and receive the drugs without any 
advanced payment. As reported by one expert (IT-E18) “suppliers are 
aware that these traffickers are solvent”. Indeed, when trust is lacking 
or buyers and suppliers are at their first deal, the most common forms 
of guarantee are cash upfront or alternatively the use of individuals 
as collateral: “persons whose life is important enough to buyers as to 
compel to payment” (IT-E11).
Besides the role of trusted relationships, another significant variable 
discriminating among different schemes of payment is the level at which 
criminal entrepreneurs operate: more often up-front arrangements are 
made at the lower levels (between medium wholesalers and dealers, 
or the latter and users), (IT-E2). Nevertheless, although other modes of 
payment exist – such as partial payment and revolving credit arrangements, 
especially applicable at the higher/medium levels (importation and 
wholesale) – it has been underlined by some experts that in more recent 
times the trend at all levels is the request of advanced cash payments. 
In this regard, one main reason has been identified: the presence of 
various insolvent buyers. At the retail level, on the one hand, dealers 
may build customers loyalty by giving cocaine on credit; on the other, 
the latter may face economic difficulties being not able to repay quickly. 
As a result, the entire cycle of payment may be compromised (IT-E14), 
resulting in certain cases in violence (IT-E2, IT-E18). Similarly, at higher 
levels, it has been argued that the reduced availability of cash – due 
mainly to the policy of some criminal entrepreneurs to move their capital 
as little as possible – results in cocaine deals remaining unpaid:
“In recent times there is less cash, and this way buyers lose loads 
of cocaine. Usually the deal is to repay back at first a quantity of 
cocaine corresponding to 30% of the value (at European price) once 
it has been sold. The remaining part is liquidated through a second 
tranche. Thus, many suppliers run the risk either to remain unpaid, or 
to wait long periods before receiving the money back, until facilitators 
(e.g. custom officers, entrepreneurs) get paid” (IT-E3).
Despite this, when operating at higher levels and between trusted OCGs, 
retaliations are not the rule; instead, new arrangements are set up in 
order to continue to run the cocaine business smoothly. The most 
common option is to benefit from another consignment by suppliers to 
fix previous unsolved payments (IT-E18).
Instalments and revolving credit arrangements
Instalments and revolving credit arrangements are, in the opinion of 
experts, the most used in cocaine trafficking. The first, regarding high 
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and medium levels of operation, requires an advance by the buyers 
of around a 10% to 20% of the value of the agreed overall price 
per kilo in the producing countries (IT-E3). This advanced sum is 
aimed at: a) ensuring the commitment of buyers; b) covering costs 
of transportation and other expenses (e.g. corruption), usually charged 
to customers; c) covering risks (e.g. seizures by police; stealing by 
competitors).166 The remaining part is then paid either when cocaine is 
delivered or sold. Again, the degree of trust is crucial: if the business 
relationship is at the beginning, or is guaranteed by intermediaries, the 
advanced amount is higher; on the contrary, if deals are well-established 
the amount required is less (IT-E10).
Nevertheless, this mode of payment is not fixed since, besides trust, may 
depend on other contingent factors such as for example the availability of 
drug on the side of suppliers. Indeed, a variation of this main settlement 
of payment scheme has been explained as follows:
“The buyers pay an anticipated sum, let’s say, for a load of 100 kilos of 
cocaine which is actually the quantity that is able to sell on the Italian 
market. The supplier, at the same time, supply 200 more kilos, requir-
ing this part to be sold at the European price. This way, if the buyer 
is a capable seller, that is selling at a major price, repay the supplier 
while having profit margins as well. More likely, this happens, since in 
South America, the quantity of cocaine available is huge” (IT-E4).
The second, i.e. revolving credit arrangements, are more related to 
medium or low levels of operation, with trust as a form of guarantee 
more than in the aforementioned cases. The drug is then given to 
customers on credit, and it is repaid on an agreed timetable. “Street 
dealers, for example Albanians, receive small quantities of cocaine on 
credit, especially when entering the business” (IT-E5). At the same time, 
this kind of arrangement is employed by medium wholesalers to keep 
dealers (IT-E20). Similarly, in the cocaine markets controlled by Italian 
OCGs, dealers recruited as employees receive the drug on a free basis, 
being repaid back with regular salaries (IT-E24).
Payment methods
The collected data has underlined three main methods for cocaine pay-
ments used by criminal entrepreneurs, which are employed depending 
on the level of operation (high, medium, low), (IT-E20): cash which is 
physically transported; transactions via bank accounts; money transfer 
services and hawala (also applied for laundering profits of cocaine 
trafficking).
Cash payments
In the opinion of the majority of experts cash still represents the most 
method used, due to the low risks of detection that money couriers are 
166 See also Rastello, Io sono il mercato. Teoria, metodi, e stile di vita del perfetto narcotrafficante, [I Am 
the Market. Theory, Methods, and Life Style of the Perfect Narco].
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likely to face, and as stated in Rastello (2009) interviewing an Italian drug 
broker, financial transactions are at major risks of being intercepted. One 
expert (IT-E4) pointed out the current debate at the EU level centred on 
two opposite views: the first intended to prohibit €500 banknotes, the 
second willing to introduce €1,000 banknotes. The circulation of high 
denomination notes allows the transportation of huge sums of money 
requiring limited room.
“Payments of loads are made in cash. At present, there is the €500 
banknote, a real blessing for us. It is then useful to have an accomplice 
in a bank – not the director, a controlled cashier is enough – willing 
to exchange huge sums of money into large denomination notes of 
€500. Money can be concealed into the drums of washing machines, 
refrigerators, transported in containers.”167
Money collectors, persons in charge of gathering capital to finance 
cocaine trafficking operations, may be money couriers as well, while in 
other cases drug brokers or other individuals recruited for this purpose 
may be involved. They should not be related to the criminal entrepreneurs 
organising the trafficking. More often, buyers are in charge of delivering 
money; nevertheless, suppliers also have their own money collectors and 
couriers in charge of recovering payments (IT-E18). When Italian OCGs 
are involved, one expert (IT-E24) pointed out the key role of affiliates, 
among which the most trusted and closed to the bosses are in charge 
of transporting the money. “Camorra clans are at first families, brothers, 
nephews, etc., and significant amounts of money are entrusted to them, 
or affiliates that are like family members. And besides, individuals with 
different roles and duties are recruited.”
Cash is transported by cars, trucks, airplanes, concealed in bags, false 
bottoms, and in most cases through the means of transport used for 
cocaine (IT-E9). It can be delivered directly to suppliers located in South 
America or via intermediaries residing in transit countries such as Spain 
or the Netherlands.
Non-cash payments
Legitimate transaction channels are used by criminal entrepreneurs, 
especially when dealing with large scale cocaine trafficking operations 
(IT-E8, IT-E18). In these cases, cocaine is more often concealed in 
containers transporting legitimate commercial products, and this way 
the drug can be paid through the issue of regular invoices between 
import-export companies. The latter are likely to be owned by OCGs 
and registered to other family members or straw men. Besides regular 
shipping of commercial products, the use of bank accounts, finance 
and shell companies has been reported, again registered to the same 
individuals, and located also in offshore zones (IT-E15, IT-E10). In the first 
case, as indicated by one expert (IT-E15), criminal entrepreneurs may rely 
on complicit bank officers, or even directors, who facilitate the entering 
of the money into the banking system, especially in countries where anti-
167 Ibid., 145.
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money laundering legislation (i.e. reporting of suspicious transactions) is 
in force. When these means are involved, schemes of payment are more 
complex and sophisticated, as explained by the following example:
“In one investigation we detected numerous money transactions 
carried out using several bank accounts located in different countries 
registered to members, straw men and shell companies. Cash was 
transported by couriers at first to Switzerland and deposited into 
bank accounts registered to different individuals; transactions were 
then made via bank accounts in the Netherlands to Virgin Islands, 
United States and Brazil. This way, they have been able to send 
several thousands of euros” (IT-E10).
In smaller scale cocaine trafficking operations, two different means 
of payment – mainly used by foreign OCGs – were underlined by 
experts: the mainstream money transfer services (Western Union, 
MoneyGram, Ria) and the hawala. The first allows multiple transactions 
by different individuals (straw men or recruited persons using personal 
ID documents) circumventing the imposed limit for each transaction 
(i.e. €999 per day/entire week), and guaranteeing the anonymity of 
the actual sender. In some cases, owners of money transfers are 
accomplices in providing ID documents and in omitting to signal 
suspect transactions. The second, that could be defined as a “human 
bank system”, is based on the connections among at least three 
individuals (hawaladars) residing in different countries and transferring 
money through the use of small paper documents. This way, criminal 
entrepreneurs themselves, or via trusted individuals, pay suppliers 
without moving capital. Indeed, the network of hawaladars is usually 
at OCGs disposal, also assisting in money laundering operations, thus 
having huge financial resources to be used in these circumstances 
(IT-E15, IT-E3).168
“The hawala functions as follows: person A has to pay person B, for 
example in Dubai. The former receives from the hawaladar in Milan 
a receipt in front of a cash payment and travels to Dubai. There he 
consigns the receipt to a second hawaladar and receives the sum of 
money previously consigned and then pays suppliers of cocaine. After 
a month the cocaine arrives to Italy. The hawaladar charges from 6% 
up to 8% for his service” (IT-E3).
In one case another form of payment was mentioned – a trade based 
system – involving a group of Roma criminal entrepreneurs operating 
as medium level wholesalers (IT-E17) and paying for cocaine through 
fictitious transfers of cars ownership. This method was preferred since it 
allowed them to avoid the risk of money being intercepted, while at the 
same time suppliers could sell cars in order to receive capital to reinvest 
in the cocaine business.
168 See also M. Naím, Illecito. Come trafficanti, falsari e mafie internazionali stanno prendendo il controllo 
dell’economia globale, [Illicit. How Traffickers, Forgers and International Mafias Are Taking Control of 
Global Economy], (Milano: Arnoldo Mondadori Editore, 2006).
national	criminal	markets	and	Finances:	cocaine	traFFicking	 97
Costs of doing business
Costs of business include both expenses criminal entrepreneurs face in 
organising cocaine trafficking operations as well as possible extra costs 
(e.g. corruption, seizures of cocaine, theft by competitors, payments of 
legal expenses as well as support to families of imprisoned members). As 
pointed out by the majority of experts, it is possible to have estimations 
of approximate costs due to the interplay of different variables especially 
when importing at large scale levels:
• the place in which cocaine is purchased – producing countries or 
another European country;
• the quantity of cocaine acquired (usually the larger the quantity, the 
cheaper per unit of weight);
• the type of relationship between buyers and suppliers – new or 
longstanding business relation;
• the level of operation (importation, wholesale, retail);
• the type of logistics used also has a major impact on costs (IT-E4, 
IT-E19, IT-E13, IT-E15).
As a consequence, the reported estimations refer more to the costs of 
different aspects of cocaine trafficking (e.g. price of cocaine per kilo, 
transportation, facilitators) than to the cost of each single trafficking 
operation. At the same time, although extra costs were identified, 
quantifications were possible only for corruption. Police seizures, for 
example, are, in the opinion of experts, already considered as risks and 
are thus being computed in the prices of cocaine and transportation 
(IT-E4, IT-E15, IT-E11). Nevertheless, at the high level of trafficking, 
shipments seized by police seem to have no significant impact on the 
overall costs (IT-E8). Support is provided to imprisoned members and 
their families, or to external individuals who are particularly important, 
or to guarantee their silence (IT-E17).
Importation and wholesale
The price of cocaine in the producing countries (South America) ranges 
from €1,000 to €3,000 per kilo (IT-E4, IT-E14, IT-E11) depending on 
the quality of contacts, while at the wholesale level in Italy varies 
from a minimum price around €36,000 to a maximum price around 
€44,000 per kilo.169 If cocaine is imported from another European 
country, Spain and the Netherlands, for example, the price per kilo 
is respectively between €27,000-€29,000 (IT-E4) and €27,000-€30,000 
(IT-E2). As stated in Rastello (2009), prices of cocaine per kilo are fixed 
in major European markets, that is the Netherlands in the past years 
and more recently Spain due to the presence of big importers (such as 
the ‘Ndrangheta) preferring cocaine to be discharged in this place as a 
first EU destination area.
169 Data on prices were provided by DCSA during the interview with the appointed expert and 
refer to the second semester of 2013, calculated on the basis of the mean prices registered 
in the cities of Palermo, Reggio Calabria, Naples, Bologna, Venice, Florence, Trieste, Turin, 
Rome, Genoa, Milan, Verona. Variations between the minimum and the maximum prices are 
related to the purity of cocaine. These values are in line with the prices reported by experts 
interviewed in the different locations throughout the Italian territory.
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In the opinion of experts, variations in prices in Italy depend mainly 
on: a) the level of purity of cocaine, which at the importation and 
wholesale levels is between 80% – 98%; b) the balance between 
demand and supply of cocaine – if the latter declines, prices tend 
to increase; c) the number of stages within the trafficking chain – if 
criminal entrepreneurs are able to import from South America to Italy, 
or if 1-2 transit countries are involved; d) whether the transportation 
and related risks are charged to buyers or suppliers; in the second 
case the price at which cocaine is purchased is higher (IT-E8, IT-E3, 
IT-E4, IT-E17).
“If importers buy the cocaine from South America or Spain and then 
arrange transportation on their own, prices are around respectively 
€1,500-€2,000 and €27,000-€29,000 per kilo. If they receive the 
drugs in Italy, without arranging transportation, the cost goes up to 
€35,000 per kilo. Similarly, if they arrange a delivery in the city where 
they are located then the price further increases to around €37,000-
€38,000” (IT-E4).
“In general, OCGs try to join trafficking operations with as few transits 
as possible. For example, if they buy and import cocaine from South 
America the price is €1,000-€1,500 per kilo and they sell it at a 
price around €27,000-€33,000 per kilo in the EU. If there is a transit 
country in between, with the need to pay facilitators or transporters, 
they can negotiate the price, but actually it increases significantly. 
When cocaine is sold at €45,000-€46,000 per kilo, it means that at 
least three passages have occurred” (IT-E3).
At importation and wholesale levels costs are higher compared to 
the retail level, and in many cases prices of cocaine already include 
risks and transportation costs if they are born by suppliers (IT-E10). 
When criminal entrepreneurs organise trafficking operations themselves 
from producing to destination countries, the main costs are related to 
transportation, individuals dealing with logistics and corruption. Once 
again, costs of transport vary depending on the method employed. 
Indeed, cocaine can be imported in containers of unaware owners 
of import-export companies, thus implying costs related solely to 
facilitators recovering the drug (e.g. custom officers). Similarly, when 
cocaine is well concealed, cost for facilitators at customs are not 
required (IT-E14). Despite this, and taking into account all the resources 
(both material and human) needed to organise large or medium scale 
cocaine trafficking operations, experts have reported the following costs 
(Figure 10).
In-kind payments with cocaine have been reported in regard to 
intermediaries (drug brokers), with the latter usually requesting this 
type of remuneration. It may be, for example, 1 kilo out of 10 
delivered, where the payment consists in profit margins obtained with 
drug selling (IT-E8, IT-E19). An interviewed Italian trafficker provides 
similar information: “at the beginning of the business relationship the 
agreement may consist in a remuneration of 20 kilos out of 100 kilos 
of delivered cocaine with transportation costs covered on the side of 
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Figure 10. costs oF large/MediuM scale cocaine traFFicking 
operations in italy
      * In these cases, some experts (IT-E4, IT-E7) pointed to the need to open a commercial trade channel. With reference to 
an investigative operation, costs included several trial trips with commercial goods at €20,000 each.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on collected data.
buyers; when the relationship is well-established the trafficker may 
keep 50 kilos out of 100 kilos.” 170
Retail
At the retail level prices of cocaine depend on the quantity purchased, 
level of purity and the relationship among wholesalers and dealers. Prices 
also vary in regard to the different areas within the Italian territory, 
170 Quoted in Rastello, Io sono il mercato. Teoria, metodi, e stile di vita del perfetto narcotrafficante, [I Am 
the Market. Theory, Methods, and Life Style of the Perfect Narco], 115.
Opening an ad hoc
import-export company* €10,000
Compliant entrepreneurs owing
import-export company receiving cocaine
–	 30%	of	the	value	of	the	load	at	EU	price
–	 €50,000	for	each	supplying
Transhipment service €10,000	(per	container)
Customs expenses 22%	of	the	value	of	the	load
Intermediaries (drug brokers) From	3%	–	4%	up	to	10%of	the	value	of	the	load	at	EU	price
Couriers
–	 €4,000/5,000/6,000	per	kilo	transported	within	EU
–	 5%	up	to	10%	of	the	value	of	the	load	within	the
	 national	territory
Drug mules (swallowers) From	€2,000	up	to	€3,000	depending	on	the	capacity(i.e.	quantity	transported)	+	travel	expenses
Individuals recovering
cocaine nearby ships €1,000	each	kilo	recovered
Individuals recovering cocaine at ports
of destination (method “rip-on, rip-off”) 25%	–	30%	of	the	quantity	recovered	at	EU	price
Facilitators (customs officers, etc.)
–	 10%	to	30%	of	the	value	of	the	load	at	EU	price
–	 €10,000	per	container	in	EU
–	 €1,000	in	South	America/Africa	for	the	entire	load
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where the most expensive are registered in the northern/central parts 
of the country.
The costs to purchase cocaine for dealers range from €30 to €40/45 
per gram, sold at the street level at around €60 to €90 per gram. In 
particular, costs at this level were reported for organised and controlled 
markets, where OCGs (for example Camorra clans or groups) pay 
salaries to the different employees based on their role and duties, 
dealers included. In this case, the latter do not have to buy the drug 
or cut it since they are supplied with single doses ready to be sold. 
At the same time, they have to guarantee certain amounts of quantity 
delivered. Figure 11 illustrates prices for each individual employed 
in three sample of drug markets, respectively Scampia and Afragola 
(neighbourhoods in the city of Naples) and the city of Bari (IT-E24, 
IT-E26). Besides salaries, some dealers which are more crucial to OCGs 
receive benefits as well, such as coverage of legal expenses and other 
forms of aid.171
Profits and profits sharing
Profits of OCGs in the cocaine market depend mainly on the level of 
operation and the position within the trafficking chain where stages of 
distribution may vary. Thus, cocaine can be imported from South America 
to Italy and then sold at the national wholesale level, but before reaching 
the retail level another middle wholesale level may intervene. Similarly 
retail level can be divided into different stages where 1 kilo of cocaine 
can be sold to different street dealers (1,000 grams each). As stated by 
some experts (IT-E16, IT-E17), the highest profits are gained operating 
at the wholesale level, where mark-ups consist mainly in the difference 
between the purchasing price (per kilo) in the producing countries and 
171 IT-E26 and Samarelli, “La Nuova Gomorra, [The New Gomorrah]”.
Figure 11. costs oF running controlled cocaine Markets in italy 
(Monthly payMents)
Source: Authors’ elaboration on collected data; P. Samarelli, “La Nuova Gomorra, [The New Gomorrah]”, L’Espresso, April 29, 2014.
Chemist for
cocaine cutting
Warehouse
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Armed
sentinels
Money collector
(“capobastone”)
Dealers
(city of Naples)
Dealers
(city of Bari)
€10,000 €7,500 €6,000 €10,000 – €15,000 €2,000 – €3,000 €4,500 – €6,000
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the selling price in the national 
territory (Table 8). At this stage, 
cocaine is sold maintaining the 
initial level of purity, which 
decreases at each further step 
of the national distribution 
chain (Table 9), (IT-E8, IT-E26, 
IT-E2).
“Cocaine throughout the trans-
portation from producing coun-
tries can be adulterated several 
times, depending on routes, and 
especially intermediaries active 
within the trafficking chain. For 
example, kilos of pure cocaine 
are imported from Colombia to 
reach Spain where it can be 
cut at 20% to further reach 
Italy where wholesalers cut a 
15% – 20% more. Another 
adulteration process, the more 
consistent, is carried out by 
street dealers before selling to 
final consumers; at the end 
it is at 20% level of purity. 
As a result, each kilo of pure 
cocaine (at a price of around 
€1,000), produces 4 or 5 kilos 
to be sold at the retail level at 
€70/80 per gram. Investigations 
reveal the following prices in 
transit places such as Spain 
(€35,000-€40,000 per kilo) 
and Italy (€55,000-€60,000 per 
kilo)” (IT-E26).
Furthermore, at the retail level street dealers, except for controlled 
cocaine markets, can further adulterate cocaine, or sold a dose with 
less quantity (e.g. 0.80) or increase prices, depending on circumstances, 
type of relation with supplier and consumers as well as margins left 
for cutting the acquired cocaine. Usually from 1 gram it is possible to 
obtain 4/5 doses with around 20% purity (IT-E24). Nevertheless, overall 
profit margins at this level remain low, allowing in most cases to sustain 
basic living standards (IT-E2). Conversely, profits are particularly high for 
drug brokers who, besides mediating between buyers and suppliers, also 
arrange logistics172 in regard to the importation of 1,250 kilos of cocaine 
from South America to Italy (Figure 12).
172 Rastello, Io sono il mercato. Teoria, metodi, e stile di vita del perfetto narcotrafficante, [I Am the Market. 
Theory, Methods, and Life Style of the Perfect Narco].
Таble 8. Mark-ups at the diFFerent stages oF a cocaine traFFicking 
operation per kilo in italy (exaMple 1)
      * Mean prices are calculated considering the minimum and maximum values 
reported by experts and DCSA.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on collected data.
Stage of cocaine 
trafficking
Mean prices
(€/kilo) Mark-ups 
Importation
(South America) 2,250
Spain 33,000 93.18%
Italy (wholesale) 40,000 17.5%
Italy (retail) 70,000 75%
Таble 9. Mark-ups at the diFFerent stages oF the distribution 
oF cocaine in italy (exaMple 2)
      * Prices are based on a case reported by IT-E2.
Source: Authors’ elaborations on research data.
Stage of cocaine 
trafficking (national) Prices (€/kilo)* Mark-ups 
Wholesale (stage 1) 30,000
Middle wholesale 
(stage 2)
90,000
(cut 1 to 3 kilos) 200%
Retail 210,000(70,000 x 3 kilos) 133%
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In particular, profits are related to the risk taken within cocaine trafficking 
operations, and this explains the high margins for criminal entrepreneurs 
that invest capital, as well as for individuals in charge of logistics 
and organisation. Profits are also divided on the basis of the initial 
investment, so if one clan or family has invested 20% of financial 
resources, the same percentage is expected in return (IT-E23). At the 
same time, all the other actors in the trafficking chain, who are usually 
external individuals, are paid regular daily wages (e.g. street dealers) or 
lump sums in respect to the service provided (e.g. drivers, drug mules, 
curriers) (IT-E26). Nevertheless, as noted by one expert (IT-E14), profits 
do not end up with cocaine trafficking operations, instead they further 
increase due to reinvestments in different legal activities, that in turn 
produce revenues as well.
Figure 12. indicative proFit Margins oF a drug broker 
in an international cocaine traFFicking operation
Source: Authors’ elaboration on L. Rastello, Io sono il mercato. Teoria, metodi, e stile di vita del perfetto narcotrafficante, [I Am the Market. 
Theory, Methods, and Life Style of the Perfect Narco]р (Milano: Chiarelettere Editore, 2009).
–	 Material	(marble	blocks)
–	 Processing	of	marble	for	concealment
–	 Transportation	(+	tips	for	drivers)
$120,000
–	 30	containers
–	 Transporters	(+	tips	for	carriers) $50,000
Fee	to	custom	officer	at	port	of	destination
(20%	on	the	value	of	regular	invoices	$45,000) $8,000
Transportation	to	final	destination	(city	of	Milan) $1,000
Other	costs $21,000
Overall	costs $200,000
Profits	(€3,000	paid	for	1	kilo	imported) $3,750,000
Net	profits $3,550,000
Investment schemes
Investment schemes depend mainly on the level of operation. At lower 
levels, most of the profit is used for personal expenses and to raise living 
national	criminal	markets	and	Finances:	cocaine	traFFicking	 103
standards. Especially in regard to foreign criminal entrepreneurs, such 
as for example Colombians, it has been pointed out that they invest in 
a lavish lifestyle buying luxury or fashion items (IT-E5). Similarly, OCGs 
spend part of their revenues on personal expenses, due to the illicit 
nature of money (IT-E4).
At the same time, profits are used to finance cocaine trafficking and 
other criminal activities, in particular at higher levels, such as loansharking, 
illicit tobacco trade, arms trafficking, human trafficking. Reinvestments in 
the legitimate economy are more recurrent at importation and wholesale 
levels, where the amounts of profits are significant. As stated by the 
majority of experts, Italian OCGs invest revenues in very different sectors, 
mainly in the northern and central areas of Italy and in other EU and 
non-EU countries. In particular, real estate, land, night time economy 
establishments (e.g. pubs, restaurants, discos) commercial properties 
(e.g. hotels, real estate agencies, trade centres, shops, car dealerships, 
supermarkets, etc.), public contracts sector, businesses enterprises (e.g. 
real estate companies, import-export companies) (IT-E13, IT-E14, IT-E6, 
IT-E23, IT-E19, IT-E15). With reference to the latter, some experts pointed 
out the role of the economic crisis in facilitating the gradual acquisition 
by OCGs of legitimate businesses, at first through loansharking (IT-E23, 
IT-E3, IT-E16).
“Unsuspicious professionals approach entrepreneurs having economic 
difficulties offering to lend them money. Then a gradual process of 
acquisition starts. At first, some straw men are entered in the board 
of directors of the company as to control the business. Subsequently, 
complete ownership is acquired and, in the case for example of 
import-export companies, cocaine trafficking activities are covered by 
legitimate appearance. In this way, they are used to launder money 
as well” (IT-E8).
Foreign criminal entrepreneurs operating at lower levels invest profits 
mainly in their country of origins. Usually revenues are used to support 
family members (especially North Africans), or to buy real estate, land 
or commercial properties: “In one case, a Tunisian dealers was able to 
send €120,000 to Tunisia, then he went back home. There he bought a 
pub, he built his house with a swimming pool and at present he runs 
his pub” (IT-E5). Cash is sent using money transfer services and hawala 
which is also a means to launder profits (IT-E2, IT-E5, IT-E23, IT-E9).
In general, Italian OCGs invest in profitable legal activities. One expert 
(IT-E18) reported the acquisition of the most historical bar of the “dolce 
vita romana” (e.g. Café de Paris) in the centre of Rome by a family of 
the ‘Ndrangheta. The owner was about to reach a selling agreement 
with Lebanese buyers when he was compelled to turn to a different 
purchaser. The Café de Paris was, this way, acquired and registered to 
a straw man, actually a hairdresser from Sinopoli (Calabria). Straw men, 
complicit bankers, accountants, notaries, lawyers, financial brokers are 
crucial when reinvesting profits and laundering money, and in most cases 
families of OGCs also send their sons to the best universities worldwide 
in order to create a network of insider professionals (IT-E10, IT-E24, 
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IT-E7, IT-E8, IT-E3). In one case, for example, an Italian drug broker in 
charge of laundering money for an ‘Ndrangheta family could benefit 
from a complicit bank director in San Marino, facilitating the depositing 
of cash in coded bank accounts (IT-E15).173 In other cases, besides the 
use of offshore bank accounts, OCGs may directly create banks: “in 
one investigation regarding the ‘Ndrangheta, banks were found in Spain, 
France, and the Maldives, not big buildings, but basic counters where to 
transfer €5 million and have it back laundered” (IT-E23).
“Of course not all bankers are accomplices, but some may offer 
support to a person willing to buy real estate. In this case, the 
scheme is the following: a banker grants a loan to be repaid in 
instalments of €1,000 per month, raising a mortgage on the house. 
The loan can be paid in cash coming from cocaine trafficking since 
on the other hand a complicit entrepreneur produces a fictitious but 
regular contract of €3,000 per month that justify payments of €1,000 
each month into the bank account” (IT-E3).
Similarly, regular transactions of money can be performed via holding 
companies owned by OCGs or and registered to straw men or family 
members, or compliant individuals for buying properties or to transfer 
cash among different companies as to hide the origin of the money 
(IT-E8). 
Nevertheless, the level of sophistication of laundering techniques depends 
on the amount of profits. Methods range from the use of gambling 
(e.g. casinos where betting 2 fiches out of 100 bought and then collecting 
for 98); legitimate businesses (e.g. restaurants) that can produce overbillings; 
shell companies to perform inexistent transactions; fictitious transfers 
of real estate or lands; investments in block of shares (IT-E9; IT-E4, 
IT-E27).174
“Two brokers (working for a family of Cosa Nostra) took over, through 
straw men, two mineral companies about to go broke, at the same 
time advertising the opposite: claiming the presence of other mineral 
resources and raising the capital in the balances of the companies 
through dollars of cocaine trafficking. This way, the value of stocks in 
the Bremen Exchange increased.”175
173 See also A. Nerazzini, I professionisti, [The Professionals] (RAI Report, 2012), http://www.rai.it/dl/
docs/1337159451387professionisti_pdf; La Repubblica, “San Marino connection. Gli affari dei clan 
nelle banche sanmarinesi. Così si ripuliscono i soldi della ‘coca’ [San Marino Connection. Clans 
Affairs in the Banks of San Marino. This Is How Cocaine Money Is Laundered]”, May 25, 2012.
174 See also Rastello, Io sono il mercato. Teoria, metodi, e stile di vita del perfetto narcotrafficante, [I Am 
the Market. Theory, Methods, and Life Style of the Perfect Narco]; Barbacetto and Milosa, Le mani 
sulla città. I boss dell’Ndrangheta vivono tra noi e controllano Milano, [Hands on the City. Bosses of the 
‘Ndrangheta Lives Among Us and Control the City of Milan].
175 Spagnolo, Cocaina S.p.A., 373.
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In the 1990s, a number of household surveys found that all four 
countries in the United Kingdom (UK) had levels of illicit drug use that 
were several times the size of any other European country.176 Increasing 
in popularity and decreasing in price in the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
cocaine became a sought after and more readily available drug among 
this drug-experienced population. By 2011, there were over 4 million 
users of cocaine in Western and Central Europe, within which the 
UK – closely followed by Spain – had the highest prevalence rates.177 
The most recent estimate in real terms indicates that there are over 
1 million users in the UK.178
The most recent statistics from 2003 – 2004 value the UK’s illicit drugs 
market at between £4 billion and £6.6 billion. Powder cocaine179 accounts 
for an 18% share of expenditure in the market, whereas crack cocaine 
has a 28% share.180 Both powder and crack cocaine are classified as Class 
A drugs in the UK. Under the Misuse of Drugs Act – which determines 
sentences by the class and weight of the drug – maximum sentencing for 
supply is life imprisonment.181 Yet despite the risks involved, the strong 
demand results in large amounts of cocaine entering Britain, with various 
networks, means of distribution and sources of financial investment all 
playing a part in the process.
However, little research has been conducted on financial investment 
in the British cocaine market. Exceptions include two broader studies 
funded by the Home Office, one exploring middle market drug 
distribution and the other the illicit drug trade more generally,182 
which offer some information on the financial aspects of the cocaine 
market. This chapter provides detailed preliminary data and analysis 
that focuses specifically on the structures and financing of the UK 
cocaine market. Although it is estimated that the crack cocaine market 
in Britain accounts for a much larger proportion of expenditures on 
176 H. Parker, “Unbelievable? The UK’s Drugs Present”, in UK Drugs Unlimited: New Research and 
Policy Lessons on Illicit Drug Use, ed. H. Parker, J. Aldridge, and R. Eggington (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2001), 2.
177 EMCDDA, European Drug Report 2013: Trends and Developments (Lisbon, 2013); UNODC, World 
Drug Report 2013 (Vienna, 2013). 
178 J. Doyle, “UK Cocaine Market Is the Largest in Europe”, The Independent, June 24, 2009; B 
Kilmer and R L Pacula, Estimating the Size of the Global Drug Market: A Demand-Side Approach 
(Cambridge, UK: RAND Europe, 2009).
179 Cocaine hydrochloride.
180 Matrix Knowledge Group, The Illicit Drug Trade in the United Kingdom (Home Office Online 
Report, London, 2007); T. McSweeney, P. J. Turbull, and M. Hough, Tackling Drug Markets 
and Distribution Networks in the UK: A Review of the Recent Literature (London: UKDPC, 2008); 
EMCDDA, United Kingdom Drug Situation: UK Focal Point on Drugs (Lisbon, 2012). 
181 For a discussion of the penalties for importing cocaine into the UK see J. Fleetwood, “Five 
Kilos: Penalties and Practice in the International Cocaine Trade”, British Journal of Criminology 51, 
no. 2 (2011): 375-93.
182 G. Pearson and D. Hobbs, Middle Market Drug Distribution, Home Offic (London: Home Office, 
2001); Matrix Knowledge Group, The Illicit Drug Trade in the United Kingdom.
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cocaine183 and up to “80% of all primary crack episodes in Europe”,184 
the main focus of this chapter is the powder cocaine market. Research 
of this market benefited from in-depth interviews with four criminal 
entrepreneurs involved in powder cocaine supply in the UK active at 
the time of interview. Furthermore – along with a review of relevant 
literature and questionnaires completed by UK law enforcement during 
the first phase of data collection – in-depth interviews were undertaken 
with five experts with knowledge of the UK cocaine market.
Over the past fifteen years powder cocaine has emerged as a drug 
of choice among a significant percentage of the British drug-using 
population. Use peaked in 2008 – 2009 at around 3% among adults 
and over 6 per cent among young adults.185 In 2011, the percentage 
of young adults using cocaine in the UK had dropped to 4.2%186 and 
it became commonplace to talk of an overall decline in the market. 
However, the 2012 – 2013 
crime survey for England and 
Wales found that powder 
cocaine remains the second 
most commonly used drug 
among adults (aged 16-59) 
after cannabis. Although a 
fall in overall drug use is 
noted, cocaine use remains 
relatively steady over the last 
year in England and Wales: 
1.9 per cent in 2012 – 2013 
in comparison to 2.2% in 
2011/12.187 This is a decline 
since its peak in 2008 – 2009, 
but still much higher than 
the 1990s. Overall, powder 
cocaine use has continued at 
between 2 and 3 per cent 
since 2000 (Figure 13).
Evidence suggests that powder cocaine users in the UK tend to come 
from a number of demographic groups.188 On the one hand, cocaine is 
183 S. Pudney, “Estimating the Size of the UK Illicit Drug Market”, in Measuring Different Aspects of 
Problem Drug Use: Methodological Developments, ed. N. Singleton et al. (London: Home Office 
Online Report 16/06, 2006).
184 Kilmer and Pacula, Estimating the Size of the Global Drug Market: A Demand-Side Approach, 30.
185 EMCDDA, European Drug Report 2013: Trends and Developments.
186 Ibid.
187 CSEW, Drug Misuse: Findings from the 2012 to 2013 Crime Survey for England and Wales, 2013, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/drug-misuse-findings-from-the-2012-to-2013-csew/
drug-misuse-findings-from-the-2012-to-2013-crime-survey-for-england-and-wales
188 D. Zaitch, Trafficking Cocaine: Colombian Drug Entrepreneurs in the Netherlands (Studies of Organized 
Crime) (London: Springer, 2002); F. Measham and K. Moore, “Repertoires of Distinction: 
Exploring Patterns of Weekend Polydrug Use within Local Leisure Scenes across the English 
Night Time Economy”, Criminology and Criminal Justice 9, no. 4 (2009): 437-64; T. C. Ayres and 
J. Treadwell, “Bars, Drugs and Football Thugs: Cocaine Use amongst English Football Firms”, 
Criminology and Criminal Justice 12, no. 1 (2012): 83-100.
Figure 13. previous year powder cocaine use aMong adults and young 
adults in england and wales, 1996 to 2012 – 2013
Source: CSEW, Drug Misuse: Findings from the 2012 to 2013 Crime Survey for England 
and Wales.
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popular among chronic polydrug users and, on the other, it is a popular 
recreational drug normalised in the context of Britain’s ever-expanding 
night-time leisure spaces. Thus, it is not always a “problem” drug used 
by “problematic” people. A controlled and largely concealed demand 
can be found among sections of Britain’s professional class,189 and it 
is particularly popular among young people and those who regularly 
inhabit the alcohol-focused venues of Britain’s night-time economy 
(NTE).190 The demand for crack, however, has in large part remained 
limited to economically deprived areas of the UK’s big cities, specifi-
cally London.191
Previous research positions powder cocaine demand in Britain in the 
context of the NTE192 and particularly its dance and rave scenes.193 It 
has been noted that along with increased weekend binge drinking, and 
after a decline in ecstasy use in recent years, cocaine use is prevalent; 
proof of the excesses and hedonism of late-modern cultural consumption 
patterns194 and the criminogenic nature of commodified night-time leisure 
spaces.195 A large scale study,196 using self-report surveys undertaken in 
clubs and bars in a large English city, investigated the link between illicit 
drugs and ‘alcohol focused leisure activities’ in Britain’s NTE. Its findings 
offer the following insights into cocaine use in the UK:
• Night-time leisure pursuits are important as contexts for the consumption 
of cocaine.
• The prevalence of cocaine use across age groups and night-time 
scenes, thus the drug is widespread in clubs, bars and after parties 
along with cannabis and ecstasy pills. 
• From a sample of 323 people attending club events 83.3% reported 
having taken cocaine in their lifetime, along with 36.3% of a sample 
of 350 bar attendees. 
• One in 20 bar customers consume cocaine or ecstasy on a night out.
• The notion of a decline in recreational drug use is problematic.
189 Zaitch, Trafficking Cocaine: Colombian Drug Entrepreneurs in the Netherlands (Studies of Organized 
Crime), 79.
190 A. R. Winstock, P. Griffiths, and D. Stewart, “Drugs and the Dance Music Scene: A Survey of 
Current Drug Use Patterns among a Sample of Dance Music Enthusiasts in the UK”, Drug and 
Alcohol Dependence 64, no. 1 (2001): 9-17; Measham and Moore, “Repertoires of Distinction: 
Exploring Patterns of Weekend Polydrug Use within Local Leisure Scenes across the English 
Night Time Economy”.
191 Zaitch, Trafficking Cocaine: Colombian Drug Entrepreneurs in the Netherlands (Studies of Organized 
Crime); C. Allen, “The Links between Heroin, Crack Cocaine and Crime: Where Does Street 
Crime Fit In?”, British Journal of Criminology 45, no. 3 (2005): 355-72; EMCDDA, European Drug 
Report 2013: Trends and Developments.
192 Measham and Moore, “Repertoires of Distinction: Exploring Patterns of Weekend Polydrug 
Use within Local Leisure Scenes across the English Night Time Economy”; Ayres and Treadwell, 
“Bars, Drugs and Football Thugs: Cocaine Use amongst English Football Firms.”
193 F. Schifano and J. Corkery, “Cocaine/crack Cocaine Consumption, Treatment Demand, Seizures, 
Related Offences, Prices, Average Purity Levels and Deaths in the UK (1990 – 2004)”, Journal 
of Psychopharmacology 22, no. 1 (2008): 71-79.
194 Ayres and Treadwell, “Bars, Drugs and Football Thugs: Cocaine Use amongst English Football 
Firms”.
195 O. Smith, “Easy Money: Cultural Narcissism and the Criminogenic Markets of the Night-Time 
Leisure Economy”, in New Directions in Crime and Deviancy, ed. S. Winlow and R. Atkinson, 
Routledge (London, 2012).
196 Measham and Moore, “Repertoires of Distinction: Exploring Patterns of Weekend Polydrug Use 
within Local Leisure Scenes across the English Night Time Economy”.
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• The British Crime Survey’s statistics on drug use are unreliable and 
underestimated, particularly among young people who have left school.
While recent prevalence figures show a slight decline in use among the 
population, a number of obstacles stand in the way of estimating the 
real extent of the demand for cocaine in the UK. Primarily, the accuracy 
of official statistics is limited due to a large amount of underreporting. 
Basing their analysis on a number of surveys, Kilmer and Pacula propose 
that around 15.3% of underreporting takes place in the context of 
cocaine use.197 This point is also made by Zaitch who contends that 
“non-deviant” users “remain a rather unknown quantity” in European 
prevalence figures.198 Moreover, continuously mutating practices of 
consumption are apparent. For example, the 2014 Global Drugs Survey 
revealed a growing number of people buying their illicit drugs online; the 
UK has the highest percentage of people doing so in the world.199 Young 
people are also diversifying their stimulant drug use and a number of 
new psychoactive substances with variations in availability and popularity 
run alongside the cocaine market, sometimes acting as cheaper short-
term substitutes (one recent example is mephedrone).200
The entrepreneurs and experts interviewed for this research also suspected 
that statistics presenting a decline in cocaine use might be misleading. 
They revealed various market fluctuations in both price and purity, yet 
emphasised that the demand for cocaine has been steadily increasing 
over time, especially the demand for high quality cocaine. This suggests 
prevalent yet underestimated practices of cocaine consumption in the 
UK today. Rather, it could be argued that recreational stimulant drug 
use – particularly that of cocaine – has become normalised in the UK 
context.201 Indeed, some have argued that the size of the cocaine market 
cannot be precisely quantified and that there still exists a sizeable, 
growing and increasingly valuable market for suppliers.202
In terms of supply, it is well known that most cocaine is cultivated in 
South America, specifically in Colombia, Bolivia and Peru. Often it enters 
the UK via the Netherlands and Spain, having been initially smuggled 
into Europe by means of established trade routes from South America 
through the Caribbean or West Africa (Figure 14).
The following modes of transport used by suppliers targeting the UK 
market were highlighted by UK-E2:
• By sea: merchant vessels and container shipping, with the product cut 
across various commodities, containers of variation and vessels of 500
197 Kilmer and Pacula, Estimating the Size of the Global Drug Market: A Demand-Side Approach, 32.
198 Zaitch, Trafficking Cocaine: Colombian Drug Entrepreneurs in the Netherlands (Studies of Organized 
Crime), 79.
199 A. Topping and A. Hern, “UK Buying More Legal and Illegal Drugs Online, Survey Finds”, The 
Guardian, April 14, 2014.
200 See A. R. Winstock et al., “Mephedrone, New Kid for the Chop?”, Addiction 196, no. 1 (2010): 
154-61.
201 See J. Aldridge, F. Measham, and L. Williams, Illegal Leisure Revisited (London: Routledge, 
2011).
202 Kilmer and Pacula, Estimating the Size of the Global Drug Market: A Demand-Side Approach.
national	criminal	markets	and	Finances:	cocaine	traFFicking	 109
tonnes reported; speed 
boats; and luxury yachts.203
• By air: executive jets; light 
air crafts dropping cargo 
before landing; and smaller 
aircrafts landing in regional 
airports.
• By land: road (car, lorry, bus); 
national and international 
rail – the Trans-Siberian rail-
way now being utilised as 
a faster and more effective 
way in the process of 
shipping illicit goods from 
the Far East to the UK; and 
postal and courier services 
delivering parcels (this is 
particularly apparent in the 
context of the emerging 
online trade).
Recent figures show a reduction 
in the number of seizures of 
cocaine in the UK. Although 
in 2012 cocaine remained the 
most seized drug in England and Wales (80% of which was seized by the 
UK Border Agency rather than local police), the figure has been steadily 
declining since 2008 – 2009 when the highest number of seizures were 
recorded during the time of peak use.204 UK-E2 highlighted the negative 
impact of changes to the border agency and enforcement structures, 
particularly since the formation of the Serious Organised Crime Agency 
(SOCA). Formed in 2006 as a “non-police agency”, which pooled the 
investigative team responsible for drug trafficking at HM Revenue and 
Customs and the National Criminal Intelligence Service among others,205 
the expert noted that SOCA’s formation had diluted enforcement numbers 
and expertise. The UK-E2 interview also revealed:
• various institutional changes to the UK Border Force since 2004 that 
have reduced the number of customs officers;
• customs officers no longer being present around the clock at British 
airports;
• the sheer size and volume of containers entering the UK.
According to the expert, these factors have resulted in a substantial 
decrease in drug seizures and a decline in the overall effectiveness
203 See also V. Dodd, “Cocaine Worth £300m Found on Luxury Yacht in Southampton”, The 
Guardian, August 03, 2011.
204 G. Arnett, “Drug Seizures Drop in England and Wales: Falls in Cannabis, Cocaine and Heroin”, 
The Guardian, November 01, 2013.
205 See D. Hobbs, “It Was Never about the Money’: Market Society, Organised Crime and UK 
Criminology’”, in New Directions in Criminological Theory, ed. S. Hall and S. Winlow, Routledge 
(London: Routledge, 2012), 259.
Figure 14. typical routes oF cocaine Flow into the uk
Source: UNODC quoted in BBC, “Flows of Drugs to UK”, BBC, 2007.
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of drug enforcement practices. Therefore, changes to the policing of 
organised crime and drug trafficking could be the primary factors behind 
the decline in cocaine seizures in recent years, rather than a slowdown 
in supply and demand.206
Another reason for the decrease in seizures is that continued diversification 
of trade routes and techniques have begun to reshape the supply chain. 
Container shipments are still the predominant method, with ports in the 
Netherlands and Belgium heavily implicated in the cocaine trade.207 This is 
a major link in the supply chain of synthetic drugs between South American 
production centres and the UK, with “Dutch and Belgian warehousing 
operations playing a crucial role in trading directly with UK national middle 
market brokers”.208 Moreover, Eastern, South-eastern and Central European 
states have become increasingly associated with the trade.209 Increased 
seizures have been noted in Greece, Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltic 
countries.210 As mentioned above, the emerging trend of online trading (on 
the surface web and deep web) and home delivery of smaller, retail-level 
quantities of cocaine in post parcels also presents an emergent and largely 
unknown dimension of the cocaine trade in Britain. 
In order to gain an accurate understanding of the market structure and 
the actors involved in cocaine supply in the UK it is necessary to point 
out the distinct stages of the operation. These can be defined by a four 
tier classification found by Pearson and Hobbs:211
• Importation: consisting mainly of traffickers involved in the importation 
of cocaine. 
• Wholesale: those involved in selling larger quantities of cocaine. 
• The middle market: the drug brokers existing between importation/
wholesale and retail level dealing.
• The retail level: drug dealers who sell direct to consumers.
For the Matrix Knowledge Group,212 the market is structured according 
to the area covered by an operation. Therefore, alongside the four tiers 
are variations in market level and reach:
• International: those crossing borders and importing from abroad.
• National: dealers distributing nationally across towns and cities.
• Local: traders buying and selling in smaller defined areas.
• Retail: street level dealers.
206 See also Matrix Knowledge Group, The Illicit Drug Trade in the United Kingdom, 2.
207 Zaitch, Trafficking Cocaine: Colombian Drug Entrepreneurs in the Netherlands (Studies of Organized 
Crime); EMCDDA, European Drug Report 2013: Trends and Developments.
208 Pearson and Hobbs, Middle Market Drug Distribution, 21.
209 EMCDDA, European Drug Report 2013: Trends and Developments.
210 P. Kostakos and G. A. Antonopoulos, “The ‘Good’, the ‘Bad’ and the ‘Charlie’: The Business of 
Cocaine Smuggling in Greece”, Global Crime 11, no. 1 (2010): 34-57; EMCDDA, European Drug 
Report 2013: Trends and Developments.
211 Pearson and Hobbs, Middle Market Drug Distribution; see also Matrix Knowledge Group, The Illicit 
Drug Trade in the United Kingdom; McSweeney, Turbull, and Hough, Tackling Drug Markets and 
Distribution Networks in the UK: A Review of the Recent Literature.
212 Matrix Knowledge Group, The Illicit Drug Trade in the United Kingdom, 17.
Market structure 
and actors
national	criminal	markets	and	Finances:	cocaine	traFFicking	 111
Both sets of classifications are not fixed, however, and distinctions 
can become blurred at various levels and stages of an operation. For 
example, an individual or group may be importing from abroad and 
selling wholesale quantities of cocaine nationally. Alternatively, a national 
dealer may also be involved in distributing cocaine regionally or locally. 
Some operations lack organisation, as evidenced by the case in which a 
man travelled to South America alone, bought some cocaine, and brought 
it back to the UK in a small talcum powder bottle he had ingested (UK-
E5). In this case a direct connection to a crime group was not necessary 
and the process was relatively disorganised. Therefore, it is important to 
point out that the structures of the British cocaine business vary. As the 
Matrix Knowledge Group found, actors involved in supply can work as 
“sole traders”, as part of a “small to medium enterprise”, or as part of 
a “collaborative network.”213 The market is therefore best described as a 
horizontal structure. From the levels of production through to consumption 
different flexible networks of both organised and ‘disorganised’ individuals 
and groups are involved in the process. Although some degree of hierarchy 
may be present at various stages of an operation, overall, these are networks 
with variations in structure and scale in terms of the actors involved, 
the quantity and quality of the product they are distributing and the 
geographical area they cover. Therefore, descriptions of cocaine businesses 
as ‘cartels’ headed up by a ‘drug lord’ were seen as inaccurate stereotypes 
by our experts and entrepreneurs. On many occasions connections exist 
only between small numbers of individuals along the supply chain. One 
key finding of the cited Matrix Knowledge Group study was that individuals 
involved in drug supply have information about the market level in which 
they operate, yet know little when it comes to the market overall. Indeed, 
individuals working as middle level drug brokers do not want their retail 
level buyers to contact their wholesale supplier directly, which could have 
the effect of pushing the brokers out of the market. 
Although the cocaine trade is a transnational trade, local and regional 
markets are better placed for this analysis of the British cocaine trade.214 
In particular, the UK’s big cities are crucial to the functioning of the 
supply chain. The primary city associated with the illicit drugs trade 
is London, with Liverpool, Birmingham, Glasgow and Manchester also 
playing significant roles. In terms of cocaine, Liverpool is an important 
node in the market; operators in the city have established themselves as 
major national distributors.215 This fact was confirmed during a number 
of interviews. According to UK-E2 and UK-E5, once cocaine reaches the 
UK there are a number of hotspot regions, where corruption at ports is 
widespread and cocaine more easily smuggled. Of particular importance 
are the ports of Liverpool and Glasgow. UK-E4 spoke specifically about 
the importance of regional and local levels, mentioning Liverpool. Two 
criminal entrepreneurs – UK-C2 and UK-C3 – gave details about the 
size of the market and price and quality of the products available in 
Manchester, where a number of dealers from smaller towns and cities 
213 Ibid., 32.
214 See Pearson and Hobbs, Middle Market Drug Distribution.
215 Ibid., 38.
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in Northern England buy their products direct from wholesalers and 
middle market brokers before transporting it to their own local market 
to cut and sell. In this respect, along with international traffickers (usually 
smuggling cocaine into the UK by sea), national and regional drug couriers 
and local level runners (often transporting by road) play important 
roles in cocaine operations in the UK. For example, the researchers 
found transactions between wholesale actors based in Manchester and 
Yorkshire and middle level brokers in North East England who transport 
by car or train and supply the product to a number of street dealers 
or customers in Newcastle upon Tyne. Warehouses in towns near major 
transport routes and larger cities are also utilised for storage, and actors 
will be geographically situated in these aforementioned areas in order to 
maintain the smooth operation of the supply chain.
Various actors are involved in the British cocaine market and they 
perform different roles. The study by the Matrix Knowledge Group paints 
a comprehensive picture of the various roles involved at different levels 
of the cocaine trade in the UK, which can include the following:
• international transporter;
• legitimate professional (e.g. accountant, solicitor);
• drug courier;
• money collector;
• money counter;
• money deliverer;
• tester;
• transporter/runner;
• specialist;
• mixer;
• corrupt law enforcement staff;
• storer.
According to their research, a dealer’s main activities include ‘drug 
purchase, storage, domestic and international logistics planning, domestic 
delivery and sale... drug cutting activities, marketing or post sale customer 
services’.216 The interviewed dealers regarded transportation, storage and 
sale as the most important tasks.
In keeping with previous research, our data identifies differences in the 
operations at retail level, which can consist of various markets.217 Criminal 
entrepreneurs UK-C3 and UK-C4 operated a closed market, selling 
exclusively to friends who had placed orders. UK-C1 was semi-open, selling 
to friends and also to people in bars, clubs or after-parties. Finally, UK-C2 
sold online and to friends. There are also profitable prison drug markets to 
consider, and where it has been noted that connections are often made 
between suppliers and dealers at various levels of the trade.218
216 Matrix Knowledge Group, The Illicit Drug Trade in the United Kingdom, 33.
217 See McSweeney, Turbull, and Hough, Tackling Drug Markets and Distribution Networks in the UK: 
A Review of the Recent Literature, 29.
218 Matrix Knowledge Group, The Illicit Drug Trade in the United Kingdom; G. Hales and D. Hobbs, 
“Drug Markets in the Community: A London Borough Case Study”, Trends in Organized Crime 13, 
no. 1 (2010): 13-30.
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In terms of market entry, our data corroborates findings from previous 
research.219 Initial market connections can be made through family, 
friends, school, neighbourhood, ethnicity, or criminal background 
(sometimes while an individual is serving a prison sentence). One expert 
(UK-E4), discussing a personal contact involved in the trade, identified 
his imprisonment as “the making of him”, which refers to the increased 
criminal business opportunities he found among his fellow inmates. The 
role ‘clubbing’ and night-time leisure pursuits can perform in facilitating 
connections between dealers has also been noted;220 this was confirmed 
by UK-E1, who expressed how connections in the cocaine trade can 
often be made on “nights out”.
Overall, there is no specific demographic involved in cocaine supply 
in the UK. However, some patterns have emerged in specific regions 
or levels of the trade. For example, the role played by Colombians 
based in London, who control a large amount of the bulk shipments of 
cocaine entering the country, and that of Caribbean based teams, usually 
involved in “small but often” loads trafficked via air, have been noted. 
221 The policy report by the UK Drug Policy Commission222 outlines the 
following patterns with regard to the UK cocaine trade:
• The role of Colombian traffickers who dominate the international 
supply of cocaine to Europe.
• The involvement of Spanish criminals involved as middle market 
dealers who receive shipments from outside Europe and distribute 
them to the UK.
• The roles of white British traffickers as suppliers of powder cocaine 
from Spain and the Netherlands to the UK.
• West Indian traffickers involved in cocaine supply, most of which is 
intended to feed the UK’s crack cocaine demand.
Our data suggests that British crime groups and families are still involved 
in the importation and wholesale tier of the cocaine market.223 White-
British crime families were mentioned in particular as wholesalers by 
one retail level (UK-C1) and one middle level (UK-C4) entrepreneur. 
These families or groups are not exclusively white. British-Asian networks 
of investors and dealers were also mentioned by UK law enforcement. 
Often it is through a connection to such a family or group that a retail 
level dealer can gain access to cocaine. The link is not always direct; 
a partner in a scheme of smaller retail level operators may have a 
direct connection through school, neighbourhood or family and will 
arrange supply for the group, as was found to be the case with UK-C1. 
UK-C3, who is based in a smaller English city, revealed that he was 
buying direct from a dealer in Manchester. The interviewed UK-based 
219 Pearson and Hobbs, Middle Market Drug Distribution; Matrix Knowledge Group, The Illicit Drug 
Trade in the United Kingdom; Hales and Hobbs, “Drug Markets in the Community: A London 
Borough Case Study”.
220 Pearson and Hobbs, Middle Market Drug Distribution.
221 Ibid., 21.
222 McSweeney, Turbull, and Hough, Tackling Drug Markets and Distribution Networks in the UK: 
A Review of the Recent Literature, 27.
223 See also Zaitch, Trafficking Cocaine: Colombian Drug Entrepreneurs in the Netherlands (Studies of 
Organized Crime), 88.
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online dealer UK-C2 provided the researchers with access to a range 
of sites and sellers on the “deep web.” The internet gives a retail level 
dealer the opportunity to widen his customer base, and online trade 
could reduce the need for a middle level broker, because importers/
wholesalers have the ability to sell direct to the consumer. However, it 
may be the case that the internet is simply mirroring street-level dealing 
and offering a similar business-to-consumer transaction, but with less risk 
and increased anonymity.
A two-tier powder cocaine market that has developed in the UK in 
terms of differentiations in purity and price was also discussed with both 
experts and criminal entrepreneurs. The first tier is a “pure” and more 
expensive high-end market, while the secondly is a low-end, cheaper 
market for product cut to a high degree with active pharmaceutical 
ingredients (APIs) such as benzocaine; sometimes with purity levels 
as low as 2 or 3 per cent at street level. Whereas one entrepreneur 
spoke of deliveries of kilos of high purity cocaine worth thousands of 
pounds being dropped over the fence of a wealthy customer’s house by 
transporters linked to wholesalers, highly cut ounces and grams are also 
sold to numerous users at street level by dealers, or among friends by 
‘facilitators’. Most of the interviewed criminal entrepreneurs noted two 
purity levels, where they were buying or cutting their product in order 
to sell at two prices to different customers. This dual market is explored 
in more detail in the sections below.
Overall, studies to date have noted that the UK cocaine market has a 
complex and fluid structure.224 Likewise, our data found that the market 
is structured by flexible and often loosely organised criminal networks. 
Because of the complexity and variation in its structure, the cocaine 
market in the UK is financed in a number of ways. Investment practices 
in this market are flexible, messy and continuously mutating. As UK-E5 
pointed out, there are “degrees of participation” and a “spectrum of 
organisations” in the cocaine trade. The upshot is that money comes 
from a range of different places. Some operators finance operations 
collectively, others individually. Some are involved sporadically, whereas 
others continually operate and reinvest. The following sections will draw 
specifically on the primary interview data and findings from previous 
studies conducted in the UK in order to describe the financing and 
financial management of the British cocaine market.
Sources of capital for criminal operations. Profile of financiers 
in criminal operations
Whether a group or individual is operating at the level of importation, 
national or local level dealing, in the first instance they must secure 
224 Pearson and Hobbs, Middle Market Drug Distribution; Zaitch, Trafficking Cocaine: Colombian Drug 
Entrepreneurs in the Netherlands (Studies of Organized Crime); M. Kenney, “Architecture of Drug 
Trafficking: Network Forms of Organisation in Colombian Cocaine Trade”, Global Crime 8, no. 3 
(2007): 233-59; Matrix Knowledge Group, The Illicit Drug Trade in the United Kingdom.
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some start-up capital. A variety of financial and non-financial means are 
typically used in order to initiate and sustain cocaine supply in the UK 
at various levels of the market.
Capital beyond the economic
According to all interviewed experts and criminal entrepreneurs the im-
portance of social capital (i.e. connections and relationships) and symbolic 
capital (i.e. trust and reputation) were equally, if not more, important than 
economic capital in initiating and sustaining a cocaine operation.
All criminal entrepreneurs mentioned the importance of acquaintances 
and trust to their operations. One expert (UK-E4) also spoke fervently 
about the levels of trust on display. It is through social and symbolic 
capital that an actor can connect with a supplier, secure product on 
credit, and build up a reliable long-term customer base that provides 
a quick turnover. The importance of a reliable customer base was also 
highlighted by all other retail level entrepreneurs, including the online 
dealer. For example, along with acquaintances and trust, UK-C1 spoke of 
“being able to get rid of a certain amount quickly” as the most important 
need for sustaining his operation. Slowing down and diminishing the 
reliability of distribution to end-users at the local level would disrupt the 
smooth operation of the whole trade.
Moreover, drawing upon his law enforcement experience, UK-E1 noted 
that financial capital is not necessary to enter the business. Rather it is 
“reputation, reliability, an initial connection, and a will to make money”. 
In these instances, when an individual enters the market they start 
by buying small amounts of cocaine on credit and, ensuring they pay 
back on time, begin a rolling credit with suppliers, while simultaneously 
building their reputation. This supports the contention made by the 
Matrix Knowledge Group that:
“…for many individuals a combination of their life situations, and 
relatively easy access to friends and contacts in the business, meant 
that barriers to entry were very low. Furthermore, access to start-up 
capital was not considered a barrier to entry because of the wide 
availability of credit.”225
An academic expert (UK-E5) noted an interview with a dealer who 
had a family connection and used her social capital, a level of trust 
and her labour power to sell in order to enter the market. Therefore, 
an individual’s labour can also be used as a non-financial form of 
initial capital. Another example was that of a mule who was initially 
employed by his cousin (an independent trafficker). After successfully 
completing his first job he became involved in the business more 
regularly. The lower levels of the trade seem to work with entry-level 
distributors entering the market and connecting with large numbers of 
local suppliers who are willing to take small credit risks. This arrangement 
spreads the overall risk and incentivises small-scale distributors with the 
225 Ibid., 24.
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possibility of using their social networks to make profits and eventually 
move up the supply chain.
“Chipping in:” acquaintances and group investment schemes
On many occasions initial operations include friends and partners who 
work and invest collectively in a cocaine business. They will pool their 
money together to “bulk-buy” more product at a lower price. Three 
specific examples illustrate this practice:
• The first involved a criminal entrepreneur (UK-C3) investing with a 
good friend who had a larger legitimate income. They were splitting 
the cost 50/50 with the investing friend requiring double on his 
investment without touching the drugs.
• Next, UK-C1 was a partner in a group of retail level dealers collectively 
“chipping in“ to purchase larger amounts of cocaine at a discounted 
price. The group were purchasing from a crime family one of the 
partners had a direct link with via an old school friend.
• A third criminal entrepreneur (UK-C4) was also investing with a 
small group of four or five “players”, some of whom originally met 
20 years ago as members of a commercial burglary team. There 
was some fluidity within the group, with different individuals being 
involved in different deals, but the core of the unit comprised of the 
entrepreneur and two men who had all been involved in criminal 
activities in the past.
According to UKE4 it is also common for two or so otherwise separate 
groups to “chip in” and secure a larger amount of cocaine to sell.
Finally, a South Asian network of cousins was mentioned by a law 
enforcement respondent. Kinship networks played a role in investments 
in legitimate and illegitimate businesses, including cocaine supply. Here, 
the close kinship structure and a culture of reciprocity helped to initiate 
and sustain a successful cocaine operation.
Legitimate money and loans
Legitimate money coming from a variety of avenues can also fund 
cocaine operations. As mentioned above, one example from the data 
is that of a British Asian group. A businessman from the group invested 
money from his taxi company, from property that he owned and, 
combining this money with small loans from his cousins, began to import 
cocaine from a Spanish dealer.
According to UK-E1, legitimate businessmen who own restaurants, pizza 
shops, and taxi companies have been known to become involved in 
the cocaine trade. They tend to use the proceeds from their legal 
businesses as start-up capital in a cocaine operation, and then launder 
the criminal proceeds by reinvesting the money back into their legal 
businesses. Therefore legitimate businesses can act as both start-up 
capital and money laundering schemes in the British cocaine trade. The 
same expert also mentioned that large scale money laundering is done 
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through acquisition of property. Trusted accountants are used to sustain 
and conceal the operations, yet another example of the crossover with 
legitimate businesses involved in the cocaine trade in the UK.
Another expert (UK-E5) gave an example of two legitimate businessmen 
who trafficked cocaine “on the side”. Here their legitimate businesses – a 
carpet business, an antiques import business and a property development 
business – generated initial start-up capital, provided ways of cleaning 
up criminal profits and knowledge and awareness of import/export 
procedures. In the loosest sense, these examples highlight the involvement 
of “organised” crime groups who finance operations, which often include 
people with legitimate business portfolios.
Legitimate start-up money invested in the cocaine trade does not 
always come from the proceeds of commercial business. UK-C1, who 
became involved in cocaine dealing with a group of friends who were 
buying from a crime family, used his student loan of £1,200 as his 
initial start-up capital. Over a 7 year period he received a loan every 3 
months, which helped him to sustain and reinvest in his drug business. 
Student life was also mentioned by the same entrepreneur and law 
enforcement respondent (UK-E1) as a good way to make connections 
with suppliers and build a customer base. Furthermore, the online 
wholesaler UK-C2, who had a connection from his previous involvement 
in dealing ecstasy, sold his car to fund his initial operation. He also ran 
a legitimate online business selling e-cigarettes, and occasionally money 
shifted between the capital and profits from both online businesses. In 
general, information from the interviews suggests a blurring between 
legitimate and illegitimate capital investment in cocaine.
Criminal careers, illegitimate money and loans
Criminal sources of investment and reinvestment also act as the financial 
capital for cocaine businesses. According to the interviewed experts, 
some cocaine deals are financed with the proceeds of armed robberies 
and sold stolen goods. For instance, UK-C4, who was also involved in 
burglaries, financed his cocaine operation directly through his criminal 
activity, alongside his ability to secure product from suppliers on credit 
due to the reputation he had built up throughout his criminal career. 
Another high profile importer known to UK-E4 used his criminal expertise, 
contacts made in prison, proceeds from crime and prior involvement in 
drug markets to facilitate his cocaine supply. Again, some of the criminals 
involved grouped together to invest in cocaine.
A particular operation known to UK-E4 involves a criminal group currently 
importing large amounts of cocaine into the UK via Spain (especially 
Tenerife) and Amsterdam. They supply to several regions across the UK 
via intermediaries. These entrepreneurs do not rely solely on cocaine 
and are involved in various legal and illegal operations. For example, 
amphetamine supply and manufacture was mentioned as a “big earner”. 
Some of the key players were also involved in large scale cannabis 
cultivation. Moreover, several individuals had legitimate concerns, 
including tyre and exhaust fitting centres, fruit and vegetable shops, 
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property portfolios, hotels, public houses, and guest houses catering for 
social security residents.
A law enforcement expert, UK-E1, mentioned cocaine dealers who 
diversify their illegitimate businesses and investments. For example, many 
known criminals who are involved in buying and selling stolen goods, 
particularly high-end expensive goods such as top of the range cars, 
also deal in cocaine. Again, there was a blurring of the legal and illegal 
because some of the same criminals also had legal business portfolios 
that they were using to launder their crime money. This included shops 
and rental properties, and particularly small cash-only businesses such as 
nail salons, barbers, car washes, and auto-repair shops.
Profile of financiers
Although investment comes from a range of sources and there is no 
fixed profile of a single typical investor, the following were identified 
as common sources of investment: legitimate business people; criminal 
entrepreneurs/financiers reinvesting in illegitimate operations; local 
crime families with connections who exert force; friends and/or family 
collectively investing in a cocaine business. In terms of criminal financiers, 
two experts spoke specifically about individuals with criminal histories 
who, having “made it” and moved into the legitimate business world, 
continue to finance cocaine deals. Often they will be known to drug 
dealers from childhood. One such individual in Northern England owns 
a very successful chain of used car retail outlets.
Settlement of payments
In the cocaine trade settlement of payments depends on several factors:
• whether the payment is being made upstream or downstream;
• whether there is a pre-existing relationship;
• the level of trust between the actors involved;
• the level of the trade in which they are operating.
According to UK-E3, upstream payments between producers/suppliers at 
different levels of the British cocaine business are usually organised in 
three ways: up-front, part-payment and payment on delivery. Still, it is 
rare to find either full up-front or on-delivery payments, but various ratios 
of part-payments are usually agreed. At the international importation level 
some groups/operations may settle a payment for a shipment in full in 
one nation state, then have different agreements set up for further dis-
tribution in other countries. This can include the use of front companies 
and/or off-shore bank accounts to transfer money and settle payments.
Once in the United Kingdom, UK-E4 suggested that large payments 
can be made up-front and often larger sums “on bail” or credit. As for 
employees facilitating payment arrangements, a runner is often used to 
transport money to and from locations and between groups. For example, 
one “firm” known to an expert in the North East of England, with strong 
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links to another in the South East, have been known to transfer both 
money and drugs via London Kings Cross station. As he explains:
“A runner would almost always be used to carry out such a task. 
Typically it would be someone lower down in the hierarchy, although 
they must be trusted. Often someone known from youth. Often an up-
and-coming youngster who is in need of the money enough to take the 
risk, but not seen as desperate enough to try and rob monies or goods. 
Typical payments would be 500 to 1,000 pounds per trip – money or 
drugs at the same rate – depending on who the runner was.”
Therefore, payments to employees can be in cash or a share of the cocaine 
being imported/distributed. Downstream payments between customers and 
dealers are usually cash up-front, but on occasion there will be a certain 
amount of credit given. However, this credit is in cocaine not money. 
The interviewed retail level dealers offered the following information 
about both upstream and downstream payment arrangements:
• UK-C1
– Upstream: the first entrepreneur either paid up-front, or on credit 
with an agreement to pay back over a certain amount of time. 
Sometimes he would pay back his connection as and when he sold 
the drugs, i.e. a revolving credit agreement. He never borrowed 
money, only received drugs on credit. The bigger and faster his 
turnover and the more he gained trust, the larger the amount of 
cocaine he could buy at a discount and the greater the level of 
credit he could receive. 
– Downstream: he would ask for cash up-front, but would occasionally 
give a gram or two of cocaine to his friends on credit without 
interest. This would only be with trusted people to guarantee 
payment. He reported having only ever had to make a couple of 
threats to secure payment.
• UK-C2
– Upstream: this entrepreneur dealt with a trusted supplier and 
sometimes was given product on credit. As he explains: “I see one 
main guy. Payments were always in cash. I could get some coke 
“on tick”226 because we go way back, I knew him as a kid and 
he trusts me. The terms were just like a kind of rolling credit. He 
never had to secure his payment because I wouldn’t mess about”.
– Downstream: he would sometimes give customers cocaine on 
credit, but only trusted people. Moreover, the majority of his 
business was now online and he traded solely in bitcoin, whereby 
orders were not sent until the digital currency arrived in his 
bank account. For sellers, the deep web and digital currencies 
offer less risk in terms of securing payment from customers. The 
entrepreneur even mentioned the increasing popularity of private, 
invite-only and personalised sites now appearing on the deep web 
in which trusted online sellers and buyers do business.
226 British, informal – on credit or trust; from “tick” – a score or account.
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• UK-C3
– Upstream: only one supplier in Manchester and no credit allowed, 
only cash up-front.
– Downstream: normally cash up-front, however he would infrequently 
give small amounts to very close friends on credit.
• UK-C4
– Upstream: this entrepreneur has done deals in the past whereby 
he would pay a certain amount up-front, and also receive the 
remaining quantity of cocaine on credit from a dealer in Liverpool. 
Currently, he has the capital and buys his cocaine up-front from a 
wholesale dealer based in Yorkshire.
– Downstream: at one point in his career he was selling over a kilo 
of cocaine every two weeks. Now, he sells to a “select group of 
customers”, the money is usually up-front and only in ounce deals, 
never smaller.
In the cocaine business the cash flow needs to be constant and there 
is always a floating amount of debt and recovery. In order to guarantee 
payments many of the interviewed dealers, along with UK-E4 with 
personal experience in the market, spoke of trust as a key principle 
required to ensure a return of payment. These findings support of 
previous research227 in that threats and intimidation are part of the 
cocaine business but not routine. In other words, violence happens 
when things go wrong. As UK-C3 notes: “I only deal to trusted friends 
with jobs and cash, but if I have to, threats of violence or taking 
some collateral worth more than the debt such as and X-Box or a 
watch usually would do the trick to incentivise a payment”. One expert 
(UK-E5) also spoke of cocaine being sold at street level in return for 
stolen goods, one example being that of a shoplifter who traded a flat 
screen TV for 1 gram of cocaine worth 50 pounds. Therefore, how 
various dealers manage their payments and profits may also depend on 
the demographic profile of their customers.
However, sometimes things do not go to plan, and in order to guarantee 
that payments will be settled cocaine dealers may use violence or 
intimidation, recover assets, or sell on debts. The law enforcement 
experts spoke of cases where the use of violence, threats, recovering 
property/assets, and selling debt to enforcers had taken place. “Some 
people employ a ‘facilitator’ or ‘enforcer’ and pay a fee. Others may sell 
the debts on. It all depends on the amount needing to be recovered. If 
it goes to a local loan shark the interest will be big” (UK-E1). A similar 
observation was shared by UK-E3: “A UK dealer may have networked 
and made an agreement with an importer but something goes wrong, 
they are ripped off or the product intercepted. They may use violence 
or threats… or sell this debt on to a heavier handed group or individual 
to enforce the debt, say a 40 thousand pound debt sold half return.” In 
other words, the enforcer keeps half of the money they recover.
227 See Pearson and Hobbs, Middle Market Drug Distribution.M. Soudijn and P. Reuter, “Managing 
Potential Conflict in Illegal Markets: An Exploratory Study of Cocaine Smuggling in the 
Netherlands”, in Further Insights into Aspects of the Illicit EU Drugs Market, ed. F. Trautmann, 
B. Kilmer, and P. Turnbull (Brussels, 2013), 345-60.
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Costs of doing business
There are variations in the costs involved in various stages of cocaine 
operations, from the start-up capital needed to purchase the product 
through to transportation, distribution and sale. They will not be fixed 
and will vary over time, and across the levels and stages of the operation. 
Although estimates were not provided, according to UK-E3, costs for 
trafficking and dealing cocaine can include:
• Staff costs;
• Corruption costs – “organised criminals approaching customs officers 
with money problems;”
• Transportation costs;
• “Sweeteners” – this could include paying someone assisting with the 
load of a freight;
• Chemist costs – used to test purity;
• Drug debts/enforcement costs;
• Interest charges – for example, if imposed on a promised time of 
delivery that is missed;
• Information – for example, paying for relevant information about a 
competitor, business opportunities or law enforcement actions.
Indeed, these are flexible networks of actors and costs can differ 
depending on the actors involved and level of the business in which 
they are operating (importation, middle market, or retail market). Data 
collected from law enforcement highlighted the following specifics in 
terms of costs:
• It costs approximately £500 per kilo of cocaine in Colombia, but in 
the UK an importer can pay £30,000 – £40,000 per kilo.
• The price changes depending on seizures, purity and locale.
• Shipment costs can vary in accordance with the means of transport 
used and volume of cocaine being shipped.
• Drug couriers can be paid as much as £500 – £1,000 per job.
• Money counters and collectors may receive £300 – £500 per day.
• In one case the money collector was receiving 2-3% of an international 
transaction. 
• Around £500 can secure the support of corrupt law enforcement in 
a country such as Guinea Bissau.
• In the UK corrupt officials may be paid to turn a blind eye.
• Younger entrepreneurs are often paid to monitor storage facilities or 
to find out information about operators in their area.
• Trusted people can be used as drivers, being paid £300 per day to 
chauffeur high level dealers.
Again, the fluidity of operations and costs is apparent. Previous research 
has analysed the costs involved in one British cocaine business in which 
two main partners were involved in buying cocaine from international 
Colombian traffickers before selling wholesale in the UK (Table 10).
The costs of this particular operation will no doubt have shifted alongside 
corresponding fluctuations in the market. However, the example highlights 
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the staff needed to head up an operation at national wholesale level and 
proves that sizeable profits can be made by UK-based importers and 
wholesalers of cocaine.
However, not all staff are paid. UK-E5, who has knowledge of drug 
mules involved in the cocaine trade, explained that some work for free, 
for example to pay off debts. Others may be paid in cocaine (a chunk 
of the shipment for them to sell and/or use), or cash. This may be paid 
up-front, or on delivery. Various business deals are arranged according to 
the needs of the individuals involved.
There are smaller costs associated with the retail level of the business. 
The interviewed retail level dealers highlighted the following expenses:
• Fuel/local transport costs;
• Mobile phone bill;
• Scales;
• Packaging;
• Cutting agents (whether more expensive APIs such as benzocaine at 
approximately £1 per gram, or a cheap agent such as Glucose for a 
little as £0.006 per gram).
The online dealer (UK-C2) also spoke specifically about moisture barrier 
bags and alcohol used to wash the outside of a package before delivery 
via post to prevent detection. Online orders also involve postage and 
packaging charges; however, these would be costed into the retail price 
paid by customers.
Таble 10. costs, revenues and proFits oF one british cocaine business
       * 10 kilos costing £18,000 per kilo.
Source: Matrix Knowledge Group, The Illicit Drug Trade in the United Kingdom, 34.
Cost (£) Profit (£)
Buying 10 kilos wholesale in London 180,000*
Main courier (salary & expenses) 800
Money collector (per day) 250
Money counter (per day) 250
Money deliverer (per day) 250
Driver (per day) 200
Total known costs 181,750
Revenue (per 10 kilo transaction) 220,000
Gross Profit 40,000
Net Profit 38,250
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In terms of the cocaine 
they bought, the interviewed 
criminal entrepreneurs were 
paying between £500 and 
£1,600 per ounce, depending 
upon their relationship with 
the supplier and purity levels. 
Some sold the product on 
without adulterating it and 
others cut it, usually into 
two purity levels, which they 
would sell at two different 
prices. For example, UK-C3 
travelling to Manchester was 
making monthly trips and 
spending around £100 on fuel, 
but the product he bought 
was cheaper and better 
quality than that available in 
his home town. Two purities 
were available to him at £500 
and £700 per ounce and he 
would also occasionally cut 
the product he bought with 
glucose, and had the most profitable operation at retail level.
Furthermore, UK-E4 identified a middle level entrepreneur who supplies 
two purities of powder cocaine in ounces and half ounces to a select 
group of customers. As he explains: “He buys 9 ounces of high quality 
cocaine from a contact in a rural part of the North East. He pays 
£15,000. He adulterates 6 of the 9 ounces with lactose and caffeine 
powder at a rate of 3, 2, 1. He sells this for £800 an ounce. The 
remaining three ounces are less savagely ‘cut’ at 1 to 1. He sells these 
as ‘pure’ for £1,500 an ounce. To further emphasise the ‘pureness’ of 
this cocaine he presses it into hard blocks using a press and hammer. 
For big amounts dealers use industrial hydraulic presses designed to push 
pistons out of car engines.”
These examples emphasise the higher profit available once cocaine is 
cut, and the tiered market that has appeared in the UK in terms of 
different purity levels. Therefore prices of the drug itself vary and value 
is added, along with a range of other costs. Actors and costs associated 
with the trade vary according to the stage and level of the operation. 
Profits and profit sharing
The UK is an end user market for cocaine, therefore the drug is at its 
highest price, having increased incrementally as it moves through a variety 
of places and complex stages in the supply chain. There are variations in 
mark-ups and profit margins throughout the stages and operations involved. 
The example in the previous section highlights that considerable profits 
Таble 11. Monthly costs and proFit Margins oF a criMinal 
entrepreneur*
       * This calculation does not include profit lost through his own use.
      ** C3 sold 0.8 gram for £60.
Source: UK-C3 interview.
Cost (£) Profit (£)
Cocaine (1 ounce) 700
Fuel 100
Mobile Phone Bill 30
Cutting Agents 5
Packaging 5
Total Known Costs 840
Revenue** 2,037.6
Gross Profit 1,337.6
Net Profit 1,197.6
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can be made at the wholesale 
level of the cocaine business in 
the UK. This is also true at the 
level of importation. 
One law enforcement expert 
(UK-E3) noted that on average 
an “original block” of 1 kilo of 
high quality cocaine is worth 
approximately £40,000 once 
it reaches the UK market. He 
explains: “If you import a block 
you may sell in full, or usually 
have a small number of one-
off deals and cut product by 
one third with APIs to make 3 
times the profit.” Once cocaine 
reaches the UK, the profits 
of criminal entrepreneurs can 
fluctuate and vary depending on 
a number of factors: availability, 
demand, quantity, quality of the 
product (purity before and after 
adulterating), customer base, 
and risk of seizures or arrests.
The variation in the prices 
that retail level dealers pay for 
ounces suggests that the levels 
of purity and adulteration of the 
cocaine they buy and sell also 
varies. Considerable profits can 
be made at the retail level with 
the right supplier and customer 
base, particularly if the actors 
involved cut the product to a 
high degree. Having said that, 
UK-C1, although having been 
involved in the business for 
over 7 years, hadn’t gained or 
invested his money and seemed 
to offer a typical example of 
a street-level dealer who had 
fewer opportunities to profit 
from the cocaine trade in the 
long term. He noted that he 
had simply “had a good time.” 
This contention was supported by two experts (UK-E1 and UK-E5) who 
spoke of the “big money” available in operations over borders, but less 
profit available at street level. UK-E5 gave details of three specific cases, 
which offer an insight into the fluidity in levels and profits of cocaine 
operations:
Таble 12. costs and Mark-ups per kilo oF cocaine at speciFic points 
along the supply chain in the uk
Source: Matrix Knowledge Group, The Illicit Drug Trade in the United Kingdom, 18.
Point in supply chain Cost per kilo Mark-up
Production £325 
550% mark-up
In South America £2025
280% mark-up
In the Caribbean £7800
292% mark-up
UK wholesale £30,800
89% mark-up
UK retail £51,850
Таble 13. Mark-ups in the buying and selling oF cocaine by uk 
criMinal entrepreneurs*
      * UK-C1, UK-C2 and UK-C3 work at the retail level, while UK-C4 is a middle 
level dealer.
     ** UK-C4 splits his 9 ounce deal into 2:
 • He cuts 6 ounces into 18 ounces ‘3, 2, 1’ with lactose and caffeine 
 powder sold at £800 per ounce (44% mark-up);
 • He cuts 3 ounces into 6 ounces ‘1 to 1’ sold as ‘pure’ at £1,500 
 per ounce (80% mark-up).
Source: Interviews.
UK-C1 UK-C2 UK-C3 UK-C4
Buys £960 per ounce
£800 per 
ounce £700
£15,000
per 9 bar 
(9 ounces)
Sells £40 – £50 per gram
£50 (to 
friends) £70 
(online) per 
gram
£60 per
0.8 gram
£23,400
per 9 bar**
Mark-up
47.6% @ 
£50 per 
gram
147.6% @ 
£70 per 
gram
191% 56%
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“The biggest case I know was international and they were importing 
2.5 to 5 kilos per month. Another was at street level, where a woman 
at the peak of her dealing was making £1,000 per month. However, 
another case was that of a female dealer who chose to do less. She 
made £300 per month because it was less bother and she was happy 
with her customers and how it fit with her lifestyle – she had kids 
and a job.”
The vast differences in terms of profit margins at retail level and a suggested 
drop in purity could be the result of criminal entrepreneurs who operate 
at street level further adulterating their products to increase profits.
Previous research also suggests that mark-up can depend on risk.228 
For example, the risk of arrest at the level of importation results in 
larger profit margins when trafficking cocaine over borders. As Matrix 
Knowledge Group contends:
“Mark-ups in the illegal drugs market mirror the risks taken, and 
dealers reported that local and regional price rises of a ‘couple of 
grand a kilo’ can occur because of a large and effective enforcement 
operation affecting that part of the supply chain. However these 
limited effects are not enough to change price trends overall.”229
This risk-driven mark-up can have a knock-on effect in terms of purity 
and/or price along the supply chain to customers.230 One interviewed 
law enforcement officer suggested that profit margins depend on the 
original investment and level of risk: “Depending on what one invested 
in the first place. If one invested 50% they expect 50% of profits. That 
is of course in those cases that do not involve losing merchandise.”
Moreover, at wholesale and middle-level in the UK, prices and profits 
can vary depending on the size of the local markets and the availability 
of cocaine. One entrepreneur (UK-C3) based in North East England was 
buying in Manchester in “ounce deals” cheaper than another entrepreneur 
(UK-C1) based in the same city who bought from a local dealer. He was 
also selling 0.8 as 1 gram deals, which leads to a further increase in the 
mark-up (see above). Therefore a dealer buying wholesale in a larger 
market such as Manchester or Liverpool, but selling in a smaller city or 
town, can secure a higher profit margin.
In terms of profit-sharing, experts suggested that some actors may be 
involved in group investment schemes in which they seek a percentage 
return similar to their original investment. However, we have found that 
most cocaine entrepreneurs work on an individual basis. For instance, 
UK-E5 spoke of street level dealers who decide what to do with their own 
product – how much they cut it, who they sell to and so forth – and 
228 N. Dorn, L. Oette, and S. White, “Drugs Importation and the Bifurcation of Risk: Capitalization, 
Cut Outs and Organized Crime”, British Journal of Criminology 38 (1998): 537-60; Matrix Knowledge 
Group, The Illicit Drug Trade in the United Kingdom.
229 Ibid., 10.
230 Dorn, Oette, and White, “Drugs Importation and the Bifurcation of Risk: Capitalization, Cut 
Outs and Organized Crime”.
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what they do with the return. Therefore flexible networks of individuals 
may invest in cocaine to sell, yet profit from it on an individual basis. All 
the entrepreneurs we interviewed profited individually. Furthermore, our 
interviews emphasised that profits were usually spent on a conspicuous 
lifestyle (buying expensive goods such as cars and holidays), reinvesting 
in the cocaine business or laundering money by investing in legitimate 
businesses or property. UK-C1 spent his profits solely on his lifestyle and 
his own cocaine use.
Access to capital in critical moments
As is the case with high-risk criminal operations, it is not uncommon 
for actors involved in the cocaine trade to require immediate access 
to substantial amounts of capital in critical moments; for example, if 
a shipment is seized or an arrest is made. Highlighting similarities with 
the processes used to obtain capital in order to initiate and sustain a 
cocaine operation, the information we gathered during the in-depth 
interviews with experts and criminal entrepreneurs in the UK suggested 
the following ways in which cocaine dealers acquire access to such 
capital in critical moments:
Securing cocaine from a trusted source on credit. Entrepreneurs, 
academic experts and law enforcement all spoke of the role past 
associates and connections in the cocaine trade can play in critical 
moments if an individual needs to access capital in the form of an 
amount of cocaine on credit. One entrepreneur (C4) – who having been 
arrested and sentenced to six years began to buy cocaine entirely on 
credit through an old associate on his release – explained that this may 
be at a higher price at first: “he wasn’t doing many favours with the 
prices mind, I was paying a little bit over the odds, but beggars can’t 
be choosers”.
One expert (UK-E4) also noted the role played by “a help out”, in other 
words a past associate, friend, and/or supplier who can “offer a decent 
amount of gear totally on bail with no up-front payment.” Moreover, 
UK-E1 was quite adamant that re-entering the market after an arrest 
is relatively easy if you have the right connections: “You can re-enter 
using connections and reputation more than money. Product on tick 
from friends for example. Then establish yourself back in the market”.
Therefore, just as was found with regard to securing initial start-up 
capital, connections, reputation and trust play a fundamental role in a 
cocaine dealer’s ability to access capital in critical moments in the British 
cocaine trade.
If arrested, a trusted partner acts in your absence to continue 
operations. Similarly, UK-E4 described cases in which individuals involved 
in the trade were able to begin dealing immediately after release from 
prison because a trusted associate had kept their business in operation 
during their time away: “Usually this involves a trusted accomplice 
keeping the business going in his absence”.
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Selling labour. Two experts (UK-E3 and UK-E5) mentioned individuals 
simply selling their labour by making themselves useful to existing 
operations in order to re-enter the market. One specific example involved 
an individual working as a mule to “get back in the game” after 2 kilos 
of cocaine they were responsible for delivering was “lost.” Although the 
mule denied his involvement in the missing shipment, he chose to work 
again to gain entry back into the business, to build his reputation and 
to pay off the debt.
Selling assets. At retail level, dealers have been found to sell assets in 
return for some cocaine. UK-C2 sold his car and used the proceeds to 
invest in cocaine. Some may exchange their assets directly in return for 
some product.
Using financial capital from other legitimate or illegitimate businesses. 
If an individual or group involved in a cocaine operation has a business 
portfolio (illegitimate and/or legitimate), he or she may borrow and 
move capital between businesses in order to gain access to funds 
when necessary. This also links to the simultaneous role that legitimate 
businesses can play in money laundering. For example, the online dealer 
(UK-C2) also runs an online e-cigarette business.
loan sharking in the context of Britain’s cocaine market was little 
discussed at the interviews. Two experts (UK-E3 and UK-E5) in particular 
noted that loans are used and definitely part of the process, but that the 
term is probably not applicable as an accurate description of a direct 
link with the initial financing of a cocaine operation.
UK-E3 suggested that loan sharks are not normally connected to 
the international trafficking level. Instead there are loans, drug debts 
and criminal investments that can vary considerably. He noted the 
following:
• Drug debts: “some broken agreements – promises of quantities, 
quality, time frame, prices – end with debts which can be sold on 
to enforcers who have different repayment plans and agreements in 
place, which can include violence.”
• Criminal investments: “Original agreements between actors may also 
include arrangements put in place in case something goes wrong. For 
example a discount on the next shipment and/or risk spread across 
investors, whereby one person pays 40% and the other 60% in order 
to spread costs if the product is intercepted”.
Having said that, it became clear that national and local level cocaine 
dealers can sometimes become involved in loan sharking and that 
loan sharks and drug enforcers can play crucial roles in terms of debt 
recovery. It was found that the following specific practices are common 
with regard to loan sharking and enforcement:
• Enforcers buy debts from cocaine dealers in return for a percentage 
of the recovered capital.
• Loan sharks mainly target vulnerable users not cocaine dealers.
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• Importers are exclusively involved in cocaine, not loan sharking.
• At the middle and retail level, cocaine dealers may also become 
involved in loan sharking because it is seen as lower risk.
• Loans sharks involved in cocaine supply may use the proceeds from 
loan sharking to fund or sustain a cocaine operation. However, others 
operate both businesses separately.
• Most often loan sharks offer money at a high interest but this is 
agreed on a personal basis.
• Penalties for missing a repayment can include added interest, 
background threats, asset recovery (from the individual in debt or 
their family or friends) and violence (sometimes extreme).
Over the course of the last twenty years Bulgarian organised crime has 
moved into all lucrative drug markets both on national level and in 
Europe. Since the end of the communist regime, drug trafficking and 
drug distribution have always been among the major sources of revenue 
for Bulgarian organised crime. The geographical location of the country 
on the Balkan route for smuggling of heroin from Afghanistan to Western 
Europe has pre-determined the involvement of Bulgarian organised crime 
in the drug trafficking networks. In the nineties Bulgarian OCGs mostly 
facilitated the international heroin trafficking networks, but they gradually 
shifted to supply of the domestic market and playing more important 
role in the heroin trafficking in Europe.231
Bulgaria along with Turkey was also known as one of the major producers 
of illicit captagon232 tablets in Europe. Captagon trafficking towards the 
Near East countries exploited the heroin trafficking routes and Bulgarian 
OCGs often used to exchange captagon for heroin. Recently, OCG have 
moved out the captagon production to Near East countries and closer 
to their end markets, as a result of which mostly small-scale production 
of amphetamines for the domestic market remained in Bulgaria.233 In the 
last ten years Bulgarian OCGs have also actively been penetrating the 
cocaine trafficking market. Joint police operations on EU level revealed 
that there are Bulgarian criminal entrepreneurs on the highest levels of 
the cocaine trafficking rings supplying tonnes of cocaine to Western 
Europe directly from South America.234
The Bulgarian markets for illicit drugs emerged with the fall of the 
communist regime in the beginning of the nineties and soon became a 
source of profits for organised crime. It all started with heroin, as the 
231 EMCDDA and Europol, EU Drug Markets Report. A Strategic Analysis.
232 Captagon (Fenethylline) is an amphetamine-type stimulant.
233 Ibid.; CSD, Organised Crime in Bulgaria: Markets and Trends (Sofia, 2007).
234 EMCDDA and Europol, EU Drug Markets Report. A Strategic Analysis; UNODC, The Illicit Drug Trade 
through South East Europe (Vienna, 2014).
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location of the country along the Balkan Route provided for unlimited 
options of supply at a fairly low price. The rapid expansion of heroin 
use in the beginning of the nineties secured an exponentially growing 
demand, fuelled by the vast number of dependant customers. The 
heroin consumption reached its peak in the end of the nineties and 
eventually started to decrease, impelling OCGs to shift their interest 
to amphetamines, cannabis and eventually cocaine. However, in the 
meantime the heroin trade moulded the shape of the entire drug market 
for more than a decade – strict territorial zoning and few hierarchically 
structured big organisations dominated the market.235 This changed in 
the last seven years, when the markets gradually turned to a more 
fragmented state with many competing medium and small players.236
The domestic Bulgarian drug markets are relatively small compared to 
the drug markets in Western Europe. A recent estimation drawing on 
the EMCDDA official statistics assessed the market value of four major 
drugs – heroin, cannabis, cocaine and amphetamines.237 The heroin 
market comprises of ten to twelve thousand users and is estimated at 
€14-28 million on an annual basis. The regular cannabis users in Bulgaria 
are estimated at 55,000 – 88,000, whereas the recreational cannabis 
users amount to another 51,000 – 83,000. The estimate of the overall 
value of the cannabis market is €41.4-€92.6 mln. Furthermore, the 
regular cocaine users are 4,000 – 8,000 persons, while the recreational 
users are 20,000 – 40,000. The value of the illicit cocaine market is 
estimated at €22.3-€80.3 million. Moving to synthetics drug market, the 
number of the synthetic drugs 
users is around 46,000 people 
and the value on annual basis 
is €31.3-€78.8 million.
Since these are the first 
estimates of the volumes and 
the value of the markets, 
it is not possible to use the 
data as an indicator for the 
trends over the last 20 years. 
However, the available data on 
the prevalence of use among 
the general population can be 
used as proxy indicator for 
the consumption and therefore 
about the trends of the volumes 
in the various drug markets.
The most recent – 2005 – data 
for heroin use in Bulgaria 
suggest 20,000 – 30,000 users. 
235 CSD, Organised Crime in Bulgaria: Markets and Trends.
236 CSD, Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2010 – 2011.
237 Ibid.
Figure 15. prevalence oF drug use aMong adults (15-64 years old) 
in bulgaria, 2005 – 2012
Source: EMCDDA, Data and statistics.
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However, expert assessment state that by 2011 the consumption had 
halved, so the actual number of users should be closer to 10,000 – 12,000 
people.238 More recent data is available on the consumption of cannabis, 
amphetamines and cocaine. The EMCDDA statistics show that for the 
period 2005 – 2012 the numbers of adults (15 – 64 years old) who 
have used cannabis in the preceding month had doubled from 0.8% to 
2%. The number of people who have used cocaine in the preceding 
month had been rising steeply for the period 2005 – 2008 (from 0.2 
percent to 0.4 percent), but sharply declined in 2012 to 0.1 percent. 
At the same time, from 2005 to 2008 the share of all adults that had 
used amphetamines in the preceding month more than doubled from 
0.2% to 0.5%, although subsequently declined to 0.3% in 2012.239
Bulgarian organised crime groups are active at all levels of illicit drugs 
trafficking including production, importation, wholesale and retail level. 
At each of these supply chain levels, OCGs operating on different scale 
can be identified – from OCGs of few persons producing or moving 
small quantities to OCGs producing or moving hundreds of kilos. These 
facts suggest that specific segmentation exists at each level depending 
on the scale of operation of the OCG. In order to account for the 
specifics of these segments at each of the level of the drug supply chain, 
these segments would be generally referred to as low, middle and high 
corresponding to low-scale, medium scale and large scale of operation 
at each of the supply chain levels. Additional details will be provided 
for each of the segments in order to more precisely illustrate, what is 
defined as low, middle and high segment.
Production level
Cannabis consumption is not only the largest in the country in comparison 
to all other drugs, but also the fastest growing in the recent years. 
The cannabis market in Bulgaria is really diverse and not all of it is 
controlled by the organised crime. The bulk of the demand is met by 
domestically produced cannabis. Both regular users and organised crime 
groups are involved in crop cultivation. With the rapid development of 
the technology for indoor growing, many regular users started to grow 
marijuana to meet their own consumption, as well as to supply their 
close friends. This trend is increasing in the last years due to the easy 
access to quality cannabis seeds over the internet and the easy access 
to cheap equipment for indoor cultivation (BG-E4, BG-E5). The users-
growers usually operate on a small scale (grow up to 10 plants at a time) 
and comprise the low segment of the production.
However, organised crime also has considerable interest in this fast 
growing market, so many drug wholesalers and retailers have invested 
in indoor or outdoor cannabis plantations. The criminal entrepreneurs 
238 A. Rusev, P. Gounev, and T. Bezlov, “European Lessons from the Bulgarian Serious Organised 
Crime Threat Assessment”, in Human Dimensions in Organised Crime, Money Laundering and 
Corruption, ed. P.C. van Duyne et al. (Nijmegen: WLP, 2013), 95-120.
239 EMCDDA, Data and statistics. http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/data/2014
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operating in the middle segment of cannabis production usually grow 
relatively bigger quantities (up to 500 plants), which are intended for the 
domestic market (BG-E1, BG-E5). Often retailers or wholesalers are the 
ones who invest in such plantations in order to secure steady supplies 
for their street dealers.
the high segment is related to large-scale indoor or outdoor growing 
(more than 500 plants), which often is intended for exportation (BG-E1, 
BG-E3). Two distinct modi operandi can be identified. The first method 
involves OCG groups renting land, greenhouses or abandoned houses to 
set indoor or outdoor cannabis plantations. These plantations are mostly 
set for large-scale growing, as it would be hard to trade such volumes at 
the domestic market, so the quantities produced are usually destined for 
abroad. An example of such operation was provided when SANS busted 
a greenhouse plantation on 5,000 sq. m. in the Pazardzhik region with 
a yield amounting at 1000 kg dry cannabis mass (BG-E3). The OCG that 
established the plantation had been financed by a Dutch citizen, so the 
end product was intended for the Dutch market.
The second method of operation is typical for the South-western region 
of Bulgaria and in particular for the mountain regions of Ograzhden and 
Belasitsa, which have been the major producing regions for cannabis in 
the last 25 years. The crops are cultivated outdoors by local villagers 
and the trade is controlled by several large wholesalers that finance 
the farmers and subsequently sell the drug to retailers from all parts 
of the country. This method for outdoor growing brings just one yield 
per year, but requires comparatively lower costs, so the big wholesalers 
are able to maintain the prices at half the level of greenhouse or 
indoor cultivated cannabis. For example, the wholesale price of 1 kg 
of cannabis in Petrich (a town in South-western Bulgaria)240 is €1,500-
€2,500, while the wholesale price of indoor grown cannabis starts at 
€5,000 (BG-E3).
Amphetamines and methamphetamines are the second most used 
drugs in Bulgaria and therefore one of the key markets for organised 
crime. The supply of the drugs is predominantly domestic and usually 
wholesalers invest in establishing such drug labs and subsequently 
trade the product to the retailers (BG-E2, BG-E3, BG-E4). Although, 
the golden times of large-scale production of amphetamines destined 
for trafficking abroad seem to have waned, many small-scale producers 
regularly feed the market with illicitly manufactured amphetamine and 
methamphetamine.241
In the last years OCGs from the Sofia region (Sofia, Pernik, Kostinbrod) 
have established themselves as major producers of amphetamines, 
whereas OCGs from South-eastern Bulgaria (Sliven, Yambol) have become 
240 The town and region of Petrich emerged as an important drug trafficking hub in the 1990s, 
which has been documented in numerous media reports. Many big traffickers of cannabis, 
heroin and cocaine who have been prosecuted in the last 20 years in Bulgaria originate from 
this region.
241 CSD, Organised Crime in Bulgaria: Markets and Trends; EMCDDA and Europol, EU Drug Markets 
Report. A Strategic Analysis.
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known for production of methamphetamines (BG-E3, BG-E5). Most of 
their facilities can be classified as “kitchen labs” and produce small 
batches (from 0.3 to 1 kg) on request, so the criminal entrepreneurs 
rather occupy the low or middle segment. The precursors are mainly 
supplied through ordering the needed chemicals online or purchasing 
over-the-counter medicines from pharmacies. Some OCG groups provide 
precursors through cross-border smuggling – i.e. smuggling of ephedrine 
or ephedrine-based medicines from Turkey (BG-E1, BG-E4).
Importation level
The involvement of the Bulgarian OCGs in the trafficking of heroin 
and cocaine in Europe and beyond has been growing in the last years, 
although their role remains primarily that of facilitators. Looking at cross-
border-trafficking of heroin in Europe, Turkish and Albanian criminal 
networks are still the incontestable leaders via the notorious Balkan 
Route. Turkish crime networks are also active in moving back along 
the Balkan Route amphetamines and ecstasy towards the Near East. 
The large-scale importation of cocaine from South America is primarily 
dominated by the Colombians, although other Latin American (Mexican, 
Venezuelan, Peruvian, etc.) and Nigerian groups are contesting their role. 
European OCGs such as Italian, Spanish, and Western Balkan have also 
established themselves as significant importers of cocaine.242
Considering the relatively small domestic market in Bulgaria, most of 
the organised crime groups involved in heroin or cocaine trafficking 
provide transportation of the drugs from countries where the drugs 
are produced or stockpiled to the lucrative Western European markets. 
The majority of the interviewed law enforcement experts concurred 
that the Bulgarian OCGs usually operate on a fee-for-service basis for 
other criminal networks operating on international level. Typically, when 
acting as facilitators, the OCGs provide services like identification and 
recruitment of drug couriers and cash couriers, establishment of fictitious 
export-import companies, providing safe storage and repackaging.
However there are also organised crime groups, who act as small scale 
importers of heroin and cocaine for supplying the domestic market and 
work on their own behalf. Recently, a Bulgarian OCG was detected 
involved in a large scale importation of cocaine from South America 
acting not as subsidiaries, but on their own account.
Three segments need to be distinguished at importation level. The low 
segment comprises of small scale importers smuggling drugs for the 
domestic market. The middle segment is the criminal entrepreneurs 
providing logistical services on a fee-for-service basis for bigger international 
criminal networks, as well as the suppliers of bigger quantities of heroin 
and cocaine for the domestic market. Finally the high segment is 
the OCG organising large-scale importation of drugs from the source 
countries to the Western Europe markets.
242 Ibid.
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Low segment – small scale importers
Both heroin and cocaine are imported on a small scale in Bulgaria. In 
the last 6-8 years, heroin has become mostly the drug of the poor 
and marginalised social groups, especially Roma. Hence, many Roma 
are involved in heroin trade on all levels, including importation. Certain 
Roma neighbourhoods like Stolipinovo in Plovdiv and to some extent 
Maksuda in Varna have turned into giant warehouses for heroin storage 
and wholesale. Many families from these neighbourhoods are involved in 
small scale heroin trafficking from Turkey and smuggle from 1 to 5 kg 
per trip across the border (BG-E3, BG-E4, BG-E5). The typical profile of 
the importer is a person running small family merchandise business, who 
regularly travels to Turkey in order to supply various commodities.
Small-scale importation is also common at the cocaine market, where 
an increased number of cases are reported for using postal services for 
smuggling drugs (BG-E5). The cocaine is ordered online, the payment 
for the delivery is settled through companies like Western Union, while 
the drug itself is physically delivered through the postal services. The 
quantities smuggled with this method are rather small 50-100 grams.
Middle segment – OCGs facilitating cross-border trafficking
In the last 25 years, many Bulgarian OCGs have been detected as 
facilitators of heroin and cocaine cross-border trafficking – mainly 
through organising the transportation of the drugs across one or more 
borders, providing warehousing and repackaging.243 In many cases, these 
OCGs get paid in kind with a share of the smuggled drugs, which they 
subsequently can sell at the domestic or other market (BG-E2).
Facilitators pursue different methods of operation. Smuggling overland 
in cars or trucks from Turkey to Bulgaria or other European country is 
the preferred modus operandi for heroin cross-border trafficking. The 
role of the criminal entrepreneurs is to identify and recruit the drivers, 
as well as to secure the modified vehicle with concealed compartments. 
Sometimes part of their role is to ensure the safe crossing of the border 
through bribing the border guard and customs personnel (BG-E1, BG-E2, 
BG-E4, BG-E6).
Cocaine cross-border trafficking is usually carried either via air or via sea 
from South America to Western Europe. Bulgarian OCGs are active in 
recruiting and managing air couriers, yacht skippers or commercial sea 
vessel crews (BG-E1, BG-E2).
High segment – large-scale drug trafficking
For many years it was largely accepted by law enforcement experts 
and academics that Bulgaria is predominantly a transit country and 
local organised crime groups were merely facilitators of the Turkish 
and Albanian criminal networks. This notion has been contested in 
243 Ibid.
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the last years, when large-scale schemes for trafficking of heroin and 
cocaine were dismantled. The 2013 joint report of EMCDDA and Europol 
acknowledged that in the last years Bulgarian OCGs have also entered 
into the large scale trafficking of cocaine from South America to Western 
Europe, as well as trafficking of heroin along the Balkan route.
Comments from law enforcement experts on some of these cases provide 
important insight in the profile and modus operandi of these big players. 
Generally these are persons running big legitimate businesses associated 
with logistics, transportation, import and export of various commodities. 
Often their business is not limited in only one economic sector and 
they control numerous companies, which also allows them to effectively 
launder the proceeds from the drug trafficking. Unlike the players from 
the low and middle segment, the actors in the high segment employ 
means such as setting up of front companies run by straw men, fictitious 
import and export trade transactions or concealment of the trafficked 
quantities within legitimate trade shipments for smuggling of hundreds of 
kilograms of cocaine and heroin (BG-E2, BG-E4).
Wholesale and retail distribution
The domestic drug markets currently comprise of numerous independent 
players and most of them are specialised in a certain segment – cannabis, 
amphetamines, cocaine or heroin. The big hierarchical structures and 
the strict territorial zoning, which dominated the drugs markets up to 
2008, in the recent years have been replaced with numerous small 
wholesalers and retailers. This tendency is most visible at the heroin 
market, where in the recent years the consumption has mostly shifted 
to the marginalised Roma communities.244
Heroin distribution happens also outside Roma communities, although 
the declining heroin consumption has pressed many of the wholesalers 
and the retailers to supplement with or shift their activities to other 
drugs such as amphetamines and cannabis. For example this is the case 
in Sofia, where currently many medium to small-size OCGs are active 
on the drug market and in many cases they control street dealers selling 
heroin, as well as dealers selling amphetamines and cannabis.245
the domestic cocaine market in Bulgaria is even smaller than the heroin 
market given the current retail price, which makes it inaccessible for 
most of the drug consumers. Therefore patterns of the distribution are 
totally different from that of the other illicit drugs. It is concentrated 
around the expensive night clubs in the big cities (Sofia, Plovdiv, Varna, 
Burgas) and the big summer and winter resorts (Albena, Golden Sands, 
Sunny Beach, Bansko, Pamporovo, Borovets). This is why the distribution 
is heavily dependent on the collaboration of the club owners, as well as 
on the private security companies that usually are key for access in these 
entertainment venues (BG-C1, BG-C2, BG-C3). Hence some OCGs have 
244 CSD, Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2010 – 2011.
245 Ibid.
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secured the access to clubs by obtaining contracts for the provision of 
security services. There are also cases where the club owners themselves 
decide to organise or get involved as partners in the sales (BG-E1, 
BG-E4, BG-E5).
Cocaine dealing is also often linked to prostitution rings, where it is 
offered to the clients as a lucrative bonus. Cocaine traders also try to 
herd up wealthy customers, which are offered high quality product in 
order to keep them loyal.246 The data from the filed interviews indicates 
that the importers and big wholesalers are based in the capital Sofia and 
they supply the local retailers in the other parts of the country (BG-C1, 
BG-C2, BG-E1, BG-E5).
Cannabis distribution is not dominated by big players, but rather 
by numerous small and medium sized groups, which distribute the 
drug practically in all cities competing with each other for clients. 
Often cannabis distribution goes hand in hand with the distribution of 
synthetics – amphetamines and methamphetamines. The bulk of the sales 
are arranged via telephone and delivered to the customers keeping great 
level of caution (e.g. using code words, never handing the drug to the 
customer and instead leaving it in a concealed place, etc.). The organised 
crime groups also rely on recruiting youngsters as dealers in order to 
exploit their friend networks at school. In some cities the organised crime 
groups are trying to exert control over certain territories and readily fight 
turf wars to push out competitors or independent dealers.247
The distribution of amphetamines and methamphetamines to a large 
extent resemble the modus operandi typical for the cannabis distribution 
and often they go together – i.e. OCGs operate in certain districts of the 
city and actively subduing or pushing out competition, sales are typically 
arranged via telephone or exploiting extended friend networks through 
recruiting students as dealers.248 However some OCGs also pursue the 
club distribution model, which is common for cocaine distribution in 
Bulgaria (BG-E3, BG-E5). Heroin retailers also often sell amphetamines or 
“pico”249 along with the heroin (BG-C5, BG-C6).
Drawing on the interviews, certain similarities and differences between 
drug markets have been identified as regards criminal finances. The 
specifics of a drug market apparently have direct influence on criminal 
finances. The type of drug traded impacts costs and profits due to the 
differences in prices. On the other hand, the level in the supply chain 
along with the segmentation of the market entail far more reaching 
differences in sources of financing, access to capital and settlement 
of payments reflecting the level of market risks born. At production, 
wholesale and importation level financial resources seem to play significant 
246 CSD, Organised Crime in Bulgaria: Markets and Trends.
247 Ibid.; CSD, Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2010 – 2011.
248 CSD, Organised Crime in Bulgaria: Markets and Trends.
249 A slang word used in Bulgaria, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and other countries for “cooked” 
methamphetamine hydrochloride; in English it is known as “crystal speed”, “meth”, “ice”, 
“glass”, etc.
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role for market entry and operation, whereas at retail level initial capital 
has minor importance for market entry and operation. However, the 
collected data show that at all levels barter arrangements and in-kind 
payments also are common practice. Notwithstanding the significance 
of financial capital, social capital in terms of trusted relationships and 
reputation seem to be far more important at all levels of drug trafficking. 
Social capital and reputation not only allow for entering in a given 
criminal network and establishing business relations with suppliers and 
customers, but also allows for access to credit (i.e. money loan or trade 
credit) in order to start a drug trade business or ensure financing in 
critical moments.
Sources of capital for criminal operations. Profile of financiers 
in criminal operations
Social capital as a substitute of financial capital
Both interviewed law-enforcement experts and criminal entrepreneurs 
agreed that social capital (i.e. established connections and trust) and 
reputation are key for entering or ascending in drugs markets. Trusted 
relationships, often built on friendships and acquaintances forged during 
prison time, seem to be a common gateway into drug trade. This seems 
to be especially the case with the retail and the production level. 
Subsequently reputation and tenure in the business pave the way to 
ascending in business, as they open up opportunities for more profitable 
partnerships and direct access to valuable contacts (i.e. brokers, suppliers 
and investors).
Hence, it is common among entrepreneurs entering the drug market at 
retail or production level to begin their career without any start-up capital. 
Various arrangements exist that alleviate the problem with lack of own 
start-up capital – a good reputation or a surety can provide for goods 
on credit on a revolving basis. Several interviewed drug entrepreneurs 
shared that they have started their business through getting the drugs on 
a revolving credit arrangement – i.e. the drugs are paid once the whole 
quantity or part of it has been sold (BG-C1, BG-C2, BG-C3, BG-C4).
Similar arrangements have been cited in regards to production. For example, 
a “meth cook” is provided with all the necessary equipment and precursors 
in exchange of share of the quantities produced (BG-E4). Analogous cases 
were also cited about cannabis growers, where the grower is provided 
with the seeds, the equipment and money for the related expenses (utility 
bills, fertilisers) and, in addition, can keep part of the yield in exchange 
for his work and willingness to take the risk (BG-E1, BG-E3).
Criminal proceeds as a source of capital
Whereas social capital is of key importance for entering market and 
securing start-up capital especially at the retail levels of drug markets, 
wholesale and importation levels presume dealing on a bigger scale and 
with larger quantities. Doing business at that level also implies certain 
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payments to fee-for-service providers that cannot be postponed in time 
(drug mules, couriers, stash keepers, debt collectors, providers of money 
laundering services, corrupt law enforcement officials). Therefore besides 
social capital it also requires more substantial financial resources in order 
to enter or operate on the market at that level.
The majority of interviewed law enforcement experts concurred that the 
notion of “self-growth” captures the way criminal entrepreneurs enter 
the market at higher levels, i.e. the criminals enter the market at lower 
levels and gradually work their way up or expand activities reinvesting 
the revenues of the drugs traded. A typical example is an OCG that 
have started as facilitators of cross-border trafficking through provision of 
transportation and other logistic services on a fee-for-service basis and 
with accumulating capital and contacts moved on to organising their own 
importation (BG-E2). This model was to some extent confirmed in several 
of the interviews held with criminal entrepreneurs (BG-C1, BG-C2, BG-
C6). For example one of the heroin retailers (BG-C6) shared how he has 
started working as a “stash keeper”, gradually moved to retail distributor 
working for one of the big OCGs dealing in drugs in Sofia and ended 
up as a sole trader working on his own.
Although ‘self-growth’ seems to provide a plausible explanation of the 
sources of financing for entering or expanding activities at the wholesale 
and importation levels, it appears to be an oversimplification. Apparently, 
criminal entrepreneurs do use criminal proceeds for financing their 
drug market operations, but these funds are not necessarily from drug 
trafficking. For example, it was reported that some drug entrepreneurs 
resort to burglaries, robberies or other crimes in order to secure the 
needed financing to purchase drugs (BG-E3).
Furthermore, law enforcement experts shared that many of the criminal 
entrepreneurs operating on wholesale and importation level are career 
criminals with established reputation in their city and accumulated capital 
from previous criminal activities. They can be described as high-risk 
entrepreneurs with extensive criminal background, that readily invest this 
accumulated criminal capital in various high risk and highly profitable 
activities – sex trafficking, drug trafficking, payment card fraud, tobacco 
smuggling, real estate fraud, etc. (BG-E3). It is not uncommon for some 
of them to be ex-members of the former racketeering structures known 
as “grupirovki”,250 which used to dominate the organised crime markets 
up to 2008 – 2009 (BG-E1, BG-E4, BG-E5, BG-E6). They capitalise on 
their reputation and social capital in order to take a stake in the drug 
trade – e.g. to buy and sell drugs on wholesale or to set up and run 
transportation of drugs through the country or to some other EU country. 
Subsequently the proceeds from the drug trade could be invested in 
some other criminal activity, as these entrepreneurs are constantly looking 
to seize the next high profit opportunity.
250 The so called “grupirovki” were the first powerful organised crime groups in Bulgaria, which 
emerged in the early nineties and started their criminal activities with wide use of violence 
and extortion. Most of them established private security and insurance companies as fronts 
for their extortion. Subsequently, most of them developed extensive crime portfolios including 
drug distribution, prostitution, contraband, etc.
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It should also be noted that many of these high-risk entrepreneurs 
also invest in legal businesses that are used for money laundering or 
for facilitation of their criminal activities (BG-E2, BG-E3). Subsequently 
this leads to mixing of the illegal and legal revenues, which blurs the 
boundaries between the legal and illegal sources of capital for financing 
of the drug trafficking activities.
Other criminal sources of financing were also indicated, such as drug 
producers securing the needed financing from drug retailers/wholesalers 
by getting an advanced payment for certain quantities (BG-E2, BG-E3).
Legitimate sources of financing
Along with the widely discussed criminal sources of financing, legitimate 
sources also appear to be common at all levels and segments of the 
drug markets. For example, it was pointed out that in many of the small-
scale cannabis growers (user-growers), who comprise the low segment 
of cannabis production, invest money from own personal savings or 
from small consumer loan, as the investment needed is as low as few 
hundred euros (BG-E5).
Similar investment strategies were reported about the low segment 
of the heroin importation. The small-scale importers from the Roma 
communities (i.e. from Stolipinovo in Plovdiv or Maksuda in Varna) 
usually run some legal or semi-legal commerce, associated with regular 
trips to Turkey for purchase and delivery of various commodities such 
as clothing, shoes, household goods, etc. Given the small amounts of 
heroin trafficked (from 0.5 to 5 kg), they usually need to invest small 
amounts of money – usually €3,000-€9,000 to purchase the drug. So, 
it is not uncommon for them to raise these sums from the revenues of 
their legitimate business or within their extended family circle. Once 
started, the heroin trade generates enough revenues to self-sustain the 
enterprise (BG-E4, BG-E5).
Use of legitimate sources of financing was also reported for the high 
segments of production, wholesale and importation levels of the drug 
markets. For example, in Plovdiv and Varna the law enforcement experts 
reported cases about entrepreneurs with well-established restaurant and 
agriculture businesses who invested legal revenues in large-scale cannabis 
growing (BG-E4, BG-E5).
Large scale drug importers were also reported to invest legitimate 
(or at least laundered) revenues in their operations. It is common for 
the big players to use legitimate businesses as a cover up for their 
drug trafficking operations. Often the settlement of payments is also 
concealed as legitimate bank transactions, which necessitates the use 
of legal sources of money. Thus, drug trafficking, money laundering 
and legitimate business operations are interlinked and it is hard to tell 
the source of capital invested in the drug trafficking operations (BG-E2, 
BG-E5). An example was one of the biggest Bulgarian OCGs, which has 
turned into a big supplier for cocaine from South America to Italy. The 
leader of the OCG also controlled a number of legitimate businesses, 
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which were used as means for money laundering and cover up for the 
drug trafficking operations (BG-E2).
Criminal joint ventures
The interviewed law enforcement experts also provided examples, where 
drug entrepreneurs form partnerships with another criminal or legitimate 
businessman in order to raise the needed financial resources. Apparently, 
these criminal joint ventures can be observed on all levels of the drugs 
markets, but are more common when it comes to large scale operations. 
Such joint ventures not only allow criminal entrepreneurs to secure 
additional financing when needed, but also to share the financial risk 
of a given drug trafficking operation. These partners could act either 
as full-fledged partners taking care of some part of the operations, or 
as investors which provide financing for a share of the expected profits 
(BG-E2, BG-E5).
Whereas career criminals would rather involve other criminal entrepre-
neurs, large scale drug importers with own legitimate businesses could 
also attract as partners legitimate businessmen from their business circles. 
This was the case of a large cocaine trafficking enterprise in which the 
kingpin had enrolled some of his close partners that had legitimate 
business ties with him in his cocaine trafficking operations as investors 
(BG-E2). In a similar case, a big wholesaler controlling part of the retail 
distribution in Plovdiv and his partners owned several trendy night 
entertainment venues in the city and decided to invest part of their legal 
revenues to set a cocaine distribution network in the city (BG-E2).
Access to capital in critical moments, loan sharking
Apart from start-up or operational capital, drug entrepreneurs also need 
access to financing in critical moments – when the drugs are confiscated 
by the police or stolen by competitors, in case of incidental order for 
larger quantities, police arrest leading to litigation expenses or the need 
to use corruption (BG-E3). Drug entrepreneurs seem to employ various 
approaches to deal with such situations, which generally seem to repeat 
to some extent the already described models for access to financing.
Firstly, drug entrepreneurs rely on their own resources. According to the 
interviews, many of the criminal entrepreneurs, even the low-level retail 
dealers, put aside some of their revenues in a “rainy day” fund to meet 
such incidental expenses. The majority of interviewed criminal entrepreneurs 
admitted to have such money set aside (BG-C2, BG-C3, BG-C4).
The second option is to turn to their wider social network to raise money, 
if they cannot meet such expenses with their own resources. However, 
there is an important difference between raising money for incidental 
expenses and rising of external capital for starting or sustaining drug 
trafficking activities. Raising start-up capital is most often associated with 
equity financing, where the investor provides financial capital in return of 
share of profits, but also shares the financial risk with the entrepreneurs. 
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On the other hand, when criminal entrepreneurs have to raise funds in 
order to meet incidental expenses in a critical moment, they are rather 
looking for a loan and are supposed to pay certain interest for it.
Apparently, there are two main options to get a loan under such 
circumstances – to borrow from someone from their own extended social 
network or to borrow from a loan shark. Either way, incidental borrowing 
of money appears to be troublesome and expensive undertaking. All 
interviewed drug entrepreneurs shared that even when they turn for 
a loan to someone from their criminal network, they are typically 
supposed to repay the money with certain interest. However, in many 
cases the interest would be lower compared to the one that a loan shark 
would charge (BG-C3). In any case, getting a loan even from a loan 
shark requires certain reputation or at least having a surety (BG-C5). 
Furthermore, loan sharks usually ask for some kind of collateral and lack 
of such could lead to charging interest of up to 100% per day (BG-C1).
For smaller sums, retail drug dealers also turn to pawn shops or may 
ask for extending their revolving credit for drugs. These options are 
also bound with additional costs, as in both cases the dealer would be 
demanded to pay some interest (BG-C5).
According to law enforcement experts, mostly entrepreneurs operating 
on retail level and small scale importers and wholesalers need external 
financing for covering incidental costs. Large scale drug traffickers usually 
have more assets and funds set aside, so they are a lot more prepared 
to cover such incidental expenses (BG-E3).
Settlement of payments
Along with the sources for securing of capital, the other important 
aspect of criminal finances is the settlement of payments. Drug 
trafficking entrepreneurs employ various modes of payment and payment 
arrangements. The identified modes of payment include in-kind, cash and 
non-cash payments, whereas payment arrangements could be broadly 
classified as advanced payment, cash up-front, revolving credit and multi-
step arrangements.
Modes of payment
Contrary to the widespread view about drugs trade as entirely cash-driven 
business, the collected data points to a much more complex reality. 
Certainly cash payments dominate drug trafficking, but equally common 
at certain levels of the supply chain seem to be barter exchanges, as well 
as non-cash payments such as bank transfers, money transfers through 
Western Union/Money Gram.
Settlement of payments in cash is a rule between retailers and users, as 
well as between retailers and wholesalers (BG-E1, BG-E4). At importation 
level cash payments to suppliers seem to be more common for heroin 
trafficking, as in most cases the drug is purchased from neighbouring 
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Turkey. Interviewed law enforcement experts reported that this finding is 
corroborated by seizures of large sums of cash at the Bulgarian-Turkish 
border (BG-E2). Importers also pay in cash to various contractors and 
facilitators they collaborate with for the smuggling – couriers, truck 
drivers, corrupt officials (BG-E2, BG-E5, BG-E6). The settlement of 
payments with local drugs producers such as cannabis growers is also 
done in cash (BG-E3).
However, criminal entrepreneurs at production, wholesale and importation 
level settle part of their payments in kind. Plausible explanation for use 
of such practices is that barter payments have the advantage to allow for 
equal distribution of risk between the involved parties and decrease the 
risk the money to be detected or seized by law-enforcement authorities. 
These barter payments can take different forms. In one of the cases 
described in the interviews, in a group for large-scale cultivation and 
subsequent trafficking of cannabis an investor provided the initial financing 
and the cannabis seeds, but the rest of the players were supposed 
to contribute by taking the risk of apprehension by the police and 
performing certain aspects of the operation. All actors were supposed 
to be rewarded with a share of the yield (BG-E3). Similar arrangements 
were described in cases with producers of methamphetamines (BG-E4) 
and with a group involved in smuggling and transportation of drugs 
(BG-E2). Other barter schemes practiced by wholesalers and importers 
involve exchange of one type of drug for another – e.g. amphetamines 
for heroin (BG-E4, BG-E6).
Non-cash settlement of payments seems to be typical for cocaine 
trafficking and generally for large-scale drug trafficking entrepreneurs. 
As cocaine is usually purchased in Spain or Latin America settlement 
of payments in cash would require taking greater risk for moving the 
cash across multiple borders. Therefore various methods for non-cash 
payments are applied. Some small scale traffickers smuggling cocaine via 
post or through drug mules settle their payments by Western Union/
Money Gram transfers, which are typically sent to a straw person (BG-
E4, BG-E5). This allows for greater anonymity, although sometimes the 
sum has to be split in several smaller transfers in order to circumvent 
the anti-money laundering restrictions.
Concealing the drug trafficking behind legitimate commercial operations 
and dealing in bigger quantities require large scale traffickers to transfer 
money only through bank transactions. In order to imitate normal payments 
for delivered services or goods they might use legitimate companies or 
register shell companies (BG-E2, BG-E3, BG-E4, BG-E5). Sometimes they 
are also using sophisticated schemes to hide the suspicious nature of 
these transactions – e.g. such financial transactions run through several 
different banks and involve various account holders including offshore 
companies.
Payment arrangements
Besides mode of payment, the other important aspect concerning 
settlement of payments is the payment arrangements between the involved 
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parties. According to the interviewed experts payment arrangements vary 
quite a lot at the different levels of the drug trade.
Advanced payments require that one of the parties makes a payment 
in advance and receives the drug later in time. Such payment schemes 
were reported, when settling payments between producers or importers 
and wholesalers (BG-E3). An example of advance payment scheme was 
given in regards to the cocaine traffickers that smuggle the drug by 
post – in order to receive the drug they usually prepay the amounts via 
Western Union (BG-E5). Similar arrangements were reported in regards 
to cases where wholesale or retail drug entrepreneurs pay in advance 
to cannabis growers for a pre-agreed quantity of the yield (BG-E2). 
Drug couriers also often receive part of the payment for their services 
in advance, while the rest is paid after the drug is delivered to the 
destination point (BG-E2).
Cash upfront implies that payment is done at the same time when 
the drug is delivered to the other party. Cash upfront arrangements are 
typical for transactions between user and dealer. They are also common 
between retailer and wholesaler or between wholesaler and importer (BG-
E3, BG-E4). Some of the interviewed entrepreneurs, that have operated as 
independent drug entrepreneurs at retail level reported that in the recent 
years many wholesalers that used to supply drugs on revolving credit, 
started to demand upfront payments (BG-C5, BG-C6). According to the 
interviewed law enforcement experts, in most cases importers purchasing 
heroin from Turkey also pay the quantities upfront (BG-E2, BG-E4).
In a revolving credit the price is paid once the drug or part of it 
is produced and/or sold. Upfront payments between wholesalers and 
retailers are the rule with few exceptions – when the street dealer 
works directly for (or is controlled by) the wholesaler or when the two 
parties have cooperated for a long time and there is trusted relationship 
established (BG-E1, BG-E3). Several criminal entrepreneurs that have 
worked as street dealer for a given wholesaler, reported that they 
typically received the drug on a revolving credit arrangement, but were 
supposed to account all money for the quantities sold, before receiving 
their share of the revenues (BG-C1, BG-C2, BG-C3, BG-C4).
Multistep payment arrangements refer to various payment schemes, 
where the flows of money and drugs are not directly linked and even 
may take place independently. Such arrangements were described in 
relation to large-scale drug trafficking networks, where payments between 
partners involved are done via multistep bank transfers and often involve 
certain money laundering operations. These multistep arrangements make 
it difficult to define whether the payments are done in advance or 
subsequently (BG-E2).
Costs of doing business
Analysis of criminal financing for initiating and sustaining criminal activities 
is not possible without taking into account the size and types of costs 
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at the various levels of drug trafficking. It is precisely the size of costs 
that determines the amount of capital needed to enter or operate on 
a drug market at a given level. Although type of costs may be more or 
less similar at a given level of the supply chain across the different drugs 
markets, the size of these costs vary not only across markets, but also 
depending on modus operandi and scale of the drug trade. Moreover, 
each drug entrepreneur operates in a specific setting (local demand for 
a certain drug, number of regular clients, level of competition, etc.) 
and has some discretion on how to organise his own business and 
therefore his expenses. Drawing on the interviews conducted, the type 
of costs and approximate level of required investment for market entry 
at different levels of the drug markets can be reconstructed.
Costs related to production
Drugs production in Bulgaria is mostly related to cannabis cultivation 
and amphetamine manufacturing. Costs related to cannabis cultivation 
vary widely depending on the method of cultivation (in-door, greenhouse 
or outdoor) and scale of production. The costs for cultivation usually 
relate to purchasing of seeds, fertilisers, specialised equipment for indoor 
cultivation (lamps, heaters, humidifiers, etc.), as well as for covering utility 
bills. In addition to that, large scale indoor growing also involves costs 
for rent of the apartment or house and ventilation systems in order to 
eliminate the strong odour. Large scale outdoor growing incurs costs such 
as covering rent of greenhouses or land, as well as contracting greenhouse 
keepers or farmers. Different costs brackets were reported depending 
on the scale of production. Usually large scale in-door growing requires 
larger initial investment compared to similar size outdoor plantation 
(BG-E2). The investment for small scale indoor cultivation using a tent kit 
(5-25 plants) was indicated at approximately €1,000 with fertilisers and 
utility bills included (BG-E5), whereas the investment for a large scale 
greenhouse cultivation (growing 500-800 plants at a time) was estimated 
at approximately €10,000 (BG-E1).
Costs related to amphetamine and methamphetamine manufacturing 
usually include expenditures such as purchasing of “cooking” equipment 
and precursors, utility bills, rent for suitable house, etc. According to 
the interviewed law enforcement experts, the manufactured quantities 
are usually small – up to 1 kg per batch and most of the operating 
illegal laboratories may be classified as “kitchen” type. They do not 
operate on a regular basis, but rather “cook” on demand (BG-E2, 
BG-E5). Depending on the precursors used and the scale of production 
the size of the initial investment required varies. The experts cited sums 
such as €500-€1,000 invested for a batch of 300-500 grams (BG-E5) and 
€2,000 invested for a batch of 4-5 kilograms (BG-E3).
Costs related to importation
Entering the market at wholesale or importation level is associated 
with higher costs compared to the retail level. Apart from the costs 
for purchasing the drug, the operational costs at importation level are 
usually related to transportation costs and fees for the actors that provide 
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the logistics. For heroin trafficking, which is predominantly smuggled 
overland, costs include expenditures such as purchasing of the drug, 
modifying a suitable vehicle for the transportation and paying to the 
drug courier (the driver of the vehicle), as well as bribes to certain 
customs and border guard officers. Usually for smaller amounts of heroin 
(5-15 kg) the fee for the driver is a fixed amount (€500-€1,000). For 
bigger quantities the practice is to pay a certain percentage (about 10%) 
of the market value of the drugs (BG-E1, BG-E2, BG-E3, BG-E5, BG-E6). 
Therefore, considering the transportation costs and the wholesale price of 
€9,000 per kilo for the heroin in Istanbul,251 the investment for entering 
the market at importation level when smuggling on average 8 – 10 kg 
per operation can be estimated at €90,000-€100,000. Certainly, small 
scale importers, smuggling up to 1 kg of heroin could manage with 
€5,000-€10,000 (BG-E4).
Little information was provided on cases of large cocaine trafficking 
carried out by Bulgarian OCGs, so it is difficult to gauge the size 
of investment needed to enter the market at that level. Most cases 
cited in the interviews were related to OCGs providing logistics and 
transportation through organising drug couriers that smuggle the drugs 
by air. Law enforcement experts reported that the typical quantities 
smuggled by a single courier were up to 5 kg and the remuneration was 
about $1,000 per trip. In addition to that the organisers also cover all 
costs related to the travel and accommodation of the drug mules, which 
add another $1,000 per trip (BG-E2, BG-E3). Therefore one such OCG 
operating with 10-15 drug couriers at a time is supposed to secure about 
$20,000-$25,000 in order to set up a single trip.
Cost related to wholesale and retail distribution
Certainly retail level entrepreneurs need least start-up capital compared to 
other levels of the drug market. Moreover, if the retailer starts as part of 
a larger OCG, he actually does not need to invest any money. The drug 
is supplied on a revolving credit basis and many of the accompanying 
costs are covered by the ringleader. In this case the retailer is supposed 
to pay for the drugs after the provided quantities are sold. On the other 
hand, typically he is supposed to account for his sales on a regular basis 
and work exclusively with the drug supplied by his wholesaler. He does 
not have permission to cut the drug and is also usually supposed to pay 
back a certain share of his profits as a form of interest on the credit 
provided or as a protection fee (BG-C1, BG-C2, BG-C3, BG-C4).
Often, the independent retailers also manage to secure the drugs on a 
revolving credit arrangement, especially if they have the right connection 
or well established reputation. The majority of criminal entrepreneurs, 
which have been interviewed were operating on retail level and reported 
that they sell about 100-200 grams per week of heroin or cocaine 
depending on the number of their clients. The wholesale prices reported 
in the interviews were €12.5-€14 per gram of heroin, €40-€45 per gram 
of cocaine, €5 per gram of cannabis and €2 per gram of amphetamines 
251 UNODC, The Illicit Drug Trade through South East Europe.
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(BG-C1, BG-C5, BG-C6). Therefore it is easy to estimate that in order 
to secure 100-200 grams a retailer would need to invest €1,200-€2,800 
for heroin, €4,000-€9,000 for cocaine, €500-€1,000 for cannabis and 
€200-€400 for amphetamines.
In addition to the costs for supplying the needed quantities, independent 
retailers may also incur additional expenditures such as paying to certain 
people to keep the drugs, paying someone to cut it and pack the doses, 
paying street pushers, paying couriers to deliver the drug to the street 
pushers and collect money. They also have to cover various accompanying 
costs for gasoline, prepaid telephone cards, etc. (BG-C5).
Profits and profit sharing
The profits of OCGs in illegal drug markets seem to depend on many 
factors – type of drug traded, position in supply chain, level of autonomy, 
scale of operation. Several cases are outlined below with estimates for 
profits of entrepreneurs operating on different positions of the supply chain 
and trading heroin, cocaine and cannabis. Generally it seems that retail 
level profit margins in a given market are lower than the profit margins on 
importation level, which supposedly reflects the levels of risk they face.
Case 1
The first example is drawing on interviews with a heroin retail level 
dealer who described himself as an independent sole-proprietor working 
with 3 street dealers (pushers) beneath him. He reported that roughly 
Таble 14. heroin retail level dealer (independent)
Source: Interviews with BG-C4 and BG-C6.
Known costs Value per gram Value per average sale of 150 grams/week
Heroin €12.5 €1,875 
Stash keeper €0.5 €75 
Packager €0.5 €75 
Courier (delivers the doses to the pushers) €0.5 €75 
Pusher (sells the drug to the end users) €1 €150 
Other costs (prepaid telephone cards, 
gasoline, cutting agent, etc.)
€50 
Overall costs €2,300 
Sells the heroin at €30 per gram Revenue – €4,500 
Profit – €2,200 
(49% profit margin) 
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half of the money he made from each gram of heroin covered all his 
expenses and the other half remained as a profit for him. The retailer 
also reported that he purchased the heroin for €12.5 per gram and 
sold it at €30 per gram, without cutting it. Assuming that he sells about 
100-200 grams per week, it could be calculated that his weekly revenue 
should be €3,000-6,000 (see Table 14).
Case 2
Apparently profit margins at importation level of the heroin market 
are much higher. The wholesale price of heroin in Istanbul is about 
26,000 TL or roughly €9,000 per kg,252 while the wholesale price in 
Bulgaria is about €16,000.253 Interviewed police experts reported that 
the most common transportation method for heroin smuggling is by 
car. The average shipment per trip is 2-3 kilos and might reach up to 
50 kilos (BG-E6). The overall investment for such a trafficking operation 
would be about €93,000 for 10 kilos and would bring three times 
higher revenues. According to the experts, the big profits are usually 
ensured through cutting the imported drug in 1:1 ratio. Taking into 
account the available data, it could be estimated that the profit of a 
single smuggling operation doubles the money invested (see Table 15). 
Admittedly, this simple calculation neither takes into account other 
possible costs like bribes, costs for bringing the cash out of country, 
etc. Yet, it still illustrates well the profit margins at this level of the 
illegal market.
252 Reitox National Focal Point-Turkey, 2013 National Report (2012 Data) to the EMCDDA: Turkey 
(Ankara: Turkish Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 2014).
253 UNODC, The Illicit Drug Trade through South East Europe.
Таble 15. heroin iMporter
Source: Interviews with BG-E6, UNODC.
Known costs Value Value for 10 kg smuggled per crossing
Heroin (wholesale price Istanbul) €9,000 per kg €90,000 
Modified vehicle with concealed 
compartments 
€2,000 €2,000
Driver (drug courier) €1,000 €1,000
Overall costs €93,000
Sells the heroin at €16,000 in 
Bulgaria after cutting it 1:1
€16,000*2 = €32,000 per kg Revenue: €320,000
Profit – €227,000
(71% profit margin)
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Case 3
Cocaine is about four times more expensive than heroin in Bulgaria 
and apparently this pushes retail level cocaine dealers to work on a 
considerably lower profit margins compared to heroin dealers. Moreover, 
they usually trade with their clients in various nightlife venues (night clubs, 
bars, etc.), which are guarded and therefore a dealer needs secured 
access to these venues (BG-C1, BG-C2, BG-C3). This is why most cocaine
dealers usually operate within larger OCGs, which can provide for such 
access. From the interviews with the criminal entrepreneurs was really 
hard to determine the number of clients and quantities sold per day, 
as apparently in some days of the week they tend to sell more and 
in some less. One of the cocaine dealers (BG-C1) reported that he 
purchases the cocaine at €45 per gram and sells it at €70 per gram. 
His weekly revenue was roughly €10,000 or in other words he was 
selling over 140 grams per week. The profit margin can be estimated 
at 28% or about two times lower compared to the heroin dealer from 
Case 1 (Table 16).
Таble 16. cocaine retail level dealer (part oF larger cocaine enterprise)
Source: Interview with BG-C1.
Known costs Value per gram Value per average saleof 150 grams/week
Cocaine €45  €6,750 
Protection €5 €750 
Other costs (gasoline, etc.) €50 
Overall costs €7,550 
Sells the cocaine at €70
per gram
€70 Revenue: €10,500 
Profit: €2,950 
(28% profit margin)
Case 4
Bulgarian OCGs that are involved in cocaine importation in most 
cases only provide logistic support to larger criminal networks and do 
not invest their own financial resources for purchasing the drug (BG-E2, 
BG-E3, BG-E4). Common modus operandi is OCG recruiting drug 
couriers to smuggle cocaine by air from South America to Western 
Europe. The interviewed law enforcement experts report that such 
logistic services are usually rewarded either with 10 per cent of 
the market value of the drug, or with 30 per cent of the quantity 
smuggled (BG-E2). The drug couriers usually smuggle between 1-5 
kilograms of cocaine (BG-E4), which in South America is worth about 
148 Financing	oF	organised	crime
Case 5
One of the most profitable criminal undertakings in Bulgaria seems to 
be cannabis growing. Unlike the small-scale indoor growing that is often 
done by user-growers, large-scale growing is typically organised criminal 
activity. A case reported by one of the law enforcement experts (BG-E1) 
sheds light on the revenues and profits of a large-scale greenhouse 
plantation. It was a joint enterprise of 2 drug dealers and an owner 
of mushroom plantation. The farmer provided the greenhouse and 
looked after the plants, while the drug dealers provided the financing 
of €10,000 for the seeds, fertilisers and additional equipment. The 
partners in this criminal enterprise had an arrangement that each of 
the sides (i.e. the drug dealers and the farmer) will receive half of the 
yield. When the police busted the greenhouse they uncovered 500 
cannabis plants in it. It is hard to come with a precise estimate of the 
yield of these plants, as the saleable material yielded per plant depends 
on variety of factors such as density of planting, growing period and 
application of nutrients. The yield could vary from 35 grams per plant 
for indoor growing with high planting density up to 1 kilo for outdoor 
growing with low planting density.254 Thus, a conservative estimate 
would assume 100 grams yield per plant. The wholesale price of the 
cannabis is €5 per gram (BG-C5), so the expected revenue from this 
greenhouse for the 2 entrepreneurs is €125,000 from one harvest, 
which indicates 92% profit margin (Table 18).
254 J. Caulkins, Estimated Cost of Production for Legalized Cannabis, RAND Working Paper, 2010.
Таble 17. cocaine traFFicker (provides only logistics For share 
oF the cocaine)
Source: Interviews with BG-E4 and BG-E2.
Known costs Value per trip Value per 15 drug mules/month
Drug mules $1,000 €10,000 
Transport, accommodation 
for drug couriers $1,000 €15,000
Overall costs €25,000 
Receives 10% of the market 
value of cocaine trafficked – 
1 kg, which is about €40,000 
Revenue – €40,000
Profit – €15,000
(38% profit margin)
$5,000-$7,500 and in Western Europe roughly €40,000 (BG-E2). If we 
assume that such OCG recruits 15 drug mules monthly and ten of 
them reach the destination with 1 kilogram without being intercepted, 
this provides for €40,000 monthly or 38 per cent profit margin 
(Table 17).
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Investment strategies of criminal entrepreneurs
The investment strategies of the criminal entrepreneurs differ depending 
on the scale of profits. The retail level dealers apparently have lower 
profits and therefore most of the money is spent on personal expenses 
such as cars, lavish lifestyle or gambling (BG-C1, BG-C2, BG-C4, BG-
C6). Along with that many of them admit of putting money aside in a 
“rainy day fund”, which is not necessary a bank deposit (BG-C2, BG-C3, 
BG-C4).
It seems common to invest money in the same (BG-C1) or other 
criminal businesses such as cannabis growing (BG-E1), amphetamine 
labs (BG-E2, BG-E4), sex trafficking or skimming (BG-E3), illicit tobacco 
trade or loansharking (BG-C5).
Investments in the legitimate economy and money laundering seem to 
be more common at wholesale and importation level, although some of 
the interviewed retail level entrepreneurs also reported such practices, 
yet on a smaller scale. Typically, the bulk of these investments did 
not involve sophisticated money laundering techniques, except in the 
few cases of large-scale drug trafficking that were mentioned (BG-E2, 
BG-E4). Investing in real estate seems to be favoured by many criminal 
entrepreneurs, not only on wholesale and importation level (BG-E2), 
but also on retail level (BG-C1, BG-C3, BG-C6). Often the property is 
purchased on the name of someone else such as relatives or a straw 
person in order to avoid detection by the authorities. Other strategies 
that were reported included investments in a café (BG-C3), in a family 
grocery business (BG-C2) or in agricultural business (BG-C4). The purpose 
of such investments seems to be two-fold – to secure initial capital for 
some legitimate business and to use such cash-intensive businesses to 
launder the profits from the drug trade.
Таble 18. cannabis growing entrepreneur (greenhouse growing in 
cooperation with a FarMer)
Source: Interview with BG-E1.
Known costs Value Value per 400 plants
Selected seeds (500 seeds) + 
equipment + fertilisers + 
utility bills for 4 months)
€10,000 €10,000
Greenhouse keeper share ½ of the yield
Overall costs €10,000 + ½ of the yield
Revenue calculation: 1 plant →
100 grams/500 plants → 
50,000 grams
½ of the yield → 25,000 
grams x €5 → €125,000
Revenue – €125,000
Profit – €115,000 
(92% profit margin)
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Law enforcement experts reported that typically criminal entrepreneurs 
involved in large-scale drug trafficking alongside their criminal businesses 
also run large legitimate businesses, which are used both for a cover-
up and for money-laundering (BG-E2). A particular large scale cocaine 
trafficking case was discussed, where the ring leader was also involved 
in wide range of money laundering activities and invested in a number 
of legal businesses such as hospitality industry, construction, financial 
services, international transportation services and logistics (BG-E2). The 
criminal network was involved in trafficking of tonnes of cocaine from 
South America to western Italy in partnership with figures from the Italian 
‘Ndrangheta. The legitimate businesses were used for a cover up of the 
smuggling of drugs through legitimate commercial transactions, as well as 
for concealing the payments and laundering the proceeds of the cocaine 
trafficking. A similar case, although on a much smaller scale, took place 
in Pazardzhik where a small cocaine importer invested his profits in a 
company trading with computer parts, which was later used as a cover up 
for importing small quantities of cocaine from the Netherlands (BG-E3).
In 2005, Estonian law enforcement declared tackling drug-related crimes 
to be one of its top priorities. The number of registered drug crimes has 
been growing along with the growth of the economy, peaking in 2008 
after which it started to decline. Research data on drug users show quite 
similar trends.255
In the past 20-25 years, drugs have remained an important part of the 
criminal underworld in Estonia. The actors on the market, however, have 
changed, especially in last 10 to 15 years. Nowadays, the market is more 
fragmented, there are more ad-hoc groups, temporary projects and single 
entrepreneurs. Old traditions and authorities – although still playing an 
important role – lose their power. New actors come to replace them 
who are more flexible, mobile, and use modern technologies.
The overall turnover of the Estonian drug market in 2008 was estimated 
to be in the hundreds of millions of euros – according to Kaido Kõplas, 
Senior Superintendent of the Narcotic Crimes Department at North 
Police Prefecture, “only 1% of the amount of drugs circulating on the 
market in Estonia is confiscated. It means that the turnover of the six 
most popular drugs is EEK 4.5 billion [€290 mln]. If the other segments 
are added, the level of EEK 5 billion would be easily exceeded.”256
In recent years, the police have shifted their attention from small quantities 
of drugs to the handling of large quantities (under Estonian law, large quantity 
255 Reitox National Drug Information Centre-Estonia, 2013 National Report to the EMCDDA (2012 Data): 
Estonia (Tallinn: National Institute for Health Development, 2013).
256 Quoted in K. Koovit, “Estonian Narcotics Market Turnover Exceeds EEK 5 Billion”, Baltic Business 
News, October 03, 2008.
4.4. EStONIA: BEtWEEN EASt AND WESt
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means the amount equal to at least 10 doses). In 2013, large quantity crimes 
were the majority – 795 of the overall of 1,019 registered drug-related 
offences – a trend that has been around for several years (Figure 16).
The Estonian national report to 
the EMCDDA, states that 69 
domestic and 10 international 
joint operations were carried 
out in 2012 to reduce the supply 
of drugs. The total amount of 
illegal income confiscated in 
2012 was €1.5 million, which 
is almost double the amount of 
2011.257 In terms of confiscated 
narcotics, the dynamics for the 
different kinds of drugs varied 
(Table 19). One of the most 
significant reductions since 
2007 occurred in the seizures 
of hashish.
The purity of drugs has also 
been changing: for cannabis it 
has increased since 2010; while 
the most common tetrahydro-
cannabinol (THC) content in 
hashish was 5% in 2011, it rose 
257 Reitox National Drug Information Centre-Estonia, 2013 National Report to the EMCDDA (2012 Data): 
Estonia, 59.
Figure 16. drug-related oFFences in estonia, 2003 – 2013
Source: Justiitsministeerium [Ministry of Justice], Kuritegevus Eestis 2013 [Crime in Estonia 
2013], Tallin, 2014, 52.
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Таble 19. aMounts oF conFiscated narcotic substances in estonia, 
2007 – 2012 (kg)
Source: Estonian Forensic Science Institute 2013. Quoted in Reitox National Drug Information Centre-Estonia, 2013 National Report to 
the EMCDDA (2012 Data): Estonia, 60.
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Cannabis resin (hashish) 155.4 48.5 19.2 14.6 45.6 4.7
Cannabis leaf (marijuana) 8.1 24.2 7.1 14.8 53.5 25.1
Cannabis plants 8.1 23.2 17.2 10.8 29.3 6.06
Heroin 5.7 0.1 3.9 0.004 0.05 0.0004
Cocaine 13.0 3.6 5.0 217.7 0.8 3.4
Amphetamine 56.3 23.3 55.9 47.7 41.6 14.2
Methamphetamine 0.02 37.7 0.001 0.5 1.5 27.1
GHB 26.4 7.7 25.1 16.1 13.5 28.9
Fentanyl/ 3-methylfentanyl 1.3 1 1.8 0.5 0.9 1.7
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to 11% in 2012. The purity of marijuana improved in 2012: while the 
average THC content in marijuana was 11% in 2011, it increased to 13% 
in 2012. As regards price, cannabis products have kept their 2010 levels, 
and the mean price of marijuana was €20 for a gram in both 2011 and 
2012. The mean price of hashish in 2012 was €7.258
According to the law enforcement interviewees, hashish along with 
cocaine are the drugs smuggled in large quantities via Estonia and 
trafficking in hashish is one of the most profitable drug crimes.
“Hashish is quite an interesting drug, it passes through Estonia in 
tonnes, but it is not distributed on the streets in Estonia (EE-E2).”
Another expert confirms it:
“If we are talking about transit, it is definitely hashish. Almost all 
marijuana is brought to Estonia from the outside, but in case of 
marijuana we cannot talk about big sums of money or organised 
crime. As for the big actors, they are definitely into hashish and 
cocaine, this is what brings the money (EE-E7).”
The World Drug Report notes the signs of a possible expansion of the 
cocaine market in Baltic countries, including Estonia. Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania had a peak in cocaine seizures in 2010 including significant 
quantities being trafficked by sea. Some cocaine is smuggled further to 
Eastern Europe and possibly Scandinavia. Estonia also reported recent 
increases in the use of cocaine in its own consumer market.259 The 
EMCDDA report for Estonia notes that the price of cocaine increased a 
little in 2012 compared to 2011. While the street price of cocaine was 
€90-110 in 2011, it ranged between €80 and €120 in 2012. The most 
common purity of cocaine increased as well, from 26% to 36% of pure 
substance per gram. The range of cocaine purity was 7-83%.260
In the spring of 2014, however, law enforcement interviewees estimated 
that the amount of cocaine on the market was not high and that the 
supply chains for cocaine were so long that this reflected on the quality 
of the drug. “There is some cocaine on the streets but it is of very poor 
quality (EE-E7).”
According to the World Drug Report 2013, Estonia has one of the highest 
rates of injecting drug users – 1.5% of the adult population. In recent 
years, heroin has been less available, and the most popular drug to inject 
nowadays is fentanyl. In Estonia, the annual prevalence of fentanyl use 
in 2008 was reported to be 0.1%, but it was 1.1% among males aged 
15-24. Seventy-six per cent of users registered for treatment took 
fentanyl.261 Its street price in 2012 was €7-10 per dose, the same as in 
2011. “The most common purity level of fentanyl in 2012 was 6% of 
258 Ibid., 61.
259 UNODC, World Drug Report 2013, 45.
260 Reitox National Drug Information Centre-Estonia, 2013 National Report to the EMCDDA (2012 Data): 
Estonia.
261 UNODC, World Drug Report 2013, 16.
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pure substance per gram (variability range 0.2-10 per cent). The most 
common purity of fentanyl has increased 3% from 2011.”262 According to 
interviewed criminal entrepreneurs dealing in fentanyl, prices for fentanyl 
increased in 2011, when the euro was introduced as currency in Estonia, 
and has not changed since then.
Key actors of the criminal market
Based on the interview data, it is possible to divide drug market’s 
actors into three categories: individual entrepreneurs, ad-hoc groups and 
criminal organisations.
Individual entrepreneurs. Those are people who learn from mass media 
or from some acquaintances about prices and availability of drugs. They 
decide to make additional money and get involved in the business. One 
such example is EE-C3 interviewed in Viru prison. The man had a full-
time job as a miner but his family income was low and he decided 
to make some extra money. He knew some people who sold drugs 
(respondent says there are plenty of such people in North-Eastern 
Estonia, no problem to establish a contact). He worked alone, without 
any partner and was selling only one type of drug: fentanyl. He bought it 
in bulk, re-packaged and sold further either to retailers (3-4 grams) or to 
individual customers. The amounts he bought were about 100-200 grams. 
Similar cases were also described by the law enforcement interviewees:
 
“We had such cases: two guys, about 20-30 years old, put some 
money together and bring 2,000 pills and 2 kg of amphetamine. 
There were other cases as well, when a truck driver brought 15 kg 
of cannabis from the Netherlands (EE-E2).”
Also, according to EE-E7, a lot of drugs are moving to Estonia via mail 
packages, typically ordered by individual entrepreneurs. 
Ad hoc or project-based groups are another type of actor on the 
drug market. The groups are based on social relationships (friends, 
acquaintances, prison mates, etc.) where each member has some special 
skills or contacts that are useful. If the criminal transaction is successful, 
the group – with the same or varying members – could get together 
again for a different job. 
“This [drug market] is fragmented and divided among different groups. 
Usually, there is no hierarchical structure leading to a criminal boss. If we 
look at organised crime as a whole, we see first of all ad hoc groups – 
they come together to complete a job; project based (EE-E6).”
“There was this case of three friends, all university graduates, who 
trafficked cocaine from the Netherlands to Estonia in shipments of 
about 200-250 grams. It was 90% purity but they cut it 4 times and 
262 Reitox National Drug Information Centre-Estonia, 2013 National Report to the EMCDDA (2012 Data): 
Estonia, 61.
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got a whole kilogram that was eventually sold further. Two of them 
started the business, then the third, who was from a rich family, 
lent them money. When the two ran up a large debt, the ‘financier’ 
decided to get involved in the drug business himself to get his money 
back (EE-E4).”
EE-C3 is an example of a person belonging to a group which stays 
together for longer periods but they complete only one task and do 
not know what other people in this network are doing. The role of EE-
C3 was to collect money from the customers and bring it to a certain 
person in the network but he never touched drugs and did not want to 
know much about it.
Organised criminal groups are also involved in trafficking, and this is 
an increasing trend. It is these groups that shape the illegal drugs market 
in terms of price, quality and other aspects (EE-E4). Their international 
outreach covers the Netherlands, Germany, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and 
Estonia (EE-E5). 
The organised crime situation has changed considerably in Estonia within 
the last 10-15 years. At the end of the 1990s, organised crime groups 
were relatively stable, had a hierarchical structure and were often named 
after their leader or locality from which the core member of the 
criminal group came from. The market was partitioned, conflicts settled 
through a mutual fund263 which was the kept by the “authority” of the 
criminal world. Nowadays, according to the experts, this phenomenon 
still exists – maintained mostly by old-timers’ in their 50s-60s – but has 
lost its power. 
Traditional groups, however, are still playing important role on the illegal 
drugs market. Experts mentioned the involvement of Azeri groups, 
Chechen groups and also some old groups from the 1990s, or at least 
what is left of them. The Azeris are not trusted by the Estonians, while 
the Russian-speakers stick together as they do not understand Estonian 
(EE-E6).
Offenders who served time in prisons abroad, for example in Germany 
or the Netherlands, use connections created there to establish new 
criminal networks and traffic drugs either to Estonia or other countries 
were the profit is bigger (EE-E5).
Supply chains
The following drugs supply chains were outlined by the experts and 
criminal entrepreneurs during the interviews:
• Cannabis trafficked from the Netherlands to Estonia. The drugs are 
carried by road transport mainly and, in small quantities, are also 
ordered by mail (e-trade). Some larger shipments stay in Estonia, some 
are trafficked further to Russia.
263 Referred to by the Russian slang word obschak. More on this on pp. 158-159.
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• Hashish trafficked from Bolivia/Morocco to Spain/the Netherlands 
and then transit through Estonia to Russia/Finland/Sweden/Norway. 
Hashish is rarely brought for consumption in Estonia. Usually, it passes 
via Estonia on the way to the Scandinavian countries or Russia. EE-C2 
was serving time for smuggling hashish (he mentioned 12 kilos) from 
Estonia to Russia. He did not reveal any information about the starting 
point of the trafficking route. During the interview, however, he 
mentioned that he has visited several times friends in Dutch prisons 
that could be indicative of the routes of drug trafficking.
“It used to be the Nordic countries but this has changed, now 
it is Russia – today it is very popular to transport to Russia, 
because there is a big market. Hashish is sent there and money 
consignments of up to half a million are coming back from there 
to be laundered in Europe (EE-E7).”
• Amphetamine follows several routes: from the Netherlands /Germany/
Denmark via Estonia to Finland/Sweden; from the Netherlands/
Germany/Denmark to Finland/Sweden; from Russia to Finland.
“Those routes vary. Based on the latest cases, it could be said 
that sizeable shipments go directly from the Netherlands to the 
Scandinavian countries and are distributed there. Estonians are 
involved in this trafficking but only money goes to Estonia. Drugs 
do not come here, they carry the drugs over there, because it 
is more expensive there. Estonians, as well as others, organise it 
(EE-E4).”
• Cocaine is trafficked from Latin America to Europe (e.g. by Estonian 
couriers) by plane from different parts of Europe to Estonia (plane, 
road transport).
The organisation of drug trafficking chains via Estonia varies. In some 
cases, the criminals carry out the trafficking from the beginning to the 
end themselves; in others, the whole operation is co-organised by 
criminal entrepreneurs who do not travel themselves.
“There are different types. The first type has its main organisers 
in Russia, and they have contact persons in Spain, in Estonia, and 
intermediaries in Lithuania; they would meet somewhere in Latvia. 
Everything is very well organised and they know what they are 
doing; they deal exclusively in drugs. Then there are the ‘tough 
guys’ who start from scratch, raise some money and move into 
trafficking stuff.
“There was this case where they wanted to bring cocaine hidden 
in coffee beans. People from the Netherlands and Estonia were 
involved and the stuff was brought from Venezuela. These were 
coffee packages smelling like coffee and one can make coffee and 
drink it. It was established that that 50 kilos of cocaine was hidden 
among those coffee beans. Some of the people involved were not 
aware and in good faith thought they were transporting coffee. The 
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shipment was aimed for the Netherlands market, but it was first 
brought to Germany, and then shipped via Estonia (EE-E7).”
Sources of capital for criminal operations
The source of capital for initiating the business varies form one kind of 
actor to another.
For solo entrepreneurs the initial capital often comes from either savings 
they made from legal income or from some form of credit they take. 
For example, EE-C3 invested his legal income as a miner into a fentanyl 
business. Experts mentioned several cases when money came from a 
legal business; others would borrow money from friends or relatives. 
Several experts also mentioned quick cash loans being used to buy the 
first shipment of drugs. The initial capital required is about €3,000 for 
a kilo; if sold in 10 or 100 gram portions the profit would be 2-3 times 
that amount (EE-E2).
For both ad hoc groups as well as more organised criminal groups, money 
can come from sources of credit such as small bank loans or quick cash 
loans. However, quite often the money they invest into the drug business 
comes from other illegal activities, e.g. organised shoplifting, prostitution, 
robbery or any kind of criminal activity (an example is a group shuttling 
to Finland for thefts, EE-E7). According to expert interviewees, criminal 
groups rarely specialise in a certain type of criminal activity but are 
rather quite opportunistic – they would engage in any kind of business – 
legal or illegal – that would bring them considerable income. Drugs are a 
particularly profitable enterprise and thus one can hardly find any group 
who would not be somehow involved in drug-related crimes.
There are, of course, the professional criminals who re-invest their illegal 
income into drugs trafficking but, unlike smaller or ad-hoc groups, do not 
traffic themselves, preferring the role of financiers. Some of their initial 
capital was made in the 1990s in the legal economy, and so to “save 
their bacon” they do not commit crime themselves but just finance it 
(EE-E6).
Financing could be advanced by middle-level entrepreneurs. An example 
is EE-C1 who served his first time in an Estonian prison. After his release, 
one of his prison mates contacted him, asked him to arrange a shipment 
of fentanyl and gave the whole amount of money in advance. Operators 
such as EE-C1 do not usually know where the money comes from or 
the origin of the drugs; they are just a link between the client and the 
provider. In case of longer supply chains, the pattern is quite similar: the 
one on the demand side (the client of the shipment) invests the money 
into the chain. While Estonians would organise it, the money could 
originate either from Russia or Finland or other destination country. “It is 
not possible to get drugs from another country on credit (EE-E2).”
There were also some cases when a legal business was involved in drug 
trafficking operations. Experts reported cases when a company that was 
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in a financially dire situation would improve it by investing into drug 
trafficking and re-investing the profit back into the legal business. In one 
instance, a legally operating company in Estonia “organised a shipment 
from Spain to Russia via Estonia. They got €100,000 in profit which 
was invested back into the company. As long as things went well with 
the legal business, they were not getting involved in drugs, but when 
the company started going downhill financially, they went for another 
shipment (EE-E7).”
Another financing scheme is blackmail. Criminals would collect discrediting 
information about a legitimate business or even create a situation that 
would force the business into some kind of wrongdoing. Examples could 
be a case of corruption when a company pays a government official a 
bribe to win a tender, or evade taxes, or a businessman would cause a 
traffic accident while being drunk and then claim his driver was behind 
the wheel, etc. Then criminals would blackmail the businessman and in 
exchange for not reporting this case to the police would demand an 
investment into a drug smuggling operation. To pay up, the businessman 
is forced to do some “creative accounting.” If the trafficking is successful, 
the criminal entrepreneurs would return the money and even share some 
profit with the businessmen, thus making the ties between two parties 
even stronger. This creates a spiralling engagement since the criminals 
now have even more compromising information about the businessman. 
This can go all the way to bankrupting the business. Government officials 
can also be blackmailed in such ways.
Settlement of payments
The drug market operates mostly in cash. Starting from the small dealers 
and ending with big traffickers, cash in euros is preferred. Law enforcement 
experts confirmed that cash operations are the main form of payment. If 
bought on credit, drugs would cost much more than if the price is paid 
directly in cash. For example, if a whole kilo of amphetamine is bought 
it costs €3,000-€3,500, but if paid only after it is sold to end customers 
the price doubles (EE-E4). With each step down the distribution chain the 
use of credit increases; for example, “they would give 50 grams on credit 
and in the evening they would come to collect the price (EE-E5).”
Financing schemes depend on the relationship between the first person 
in the supply chain and the criminal group owning the drugs. Buying 
drugs on credit happens among entrepreneurs who have high degree of 
trust among themselves – trusted criminal partners could get up to 50 
kilos on credit. Usually, however, “they would pay half price in advance 
(in cash); when the drugs are ready for shipment they would pay the rest 
of the money (EE-E5).” Another arrangement is to pay the whole sum in 
advance and then bear the distribution risks. Sometimes, the distributor 
would pay the amount and then would be informed where to go to 
pick up the merchandise.
Sometimes payments are made either in goods or in services. According 
to EE-C3, sometimes customers offer stolen goods or gold or other 
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valuables. He suggested that on occasion the amount of cash could 
be too big and he remembers going around with two bags full of cash 
(although the €500 banknotes solve this problem). Therefore, certain 
valuables (e.g. diamonds) would be also acceptable although to sell these 
further would be too risky.
Drugs can also be exchanged for services, for example, providing couriers 
for trafficking or providing information from stolen credit cards. Couriers 
would be paid but at least the buyer finds the ones who are willing to 
risk. “For example, a supplier gives a kilo of cocaine and gets 5 couriers 
for it (EE-E5).”
When drugs are bought on credit, the payment deadlines are quite short. 
In the case of small-scale retailers when the sums of money are not so 
large, the sanctions for not meeting the deadline may be quite mild. 
For example, if EE-C1 would not get paid for the drugs he provided 
he would just avoid any further business with that person; no violence 
would be used.
In case the criminal is arrested and cannot pay the money back, an 
interest rate would be charged for the duration of the prison time, 
although there could be an agreement for a certain interest-free period 
(EE-E6).
When something goes wrong with a sizeable shipment and the courier or 
the organiser of the shipment cannot return money to the person/group 
who financed the drug trafficking operation, various sanctions may be 
applied. It starts with financial sanctions – a high interest rate would 
be added to the initial debt and a new, rather short deadline set. If 
it is breached, the person would be threatened or violence would be 
used against him/her; on rare occasions the violence goes to extremes. 
Sometimes the issue would be settled by a mediator (usually a criminal 
authority) who decides what sum of money shall be paid (EE-E5).
The typical interest rate is around 20% for the operation but there have 
been some very high interests charged – 10% or 15% a day. The large 
loans are usually guaranteed by a surety and it is the surety, not the 
creditor who ensures that the debtor pays. The surety can choose to 
receive valuables from the debtor but would then have to sell them for 
cash to pay the creditor (EE-E5).
Criminals’ mutual fund
Criminals’ mutual fund or “obschak (“ühiskassa” in Estonian) is a 
phenomenon in the Estonian criminal world that deserves special 
attention. The word obschak comes from Russian and means “common 
cashbox” and is related to the criminal subculture in Russia, namely 
to the so-called “thieves-in-law”, a phenomenon that emerged in the 
middle of the 20th century. Obschak “governs the criminal community 
based on a functional-territorial principle. The obschak has a designated 
person in charge of a specific spectrum of criminal activity, as well as 
for a certain territory of operations. These persons collect taxes from the 
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individuals and businesses which are under organised crime protection.”264 
Kostjukovskii265 defines obschak as a common till; today, it is often just a 
bank account or a fund, sometimes even legally registered as a business 
company. Money from the fund goes to support imprisoned criminals 
and their families, and also to expand the criminal enterprise.
“What distinguishes Estonia from other [European countries] is that we 
have the influence of Russian organised crime. Starting with the obschak 
and all other things associated with it – criminal codes of conduct, etc. 
This influence is smaller than in Latvia but it is still tangible. The further 
we go into the west of Europe, the less we see of it (EE-E6).”
As far as Estonia is concerned, “a unique situation in the Baltic Sea 
region has formed where the nucleus of the underworld is one person 
surrounded by a dozen persons belonging to his immediate circle... [The 
leader] solves disputes, usually making sure that both parties are happy 
and that [mutual fund] is also happy. ... With money from this fund, 
current expenses and lawyers’ fees are paid and those in prison are 
helped.”266
The mutual fund in Estonia differs from the obschak in Russia in the 
functions it performs. From the end of the 1980s, when the organised 
criminal groups from Russia (e.g. Solncevo group, Kemerovo group, 
Krasnodar group) came to Estonia, the mutual fund was not only a 
form of insurance. The mutual fund in Estonia was also a regulatory 
mechanism of the criminal underworld – it was a kind of “round table” 
or a criminal council rather than simply a cash till or monetary fund. 
The leader of the mutual fund played role of criminal’s world moral 
authority, judge and mediator. The disputes between groups and spheres 
of influence were settled by the leader of the mutual fund. In the 1990s, 
the mutual fund already played an important role in the architecture of 
organised crime in Estonia.
According to law enforcement interviewees, today the position of the 
mutual fund has changed. Although those who some years ago came 
from Russian prisons and established a criminal hierarchy are still around, 
they are in their 60s and their influence is declining. There is no 
longer an undisputed criminal authority, as the criminal world is very 
much fragmented and the new generation of criminals do not find 
this organisation useful. Experts were also sceptical about the extent 
to which the mutual fund is invested in the organisation of crimes, 
particularly drug trafficking. It is possible that some money goes to the 
organisation of trafficking but its share of the market is not significant. 
It is also questionable to what extent the mutual fund fulfils its main 
function – financial support of imprisoned criminals and their families.
264 S. Cheloukhine, “The Roots of Russian Organised Crime: From Old-Fashioned Professionals 
to the Organized Criminal Groups of Today”, Crime, Law and Social Change 50, no. 353-374 
(2008): 360.
265 Kostjukovskii, Y. Организованная преступность в России на примере Санкт-Петербурга [Organised 
Crime in Russia: The St. Petersburg Case], 2000, http://www.narcom.ru/publ/info/542
266 R. Pullat, “Criminal Hierarchal Structures: Models of Organised Crime in the Baltic Sea Region”, 
SIAK-Journal – Zeitschrift Für Polizeiwissenschaft Und Polizeiliche Praxis 2 (2009): 24-30.
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The influence and role of the mutual fund in those mattes is declining. 
An important function of the mutual fund that has been maintained 
is dispute settlement as it is the service that criminals or criminal 
organisations are willing to pay for.
Costs of doing business
A significant expense in drug trafficking is incurred by transportation and 
couriers – vehicle purchase or rent, airplane tickets, hotels, etc. EE-C3, 
for example, claims that car maintenance and petrol were notable costs 
for business. He also mentioned paying sums of money to other criminals 
for a version of the protection racket: a fee for being “left alone.” Such 
payments to criminal authorities are among the costs related to the drug 
business. This is why “at some point quite a few [solo entrepreneurs] join 
some criminal group, because they need some kind of security (EE-E4).” 
As for more established groups, they “need to share some of their profit 
just for the opportunity to run their business.[...] This share is not very 
big, up to 10% (EE-E7).”
Experts estimate that some money is paid to the mutual fund as well. 
Few pay on a regular basis, others only when a dispute needs to be 
settled.
Another cost of doing this kind of business is corruption. EE-C3 who 
trafficked big shipments of hashish to Russia mentioned corruption in 
Russia being the main expense: “You need to pay everyone there.“
Profits and profit sharing
Criminal entrepreneurs operating on the lower level of the hierarchy claim 
they make €2,000-3,000 per month. An entrepreneur dealing in fentanyl 
mentioned that income was enough to cover everyday expenses.
“There was this group in which the organiser was from Estonia (he was 
the ‘brains’), the money handler was from Lithuania, the customer 
was from Russia and the one who prepared the shipment was in the 
Netherlands. They earned between €20,000 and €50,000 per month. 
[…] 100 kilos [of drugs in Morocco], costs around €35,000. If shipped 
to Russia, it would fetch €140,000-150,000. If transportation costs are 
deducted, this brings about €100,000 in profit. The initial €35,000 
is not very difficult to raise for groups or larger scale entrepreneurs. 
The solo entrepreneurs cannot invest this kind of money. Thus, they 
are trying to get the drugs on credit, or they are trying to cut 
the stuff – buying 90% cocaine and trying to make it 10%. By 
bringing in 100 grams and cutting it to 300-400 grams, they could get 
€10-15,000 profit (EE-E7).”
When shipments are organised by Estonian criminals but go from the 
Netherlands or Spain to the Scandinavian countries or Russia, the only 
profit that stays in Estonia is the facilitation fee. “Some couriers’ fees or 
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facilitators’ fees are €50,000-€100,000 only. The big money goes back 
to Western Europe.
“While the majority of criminals are in it for the expected lifestyle 
enhancement (expensive cars, jewellery, etc.), some criminal entrepreneurs 
sought to invest their profits in legal businesses. “When we had here the 
financial boom, construction and so on, bigger drug criminals become 
involved in the construction business and invested all their money there 
(EE-E7).”
Since today the profits are not particularly large and mainly spent on a 
lifestyle, not much money laundering is involved. Neither the experts, nor 
the interviewed criminal entrepreneurs considered this topic important. 
According to the head of the Financial Investigation Unit, the share of 
drug related crimes in the whole load of their work is insignificant.
Access to capital in critical moments
Access to capital in critical moments does not generally differ from 
the general financing mechanisms of drug trafficking. According to law 
enforcement experts, the sources of credit for drug shipments could 
be either a criminal group with significant cash flow or loan sharks. 
The number of loan sharks in Estonia is not exactly known but experts 
estimate it to be few dozens of people. These operate at all levels: 
“while one can get a €30,000 credit from bigger loan sharks, smaller 
operators lend, for example, €500 and want €700 back in a week 
(EE-E5).” Some are in this business because they do not want to get 
involved in crimes but make a profit by financing it.
The procedures of taking credit from such a “criminal bank” are actually 
very similar to the procedure of getting credit from a legal bank. Once 
a criminal has an idea about a criminal operation, he presents this idea 
to the creditor who then decides whether the idea is feasible, what the 
risks are, etc. “There are those who would like to know every detail of 
the plan – what will be done and how it will be done. Everything should 
be described in the details and then this project will be evaluated – 
whether it is profitable and workable. Then there are creditors who just 
give the borrower a deadline; if he misses the deadline, he pays an 
additional 20% a month. This kind of creditor does not care where the 
money goes (EE-E5).”
A criminal usually turns to a criminal group or illegal banker only if 
they already know each other from previous operations. If a person is 
looking for a loan for the first time or if the creditor and the criminal 
entrepreneur do not know each other, they need a facilitator. This 
facilitator plays the role of a surety. His task is to bring the donor and 
the recipient together, and guarantee the deal. If something goes wrong 
with the credit, the surety is responsible that the donor receives his 
money back. It is he who communicates with the recipient and collects 
money if something goes wrong. In other words, the illegal credit system 
operates very similar to its legal counterpart.
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Loan sharks have been known to use signed contracts with the borrowers, 
even notary certified. Contracts contain quite harsh conditions, including 
mortgaging the debtor’s property or a fine of up to €1,000 if the 
payment is late or the debtor is out of reach (EE-E7).
Cocaine trafficking is one of the most developed illegal markets in Spain. 
Its expansion began in the 1980s when Galician groups (specialists in 
the illicit tobacco trade) redirected their activities to cocaine trafficking. 
At the time, Colombian criminal entrepreneurs wanted to bring their 
merchandise to the European market and Spain was considered the best 
place to start. A number of factors facilitated the Colombian alliance 
with Spanish organised groups: similar culture and language, Spain’s 
geographical position in Europe and the experience of Galician groups in 
other types of contraband (tobacco and other products).267
Organised crime groups based in Galicia had vast experience navigating 
in the North-Western coast of Spain and most had legal infrastructures 
in the fishing industry. That expertise and foundations were a useful 
platform to help Colombian importers transport cocaine. Conversely, 
Colombians needed Spain to enter the European market and the 
alliance was necessary to start the illegal trade. That is how Galician 
organised crime groups became specialised in the transportation from 
open sea to the coast. Colombians paid 50% in cash and 50% in 
kind (ES-E4), which the Galician groups would sell directly at the local 
market (ES-E2).
Spain has traditionally been an important European entry point from 
countries of origin (Colombia, Peru and Bolivia). From 1990 to 2000, 
Spain was the most important transit point in the European cocaine 
market due to the alliances with producer countries. However, in 
recent years, the situation has changed considerably due to a number 
of factors:
• Colombians and other South American organised crime groups have 
established stable infrastructures in Europe and Spain, thus the 
relationship with Spanish groups is no longer of the essence. 
• The routes and means of transportation of cocaine have diversified, 
which has led to a reduction in the quantity of the substance arriving 
at the Galician coast. It is currently more common to use containers 
arriving at the main Spanish ports of Algeciras, Valencia and Barcelona, 
and other alternative routes with other key points of transit.
• Policies have been introduced which reinforced the fight against 
organised crime, especially drug and human trafficking. This 
reinforcement (by sea and land) has led to a decrease in the amount 
267 L. De la Corte and A. Giménez-Salinas, Crimen.org. Explicación y claves de la delincuencia organizada 
[Crimen.org. Explanation and Keys of Organised Crime] (Barcelona: Ariel, 2010).
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of cocaine passing through Spain, generating two more prominent 
alternative routes as a result of the stricter supervision by the 
Spanish authorities: through the countries in Western Africa, such 
as Guinea Bissau and Senegal, Nigeria and Ghana, and Mali and 
Mauritania (African organised crime groups have increased their transit 
infrastructures and international contacts in the last decade); direct 
transportation by air or sea to the countries of destination.268
The consumption of cocaine in the two major cocaine markets – 
North America and Western and Central Europe – decreased between 
2010 and 2011, but these markets together represented approximately 
half of the number of cocaine users globally. Spain has the highest 
consumption rate on the continent and it has also been the European 
country with the highest number of seizures since 2000, followed by 
Portugal and the Netherlands.269 Nevertheless, there was a decline in 
seizures in Spain from 50 tonnes in 2003 to 20 tonnes in 2011, and a 
decrease in annual prevalence of cocaine use from 2007 to 2011 (3% 
in 2007 to 1.2% in 2011).270
In spite of the recent changes, cocaine trafficking is still the most 
significant illegal market in Spain, according to the volume of organised 
crime groups detected (around 40% of the total organised crime groups 
detected by the police every year), the quantity of cocaine seized 
in Spain (an average of 40 tonnes per year, from 2006 and 2012271), 
the amount of money laundered by organised crime groups and the 
substances seized by the police.272 It is also the illegal market with the 
most sophisticated means and one that creates most collateral crime 
such as violence, money laundering, local corruption, etc.
According to data published by the Spanish Ministry of Interior in March 
2013, drug trafficking generated €15.7 million in income per day, i.e. 
around €5,717 million per year. 27% of the organised crime groups 
detected in Spain in 2012 were involved in cocaine trafficking.273
In cocaine trafficking, the most relevant groups are from Colombia; they 
ship the cocaine from Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil or the Caribbean 
countries. Colombians were traditionally in charge of production, 
Venezuelans of transport and the Spanish organised crime groups 
specialised in transportation to the coast. Nowadays, things have 
changed and Colombians are well positioned in Spain to control the 
global supply chain.
268 UNODC, The Globalization of Crime. A Transnational Organised Crime Threat Assessment (Vienna, 
2010); Europol, SOCTA 2013. EU Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment (The Hague: 
Europol, 2013); Europol, EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment (The Hague: Europol, 2011).
269 UNODC, World Drug Report 2013, 43.
270 Ibid., 44.
271 UNODC, World Drug Report 2013; UNODC, World Drug Report 2014 (Vienna, 2014).
272 Data from unpublished reports of the Ministry of Interior regarding organised crime.
273 RTVE, “El tráfico de drogas genera en España 15,7 millones de euros de beneficios al día [Drug 
Trafficking in Spain Generates €15.7 million Daily]”, RTVE, April 18, 2013.
Market overview
Market structure 
and actors
164 Financing	oF	organised	crime
Several years ago, large Colombian importers were capable of managing 
the supply chain from the location of origin to the place of destination. 
Today, the illegal market is fragmented and there are many small groups 
throughout the business: importers, wholesalers, transporters, dealers by 
land, distributors, retailers, etc.274
Retailers represent 60% of the cocaine traffickers detected by the 
police. They acquire the cocaine from local wholesalers to be sold to 
the final consumer. In some cases, cocaine is acquired by stealing it from 
other traffickers. Some of them have direct contact with South American 
importers, thus they can acquire cocaine directly from them and send it 
to Spain by post or personal couriers.
Wholesalers represent around 5% of the cocaine traffickers detected by 
the police in Spain. They supply large amounts of cocaine to Spanish or 
European groups (the Netherlands, the United Kingdom or France) to be 
distributed in the local market.
Importers are around 35% or the cocaine traffickers detected. They 
introduce vast amounts of cocaine in Spain directly from producer 
countries:
• by sea through other South American countries or transit countries 
(containers or to the Galician coast);
• by air from South American countries or intermediary countries to 
Spain;
• by air through personal couriers or post.
Importers have generally been Colombian, which is the second most 
prevalent nationality in organised crime groups detected in Spain (30%), 
following the Spanish nationality (70%).275 Regarding the number of 
individuals apprehended by the police, Colombians represent 10% and 
Spanish 40%. Intermediaries and distributors are also usually Colombian 
or Spanish, with the number of Mexicans on the increase. Recently, 
several large operations have revealed the Mexicans as main importers 
of cocaine into Spain.
legitimate companies can be useful in the cocaine business to conceal 
the transport or other illegal activities and to launder the criminal 
income. The following are the most common methods of using legitimate 
companies:
• Using a front company (i.e. export and import companies) owned by 
the criminal group at the locations of origin (Colombia or a transit 
country) and of destination. Small groups create small companies 
or use outsourcing methods to develop auxiliary services (transport, 
money transfers, etc.).
274 L. Giménez-Salinas et al., “The Profile of a Sample of Criminal Organisations in Spain during 
the Last Decade”, in Human Dimensions in Organised Crime, Money Laundering and Corruption, ed. 
P. C. Van Duyne et al. (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2013), 121-48.
275 These figures may exceed 100% because some organised crime groups may be ethnically 
diverse (data from the Ministry of Interior).
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• Establishing a new company. The cost of incorporating a company 
is around €3,000 and the sellers provide support and assistance to 
change the management, to substitute shareholders, etc. Nevertheless, 
these new businesses are less common when cocaine is transported 
from South America to Spain. The lack of track record of a new 
company can raise suspicion in borders or ports. 
• Using legitimate companies in difficulty, the owners of which can 
provide a safe cover for traffickers. Colombians or producers have 
their own companies and have recruiters to find business people with 
financial problems and in vulnerable situations. In these cases, it is 
harder for the police to detect the connection with drug traffickers.
As regards the means of transportation, the typical interchange at open 
sea is by using fishing boats. Under this procedure, groups from Galicia 
have traditionally been in charge of cocaine transportation from open 
sea to the Spanish coast. They have fishing licenses and use them to 
conceal their illegal activity. In the case of transport by containers, the 
“rip-on/rip-off” method is applied which involves the use of an import-
export company that is unaware of the transportation. This method is 
applicable when the criminal organisation has a major contact in the 
ports of origin and destination that can introduce the cocaine in the 
port of origin and take it out of the container (rip it off) when it arrives 
at the port of destination. The method has been subject to an intense 
seven-phase investigation in Spain involving port workers. It is also used 
to send the illicit revenue back to the country of origin.
According to the interviewees, the amount needed to start a business 
in cocaine trafficking is not significant. The usual way to initiate is 
to start gradually, by dealing in small amounts of cocaine. It is also 
common when large sums are needed, to create a pool where some 
criminal entrepreneurs invest small amounts to pay for transportation and 
importers to send the cocaine to Spain. It is exceptional to use loans or 
sizeable investments; sometimes credit is extended in the form of a small 
amount of cocaine, which allows the person to enter trafficking.
Sources of capital for criminal operations. Profile of financiers 
in criminal operations
There are a number of ways in which criminal operations in cocaine 
trafficking are launched. Relationships of trust among members of the 
same family, friends or professional colleagues with the big importers 
from Colombia can be the starting point. Such relationships resulting 
from previous business relations can offer an opportunity to request an 
amount of cocaine to make sufficient money for starting a trafficking 
business. For the traffickers from Colombia the product has no value 
until it enters Europe. An advance in the form of a small amount of 
cocaine to provide an opportunity to start trafficking is not a problem for 
these criminal entrepreneurs. Trust is a very important starting condition 
because it is difficult to enter the market without a business patron 
or financier. Cocaine is mostly paid for in advance, so it is necessary 
Financing 
and financial 
management
166 Financing	oF	organised	crime
to have money for transportation and to pay intermediaries. When a 
relationship of trust is established the product can be obtained and paid 
for when the deal is concluded.
Another way to develop a cocaine business is from the bottom up. 
Some members of a group start by selling small amounts of cocaine, 
and gradually begin to import cocaine directly from South America. 
Initial funds could derive from legal sources or even public funding. In 
one particular case, the Guardia Civil came across a criminal group that 
applied for funding from the European Commission to run fishing farms 
in Morocco and once they received the funds, they moved into cocaine 
trafficking.
As mentioned above, in exceptional cases managers of legitimate 
businesses going through difficult economic times and in need of money 
get involved in drug trafficking to salvage their companies. Civil servants 
have also been known to move into organised crime, such as Don 
Lucho, a member of the Colombian intelligence service who became the 
leader of a criminal organisation.
The sources of capital to start criminal operations differ for importers, 
wholesalers and final retailers.
Importers. As mentioned above, previously Colombian traffickers used to 
pay 50% in cash and 50% in kind; the situation is completely different 
now, with each illegal organisation using its own income to fund its 
business. Colombians and other South American groups are the most 
powerful organisations financially, having the capacity to fund or invest in 
other types of legal and illegal markets. They have their own infrastructures 
and their own money to be laundered or invested. They tend to use 
their own members to collect the money, but then use specialised 
organisations to send the illegal income from Spain to Colombia using 
various methods (more on this in the following section).
Wholesalers. The investigations by the Spanish authorities reveal that the 
wholesalers do not have the financial capacity to make large investments. 
They provide logistics or transportation for a share of the smuggled 
drugs. If they send money to Colombia, they usually divert part of it 
to make arrange a boat or for other logistical purposes. The revenue is 
used to fund the next deal.
The wholesalers sometimes create cooperatives. These are not created 
during the first phase of the business but when a business is already 
under way. Spanish wholesalers who have contacts in Colombia or 
another country of origin usually try to set up cooperatives. If they are 
sure they have a client to whom to sell the amount of cocaine offered, 
they use a cooperative to share the expenses of sending the cocaine to 
Spain.
Retailers. Their funds derive from income earned, except when they 
have relationships of trust with importers guaranteeing that they can 
borrow some amount of cocaine.
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Settlement of payments
Payment arrangement are typically upfront; exceptionally, when there is 
a relationship of trust, some groups may receive cocaine on credit and 
pay after they sell it. In such cases, as a precaution against default, a 
representative of the creditor could visit the borrowers home to “get to 
know” his/her family or a member of the borrowers group could be 
held as collateral. In case of small amounts of drugs coming by air, the 
money is usually paid using money transfer companies.
Payments are made in cash or in kind (drugs or other products). 
Transporters (Galician dealers) are paid usually with drugs to be sold 
in Spain to distributers. Payments in cash are always managed by the 
criminal organisations and then the money laundering is outsourced to 
organisations specialised in sending criminal proceeds to the countries of 
origin, compensating illegal funds or creating new companies. Colombian 
organisations usually contact money launderers in Colombia and issue 
instructions on how to proceed.
The most common ways of payments and money laundering in the 
cocaine trafficking market are the following:
• Transfer of money by means of personal couriers and by transit 
(containers, etc.) as with any other type of commodity.
• Money transfer companies (Western Union, etc.) or call box. Those 
systems are used by organised crime members to send personal 
money to their families. Large criminal organisations move large 
amounts of money when they have extensive networks in Spain and 
Colombia. Groups specialising in this type of transfer on a larger 
scale use fake identities and contacts at locations of origin and 
destination.
• Compensation-type money transfers. A typical compensation system 
is the hawala which involves two intermediaries (hawaladars) at the 
locations of origin and destination. Colombians and Spanish cocaine 
traffickers use hawala for moving money, in many different ways. 
Under this type of system, if a person in one country wishes to send 
an amount of money to a person in another country, the transfer 
is made through intermediaries in each country in order to avoid 
traceability. In country A, the intermediary receives the money from 
person A, and in the country of destination the money is sent to 
person B by the intermediary in that country. The money is then 
exchanged between intermediaries.
Currently there are other compensation systems that use goods rather 
than money. These are more complex because the intermediary of the 
broker needs to use the services of a businessperson in the country 
in which the import-export activities take place. There are many ways 
to do this, but the most common when a broker who works for 
cocaine traffickers offers to pay the invoices of a legitimate company 
(for merchandise) with a reduction on the actual price. The drug broker 
settles the invoices using money coming from drug dealers and the 
company pays the broker the price including a reduction on the amount 
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to be paid for the merchandise. There are brokers all over the world 
that search for legitimate companies to repatriate illegal funds from 
destination countries.
Costs of doing business
Information on the expenses 
involved in cocaine trafficking 
is difficult to come by, although 
there are some indicators at 
certain stages of the business. 
Shipment costs, for example, 
vary considerably depending 
on mode of transportation, 
amount of drugs, distance, 
etc. According to the National 
Drugs Plan, the average prices 
of the various volumes of 
cocaine are:
• 1 kg of cocaine at source 
country: €6,000.
• 1 kg of cocaine in Spain: 
€32,000-€34,000.
• 1 gram in retail: €60.276
As expected, each intermedi-
ary involved in bringing the 
products to Spain generates an 
added cost on the initial price. Figure 17 shows the evolution of prices 
of 1 gram of cocaine from 2000 to 2010. There has been a stabilisation 
of prices since 2005.
Profits and profit sharing
Information concerning profit sharing is not available. In general, traffickers 
and wholesalers invest in Spain using the following methods:
• Small financiers or retailers seek to create legitimate companies to 
conceal their activities.
• Large groups of traffickers have the following laundering strategies:
– using legitimate companies to mix legal and illicit money;
– using fake purchasing contracts;
– using front men or lawyers in some companies;
– using insolvent companies to launder money by giving them a loan 
to be paid by employees’ salaries;
– purchasing art and/or jewellery;
276 Observatorio Español sobre la Droga y las Toxicomanías, Situación y tendencias de los problemas 
de drogas en España, (Madrid, 2011).
Figure 17. dynaMics oF prices oF cocaine in spain, 2000 – 2010
Source: Observatorio Español sobre la Droga y las Toxicomanías, Situación y tendencias 
de los problemas de drogas en España, 210.
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– using failing businesses;
– using contracts with compensation clauses.
The most powerful groups of Colombians send the illicit money back 
to Colombia, which is then invested in companies in Spain following 
complex procedures and interposed companies, such as fake products, 
gold mines, etc.
Access to capital in critical moments and loan sharking
Organised crime groups often take advantage of critical situations to 
introduce legitimate partners into the business, which enables them to 
conceal transportation, to launder money and to cover up other illegal 
activities. If drug dealers need money, other members can help providing 
merchandise (cocaine) if they have a good relationship based on trust. 
At times it suffices to wait for the drugs to be sold and the amounts 
received from the deal are used to pay for the merchandise acquired. 
Because of that payments are usually done in advance or organisations 
always take security measures in order to assure payment (kidnapping, 
information about family, properties, etc.).
Organised crime groups of considerable financial capacity are always 
seeking companies or businesspersons in critical situations to offer loans 
in exchange for a favour: transport cocaine or money, launder money, 
etc. These groups have experts in finding and recruiting vulnerable 
companies or managers and offering them a way out of their difficult 
predicament.
France is an important consumption country but also a transit area for 
illicit drugs smuggled to the Netherlands, Belgium, the United Kingdom 
and Italy. As in most of the European countries, cannabis – herbal and 
resin – is the most widely available and accessible illicit substance. Herbal 
cannabis is the only drug produced directly in France, mainly by private 
individuals on a small scale, even if lately, an increasing involvement 
of criminal circles has been observed. However, cross-border trading of 
herbal cannabis from Belgium and the Netherlands is also reported.277
Cannabis resin on the other hand originates generally from Morocco 
and enters France through Spain. This market is today less dynamic: it is 
indeed highly impacted by the competition coming from herbal cannabis, 
domestic or imported one, but also by the increasing effectiveness of law 
enforcement operations. These two phenomena have huge implications 
on the costs which are growing and lead to a reduction of the profitability 
277 EMCDDA, European Drug Report 2014. Trends and Developments.
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of trafficking operations. Cannabis resin remains the main drug trafficked 
in France, even if some of the traditional cannabis resin trafficking 
groups are refocusing their activity on more profitable operations, such 
as dealing cocaine.
While contacts with the OCGs controlling cocaine production are 
not so straightforward, it is possible for French wholesalers to have 
direct connections with resin or herbal cannabis‘s producers. As resin 
production is located in Morocco, geographical and ethnic ties do exist 
with transnational wholesalers and avoid multiple intermediates to buy 
the product. And with cannabis herbal production increasingly located in 
Europe, a new world of opportunity will certainly change the economy 
of cannabis in Europe.
On the other hand, with the increase of cocaine consumption in France 
in the last 10 years, more small traffickers decide nowadays to shift 
to trafficking cocaine using their cannabis profits: it is indeed now 
very frequent to find cocaine in drug market places which used to be 
exclusively dedicated to cannabis business. The spread278 of cocaine 
consumption is now followed by a kind of democratisation of the 
cocaine retail marketplace.
Cocaine enters France directly from South America, lately from West 
Africa via sea routes or by courier from Belgium, the Netherlands 
and Spain. French overseas departments (Caribbean islands and French 
Guyana) are the main roads to import cocaine in Europe.
Cocaine circulates in two chemical forms: salt (hydrochloride) and base 
(“crack” or “freebase”) forms. With regard to synthetic stimulants, they 
are mainly smuggled from Belgium, the Netherlands or Germany, though 
only in small amounts.
In 2010, a total of 157,341 drug-related offences were reported, 87.5% 
of those being cannabis-related, 6.8% heroin-related and 4.1% cocaine-
related. A record number of 131,000 cannabis plants were seized in 2012. 
Cannabis resin has been decreasing since 2004, and the upward trend 
observed for herbal cannabis in 2010 – 2011 seems to have ended in 2012. 
The amount of cocaine seized in 2012 (5.6 tonnes) has also decreased 
compared to 2011 when a record 10.8 tonnes were seized.279
General population surveys280 carried out in France indicate that cannabis 
remains the most widely used illicit drug. Despite an increase in lifetime 
prevalence rates for cannabis amongst people aged 15-64 years old from 
22.5% in 2000 to 32.1% in 2010, cannabis usage during the last year and 
last month has remained stable – 8.4% in 2000 and 2010 for last year, 
and 4.3% in 2000 compared to 4.6% in 2010 for last month.
278 As the increase of consumption prevalence after 2000 is impacting more middle and lower 
classes and youth (observed by the French Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction).
279 Direction centrale de la Police judiciaire [French national judicial police], Létat des drogues en 
France 2013 [The State of Drugs in France 2013] (unpublished, 2013).
280 Reitox National Focal Point-France, 2012 National Report (2011 Data) to the EMCDDA: France, 
2012.
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Cocaine is the second most widely used illicit drug, with a lifetime 
prevalence of 3.7% in 2010 and its penetration has increased from 1.6% 
in 2000. Unlike cannabis, last year prevalence also indicates an upward 
trend (0.2% in 2000; 0.6% in 2005; 0.9% in 2010).281
Among young people, the prevalence of cannabis and cocaine usage is 
much higher. In 2010, 45.1% of 15-34 years old people had consumed 
cannabis at least once in their life versus 6.0% for cocaine. For the same 
age group, last year prevalence was reported to be 17.5% for cannabis, 
1.9% for cocaine and less than 1% for other illicit substances. Last 
month cannabis use for this age group was 9.8%.282
According to a European School Survey Project on Alcohol and Other 
Drugs (ESPAD) study conducted in 2011, 39% of young people aged 
15-16 years have tried marijuana or hashish at least once in their lifetime 
(31% in 2007). Lifetime prevalence was 12% for inhalant use (same rate 
as in 2007) and 4% for cocaine (5% in 2007). The results indicated 
35% penetration for last year cannabis usage and 24% for last month. 
Although lifetime prevalence of cannabis usage was the same for male 
and female students, male students slightly more frequently reported 
recent use of cannabis.283
Some data on drug use in recreational settings exists and indicates high 
consumption of cocaine powder in large dance events.
In France, the volume of annual cocaine market is estimated at around 
€800 million284 and €1 billion for the illicit cannabis market but such 
estimates need to be approached cautiously. A new evaluation of the 
value of the French illicit drug market is currently under elaboration.285
French cannabis and cocaine prices show that there are two very 
different business models. In the cannabis economic model, prices are 
in constant evolution. This phenomenon started in the mid-2000s when 
the Moroccan resin producers and retailers were struggling with herbal 
products competition in Europe.286
Retail prices for cannabis strongly increased between 2006 and 2013 
with a 20% growth observed for both herbal and resin cannabis. At 
the wholesale level, only the herbal cannabis prices had been increasing 
(around 50% growth from 2006).
281 OFDT, Drugs, Key Data 2013 (5th edition, 2013).
282 Ibid.
283 Ibid.
284 C. Ben Lakhdar, La culture du cannabis en France: implications, volume et qualité estimés [Cannabis 
Cultivation in France: Implications, Volume and Quality Estimated] (OFDT, 2009).
285 N. Lalam and D. Weinberger, L’argent de la drogue [Drug money in France], (INHESJ), 
forthcoming.
286 C. Ben Lakhdar and D. Weinberger, “Du marché du cannabis au marché du THC en France. 
Implications pour le système d’offre et les politiques de lutte [From Cannabis Market to THC 
Market: Effects on Supply System and Public Policies]”, Revue Française de Socio-Economie [French 
Journal of Socio-Economy] 7, no. 1 (2011): 125-47.
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Таble 20. cannabis products and cocaine prices in France in 2013 
(€/graM)
      * median price.
Source: Office central de lutte contre le trafic illicite de stupéfiants (OCRTIS) [Central Directorate of Judicial Police], 2014.
Retail prices Wholesale prices Import prices
Herbal cannabis 7-10 (8.5*) 4.5-7 (5*) 3-5 (4*)
Resin 5-8 (6*) 3-4 (3.5*) 2-2.7 (2.25*)
Cocaine 60-75 (65*) 35-50 (40*) 25-35 (30*)
To preserve the market share of Moroccan resin in France, cannabis 
producers had to improve significantly the quality of their product and 
had to obtain a better productivity with the same or a reduced amount 
of land plots to cultivate the plants.287 As a result, they had to invest in 
new cannabis varieties and to use intensive agricultural methods.
The difference between prices of herbal and resin cannabis grows more 
rapidly for wholesale than for retail, which indicates that it is much 
more profitable to sell cannabis resin than herb in France (Figure 18). 
Interviews confirm that OCGs specialised in Moroccan resin intend to 
propose in the future a very attractive resin to resist what was called 
“the green avalanche” in Europe.288
287 P. A. Chouvy and K. Afsahi, “Hashish Revival in Morocco”, International Journal of Drug Policy 25, 
no. 3 (2014): 416-23.
288 A.C.M. Jansen, “The economics of cannabis-cultivation in Europe”. Paper presented at the 
2nd European Conference on Drug Trafficking and Law Enforcement. Paris, September 26-27, 
2002.
Figure 18. the evolution oF retail and wholesale cannabis prices 
in France, 2006 – 2013
Source: Office central de lutte contre le trafic illicite de stupéfiants (OCRTIS) [Central Directorate of Judicial Police], 2014.
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In contrast, the retail prices of cocaine in France are stable and the 
changing variable is higher quality production (Figure 19). In order to 
adapt prices with supply and demand, the illicit market for cocaine 
prefers to adapt the share of cutting products than change the price.
Figure 19. the evolution oF retail and wholesale cocaine and heroin 
prices in France, 2006 – 2013
Source: Office central de lutte contre le trafic illicite de stupéfiants (OCRTIS), Central Directorate of Judicial Police, 2014.
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Prices and purity
To better understand the structure of the illicit economy of cannabis and 
cocaine, price analysis is insufficient, but an analysis of the price data 
together with percentage of purity of the products is required.
The average wholesale herbal price shows a significant increase since 
2010, while the average retail price has been increasing also but at a 
slower pace (+21.4%). This indicates that the wholesalers are the ones 
who make a lot of money with the herbal cannabis products. At the 
retail level, it is much more complicated to obtain significant profits. This 
Таble 21. retail and wholesale herbal cannabis prices and purity 
in France (2010 – 2013)
Source: Office central de lutte contre le trafic illicite de stupéfiants (OCRTIS) [Central Directorate of Judicial Police], 2014.
Herbal cannabis, retail 2010 2011 2012 2013 2010/2013
retail price (gram/€) 7 7.5 8 8.5 +21.4%
median purity per gram (%THC) 9 6.0 10 10 +11.1%
Herbal cannabis, wholesale
wholesale price (gram/€) 2,750 3,050 3,625 4,000 +45.45%
median purity per gram (%THC) 11 12 15 15 +36.36%
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result suggests that French illicit cannabis market’s profit is important at 
the wholesale level and weak at the retail level.
Surprisingly, the quality of resin products has significantly improved: 
90.5% increase for the THC level between 2010 and 2013 for retail 
and 55% for wholesale. Compatibilities evidence from judicial cases on 
cannabis wholesale shows that the cheap quality of resin offers a very 
weak merge and high level quality resin are much more manageable. 
However, the majority of the stock sold is from the cheap quality and 
means that retailers need to sell a lot a quantity to be profitable in the 
“supermarket model” (see the section below).
The analysis of the price indexed by kilo could be used as a proxy to 
estimate the virtual purity of a kilo of cocaine in France: the lower the 
cost, the purer the cocaine. At the importation wholesale level, there 
is no variation between the price and the purity: the local wholesaler 
adjusts the level of cutting to demand.
The reduction of the price between 2006 and 2007 indicates that the 
cocaine was sold with more cutting products at that period of time 
Таble 22. retail and wholesale resin cannabis prices and purity 
in France (2010 – 2013)
Source: Office central de lutte contre le trafic illicite de stupéfiants (OCRTIS) [Central Directorate of Judicial Police] 2014.
Resin cannabis, retail 2010 2011 2012 2013 2010/2013
retail price (€/gram) 5 5 6 6 20%
median purity per gram (%THC) 10.5 10 20 20 90.5%
Resin cannabis, wholesale
wholesale price (€/gram) 2,500 2,000 2,000 2,250 -10%
median purity per gram (%THC) 11 13 17 17 +54.6%
Таble 23. retail cocaine prices and purity in France (2006 – 2013)
Source: Office central de lutte contre le trafic illicite de stupéfiants (OCRTIS) [Central Directorate of Judicial Police], 2014.
Cocaine, retail 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2006/2013
retail price
(€/gram)
65 60 60 60 60 60 65 65 0%
median purity
per gram (%)
28.5 21.7 28.6 26.3 28.5 17.8 23.6 46 61%
price index per 
gram (100% pure)
228 276 210 228 211 337 275 141 -38%
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to meet an increasing demand. After 2007, the evolution of the virtual 
pure price shows that the quantity of pure cocaine in France had been 
increasing until 2010. After 2010, the repetition of the phenomena (2-3 
years cycle) confirms that the transnational wholesalers have the ability 
to adapt the cocaine offer to local demand.
The latest (2005) estimate of the value of the annual cannabis market 
in France puts it at €832 million,289 which makes it the first illicit drug 
market. With its estimated €800 million a year, cocaine is the second illicit 
market in France. Because of high retail prices, a growing demand and its 
ability to be cut, cocaine is perceived as the best value product.
Qualitative data indicate that the French illicit market is divided into two 
main organisational models: the network model and the supermarket 
model.290
Find better customers: the network model
The network model is the one which enables the trafficker’s profit to 
be optimised; to this end, a good network of clients is needed. In Paris, 
the best model is surely when the drug dealer sells the cannabis in 
the richest part of the city (centre of town) and buys it in the suburbs. 
With this model, it is possible to do more than 150% mark-up on the 
cheapest cannabis resin quality.
In the French urban tradition, the richest population lives in city centres 
and the poorest in the suburbs: this explains why in a city like Paris, the 
variation of the cannabis price can be described as a concentric circle. 
In the suburbs, cannabis prices are cheaper than in the centre of the city 
because the importers stock the cannabis bought directly from Spain or 
289 Ben Lakhdar, La culture du cannabis en France: Implications, volume et qualité estimés [Cannabis 
Cultivation in France: Implications, Volume and Quality Estimated].
290 May and Hough, “Drug Markets and Distribution Systems”.
Таble 24. wholesale cocaine prices and purity in France 
(2006 – 2013)
Source: Office central de lutte contre le trafic illicite de stupéfiants (OCRTIS) [Central Directorate of Judicial Police], 2014.
Cocaine, 
wholesale
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2006/2013
wholesale price 
(€/kilo)
30,000 28,700 29,350 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 0%
median purity
per kilo (%)
59.8 67.8 65.1 62.4 58.9 61.5 67.8 60 0%
price index per 
kilo (100% pure)
50,167 42,330 45,084 48,077 50,934 48,780 44,248 50,000 0%
Market structure 
and actors
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from Morocco. Otherwise, the higher price of retail cannabis is certainly 
in the centre of the town thanks to the richest customers who prefer to 
pay a higher price and avoid the risk of buying it on the street.
In theory, one of the best business models is to have access to the 
best prices in the suburbs and to use a network of customers living in 
the centre of French cities. In reality, there is a multitude of small drug 
trafficking agents in relationship one with each other who share the 
profits. As an example, an individual who knows how to buy at a lower 
cost in the suburbs will sell to someone living in the centre of the city. 
The second one will liaison with another player closer to the centre of 
the circle. The social and geographical proximity to wholesalers is the 
key factor to obtain good prices and to increase profits.
“When I went to the university, I met a lot of guys asking for cannabis 
and even cocaine. I understand they were used to pay for the weed 
around €10 a gram and I saw the opportunity: now, my sellers are in 
the cité291 and I provide weed to the university’s smokers with much 
more profit” (FR-C1).
This virtual concentric circle shows the mark-up rate – from €3 for a 
gram in the cité to €6-€10 in the centre of Paris.
Selling volumes: the supermarket model
The other way to obtain higher 
profits is to sell significant 
quantities in the cité. As in a 
licit supermarket, this kind of 
trafficking is very effective: the 
large turnover ensures a good 
profit margin and customers 
know where to find their 
dope.
Drug dealers can optimise their 
profits with the economies of 
scale: the larger the quantity 
they buy and sell, the lower the 
price. Overall, the supermarket 
business model is more and 
more used for selling cocaine 
while the network market used 
to be the main model.
The importation and wholesale level
Cocaine importation is mainly carried out by sea routes (52% of the 5 
tonnes of cocaine seized by the French police in 2012) and specifically 
291 “Cités” are public housing projects built in the 1950s and 1960s in the suburbs of main French 
cities, intended for working class and/or immigrants coming from former French colonies such 
as Algeria, Mali or Senegal.
Figure 20. pyraMidal distribution channel or “superMarket”
Source: T. May and M. Hough, “Drug Markets and Distribution Systems”, Addiction 
Research and Theory 12, no. 6 (2004): 549-63.
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by containers in important French ports such as Le Havre or Marseille. 
The two thirds of maritime seizures by French law enforcement confirms 
that French oversea territories – West Indies and French Guyana – are 
an important hub for cocaine trafficking.292 Venezuela and the Dominican 
Republic have been identified as transit countries.
The main shipment method is in containers (hidden in goods like 
banana or in the structure of the boat) or by private yacht loading up 
to a tonne of cocaine with 1 or 2 members of the group and 1 or 2 
skipper/sailors.
If, in terms of the number of seizures, the major part of the cocaine 
seized in France is coming by sea, the main part of quantity seized 
comes by commercial flights in major airports such as Roissy Charles de 
Gaulle. The most frequent modus operandi is through luggage or mules 
(“ex corpore” and “in corpore”) and comes directly or via West Africa or 
South Europe from American destinations like the Dominican Republic. 
The cocaine is also loaded on private aircrafts which can carry 1 or 2 
tonnes directly to France.293
The way to reach the drug consumption area from European sea ports 
or airports is overland. A significant part of the cocaine importation 
for the French market is transiting through major western ports in the 
Netherlands or Spain and operated by major European OCG. A number 
of seizures on trucks or vans in the south of France had been sent to 
Italy or Switzerland.
The retail level
Cannabis comes mainly from Morocco and, increasingly, from France 
or other Europeans countries.294 It first arrives by sea or air in Spain 
and then is carried out to France overland. The major importers for the 
French market are mainly French citizens living in Spain. They organize 
the importation, stock the product in Spain and sell the resin to French 
wholesalers. Commercial aviation is also used, mainly for the most 
expensive cannabis products like balls of 20% THC cannabis (very high 
quality) with a small size to be hidden in, for example, tomatoes cargo.
The diversification of products
Analysis of the markets in Marseille and Paris shows that some drug dealers 
can decide to make more money through the diversification of products. 
Between 2000 and 2005, a significant change has been observed on 
the French cannabis market involving massive diversification in cannabis 
products. This diversification consists of offering to consumers varying 
qualities of resin, some stronger than others and of providing more and 
292 Between 2011 and 2012, the French police seized more than two tonnes of cocaine shipped by 
sea (Direction centrale de la Police judiciaire [French national judicial police], Létat des drogues 
en France 2013 [The State of Drugs in France 2013]).
293 N. Lalam and D. Weinberger, Illicit Drug Trafficking Using Small Airfields: An Exploratory Study 
(INHESJ, 2013).
294 D. Weinberger, Criminal Networks and Indoor Cannabis in Europe: Has the Phenomenon Reached 
France?, Drugs, International Challenges (OFDT, 2011).
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more herbal cannabis. At the end of the 1990s, the commercial resin 
was almost exclusive in the French market, while today the majority of 
the retail cannabis groups sell two different qualities of resin and a least 
one quality of herbal cannabis. Furthermore, a new trend is appearing 
in France: cocaine is more and more accessible and it is easy to find 
it in cannabis marketplaces (this was not the case before 2005). Today, 
some wholesalers based in Spain can provide both drugs – cannabis 
and cocaine:
“We don’t have any proof that Spanish wholesalers sell cannabis and 
cocaine in the same criminal industry but we know there is much 
more cocaine in Morocco than ever...” (FR-E6).
Sources of capital for criminal operations. Profile of financiers 
in criminal operations
To start a small drug retail business, a small scale trafficker only needs to 
have a minimum amount of money. The usual way to obtain this initial 
capital is to make one or several small robberies: 
“I decided to do a small robbery with a friend of mine. So, we found 
a small shop in the suburb, but not too close to my place. The shop 
was owned by an old woman, working alone, selling cheap watches” 
(FR-C1).
Indeed, the two guys robbed €3,000 from that small shop and invested 
it in 1 kg of cheap cannabis. Their business model was to sell it in 
their cité. As both of them were native of one of these cités, they knew 
how to control the access and could easily be informed about police 
raids. Being native of a cité also allowed them to be aware of the drug 
trafficking technics: thanks to their local roots, they had basic skills such 
as how to buy drugs, how to cut the resin, how to sell it and stock it. 
They were also able to control people working for them, the competition 
and to limit the risk of interception by police. This knowledge comes 
from the social proximity with the world of drug trafficking. In fact, the 
interviewed trafficker is the younger brother of a local famous trafficker 
currently in jail; his family happened to be very helpful for him to start 
his drug dealing, especially as he was able to ensure a good selling 
position in his cité.
Cannabis resin is the cheapest way to start drug dealing because the price 
is very low for a low quality type frequently call “com” (commercial). In 
Marseille, this resin is sold around €2 a gram in the street in the most 
popular drug hotspot, while the average cannabis price was estimated at 
€6 a gram in 2013. Thus, in Marseille, a beginner can start his dealing 
at a very low cost by kilo: around €1,200 – €1,500 and could obtain a 
25-50% profit if he is able to cut295 the hashish without any loss.
295 The methods of cutting cannabis and cocaine are different: for cocaine, traffickers add products 
such as caffeine to increase the total weight; for cannabis, there is no product addition and 
cutting means preparing small portions. The cannabis cutting skill is very important for the 
trafficker in order to minimise the loss of product during the preparation of small portions.
Financing 
and financial 
management
national	criminal	markets	and	Finances:	cocaine	traFFicking	 179
The interviews indicated that a drug dealer can start his criminal career 
with a €500 minimum capital and buy 750 grams of commercial resin 
quality. With this stock, the drug dealer can optimise his profits by selling 
small quantities (2 to 5 grams) for €10 to €20 the piece. 
“After a few months, when I had enough money, I decided to sell 
weed too because a lot of clients asked for it. To me it was more to 
gain the loyalty of the clients and to have a good reputation. With 
that, by word of mouth, there are more people coming to my sellers 
because they know I sell cheap resin and expensive weed” (FR-C1).
A retailer can start his own business with the cheapest resin and when 
having enough money can buy better quality (and more expensive) to 
satisfy his clients. However, starting with small capital is not possible with 
cocaine: in France, an OCTRIS study shows that the average wholesale 
price for cocaine is about €30,000 a kilo. Thus, to raise enough capital 
to organise large scale importation of cocaine, OCGs often resort to 
bank robberies: “The classic way to find several thousands of euros to 
buy cocaine in huge quantities is to organise a bank robbery or assault 
of a security van” (FR-E4).
The main factor influencing profits is the purity of the product. A 
trafficker who has a direct access to a producer country can buy a kilo 
of cocaine with around 90 to 96% purity; if he buys it in Spain, a transit 
country, the purity will be only around 60% and will decrease to 25 to 
40% if the product is sold by French retailers.
The main method of financing drug trafficking in France is reinvesting 
the proceeds. Different cases indicate how the money is coming back 
to Spain, Morocco or the Andean countries and is reinvested in new 
purchases:
“In XXX case for example, the money coming from the cannabis 
business was partly laundered. But a significant amount was directly 
reinvested in a new cannabis purchase” (FR-E7).
“In Colombia, police found several containers full of money (dollars 
and euros) and part of it is reinvest to pay new containers full of 
cocaine for the US or Europe” (FR-E11).
Settlement of payments
Drugs on credit: a business model based on trust
For a young person starting a drug business, a way to obtain the first 
supply of drugs is to negotiate with established traffickers to obtain it 
on credit. For that, it is important to have good contacts, and trust with 
the trafficker involved. Social proximity is crucial to obtain this minimum 
level of trust: geographical, social, cultural ties facilitate this kind of 
business confidence. If a drug dealer lives in a cité with high intensity of 
drug dealing, his social network helps a lot. Everybody knows him, the 
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drug dealers or local wholesalers know his family, his residence and can 
easily decide to give him drugs on credit and to receive the cash later.
“A lot of the kids in the suburb decide to ask for 250 gram cannabis 
resin: they sell it and after a while, they reimburse the local wholesaler” 
(FR-E2).
Of course, any problem happening in this kind of commercial partnership 
could lead to violent enforcement, which entails certain costs: paying for 
protection, weapons, etc.
Interviews with law enforcement officers indicate that it is very frequent 
that the transnational drug trade works under a 50% payment rule: for 
example, a drug dealer from Marseille pays only half of the amount at 
the delivery and pays the remainder after the sale. This unofficial rule 
allows the trafficker to limit the risk with a margin of around 50%. In 
addition, this ensures a kind of loyalty: the client will come back to 
the same trafficker in Spain to pay him back and buy a new quantity 
of the product. The rule is applied in both markets: cannabis resin 
and cocaine (the majority of French traffickers buy both products in 
Spain). 
Costs of doing business
To obtain the highest margin, it is important for a drug trafficker to have 
good contacts in different countries: the price will not be the same if the 
cocaine is bought in producing countries (between $1,000 and $2,500 
per kg), in transit countries (around $18,000 per kg in Senegal) or in 
destination countries (around $50,000 or €30,000 per kg). The southern 
coast of Spain is the most important wholesale marketplace for the 
continent where it is possible to find cocaine with around 60% purity 
and at a price cheaper than in France.
If traffickers want to buy 
the drug at a lower price, 
they need to take charge of 
transportation. French OCGs 
use the West Indies (Martinique 
or Guadeloupe), since these 
French islands in the Caribbean 
are very close to Venezuela by 
private plane and prices are 
30% lower than in France.
An analysis296 based on an 
accountant‘s book seized in 
Marseille shows that around 
20% of the daily turnover is 
296 N. Lalam and D. Weinberger, L’argent de la drogue [Drug’s money in France], (INHESJ), 
forthcoming.
Таble 25. average incoMe identiFied in a “superMarket” cannabis 
hotspot in the south oF France (2012)
Source: Marseille police, 2014.
type of job Daily income in euros
Gatekeepers 80
Seller 150
Supplier 200
Bodyguard 200
Drug stocker 100
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for paying sellers, cutters, gate-
keepers and bodyguards.
The level of remuneration of the 
various participants in cocaine 
trafficking was established dur-
ing the interviews (Table 26).
A minority of French traffickers 
have direct access to cocaine 
producing countries such as 
Colombia or Peru. If they can-
not pay the whole amount of 
money (for example €400,000 
for 100 kilos of cocaine with more than 90% of purity), local produc-
ers can propose that they carry more cocaine and to sell it in France. 
To pay back, the French buyers will have to sell the extra quantity 
of cocaine at a price calculated as the wholesale price in France 
(€30,000). To ensure that, a member of the Colombian producer’s 
organisation will stay in France with the French importers to control 
the transaction. 
Profits and profit sharing
According to a qualitative study in Marseille, with a €3,000 initial capital 
two new traffickers were in a position to buy 1 kilogram of commercial 
resin and to sell it at around €5 retail price. Thus, for one kilo, they 
received €2,000 of profit, although it took them a whole month to 
sell their supply, and thus earned less than the minimal legal income 
in France which is around €1,100. But after a few sales and a some of 
capital accumulation, the 2 traffickers declare earning around €2,000 a 
month each with a seller working for them, paid €100 per day. As a 
result, to make trafficking profitable, they need to sell a minimum of 
3 kilos of commercial resin to earn €5,000 a month.
Таble 26. average incoMe by type oF job in cocaine traFFicking 
in France (2014)
Source: Interviews.
type of job Remuneration 
Cocaine mule (around 1 kilo) €5,000
Cocaine pilot €1,000 a kilo
Corruption in cocaine 
production countries (1 load)
€5,000
Таble 27. estiMate oF the nuMber oF French traFFickers 
and their incoMe
Source: C. Ben Lakhdar, Le trafic de cannabis en France: estimation des gains des dealers afin d’apprécier le potentiel de blanchiment 
[Cannabis Traffic in France: Estimated Drug Dealers Benefits and Estimated Money Laundering Volume] (OFDT: 
La documentation Française, 2007).
Number of 
traffickers
Annual volume
of cannabis sold
Number
of clients
Annual
income (€)
Importers 689 to 1,504 132 kg to 308 kg Around 10 253,000 to 552,000
Wholesalers 6,000 to 13 000 16 kg to 35 kg Around 10 35,000 to 76,000
Retailers 58,000 to 127,000 Around 3.5 kg 3 to 8 4,500 to 10,000
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With the right contacts, a cannabis drug dealer can decide to shift 
to selling cocaine because the profits are higher. With an average 
differential of 20% purity and a price around €30,000 per kilo, it is 
possible to obtain more than 100% profits. The majority of national 
wholesalers will cut a kilo to have two kilos with products such as 
phenacetin, lidocaine, mannitol (sugar) or caffeine. In other words, 
purity of cocaine is the variable of adjustment, not the price. With 
80% cocaine purity, it is very easy to make two kilos and to obtain 
100% profit. To make the additional kilos, they need to have a 
hydraulic press, a blender, some plastic packaging and of course the 
cutting products.
At the wholesale level, purity and prices are the most important variables 
to obtain a good profit. Because having the best contact in the producing 
countries boosts the profits, some European buyers live in countries such 
as Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Brazil and the Dominican Republic. The 
leading criminal groups used to be from Italy – like the ‘Ndrangheta.
“A shipment of 1.3 tonnes of cocaine seized in Charles de Gaulle 
airport in a plane coming from Caracas was intended for Italy because 
‘Ndrangheta was the buyer, it’s one of the few organisations with 
capacity to order this quantity of cocaine: you need also to pay people 
in both airports, it costs a lot” (FR-E03).
Since 2012, however, intelligence from producing countries identified a 
rising presence of Spanish, Russian and French OCGs. French groups 
which are able to import directly cocaine from producing countries are 
not the same as in the past: this segment of the market was only in 
the hands of traditional criminal organisations, direct descendants of 
the famous “French connections” from Corsica and the south of France 
(Marseille or Nice). Nowadays, new actors coming from the cités are 
much more involved in cocaine importation and have direct contacts in 
Colombia.
Access to capital in critical moments
Insufficient data was available on these issues but a few elements like 
human collaterals have been identified. In Colombia, French traffickers 
who do not usually have the whole amount to buy the entire quantity of 
drugs can ask for a money advance: in those cases, Colombian traffickers 
will keep a kind of human collateral – such as a family member – until 
they receive the total payment. In the case of conflict, the collateral will 
be killed.
While cocaine is only produced in the Andean countries (Peru, 
Colombia and Bolivia), the localisation of cannabis production inside 
French borders297 offered new opportunities for criminal investments. 
Thus, OCGs can now invest their profits in drug production sites inside 
Europe, especially for synthetics drugs and cannabis. For example, a 
297 Weinberger, Criminal Networks and Indoor Cannabis in Europe: Has the Phenomenon Reached France?
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large cannabis greenhouse paid by a local OCG was dismantled in the 
south of France in 2011:
“With €50,000, they paid a cannabis factory of 500 hundreds plants. 
This kind of investment is very lucrative because today it is possible to 
sell a kilo of cannabis herbal product for €4,000” (FR-E11).
Cocaine trafficking involves criminal groups and networks of cooperation 
that cross national borders. For all information on the modus operandi of 
criminal groups of this kind, little is known on the financing of organised 
crime and the way criminal groups manage their profits from criminal 
activities. Overcoming this problem is not easy because information 
provided by government authorities is mainly focusing on the quantity 
of cocaine seized and evidence for the prosecution of the offenders. 
As a consequence the financing of cocaine trafficking is an issue of 
secondary concern insofar as, in most cases, it is not directly related to 
prosecution.
According to the 2014 European Drug Report, “Cocaine remains the 
most commonly used illicit stimulant drug in Europe, although most users 
are found in a small number of western EU countries. An estimated 
14.1 million European adults (15-64 years) have ever used the drug; 
3.1 million in the last year.”298
Peru and Bolivia are considered to be the most important producers 
of cocaine sold in the EU. Colombia is no longer the main departure 
point for cocaine destined for the EU because other countries of Latin 
America, such as Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Peru, Chile and Ecuador, 
have turned into important countries of origin of the substance. The 
Caribbean countries are becoming significant points for the transit of 
cocaine, whereas the countries of West Africa, though still present as 
important transit points, face a reduction of the quantities trafficked 
through their territories.299 In addition, groups originating from Mexico 
and Nigeria induce volatility in the drug market by competing for 
domination. In Europe, the ports in the North-Western part of the 
continent, the Iberian Peninsula and on the Black Sea are the main 
entrance and distribution points for the cocaine trafficked from Central 
and South America.300
Greece is a “gateway to Europe for traffickers smuggling cannabis and 
heroin from the Middle East and Southwest Asia to the west and 
precursor chemicals to the east; some South American cocaine transits 
298 EMCDDA, European Drug Report 2014. Trends and Developments, 38.
299 Europol, SOCTA 2013. EU Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment, 20; SODN-EMP, Ετήσια 
Έκθεση για τα ναρκωτικά στην Ελλάδα έτουσ 2012 [Annual Report on Drugs in Greece 2012] (Athens: 
SODN-EMP, n.d.), 46.
300 Europol, SOCTA 2013. EU Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment, 20.
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or is consumed in Greece.”301 Additionally, due to its geographical 
position Greece is ideal for cocaine trafficking by sea, either directly 
from the producing countries of South America or indirectly through 
the ports of Spain and Italy. Moreover, large quantities of cocaine are 
trafficked by sea in containers with legal cargo into Greece, which is 
one of the main gateways of the substance into the EU, as well as being 
itself a destination country.
Over the last few decades, drug issues have obtained great significance 
in Greek society and the effectiveness of the legal framework has been 
assessed many times in order to be updated and tackle contemporary 
challenges. For this reason, all laws related to drugs enacted in Greece 
after 2006 have focused not only on law enforcement but also on the 
treatment of drug users.
In 1970, for the first time in Greek legislation an important distinction 
between addicts and non-addicts was introduced: the former would not 
face the same amenability as the latter. But it was only in 1987 that a 
new law referred to the prevention, treatment, and reintegration of the 
addicts and, on the other hand, to the prosecution of the smugglers. 
Substantially, the 1987 had two balancing concepts – of repression policy 
and of social policy. In the following years, especially in 1993 and 1995, 
new amendments to this law were introduced reflecting the contemporary 
social problems of Greek society. In addition, in 2006 the first Code of 
Laws for Drugs came into force which was further amended in 2008 
in order that the Greek legislation be harmonised with the Council 
Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA; a further amendment was introduced 
in 2013. In general, as in many other countries of Europe, Greece tends 
to focus on targeting drug supply and trafficking rather than use.
National drug policy is mainly based on the action plans on drugs which 
are updated every two or four years. The National Committee for the 
Coordination and Planning of Drugs Responses, convened under the 
chairmanship of the National Drug Coordinator drafted a new Action 
Plan on Drugs 2014-16, which is awaiting endorsement. The country 
overview by EMCDDA notes that the national strategy on drugs is based 
on a new drug coordination mechanism established by law in 2013, 
consisting of three levels: the Inter-ministerial Committee on the Drugs 
Action Plan, the National Committee for the Coordination and Planning 
of Drugs Responses and the National Drug Coordinator.
According to EMCDDA,302 up to 2012 the problem of drug use was 
defined as injecting drug use or prolonged/regular drug use of opiates, 
cocaine and/or amphetamines. In 2012, the broader definition of “high-
risk drug use” was adopted. Especially, the latest available data on 
cocaine use derive from the University Mental Health Research Institute 
(2012) research, which involved a nationwide sample of high-school 
students aged 15-16. Results showed that 15.3% of the respondents have 
301 Central Intelligence Agency, “The World FactBook”, 2014.
302 EMCDDA, European Drug Report 2014. Trends and Developments.
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tried at least once one type of illegal substance and 2.3% indicated that 
they have used cocaine. Furthermore, a 2006 study conducted among 
the general population aged 15-64 in Athens, Thessaloniki and Heraklion 
showed that 19.4% of respondents had tried some illicit drug at least 
once, and that lifetime prevalence was higher among males (24.8%) than 
among females (14%). Most of the drug offences in Greece in 2012 were 
related to cannabis, followed by heroin and cocaine.303
According to the Hellenic Police, in 2005 – 2012 the annual number of 
drug cases ranged between 9,271 (lowest level) in 2007 and 12,335 cases 
(highest level) in 2009. The highest number of persons charged for drugs 
was 16,090 in 2009 and the lowest was 12,291 persons in 2011.
In 2012, the Hellenic Police seized 198.85 kilos of cocaine, Customs – 
0.109 kilos and the Financial and Economic Fight Unit – 1.737 kilos.304 
Moreover, the Greek Documentation and Monitoring Centre for Drugs 
notes that in 2011, the largest proportion of cocaine seizures in the 
country (89.8%) took place in the Prefecture of Thessaloniki, followed by 
the Prefecture of Attica with 5.4% and Western Greece with 3.1%.305
In 2012, law enforcement uncovered 426 cases and charged a total 
of 722 individuals, of whom 416 were Greek and 306 foreigners.306 
303 EMCDDA, “Country Overview: Greece”, EMCDDA Country Overviews, 2014.
304 SODN-EMP, Ετήσια Έκθεση για τα ναρκωτικά στην Ελλάδα έτους 2012 [Annual Report on Drugs in 
Greece 2012], 24.
305 Greek Documentation and Monitoring Centre for Drugs [EKTEPN], Η κατάσταση του προβλήματος 
των ναρκωτικών και των οινοπνευματωδών στην Ελλάδα. Ετήσια Έκθεση 2013 [The Situation of the 
Problem of the Drug and Alcoholic Products in Greece. Annual Report] (Athens, 2013), 103.
306 SODN-EMP, Ετήσια Έκθεση για τα ναρκωτικά στην Ελλάδα Έτους 2012 [Annual Report on Drugs in 
Greece 2012].
Таble 28. overall data on drug enForceMent in greece, 2005 – 2012
       * Data for 2012 is preliminary as the investigation of some cases and the identification of drug cases by the State General 
 Chemical Laboratory has not been completed.
Source: Hellenic Police.
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012*
Drug-related cases 10,183 9,600 9,271 11,861 12,335 10,011 9,384 9,628
Persons charged 
for drug offences
14,558 13,622 12,895 15,825 16,090 13,018 12,291 12,817
Cocaine seizures
by police (grams)
42,386 28,043 46,862 48,412 78,452 132,603 29,021 198,850
Cocaine (black) 
seizure (grams)
     5,900   
Cocaine leaves 
seizure (grams)
5 898  5,901 583   251
186 Financing	oF	organised	crime
The Hellenic Police307 notes that the quantity of drugs seized is not 
intended entirely for the domestic market. On the contrary, Greece is 
predominantly a transit country and a stopover for criminal groups of 
cocaine trafficking. Spain, Italy and Portugal remain the main entrance 
points of cocaine in EU.
Table 29 shows the overall quantities of cocaine seized by all law 
enforcement authorities during the nine-year period (2004-2012). Cocaine 
seizures in 2011 doubled compared to 2010 and in 2012 they reached 
again the 2010 levels.
According to SODN-EMP308 
the price of cocaine was esti-
mated to range from €32,000 
to €60,000 per kilo with an 
average of €46,000 per kilo. 
The retail price was between 
€50 and €100 per gram with 
an average of €75. The aver-
age purity of cocaine samples 
in active ingredients was 59%, 
when in 2011 was 61.1% and in 
2008 64.1%.309 A large drop in 
the minimum prices of cocaine 
took place in 2006 – 2007, 
though cocaine maximum prices increased in 2012 after being stable for 
four years. The decreased prices, according to GR-E1 and GR-E2, have 
been attributed to the financial crisis in Greece. With regards all drug-
related crime in Greece, there has been a downward trend between 
2003 and 2008.
In general, according to the EMCDDA and Europol the consumer mar-
kets for cocaine Greece along with Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Romania “report prevalence level of 0.5% or less, suggest-
ing relatively small markets of cocaine”. Furthermore, Greece, for many
307 Hellenic Police, Ετήσια έκθεση για το οργανωμένο έγκλημα στην Ελλάδα για το έτος 2011 [Annual 
Report on Organized Crime in Greece for 2011].
308 SODN-EMP, Ετήσια Έκθεση για τα ναρκωτικά στην Ελλάδα έτους 2010 [Annual Report on Drugs in 
Greece 2010].
309 Reitox National Focal Point-Greece, 2013 National Report (2012 Data) to the EMCDDA: Greece.
Таble 29. trends in cocaine seizures in greece (all law enForceMent 
agencies), 2004 – 2012
Source: Reitox National Focal Point-Greece, 2013 National Report (2012 Data) to the EMCDDA: Greece (UMHRI, 2013).
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Cocaine (kg) 1,152 43 61 255 61 626 221 463 201
Таble 30. seizures oF cocaine by traFFicking route in greece, 2010
Source: SODN-EMP, Ετήσια Έκθεση για τα ναρκωτικά στην Ελλάδα έτους 2010 
[Annual Report on Drugs in Greece 2010] (Athens: SODN-EMP, 2012).
trafficking route Kg %
By sea 171.943 76.1
By air 19.800 8.8
Overland 33.54 15.1
national	criminal	markets	and	Finances:	cocaine	traFFicking	 187
years, has been the country recovering the largest quantities seized in 
the region.310
The supply of cocaine to European countries from Latin America (especially 
Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador) is carried out by criminal groups 
which have members from more than one nation, with specific roles, and 
they operate across more than one country (GR-E3). The most typical 
way of cocaine trafficking is by air whereby the shipment is imported 
from Latin America via Europe and then it comes to Greece. The second 
310 EMCDDA and Europol, EU Drug Markets Report. A Strategic Analysis, 42, 46.
Таble 31. retail and wholesale prices and purity levels in greece 
(prices in $)
Source: UNODC, World Drug Report, Statistics.
Retail level
Drug Specifics typical Range typical Range
low High Unit Year low High Year
Cocaine salts 96.6 45.1 154.6 Gram 2012 6100 800 9160 2011
Coca paste/
cocaine base
Cocaine 
base
110.3 66.2 147.1 Gram 2008 54.8 1.8 100 2008
Wholesale level
Drug Specifics typical Range typical Range
low High Unit Year low High Year
Cocaine salts 52,835.1 41,237.1 64,433 Kilogram 2012
Coca paste/
cocaine base
Cocaine 
base
69,853 51,471 88,235 Kilogram 2008 50.2 2008
Таble 32. total drug-related criMes in greece, 
nuMber oF police-recorded oFFences*
      * Total Drug-Related Crimes means all intentional acts that involve the cultivation, production, manufacture, extraction, 
preparation, offering for sale, distribution, purchase, sale, delivery on any terms whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch, dispatch in 
transit, transport, importation, exportation, possession or trafficking of internationally controlled drugs (UN-CTS M5.2).
Source: United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (UN-CTS).
Count Rate per 100,000 population
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
10,556 7,761 8,393 8,152 7,959 9,852 95.78 70.29 75.86 73.53 71.63 88.46
Market structure 
and actors
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way is overland by trucks that come from Europe, mostly Netherlands 
and Spain. Larger quantities (1-1.5 tonnes) are trafficked by sea.
Both GR-E3 and the interviewees from the Hellenic Police noted that 
OCGs which are involved in the importation of the cocaine consist of 
a small circle with few members structured hierarchically. It is estimated 
that the number of criminal groups which are involved in this business in 
Greece is six or seven. The members of the one group may know some 
members of the other, but in general these groups are accessed with diffi-
culty and they do not know each other since they have different networks 
of clients. One client (wholesaler) of one criminal group can also buy from 
two different groups. The wholesaler sells by the kilo to groups specialised 
in retail sales. When criminal groups have ensured the cooperation of cus-
toms officers through bribery, they deliver the cocaine by legitimate cargo 
whereby a transport company receives it and delivers it to the members 
of the criminal organisation in the final destination country. They often 
choose the huge ports of Rotterdam and Antwerp, because it is easier to 
avoid checking of the cargo due to the high workload.
Criminal groups prefer sea shipment of cocaine followed by land 
transportation. They hide the cocaine in container-ships, which carry 
legal cargo and make sure that other members of the group will receive 
it in the transit port and take care of the transportation to the final 
destination. For that purpose, they create shipping companies, hire or 
buy container-ships and create or hire transportation companies. When 
a ship arrives at a crucial port, the criminal group may recommend the 
replacement of the captain and some members of the crew with trusted 
ones. Usually there is a coordinator responsible for the itinerary, the 
stops and the meetings with speedboats which will offload the cocaine. 
All these require high level of accuracy.
The transfer of shipments by high speed boats from the ship anchored 
near the coast to trucks waiting at the shore is a popular method. Thus, 
when the ship reaches port, there is nothing illegal in its compartments. 
Subsequently the traffickers ship the cocaine to the final destination 
in Greece or other Balkan countries. Another strategy is to unload 
the cocaine in Italy, Croatia or FYROM and transport it to Greece by 
trucks. Popular areas in Greece for unloading cocaine are West and East 
Peloponnese, Evia and many islands, like Kythera.
According to law enforcement interviewees, a new trend is to hide the 
cocaine in the container’s columns; if it is done well, it is extremely 
difficult for the authorities to detect the hidden cargo which can be as 
much as 70 kilos.311
GR-E4 and GR-E5 stated that there are so many containers arriving 
in the ports of Piraeus, Thessaloniki, Patras, Volos and Heraklion that 
311 Although even trafficking is not without its comical moments. On one occasion in 2004, in 
the port of Aigio (a town between Athens and Patra), “while the cargo of a ship from Latin 
America was being unloaded, a wooden box fell from a height, fell apart and bananas and 
cocaine spilled out. The whole area was covered with bananas and white powder – cocaine” 
(GR-E3).
national	criminal	markets	and	Finances:	cocaine	traFFicking	 189
the Customs Office is unable to check all of them, because they do 
not have the personnel and the technological equipment to deal with 
this number of containers. The interviewees noted that none of the 
Customs Offices has X-ray machines in order to examine the content 
of the containers properly and that Greece is the only EU country 
lacking such equipment. In their opinion, there was no corruption 
problem, law enforcement do their best and have successes despite 
these shortcomings.
The Economic and Financial Crime Unit of the Department of Drug 
Enforcement uses a risk analysis model which takes under consideration 
variables such as the cargo’s country of origin, the shipping company, 
the cargo’s receiver and the cargo’s content. In this context, the Unit 
estimates the risk of smuggling of drugs or tobacco for a particular 
cargo. Examples of critical variables are the countries of Latin America 
(especially Venezuela, Ecuador, and Colombia), cargo that costs less 
than the transportation expenses (e.g. scrap metal), or a new shipping 
company that does business with Latin America. In these cases it is 
assumed that the risk of smuggling is high and further information is 
collected and/or the cargo is inspected with greater attention.
The Unit cooperates with the police, the prosecution and on occasion 
with the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA, Athens 
Office). The interviewees emphasised the DEA’s role as critical, because 
it has offices in Latin America, where it collects intelligence data on 
suspicious cargos and has the technical capacity to monitor via satellite 
the routes of suspicious ships. This allows the DEA to detect whether 
they change their initial routes and get close to the shore away from 
ports or change destination ports.
According to GR-E1 and GR-E2, there is strict division of labour 
and hierarchy in the criminal groups. Members specialise in finding 
clients, renting transportation or other tasks. Furthermore, these 
groups cooperate with other groups of organised crime, such as ones 
specialised in protection matters (e.g. contract killing), or in guns, 
explosives and robberies. The groups which deal in cocaine trafficking 
also deal in hashish and ecstasy, but not in heroine or opium. They 
are also involved in other illegal acts such as killings, contract killings 
and robberies.
In terms of the nationality of the members of these groups, Albanians, 
Serbs, Russians, Greeks and Bulgarians are high in the hierarchy. At the 
lower levels, those who distribute amounts around 30 kilos of cocaine 
are only Albanians. Every criminal group usually comprises predominantly 
members from one nationality, although there are Greeks in all groups. 
The bosses from each group know each other. They collaborate by 
borrowing some quantities or fight turf wars over territories, the quality 
of the drugs, or reckoning. The ones who definitely do not know the 
members of other groups are those who guard the drugs. There have 
been cases where one group tries to steal the drugs from the other, e.g. 
Albanian groups that trying to find the place where the good quality 
drugs are kept and steal them.
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It is difficult to estimate the number of the groups which deal in 
trafficking because of the dark figure. In general, one group consists of 
15-20 members but when there is an internal conflict, they can split into 
smaller groups. As a result the number of the groups can multiply, “today 
there are 30 groups, tomorrow 60” (GR-E1).
The number of members in each criminal group depends on their place 
in the supply chain. For example, groups dealing with the importation 
of cocaine are small, consisting of around five persons. However, groups 
which operate at the lower level supply chains usually consist of more 
members, up to twenty.
The hotspot regions are Glyfada, Kolonaki, Piraeus, where there are 
shopping districts or where the youth, media circles or film stars hang 
out. As in other countries, night-time economy establishments are also 
important consumption spots. According to GR-E3 there are several 
hotspots of cocaine dealing in Athens (Eksarcheia, Omonoia), Piraeus 
(streets near the Port and the Municipal’s Office), Thessaloniki and other 
big cities. But the interviewees all agreed that the places where large 
amounts of cocaine are distributed are difficult to find out.
Interviewees from the Hellenic Police stressed that the formation of 
criminal groups is usually based on old friendships among its members. 
Sometimes the members could have cooperated successfully in the 
past in an illegal activity with another person. This way they gain 
mutual trust which allows them to elaborate their cooperation in the 
future. On the other hand, if a high ranking member has a relative by 
marriage or by blood he can request the involvement of that person 
in the group. Friendships that are further exploited are also formed in 
prison. It has to be noted that traffickers are a very small and exclusive 
circle. New acquaintances are treated with high degree of caution. 
Membership in the circle does not change unless there are guarantees 
that a particular person can be trusted. If possible, however, additional 
risk is avoided.
Sources of capital for criminal operations. Profile of financiers 
in criminal operations
According to Bruggeman312 a criminal organisation performs its activities 
in a manner similar to that of a legitimate business. Criminals are able to 
provide services and goods through the use of violence, intimidation and 
corruption. Corruption is an especially useful tool for criminal organisations 
and is used worldwide for penetrating into the legal systems of countries 
and increase opportunities for the acquisition of wealth and power. In 
addition, organised crime distorts competition when penetrating into the 
legal economy, since the proceeds from criminal activities are invested 
in legal entities.
312 W Bruggeman, “Η καταπολέμηση του οργανωμένου εγκλήματος: δυνατότητες, προβλήματα και 
ευκαιρίες, με ειδικότερη έμφαση στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση [Fighting Organised Crime: Capabilities, 
Problems and Opportunities, with Emphasis on the European Union”, Ποινικη Δικαιοσυνη 
[Poiniki Dikaiosini] 3 (2000).
Financing 
and financial 
management
national	criminal	markets	and	Finances:	cocaine	traFFicking	 191
There is a significant re-investment of the profits derived from cocaine 
trafficking back into drug trafficking operations. Although the dark figure 
of such transnational crimes is considerable, crime groups can become 
extremely vulnerable because of the money trail. As a consequence, 
avoiding detection of the financial flows is a key concern for organised 
crime.
The source of money used to set up a cross-border smuggling operation 
is usually previous criminal activity (GR-E3). GR-E3 claims never to have 
come across a case where someone invested legitimate money in such 
an operation. When the revenue increases considerably, the smuggling 
operations move to a higher level in a cycle of expansion.
In addition, according to GR-E1 and GR-E2, money sources can 
be both the group’s own revenue and loans from other criminal 
businessmen. Borrowers need to promise good interest, usually paid 
within a period of one month. Criminal entrepreneurs who are willing 
and capable of lending to criminal groups are usually owners of retail 
shops with high turnover, owners of nightclubs, or of big pawnshops. 
There have been cases where construction companies lent money to 
criminal groups which could not be invested in their own work due 
to the slump in the construction sector as a result of the financial 
crisis in Greece.
Also, money gained from providing “protection” to nightclub businesses 
is invested in cocaine, the profit then shared between both groups. 
This kind of protection originates from racketeering structures and is 
not linked to legitimate private security companies. Furthermore, a good 
crypt for drugs can be used to hide guns from other groups that pay a 
big amount of money for it.
Robberies and gambling are also common methods of securing financing 
for drug trafficking. Most of the income is then invested in other 
businesses such as tourism or petrol stations, either in Greece or in 
neighbouring countries.
Profits are also being transferred abroad to legitimate companies and 
through complex tax accounting laundered and reinvested in legitimate 
businesses. For example, criminal groups invest their money in the 
transportation sector by buying trucks and establishing a new company 
in order to import legal goods. After importing two or three times 
legitimate cargo, the fourth time cocaine is hidden among the legal 
goods the company transports.
There is a significant information gap as regards money laundering by 
organised criminal groups in the Balkans. The main laundering methods 
include:
• through legitimate companies that are listed on the stock exchange;
• through gambling – buying lottery tickets or bets from people who 
have already won, thus justifying their illegal money. For example, one 
of the most powerful Greek cocaine dealers, Alexandros Angelopoulos, 
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claimed that in a few years he won more than €8 million from bets 
in football games and lotteries;313
• through professional football and basketball companies – by 
reporting higher profits than the actual ones or by understating their 
expenses.
The financial situation of traffickers is quite good, allowing them to own 
legal enterprises such as selling used cars. In addition to conspicuous 
consumption – expensive cars, residence in fashionable suburbs – they 
have good legal advice for the money laundering needed. Their property 
is often registered legally to other family members. Smugglers are either 
highly specialised and deal exclusively in cocaine or could deal in several 
drugs, and other commodities.314 The vast majority of them are Greek 
who often collaborate in multi-ethnic networks. Some of the actors can 
be described as arbitrageurs who are involved in whatever commodity 
can provide the opportunity for profit. It should be noted that a division 
between upper-level actors and the stereotypical offenders, as mainly 
portrayed by media and popular culture, establishes a distorted image 
of the “true interplay between the different socio-economic layers of 
society.”315
The social profile of the financiers is similar to the profile of the 
traffickers/distributors. They are usually in a good financial position as 
the traffickers, and they run legal businesses. Cocaine traffickers and 
financiers have good contacts with each other as they share a lifestyle, 
frequent the same clubs, and it is thus easy to arrange investment 
deals. It is not, however, a straightforward underwriting business, as the 
financiers cannot ensure that their share of the profit or loan repayment 
would be returned. Thus, they require collateral such as expensive cars, 
or an agreement that they would acquire a real estate at a low price. 
Still, there is generally trust among the two sides since they would 
usually have known each other for many years.
The profit margins for wholesalers are considerable and if the police 
confiscates an amount of cocaine the distributor will incur a loss; the 
damage, however, for the average wholesaler who has bought 15-30 kilos 
is smaller because of the sizeable difference between the wholesale and 
retail prices.
Retailers who sell to the end user usually are not involved in other 
illegal affairs. A dealer could be, for example, owner of a nightclub or 
an artist and he sells cocaine to 10-15 persons who are in close contact 
with him.
313 Καθημερινή, “Συνελήφθη ο Αγγελόπουλος τησ κοκαϊνης [Angelopoulos Is Arrested for Cocaine]”, 
Η Καθημερινή, August 31, 2004.
314 Kostakos and Antonopoulos, “The ‘Good’, the ‘Bad’ and the ‘Charlie’: The Business of Cocaine 
Smuggling in Greece”, 52.
315 Ibid., 55.
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Settlement of payments
The typical method of settling payments is cash up-front. “The euro is 
popular with criminal networks for the purpose of physically transporting 
money across borders because it is available in high denomination notes 
and because it effectively disguises both the origin of the cash and the 
location of the criminal activity.”316 That criminal groups prefer euros to 
dollars is confirmed by GR-E1 and GR-E2. In terms of transfer method, 
criminal groups avoid using banks or other money transfer services such 
as Western Union. A preferred method is the “ant” tactics whereby 
many persons transfer small amounts of money; the amount is limited 
in order to make sure they would not be inspected by the authorities. 
The carriers are reliable persons who act as a link between the various 
organisations and they receive 5-10% of the value of the drugs involved 
or can be paid in kind with cocaine.
According to the Hellenic Police, placing the orders for cocaine is what 
sets the whole business in motion. Usually, some groups would order 
certain quantities of drugs and pay for them in advance. When the drugs 
are imported to the country where they are going to be sold, they are 
disseminated directly to the groups that have ordered them.
Payment for cocaine trafficking is often done in three stages: a) an 
advance is paid prior to the shipment of cocaine and its smuggling for 
any logistical or other organisational costs; b) the shipment of cocaine 
takes place; c) a payment is made after the completion of the operation 
and the delivery of the cargos. A typical case is described in Supreme 
Court Decision 2369/2007, in which the payment for the trafficking 
of between 1.5 and 3.250 tonnes amounted to $4,100,000 and was 
completed in three stages: a) the amount of $1,350,000 was paid in the 
first stage as an advance before the loading the cocaine (the money 
often paid partially and not entirely); b) the amount of $1,350,000 was 
paid during the second stage of the transaction which is the typical entry 
of the substance into the transit business; c) $1,400,000 was paid in the 
third stage after the delivery of the cargo as a bonus for the success of 
the whole enterprise.
Costs of doing business
The costs for cocaine trafficking can be inferred from a specific case 
discussed with GR-E1 and GR-E2. The case was in 2012 and the amount 
trafficked from Latin America was 120-150 kilos. Its transportation by 
sea had cost €300,000-€400,000. The interviewees reported that the 
cost of one kilo of cocaine in the country of production was about 
€1,000-1,500. When this amount is successfully transported to Europe, its 
wholesale price goes up to €40,000-50,000 per kilo, whereas the selling 
price to the end user is €100 per gram, which means €100,000 per 
kilo. For this reason, even if only half of the amount of cocaine sent to 
Europe passes undetected, the traffickers make a profit.
316 Europol, EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment, 41.
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In 2007, the Financial and Economic Crime Unit uncovered a factory for 
extracting cocaine in a house in the area of Anavisos (about 50 km far 
from Athens), as a result of which 16 members of the criminal group 
were arrested and later convicted for 25 kilos found in the factory. 
Organised crime groups very rarely set up factories in Europe, according 
to the interviewees, and the only other similar case was detected in 
Spain a few years ago. The criminals were from Colombia (a chemist 
specialised in cocaine production), Greece, Albania, England, Venezuela, 
etc., and were using raw material sent from Colombia by the leader of 
the criminal organisation.
Another serious case of cross border cocaine trafficking took place in 
October 2013 in the port of Thessaloniki, where the police in cooperation 
with the Economic and Financial Crime Unit managed to locate and 
confiscate a cargo containing 146 kilos of cocaine from Latin America 
hidden in a cargo of bananas. They also confiscated €352,000 in cash, 
€500,000 in bank accounts belonging to the members of the criminal 
group, 9 luxury cars, 1 motorcycle, fake passports and many technical 
devices. Those arrested and charged were members of five separate 
groups that used to cooperate in cocaine trafficking to Greece.
Relevant experience about financing schemes was gained in the so called 
“sverte” case which took place in 2000 in Venezuela, Spain and Greece 
(GR-E3). A big Latin American criminal group, which was trafficking 
cocaine, decided to transport to Europe about four tons of cocaine by 
sea. All the ships they owned or had used in the past for trafficking 
were known to the United States Defense Intelligence Agency, so they 
approached a Greek businessman, who was facing financial difficulties at 
the time, offering him $1,500,000 to create a maritime company which 
would buy and repair an old ship to be used in the transportation of 
cocaine. The money was partially transferred from the criminal group to 
his offshore companies. Trusted partners of the Greek businessman then 
withdrew it and exchanged it to drachmas. In a few months, a ship was 
fitted for the operation and sailed from Venezuela but was under satellite 
surveillance by law enforcement. In an intermediate port in Nigeria, all 
the crew was substituted by men from the Philippines (the old crew were 
given severance pay). The new captain had been, however, involved in 
the past in similar criminal activities and the authorities knew him well. 
This allowed law enforcement to thwart the operation and prevent the 
trafficking.317
According to GR-E1 and GR-E2, in most cases (but not always) the ship 
crews know nothing of the operation and the only one who is involved 
is the captain. It is common for the crew to be substituted in the last 
port before the delivery of the cocaine by experienced members who 
know what to do and how to act in order the cocaine to be delivered 
properly.
The Hellenic Police noted that in the most significant case of 2010 where 
the trafficking of cocaine took place via containers from Latin America 
317 Supreme Court, Decision 1018/2011.
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to Europe, Greece was as an intermediate destination. The leader of 
the criminal group was from Montenegro, while some other significant 
members were Serbian entrepreneurs. Some members of the criminal 
group were arrested and it was established that their role was to legalise 
the profits by transporting large amount of money to offshore companies, 
buy luxury real estate or place cash in bank vaults which do not require 
a declaration of content.
As far as corruption is concerned, criminal groups bribe where it is 
necessary. Corruption of police officers can either protect a criminal group 
from prosecution or it can be used as a “weapon against competitors.”318 
According to GR-E1 and GR-E2, the corrupt civil servants – and more than 
one civil servant need to be involved – have to be very trusted persons 
to the criminal groups. The criminal groups use corruption methods 
to ascertain whether the authorities are monitoring the containers and 
appear only when they are sure that it is safe (GR-E4 and GR-E5). 
If they are not sure, the container loads are not released, unless a 
specific container relates to a legitimate business with another company 
which has nothing to do with the cocaine and the criminal groups are 
using it just to cover the rest of the containers in a possible checking. 
In this context, according to GR-E1 and GR-E2, it is difficult for one 
corrupt official to be in a position to guarantee that the transaction will 
be completed safely. This can increase the difficulties for the criminal 
groups but, on the other hand, it can be assumed that a small net of 
corrupt officials could be established around critical routes of cocaine 
control and inspection. However, the amount of bribery received by 
civil servants – although supposed to be high – cannot be estimated. 
The current social and economic conditions need to be taken into 
consideration when trying to make an estimate: the “economic crisis may 
also have resulted in increases susceptibility to corruption by individuals 
occupying key positions in the public sector, especially in countries 
where large salary cuts have taken place.“319
The interviewees admit that more specific estimates of the costs, 
corruption fees or expenses that groups incur for doing business are 
difficult to make. GR-E1 and GR-E2 estimate that the costs of a criminal 
group for salaries and expenses like renting warehouses are not high 
compared to the large amounts it needs to spend for the creation of a 
new legal company which may not be profitable but is necessary for the 
establishment of a new cocaine route.
Profits and profit sharing
The profits from cocaine trafficking depend on a number of factors. 
According to the interviewees of the Hellenic Police, the profit from 
100 kilos of cocaine is about two million euros. Profits are not equally 
distributed to all members, but the share each member receives depends 
on the position in the hierarchy of the criminal group.
318 F. Rizava, Οργανωμένο έγκλημα [Organised Crime] (Athens, 2012), 171.
319 Europol, SOCTA 2013. EU Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment.
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Some years ago, and especially before the financial crisis in Greece, 
the most typical way of spending the profits was the bouzoukia (live 
entertainment establishment with Greek pop and folklore music). In 
addition to a luxurious lifestyle, the Greeks involved in the criminal 
groups used to buy real estate and re-invest in drugs, while Albanian 
members of the group would invest their profit in legal businesses in 
their country.
As far as money laundering is concerned, efforts are made to have access 
to legal companies (usually offshore) by using legitimate entrepreneurs. 
Profits from cocaine trafficking are invested in establishing new legal 
shipping companies which manage the purchases of new ships. The 
creation of new offshore companies, the purchase of better ships and 
the expanding of the criminal network by hiring persons specialising in 
the complicated money transfers increase the power of the criminal boss. 
Having established strong positions, the leaders of the criminal group can 
then afford to visit personally the Colombian traders in order to gain 
their trust and ensure safer transits, but also to validate the structure and 
function of the new criminal group.
Access to capital in critical moments
Though there is no official data on recidivism,320 according to interviewees 
of the Hellenic Police, the majority of the convicted (almost 60%) are 
going back to business again. Being arrested and charged does not mean 
that one refrains from businesses: organised criminals usually continue 
operating even from prison, and can even learn new ways of running 
their business from there, including by making new contacts with other 
inmates.
Because of the significant profits, criminal groups have the liquidity 
cushion to face losses in critical moments of their business. Such costs 
are included in the total price, unless repetitive losses take place. Costs 
are also incurred when one or more of their members are arrested 
as the group needs to pay for lawyers, litigation expenses, bails, etc. 
In these cases costs could be said to be investments, as the leaders 
of criminal organisations strengthen their ties with their associates by 
providing full legal assistance to the members and cover the living 
expenses both of the arrested and their families. Because of the 
reputation of the criminal group, they can easily obtain the silence of 
witnesses and the possible exemption of the accused members of the 
courts.321
320 Access to Hellenic prisons for doing social research is very limited and it is almost impossible 
to interview a member of a criminal group in prison. Following an incident in 2014 involving 
the murder of a correctional officer and the death of an inmate, the Ministry of Justice does 
not allow any guests in the correctional facilities for research or similar purposes. Research in 
the database of the Scientific Center for the Rehabilitation of Former Inmates of Correctional 
Institutions “Epanodos” (a body of the Ministry of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights) 
shows that not a single person convicted and imprisoned for cocaine trade and participation 
in organised criminal group has asked for the services of Epanodos (social workers, lawyers, 
psychologists, business consultants, etc.) in the period 2008 – 2014. As a result, concerning 
Epanodos, it was not possible to get in touch with ex-convicts to interview them.
321 Rizava, Οργανωμένο έγκλημα [Organised Crime], 46.
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There are many cases in which criminal groups look to loan sharks for 
the financing of their business (GR-E1 and GR-E2). The Greek financial 
crisis has affected the availability of large credit lines but it is in such 
times that loan sharks thrive. GR-E1 and GR-E2 estimate that nowadays 
the amount of money given to criminal groups by loans sharks ranges 
between €200,000 and €300,000. This amount covers approximately 
one transit of cocaine, while the same criminal group may be financed 
three or four times per year. The repayment of the debt to loan sharks 
is done in instalments and it can take up to three months. The black 
market usurers often keep a collateral, usually an expensive car or a 
promissory note that real estate would be bought at a lower price in 
the case of default.
According to GR-E4 and GR-E5, the money criminal groups invest derives 
from other illegal activities, such as arms trafficking, and this applies to 
all kinds of drug trafficking, not only cocaine. Sometimes members of 
the criminal group do not resort to loan sharks, because they estimate 
that they would have sufficient revenue from selling the drugs to end 
users. In general, everyone in these circles is aware that members of the 
criminal organisation, who are experienced criminals, can play the role 
of the debt collectors without resorting to violence.

This section contains the results of the studies of the illicit trade in 
tobacco products in seven European countries. Unlike drug trafficking – 
but similar to organised VAT fraud – this trade has a strong link to its 
legal counterpart, and the legal tobacco industry generates significant 
amounts of data about the illegal market. Because of the potential for 
damage to government budgets, the illegal tobacco market is of interest 
not only for law enforcement but is also watched by tax authorities.
Texts in this section use a couple of terms that would benefit from some 
explanation at the outset:
“Ant smuggling” uses the imagery of the numerous small efforts of 
ants bringing about a considerable end effect and refers to the frequent 
crossing of borders by a large number of individuals who buy and smuggle 
back into their country small quantities of cigarettes and tobacco.
“Illicit whites” (also known as cheap whites) is a term which refers to 
cigarettes legally manufactured in the free zones of Eastern Europe, the 
Middle East, the former Soviet republics, Southeast Asia, etc., only to 
be smuggled and sold in another country without excise tax being paid. 
The best known brand in Europe is Jin Ling, which is legally produced 
in the free zone of Kaliningrad (Russia) but destined for illegal markets 
in the EU. Their life cycle has three phases. In the first (legal) phase, 
cigarettes are manufactured in full compliance with the law, under a 
registered brand that can be sold in several countries. The cigarettes 
are produced at a very low cost and low quality. They are then sold 
legally and are transported to a duty-free zone. In the second (grey) 
phase, the cigarettes are sold and transported as legal goods, but 
the identity of companies and the origin of the funds involved are 
deliberately obscured. In this phase the cigarettes are moved around 
from warehouse to warehouse and from ship to ship, until their tracks 
are lost. In the third (black) phase, the cigarettes “disappear” somewhere 
along the way and are directed towards the network of wholesale and 
retail warehouses, and from there to the network of street vendors in 
the destination countries.
The texts in this section reference a number of sources as they draw 
on numerous in-depth interviews with government officials, independent 
experts and criminal entrepreneurs. The sources have been coded in 
order to preserve their anonymity. The first two letters of the code 
indicate the country (e.g. GR – Greece), “E” indicates an expert, while 
“C” means criminal entrepreneur. The description of the background 
of the individual sources referenced can be found in the “List of 
interviewees in the section on illicit tobacco trade” in the Annex.
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Bulgaria is one of the most affected EU member states by the illegal 
sale of tobacco products. While the average share of illegal sales 
compared to total tobacco sales is about 11% among all EU member 
states, the estimated share in Bulgaria for the period 2010-2014 was 
between 25% and 40%.322 These data should be read in the context 
of two important characteristics: first, the revenue from excise tax 
and VAT on tobacco products has a significant weight in the national 
budget of Bulgaria, accounting for 11-12% of all revenue, while in west 
European member states the corresponding figures are 1-2%.323 The 
second factor is the developed infrastructure of the grey and criminal 
economy.
In terms of the prevalence of smoking, Bulgaria ranks second in the EU 
with 39% of the country’s population being smokers.324 Given that a 
third of smokers consume illegal cigarettes,325 it can be estimated that 
the number of consumers of illegal tobacco products is between 300,000 
and 400,000, and they are served by at least 15,000 members of various 
criminal networks:326 street vendors, peddlers, drivers, warehouse security 
personnel, importers from international criminal groups, owners of legal 
or illegal cigarette factories active on the domestic or international 
markets. The value of annual illegal sales is €150-300 million, or about 
0.5% to 1% of Bulgaria’s GDP.327
To understand the roots and causes of the illegal tobacco trade and its 
significance, an overview of the origins of the legal and illegal tobacco 
markets is required. Even before WWII, Bulgaria was one of the largest 
manufacturers of cigarettes and raw tobacco in Europe. During the Cold 
War, through the state-owned monopoly Bulgartabak, Bulgaria emerged 
as the number one supplier of raw tobacco and cigarettes in the Soviet 
bloc. In 1976-77, the Bulgarian efforts to penetrate markets beyond the 
Soviet economic sphere were actively supported by the State Security 
agency, the regime’s secret service. The reason for its involvement was 
that for the countries of the Soviet bloc access to certain technologies 
was denied by the CoCoM.328 With the help from State Security, 
Bulgartabak gained access to cigarette recipes and technologies developed 
322 KPMG, A Study of the Illicit Cigarette Market in the European Union. 2013 Results; KPMG, Project Star. 
2011 Results, 2012; KPMG, Project Star. 2012 Results, 2013.
323 National Revenue Agency; CSD, Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2010 – 2011.
324 TNS Opinion & Social, Special Eurobarometer 332: Tobacco (Brussels, European Commission, 
2010).
325 CSD and Vitosha Research, National Crime Survey for the years 2010, 2011, 2012 (http://www.
csd.bg/?id=1415); AC Nielsen, Empty Pack Survey Bulgaria, 2010 – 2012, unpublished.
326 CSD, Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2010 – 2011. Daily sales of 500,000 cigarette 
packs require between 5,000 and 10,000 retailers (with sales of 5 to 10 cartons per day). In 
addition, the market is served by middle and upper level wholesalers, ant smuggling agents, 
security guards, retail and warehouse personnel.
327 Ibid.
328 The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, an arms embargo mechanism 
established by the Western bloc countries during the Cold War.
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by large multinational companies.329 Bulgartabak managed to enter the 
tobacco markets of Tunisia, Morocco, Iran, Iraq, and other Middle 
Eastern markets. The exports provided much needed dollar revenues to 
the communist government.330 As a result of this expansion, the tobacco 
industry became the third largest source of foreign currency after the 
arms industry and electronics. Another result with long lasting effect 
for the cigarette smuggling business after 1990 was the development 
of a close relationship with the Italian mafia, through the cooperatives 
in Southern Italy,331 and with Greek tobacco companies and sea ports 
(BG-E3, BG-E21).332 Many studies suggest that after 1990 officers of the 
State Security effectively privatised the infrastructure333 developed and 
exploited by the communist state for illegal import and export. Thus the 
excise goods – oil products, alcohol and cigarettes – became the most 
actively traded types of goods in the smuggling channels. For the Balkan 
criminal networks, tobacco smuggling comes second, after oil products.334 
The deep involvement of State Security officers in the tobacco business 
in the 1980s is considered a decisive factor for the evolution of the 
tobacco smuggling networks after 1990.
The tobacco market presents an exceptional opportunity for precise 
and in-depth analysis. Unlike other traditional criminal markets (drugs, 
prostitution, racketeering, etc.), the illegal tobacco market has a strong 
link to its legal counterpart, and the legal tobacco industry generates 
an enormous amount of data about the illegal market. Due to the high 
taxes and excise rates for tobacco products, the illegal tobacco market 
is also closely monitored by the revenue agencies.
The structure that emerged at the beginning of the 1990s around the 
criminal entrepreneurs known as the “cigarette men” (more on them 
below) is still basically unchanged. Tentatively, two independent groups 
can be distinguished: the “manufacturers” and the “merchants.”
The illegal manufacturers are probably the criminal group about 
which the least is known. The detection of workshops, warehouses or 
equipment for the manufacturing of illegal cigarettes has never led to the 
investigation of players in the upper levels of the network who finance 
and organise its overall operation. The manufacturers take advantage 
of the available resources of the tobacco industry in Bulgaria and in 
some of the East European countries. There is evidence that they had 
329 At that time, the recipe for a Marlboro cigarette included 40 extracts of various plants and 
flavours.
330 Blitz.bg, “Полковникът от ДС и зам.-директор на НСС Чавдар Петров: ЦК прибра 60 млн. 
от италианската мафия [Interview with Former Deputy Director of the National Security 
Service]”, December 31, 2012, http://www.blitz.bg/news/article/172205
331 The migration waves of the Turkish minority from Bulgaria to Turkey in the 1980s affected the 
supply of certain types of tobacco, as tobacco growers came mainly from the Turkish minority. 
This caused the search for alternative tobacco supplies, while Bulgartabak took advantage of 
the low prices (maintained thanks to subsidies from the EU) (Ibid.).
332 Interview with BG-E21 who had been part of the smuggling channels in Greece until 2000.
333 CSD, Corruption and Trafficking: Monitoring and Prevention (Sofia, 2000); CSD, Corruption, Trafficking 
and Institutional Reform (Sofia, 2002); CSD, Partners in Crime: The Risk of Symbiosis Between the 
Security Sector and Organized Crime in Southeast Europe (Sofia, 2004).
334 By violating the Yugo-embargo the Milosevic regime was able to survive for a whole decade.
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close ties with the executives of the state monopoly Bulgartabak during 
the 1990s (BG-E17, BG-E20). While at the beginning of the 1990s the 
illegal factories operated mostly in Bulgaria, by the end of the decade 
numerous illegal operations have emerged in other Balkan countries. In 
2002, the Bulgarian government decided to establish joint ventures of 
Bulgartabak in the countries of the former Soviet Union, in order to 
avoid certain customs barriers. The decision enabled the export of an 
enormous quantity of old but highly productive, good quality cigarette 
manufacturing equipment.335 Later, some of this equipment was to be 
found in the Kaliningrad factory that manufactures the best-selling illicit 
brand, Jin Ling. Exported equipment of Bulgartabak, or parts of it, was 
distributed in all of South-Eastern and Eastern Europe, from Greece to 
Poland. At the beginning of the 21st century, due to the extremely high 
excise taxes on tobacco products, it became very profitable to set up 
illegal factories in the EU member states to meet the high demand for 
illicit cigarettes. Two models for such factories have been observed: a) 
China-made equipment was imported in Central Europe and assembled, 
mostly by Asians; and b) the illegal manufacturers who used old 
equipment from the tobacco industry in Eastern Europe, predominantly 
from Bulgaria, because of its specialisation within the former Soviet bloc 
(BG-E16, BG-E18).
Illegal manufacturing is aimed at securing the entire production cycle 
through the use of old equipment and the deployment of several 
networks which do not know each other. One network is linked with 
old equipment which is written off in legal factories and is reassembled 
by former engineers in the new illegal cigarette factories. The network 
employs people who find equipment and spare parts, others who assemble 
it, fine-tune it and launch it into production. There are also those who 
take care of the reverse process: disassembly, storage and export to 
another country. A second network consists of mid-level managers and 
engineers who maintain the equipment during the production cycle or 
hire employees of the Bulgarian tobacco factories and supervise them. 
At the low level, there are the drivers who transport the raw tobacco 
and other consumables, workers who print the packaging in printing 
workshops equipped with good quality machines. The secrecy of these 
enterprises has been growing: an illegal factory usually opens and closes 
within 2-3 months, workers are not aware who employs them.336 The 
most valuable resources in the chain, the highly qualified technicians and 
technology experts, set up and launch the equipment for 3-4 days, while 
the engineers tune the machines within 24 hours (BG-E10, BG-E12). Thus 
the period in which the system is most vulnerable is quite short.
The illegal merchants were able to become part of the Balkan smuggling 
infrastructure as early as the beginning of the 1990s, with Greece acting 
as both entry point and distribution centre (hub). In the mid-1990s, 
about 50% of the cigarette sales in Bulgaria were illegal.337 The cigarettes 
335 Bulgartabak was the largest cigarette exporter in the world until 1990, and operated 13 fac-
tories.
336 The last portion of the route is carried out in darkened glass vehicles and at night time.
337 Data from a national representative survey conducted by the CSD in 1995 and commissioned 
by a large multinational company, unpublished.
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were imported from Greece, where they were legally supplied by large 
multinational companies.338 The Balkan smugglers get their merchandise 
from the Greek duty-free warehouse operators339 and then transport it on 
to Europe at their own risk. A considerable share of the legally produced 
and legally imported into Greece cigarettes of known brands are smuggled 
through the Balkans into Central and Western Europe (BG-E3, BG-E20). In 
the smuggling infrastructure Greece is functioning as a hub where several 
networks of cigarette middlemen operate, linked to warehouse operators 
in the Middle East, Greece, Cyprus and the Turkish duty-free zones. The 
networks use various offshore companies which provide logistical support 
and financial services (bank guarantees, collaterals, etc.). The Greek hub 
is manned not only by Greeks and Bulgarians, but also by Russians, 
Georgians, Arabs, Serbs, Poles and others (BG-E20, BG-C1). The networks 
maintain good relations with the Greek political elites and magistrates. 
There are numerous cases where apprehended smugglers manage to 
avoid legal prosecution. In Bulgaria, the merchants – most often former 
State Security officers – work closely with the distribution channels of the 
state monopoly Bulgartabak and also maintain good relations with the 
representatives of large multinationals (BG-E20, BG-E21).340
The economic crisis of 1996 – 1997 in Bulgaria brought two significant 
changes: first, the popular foreign brands became too expensive for the 
Bulgarian market; and second, the political stabilisation that followed 
resulted in a better control of the Bulgarian borders. This led to the state 
monopoly’s share of the market increasing to 80-85% (BG-E13, BG-E20).
At the end of the 1990s, the merchants took steps to adapt to the new 
situation. First, through the duty-free shops at the borders they continued 
to supply the high end of the market, mostly in the largest cities, with 
popular foreign brands. Second, they started exporting cigarettes to 
the highly profitable West European markets, in particular the UK, the 
Netherlands, Germany and others. Various smuggling techniques were 
used, like dumping of cigarettes from ships in waterproof packaging close 
to the coast, collecting them with boats and bringing them to the duty-
free warehouses at the Greek borders. Other techniques included fake 
cargo flights and transporting of cigarettes in large trucks along with other 
goods used for cover (BG-E3, BG-E13). Some of the Bulgarian traffickers 
reside permanently in Italy or Poland. Despite the damages they suffered 
from foreign special law-enforcement bodies in 2002 – 2003, they 
kept working intensively until the supplies from multinational cigarette 
companies were discontinued (BG-E13, BG-E20).
After a period of adaptation of a couple of years, the illicit whites were 
introduced in the Greek hub. Until 2009, these cigarettes were of too 
poor quality and too expensive for the Bulgarian market, so the illegal 
338 The market behaviour of multinational cigarette companies is driven by the tobacco monopoly 
which East European countries practically create by imposing heavy customs duty on cigarettes, 
thus rendering their imports prohibitively expensive.
339 These warehouses are usually owned by members of the Greek hub.
340 It is indicative that while these companies sell legally only a couple of master cases, they are 
among the top advertisers. These large advertising budgets are the basis for the extremely high 
influence that tobacco companies enjoy in the media, and as a consequence, among politicians 
and political parties.
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merchants exported these types of cigarettes mostly to Central Europe 
(BG-E17, BG-E18). The illicit whites did not market well in Bulgaria prior to 
2009 because of the competitive pricing of the Bulgarian low end brands 
and the wide availability of premium brands from duty-free shops.
Following the sharp increase of excise tax in 2009 – 2010 (in the 
wake of EU membership), Bulgaria and Romania became significant 
markets for illicit whites.341 In Bulgaria, however, a new player linked to 
politicians accounted for 50% of all cigarette sales between 2012 and 
2014, according to data from empty pack surveys.342
Bringing the tobacco excise rate up to the EU level after Bulgaria’s 
accession led to several peaks in the sales of illegal cigarettes and 
decline in the sales of legal cigarettes (Table 33).
341 The affordability ratio (share of personal disposable income buying 1,000 cigarettes) in Bulgaria 
is 3.3%, and in Romania it is 2.2%. In most EU countries that introduced high excise taxes in 
order to discourage smoking the ratio is 0.8-1.3%.
342 KPMG, A Study of the Illicit Cigarette Market in the European Union. 2013 Results; AC Nielsen, Empty 
Pack Survey Bulgaria, 2010 – 2012, unpublished.
Given that Greece is an entry point for illicit whites, the “Greek model”* refers to a “policy” which 
seeks to create incentives for the export of these cigarettes further on to other countries and thus to 
discourage their sale within the country. When a certain saturation level of illicit whites is reached, 
local legal producers reduce the prices of their merchandise as much as possible in order to make the 
sale of illegally imported cigarettes – given their much lower quality – unprofitable even at wholesale 
prices. As a result, the traffickers of illicit whites prefer to export them further to other countries.
According to expert estimates, after 2012 this policy started to be applied in Bulgaria (BG-E17, 
BG-E22). Immediately following the shock rise in the excise rate in the period 2009 – 2010, the illicit 
whites imported from Greece dominated the market. Gradually, legal Bulgarian producers started to 
expand their share in the illegal cigarettes market by manipulating – raising or reducing depending 
on the presence of illicit whites – their prices thus squeezing the latter out of the market. When 
imported illegal cigarettes are on the wane, the local legal producers allow the prices of their illegally 
sold merchandise to rise. This manipulation is made possible by two factors: a) legal manufacturers 
selling illegally have considerable room for manoeuvre in the prices of their untaxed merchandise; 
b) they have effective control over a network of illegal distributors from the wholesale to the retail, 
which parallels the legal one. There has been tacit political acquiescence of a small share of the 
merchandise of legal producers being sold untaxed. Support for this policy was warranted by the 
argument that the practice does not allow untaxed cigarettes to expand beyond a certain share of the 
market – a result that could not be achieved by enforcement methods only. Without the competition 
of legally produced but untaxed cigarettes, all the revenue from the illicit market would go to the 
illicit whites exporters and Bulgarian criminal importers.
      * The term “Greek model” was used repeatedly by sources both from law enforcement institutions (BG-E3, BG-E17, BG-E18), 
as well as criminal entrepreneurs (BG-C1, BG-C2). Whether or not this policy is actually applied in Greece could not be 
established, although indirect evidence is found in the results of seizures and empty pack surveys by the Bulgarian Tobacco 
Industry Association which indicate that in 2009 – 2012 around 10% of untaxed cigarettes had been manufactured by a legal 
Greek producer.
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on the interviews.
box 1. the “greek Model” oF sQueezing out the illicit whites
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The illicit trade in legal brands is no longer possible because of, inter 
alia, the lawsuits in the United States and the EU against the tobacco 
multinationals as a result of which a system for internal control was 
introduced. The multinationals are now watching out that their brands are 
not illegally traded as they would have to pay large fines, if intercepted. 
Bulgarian OCGs adapted to a changing environment by making more 
use of duty-free shops and, to a lesser extent, trading with neighbouring 
countries with lower excise rates such as Serbia, FYROM, and the former 
Soviet Republics. In 2006, a clear evidence of the linkage between duty-
free shops and illegal sales emerged: after the rise of the excise rate by 
84.4% legal sales decline from 20.5 to 14.8 billion pcs (Table 33), while 
sales in duty-free shops shot up from 1.7 to 6.7 billion pieces.
Rising prices of legal cigarettes 
and rising sales of illegal ones, 
furthermore, coincided with 
the end of the model of 
supply of established brands 
through the duty-free shops 
to other Balkan countries and 
further on to Europe. Duty-free 
shops in Bulgaria and Romania 
were closed and so were the 
Greek ones at the Bulgarian 
border.343
Estimating the volume of illegal 
sales needs to rely on a number 
of methods in order to offset 
the limitations that each one 
has. In Bulgaria, for example, 
empty pack surveys do not 
work well in small towns where 
there is no proper waste management but it is exactly in these towns 
(because of low disposable income) where most illegal cigarettes are 
consumed. Similar considerations apply to hand-rolling tobacco (HRT) 
popular among low income groups, which is believed to account for 
343 Serbia and FYROM closed them after the fall of Milosevic.
Таble 33. cigarette sales and dynaMics oF the excise rate in bulgaria
Source: Customs Agency.
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Legal sales 
(mln pcs) 
24,979 20,656 23,085 20,142 20,575 14,823 18,424 19,107 16,400 10,520 10,875 11,600 11,500
Excise rate 
change (%)
73.3 0 50 -1.3 84.4 8.5 26.0 14.4 33.3 0 0 0
Figure 21. share oF illicit cigarettes sales in total cigarette Market 
in bulgaria (%)
Source: Empty pack surveys by the Bulgarian Tobacco Industry Association.
?
?
??
??
??
??
??
??
?? ??
????
???
???? ????
????
????
???? ????
???? ????
??
????
??
????
??
????
??
????
??
????
??
????
??
????
??
????
??
????
??
????
??
????
??
????
206 Financing	oF	organised	crime
20-25% of all illegal consumption. Triangulating the outcomes of all 
research methods, including the drop in legal sales due to rises in prices 
and the ban on smoking in public spaces, allowed CSD344 to estimate 
illegal consumption at 25-27% of overall consumption345 (Figure 22).
Overall, the Bulgarian illicit tobacco market is highly dynamic and 
has undergone a number of contractions and expansions – even 
“restarts” – which frustrates the efforts of both law enforcement officials 
and researchers. Each contraction and expansion of the market creates 
conditions for the entry of new players and the return of old ones. Each 
new cycle also creates the need for start-up funding of new entrants.
Both data (Table 34) and interviews with customs and police officers 
indicate that there has been a linkage between the growth in the illegal 
market and the number of seizures (BG-E7, BG-E13, BG-E14): while in 
2008 the seizures of illegal cigarettes are 0.5% of their estimated volume, 
in 2011 they were as high as 15%. Political instability after 2012 has 
brought down both seizures and illegal sales.
344 CSD, Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2010 – 2011.
345 CSD estimates in 2012 – 2014 are almost identical to the estimates of the Bulgarian Tobacco 
Industry Association.
Figure 22. dynaMics oF legal and illegal sales oF cigarettes 
in bulgaria (2008 – 2013)
Source: CSD, Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2010 – 2011 (Sofia, 2012); Bulgarian Tobacco Industry Association.
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Bulgarian OCGs active on the domestic and international market for 
illegal tobacco products can be described as a multi-layered cascade 
system without hierarchical subordination. Even the criminal networks 
that manufacture and sell – or buy and re-sell – dozens of containers, 
do not fit into the model of centralised and subordinated criminal 
organisations. Availability of financial resources and the social capital of 
criminal entrepreneurs have become critical factors, rather than a formal 
hierarchy.
The architecture of the illicit tobacco business can be likened to a system 
of cascading reservoirs that flow into each other. The largest (highest) 
reservoirs are filled in first and they overflow into the tanks at the lower 
levels. The highest level needs to maintain full capacity constantly – 
a kind of uninterrupted supply – in order to keep the cascade running. 
For a market the size of Bulgaria this requires the purchasing of several 
shipping containers a week (5-8 in the period 2011 – 2014).346 The 
modus operandi in this business is also shaped by the fact that cigarettes 
are much bulkier than narcotics and thus require an organisation for 
the movement of large volumes of merchandise, with the corresponding 
transport infrastructure, ownership modalities, etc. In many ways, the 
illegal trade needs to be organised like the legal trade of a complex 
industrial product.
Based on the financial resources they control, several levels of the system 
can be loosely identified. This is a generalised model as each level has 
a number of sub-strata (segments) which collaborate not only vertically 
but also horizontally. There are, for example, a number of small-time 
criminal entrepreneurs who co-exist with the larger networks and supply 
the middle and lower level reservoirs. These entrepreneurs and the more 
established networks can compete, cooperate or function independently 
of each other.
346 These calculations are based on estimates of the illegal market and are confirmed by key 
sources (BG-E13, BG-E17, BG-E20).
Market structure 
and actors
Таble 34. cigarette sales and seizures oF illegal cigarettes in bulgaria
Source: Customs Agency, Ministry of Interior and KPMG, A Study of the Illicit Cigarette Market in the European Union. 2013 Results.
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Legal domestic sales (billion pcs) 18.77 16.8 10.91 10.8 11.57 11.5
Total illegal cigarette sales (billion pcs) 2.97 3.5 4.93 2.84 2.23 2.66
Share of illegal products 15.8% 17.7% 32.1% 26.3% 24.5% 19.4%
Seized illegal cigarettes (million pcs) 15 91 386 409 181 101
Share of seized cigarettes in all illegal 
cigarette sales
0.51% 2.6% 7.83% 14.4% 8.12% 3.8%
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Таble 35. the architecture oF players in the illicit tobacco trade 
in bulgaria
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on the interviews.
High level
Importers These are several large-scale national and international importers who 
traffic cigarettes to warehouses in Bulgaria.
Illegal manufacturers These manufacturers own mobile production facilities which are installed 
for brief periods of time in Bulgaria or elsewhere in Europe.
Legal manufacturers Bulgarian producers selling part of their merchandise to criminal networks 
avoiding excise and VAT taxes.
Upper middle level
Regional level 
merchants/importers 
They buy legally produced cigarettes without paying excise and VAT taxes, 
as well as cigarettes from illegal manufacturers and large-scale importers. If 
these merchants can arrange prices lower than offered by the large-scale 
importers, the latter are bypassed. 
Sub-regional merchants These sub-regional players buy merchandise from the regional merchants 
and are part their distribution network. They can also bypass the regional 
merchants if lower prices can be ensured, even outside of the country.
lower middle level
Suppliers and couriers These players supply the retail networks and act as intermediaries 
between the larger scale merchants and retailers. Can have their own 
small warehouses.
Independent importers 
and rogue merchants 
supplying retailers 
An example of the fairly open nature of the illicit tobacco business. They 
have their own network of ant smugglers and can even traffic larger 
quantities across the land borders. Can import legally produced cigarettes 
from neighbouring countries but without paying excise and VAT. 
Owners of ant 
distribution networks 
These players buy merchandise at their own expense and own a network 
of individual smugglers or small retailers, the latter working for a wage. 
low level
Retailers (vendors) Individuals from disadvantaged social groups (unemployed, pensioners, 
etc.), including phone sales people and all kind of employees – from 
cleaning personnel in offices to taxi drivers – who sell cigarettes at their 
place of work. This group also includes people involved in the transport 
and security of cigarettes, as well as owners of small warehouses. 
Street peddlers Recruited mostly among the ethnic minorities and working at open air 
bazaars.
Ant smugglers They carry out smuggling of small amounts of illegal tobacco products. 
Residing in the regions close to the borders with Serbia and FYROM, 
these individuals take advantage of the lower price of cigarettes across the 
border (thanks to the lower excise taxes in Serbia and FYROM). They cross 
the border daily, supplying cigarettes to certain resale points in Bulgaria 
and profiting from the price differential. A similar model is applied at the 
Turkish border with the duty-free shops.
Tobacco growers and 
vendors of HRT
The people producing and selling HRT are in the same group. The 
consumers of the fine-cut tobacco are people with low income, in rural 
areas, pensioners and marginalised urban populations.
Factory workers These are the people willing to live and work for several months in 
isolation and toil for 10-14 hours a day with few days off. 
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The high level
The “cigarette men”347 – players at the highest level of the illicit 
tobacco market, also referred to as “the heads” – are a good starting 
point for understating this environment as they have both been the 
decisive factors shaping the market and provide a link to the origins 
of this illegal business. As described in the introduction, these players 
have roots in the tobacco industry before 1990, and in the early 1990s 
became an institution of their own. In the period 2001 – 2007 – the 
time preceding Bulgaria’s EU accession – the players at this level were 
the large-scale merchants linked to the duty-free shops. Around the 
time of accession (2007 – 2008), most big players were not particularly 
interested in the Bulgarian market and were either exporting cigarettes 
from Greece through Bulgaria to Western Europe or had illegal 
production facilities there. Some, however, had been preparing for 
the opportunities provided by the sharp rise in the rate of excise tax 
(BG-E3, BG-E17, BG-C1).
In that period, players at the highest level supplied tobacco products 
using two basic mechanisms: a) import of illicit whites to the Greek hub 
and subsequent transfer to the EU member states (including Bulgaria); 
b) local production through legal cigarette manufacturers with significant 
market share in the legal cigarette markets in Bulgaria and Greece.348 
It is estimated that 5 to 7 merchants, and 2 to 3 legal manufacturers 
operated under this mechanism in Bulgaria. The illegal manufacturers 
with 2-3 factories in Bulgaria and 5-6 in the other EU countries are also 
in this group. This model has price and flexibility advantages over the 
illicit cigarettes coming from the Middle East and China.
The first group at this level – the importers of illicit whites – itself 
needs to be broken down into two additional categories. The first 
group are the “old-timers” who were trafficking to Western Europe but 
were flexible enough to start supplying the Bulgarian and Romanian 
markets after 2009-2010. They have a well established reputation at 
the stage of purchasing of shipping containers and can easily expand 
their orders. The size of the order depends on the type of ship 
involved but on average includes between 6 and 20 containers. In 
terms of the number of players, between 3 and 8 members of the 
core at the Greek hub were mentioned by interviewees. Usually, there 
is collaboration both in the financing of operations and in buying 
protection in law enforcement and at the political level. The network 
of “purchased” law enforcement officers and magistrates is shared. This 
collaboration is mostly imposed by the need to evenly share the risk 
and avoid rivalry from the competition. “Play it alone, and you cry” 
(BG-C1).
The second sub-group includes the new players – “extreme risk” 
entrepreneurs,349 who have neither the sufficient capital nor the adequate 
347 Cf. the “tsigarades” in the chapter on the illicit tobacco trade in Greece in this report.
348 It should be noted that these two mechanisms often overlap at the middle and the lower levels 
of the distribution network, while the upper levels involve completely separate players.
349 CSD, Organised Crime in Bulgaria: Markets and Trends, 27.
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experience in the illegal cigarettes business. They had been anticipating350 
the black market boom after 2009 and were actively seeking funding 
to get into the illegal trade. Using political protection, in 2009 some 
of them managed to make a single purchase of untaxed cigarettes 
from the then Bulgarian monopoly producer, fictitiously export them to 
FYROM and return them to Bulgaria. The proceeds of this operation 
funded subsequent regular imports from Greece (BG-E17). A slump in 
the demand for illegal tobacco products, stricter customs control (both 
at the border and inland) and several successful police operations have 
decimated this group. As a result some became part of the criminal 
wholesale networks which illegally distribute the brands of legal Bulgarian 
manufacturers.
the second group at the highest level are the illegal manufacturers. 
Their merchandise imitates popular brands so well that it took time and 
luck for the legal manufacturers to discover that their products are being 
faked. Mobility is the main characteristic of their production facilities, 
which requires the availability of several locations to choose from. The 
other key factor is a short life-span – as mentioned, these illegal factories 
operate for 2-3 months at most, after which they are dismantled and 
moved to a different location. This is required not only by conspiracy 
considerations but also by the fact that factory workers cannot work and 
live for long periods of time in total isolation.
These illegal facilities require several types of participants. The first are 
the highly qualified experts: the tobacco technologist who supervises 
the tobacco recipe, the industrial engineer who designs and oversees the 
assembly of the machines, and the production supervisor. Next there 
are the technicians – usually with experience as workers in industrial 
plants – who operate the machinery. Drivers are the next category, and 
not an insignificant one because they have to be trusted and loyal as 
they are the ones transporting the merchandise and need to observe a 
number of conspiracy rules. There are also the workers from the already 
closed state-owned cigarette factories who are hired by the production 
supervisor and, just as the technicians, do not know the exact location 
of the mobile factory as they live and work only inside it.
the third group at the highest level are the legal manufacturers who 
sell their products on the illegal market. This is considered to be the 
most successful investment scheme. According to interviewees, some 
are local legal producers of alcohol with long experience in excise tax 
avoidance through a well-established distribution network. The model 
tested for a decade with alcohol bootlegging is applied to cigarettes 
as well: a symbiosis of legal and illegal production. It is believed that 
this model copies the so called Greek model described in Box 1. 
The Bulgarian specifics are that initially the legal manufacturer has no 
established cigarette brands. Its strategy (similar to the strategy on the 
alcohol market) is to create recognizable brands on the legal market, and 
then to sell them on the illegal cigarette market (BG-E17, BG-E22).
350 The anticipation is based on their experience in Eastern Europe where they know the potential 
of the illegal market to react to a sharp price rise (because of excise rise).
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The players at the highest level are not involved in the management of 
the lower levels of distribution (BG-E8, BG-E10, BG-E15).
Figure 23. three levels and three Models oF illicit tobacco in bulgaria
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on the interviews.
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The middle level
The next level of the system is occupied by the regional Bulgarian 
criminal entrepreneurs who buy wholesale from the cigarette men. This 
level provides the link between the upper and the lower levels and their 
operations are market driven. They move the supplies, taking the risk 
for the operation. Their capacity is at truck/van level, i.e. they handle 
about 150-250 master cases (BG-E1, BG-E3, BG-E17). This group of 20-
30 players is the backbone of this kind of criminal infrastructure, which 
large criminal entrepreneurs depend on.
Entrepreneurs at this level are ready to expand their operations when 
there is a booming market and never completely abandon this kind 
of business when sales are slow. A cigarette man needs 2-3 players at 
the middle level who can activate the distribution at the lower levels. 
Without prior coordination with these players, the investment of large-
scale criminal entrepreneurs can easily flop.
Middle level merchants are usually local businessmen with a sizeable 
business of their own, typically some kind of commerce – including 
alcohol and tobacco – and having their own transport companies. They 
employ a manager for the illicit tobacco trade – a person who is in 
charge of the organisation – but also bears the risk – of dealing with 
storers and suppliers (BG-E8, BG-E13, BG-E17).
These entrepreneurs are at varying degrees of collaboration with the 
highest level, some are even independent and compete with players at 
their level or higher. For example, to maximise their profits they can 
import directly from the Greek hub but then the risk is doubled.351 
Expanding the operations to the level of cigarette men is possible but 
quite expensive and requires protection from magistrates and at political 
level; thus, it is not very common.352 Nevertheless, in 2013 and 2014 
there have been cases of regional merchants progressing to the highest 
level.353 There are also sub-regional merchants who typically handle 30-
50 master cases; they can go up to 100 master cases in larger regions 
or become regional distributors in smaller regions (BG-E1, BG-E3, BG-E9, 
BG-E10, BG-E17).
Next in the illicit trade network are storers, suppliers and couriers. In 
border areas they can ally themselves with small importers and bypass 
the regional level, although they are typically in fairly clear subordination 
to the sub-regional merchants. The reason for this kind of relation is that 
the geographical location limits mobility and the transaction costs increase 
351 In turn, the distributors buying from them can decrease the quantities they order or stop 
buying altogether.
352 A less risky option – although one that cannot be controlled by the truck/van level merchant – 
is to be offered to distribute the product of an illegal cigarette factory.
353 This kind of upward mobility is not without its risks as evidenced by a criminal entrepreneur 
with experience in VAT fraud who decided to enter the illegal cigarettes market. Because of 
late entry, he had to pay 30% more for the merchandise and had to work for without profit 
for a while. After having large quantities seized on couple of occasions by law enforcement, 
he was killed, the explanation being that he was an outsider wanting to climb too quickly to 
the highest level (BG-E1, BG-E14).
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sharply. In general, the lower the level of a player in the illicit tobacco 
trade, the likelier it is that he would be in an employer-employee type 
of relations with the higher level. This group may include both trusted 
and long-time employees of the large regional or sub-regional traders and 
professional criminals. At this lower middle level the number of people with 
criminal experience is the highest. This is also the level where participants 
usually run the highest risk: they are in touch with the retailers who may 
betray them, and they carry risky amounts of illicit cigarettes.
Low level
The third general level of the criminal system that takes care of logistics 
and supplies are the retailers. At this level, there are also certain mixed 
models, including an “ants” black market in border regions, distribution 
networks operated by members of the Roma ethnic group, etc.
The boom in demand for illicit cigarettes – the prevalence of consumption 
of illegal cigarettes was around 40-45% in 2010, reaching even 90% in 
some areas – resulting from the shock increase in the excise rate and 
general economic slump, brought a large number of people with no 
criminal experience into the illegal market.354 This in turn required a 
large distribution network ensuring a regular supply of the merchandise. 
The entry of 5,000-7,000 persons in the illegal distribution within a 
period a 2-3 months in 2010 was of epidemic proportions. These people 
had no experience with dealing in the black market – how to find 
a supplier, storage, etc. (BG-E7). Many retailers – kiosks, small corner 
shops, etc. – would concede to start selling illegal cigarettes only after 
being approached daily by a black market supplier (BG-E15).
Following the peak in illegal sales at the end of 2010, in the next 3-4 
years the market gradually stabilised, pushing out the large numbers of 
individuals that got involved at the lowest distribution level. Interviewees 
indicate that supplies had become erratic, and suppliers come and go 
(BG-C2, BG-C3). The low quality of illegal cigarettes has also contributed 
to consumers switching to legal brands. As a result the retailer/street 
peddler level has become more secretive and closed, and sales have 
become more cautious. Further, unlike before 2010 – when many legal 
outlets would sell illegal cigarettes – distributors would now have to seek 
alternative sales methods since harsh fines and stricter enforcement are 
discouraging the involvement of legal retailers.
Key to understanding the involvement of many people at this level of 
distribution – cleaners, drivers, security guards, etc. – is that because of 
their low income selling illegal cigarettes involves no opportunity cost 
for them. Larger merchants and suppliers actively seek out individuals 
from disadvantaged groups who – again, because of their low income 
and lack of any assets to be forfeited – can count on getting away 
with administrative penalties only, if caught with small amounts of illegal 
cigarettes.355
354 CSD, Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2010 – 2011.
355 Even if they accumulate many fines, there is a threshold beyond which their property cannot 
be forfeited.
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Notable at this level are the ant structures, mostly involving members of 
the Roma ethnic group. These include ant retail – peddling at places with 
considerable footfall – and ant smuggling – transporting small amounts 
from Turkish duty-free shops or legally bought cigarettes from FYROM 
and Serbia. Entry in both types of activities is reserved for members of 
particular clans/extended families who work for a wage.
Sources of capital for criminal operations
Legal producers who sell their merchandise at the illegal market
The model is applied by a large oligarchic group which uses political and 
judicial influence to secure its investments. The same approach has been 
tested for a decade in the investment in the liquor and wine market. It 
is a symbiosis of legal and illegal investment. To enter the illicit tobacco 
industry, a privatised factory of the state tobacco monopoly is bought 
with a credit of €15 million. The purchase is carried out through the 
stock exchange, supported by a loan from a large Bulgarian bank. The 
actual ownership structure is hidden through the use of an attorney 
partnership and offshore companies. A competing Bulgarian oligarchic 
group actually wins the bidding for the deal and tries unsuccessfully to 
challenge the privatisation transaction. This may be the reason why the 
initial entry in the illicit cigarettes market is very cautious, and the new 
brands are being tested mostly on the legal market, supported heavily 
by advertising and development of the distribution network. It is believed 
that at the period of building the brands, cigarettes have been sold at 
a loss. The cost of the whole brand building operation, including the 
subsidies, is estimated at about €20 million.
The large importers (who can be seen as a periphery of the Greek hub) 
have made their initial investment back at the beginning of the 1990s. 
The social capital of this group is joint participation with their Greek 
partners in various legal and grey business ventures. These include 
trade and real estate legal companies, grey import from China (the so 
called Chinese cargo) through the ports of Thessaloniki and Piraeus, 
joint ventures in transportation companies and shady investments in 
real estate (BG-E17, BG-C1, BG-C1). After the accession of Bulgaria 
to EU and lifting the customs control between Bulgaria and Greece, 
the old Bulgarian cigarette men increased their share with capital and 
management of the container transport to Central and Western Europe 
(BG-E3, BG-E17, BG-C1, BG-C2). As it became possible for illicit whites 
to enter the Bulgarian market, the investments were expanded by 
ordering more containers through the Greek hub. By the mid-2010, 
1 out of 4 containers bought by Bulgarian traders was destined for 
the Bulgarian market (BG-E22). If the cost of a container is between 
€200,000 and €275,000, the expansion is roughly in this amount. 
In addition, corruption fees and logistics cost €50,000 to €100,000. 
Putting these two sums together shows that the entry capital at this 
level is €250,000 to €375,000 (BG-E3, BG-E17, BG-E20). Expansion 
relied on various sources. In some cases, the Greek partners simply 
provided in-kind credit.
Financing 
and financial 
management
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“Most players moved funds from other businesses, just at the beginning 
of the crisis. Others started to order less ’Chinese cargo’, fewer shoes, 
fewer toys. Others froze their construction projects. […] People who had 
exited completely the cigarette business (and gone to construction, trade), 
now made a second entry. However, despite being trusted, they had to 
wait longer, to invest twice as much as the old players” (BG-C1).
Greek importers used to provide in-kind credit to Bulgarian partners 
when they saw that they are reliable and business is growing. This 
continued even after the number of seizures grew due to the introduction 
of X-raying at the border, as long as the Bulgarian counterpart was not 
known to have problems with the law (BG-C1).
Political protection of the investment
There is evidence showing how a group of new players – extreme risk 
entrepreneurs – got an opportunity at the beginning of 2009 to purchase 
from the then still state-owned tobacco company356 cigarettes at around 
22.5 euro cents per pack. The initial investment required was €60,000 
per container. These containers were exported from Bulgaria to FYROM 
and then returned back to Bulgaria. An additional €50-60 thousand was 
needed for logistics, border crossing and security. These initial €110-120 
thousand got them around €650 thousand in retail sales, which was 
then reinvested into further cigarette purchases from the Greek hub. 
At that moment, there were at least 2-3 groups exploiting this scheme 
(BG-E17).
Criminal entrepreneurs at the middle level (150-250 master cases)
The most typical type of financing – respectively financier – comes 
from a legal cigarettes or other excise goods business. These are people 
who already understand this kind of market but their legal profit 
margins are very thin because of the high excise rate. There is reason 
to believe that the expansion of the business following the 2009 – 2010 
boom had been done with operational capital loans. Given that it was 
the height of the financial crisis, the banks must have seen these as low 
risk credits. It should be noted that the operational credit needed to 
buy legal cigarettes is higher than the one needed for illegal cigarettes. 
Thus, there is reason to believe that the bank branches have been 
aware of the black market business of their customers (BG-E15, BG-
E16). With the new cigarette wave, the initial investment has been 
about €100,000 to €150,000. Its size depends on how affluent the 
area is. If a supplier is changed (because another offers lower prices), 
the amount can go up to €250 thousand (BG-E2, BG-E3, BG-E12). 
When a larger scale illegal merchant works with a legal manufacturer, 
the former undertakes not to export the merchandise outside Bulgaria 
for fear of seizures (BG-E1, BG-E8).357
356 The state-owned company would only use tested and approved distributors. In this case, 
despite objections the company was forced to sell to these new players.
357 According to interviews with OLAF officials, there have been very few seizures in the EU of 
cigarettes of legal Bulgarian origin.
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As in the drugs market, here also a prospective criminal entrepreneur 
can get trade credit. An interviewee (BG-E20) relates the story of a law 
enforcement informer who had to help uncover an illegal warehouse. 
During the first attempt his van could not be tracked so he called the 
supplier to say that he failed to sell the merchandise; “no matter”, he 
is told, “you can come for more”, effectively providing him with trade 
credit.
Small retailers who work at their own expense usually start with €1,000-
€2,000. “A Turkish guy gave me €1,000 and I paid him back in 
3 months €1,225” (BG-C3). The entrepreneur is both financier and 
organiser, typically has a legal business (a hotel or a small production 
enterprise) and himself delivers the merchandise to sales points (hair 
salons, cafés, etc.) (BG-C3).
At the lowest level, retailers start with 2-3 cartons at €9-€12 each or 
a kilo of tobacco. They can also get these on credit, to be paid after 
receiving them 2-3 times. Their regular income is quite low – €70-€80 
a month358 – while they can get double that by selling illegal cigarettes 
(BG-E9, BG-C4).
Retailers that make €100-€150 a month require small amounts to enter 
the illicit trade – €20-€30 (when they traded legally, cigarettes would 
make around 10% of their revenue) (BG-C4). Larger traders with a 
turnover of €4,000-€5,000 do not require bigger entry amounts, either. 
Supply is increased only gradually until the limits of the demand are 
established, thus minimising the risk (BG-E17).
The legality of the payment methods varies at the different levels of 
criminal operation.
High level
Payments for the illicit whites entering through Greece are done 
through the legitimate banking system as these are made by a range 
of entrepreneurs who have long had contacts with the manufacturers. 
At the period of high demand for these cigarettes in Europe the illicit 
whites factories were working at full capacity and there were waiting 
periods, so there was a large volume of transactions. Although a buyer 
outside a closed circle of players has no chance of getting a deal 
(BG-E15, BG-E16, BG-E18), tracing the payments is of little use to 
law enforcement as there is nothing illegal at this stage – no offshore 
accounts, no suspicious transactions, etc. Traditionally, the players in the 
Balkan cigarette smuggling market who buy large quantities from large 
legal manufacturers or distributors use legal payment channels, utilising 
bank warranties and other bank instruments. This way, the large players 
in the illegal tobacco industry are able to keep out the smaller players 
(the outsiders), who operate with cash payments. One of the examples 
358 Analysis of the Situation in Relation to Minimum Income Schemes in Bulgaria: A Study of National Policies, 
George Bogdanov, Boyan Zahariev, Peer Reviews in Social protection and Social Inclusion, 
2009.
Settlement 
of payments
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of an organisation designed to control the lower levels of the market 
was the group of Ivan “the Doctor” Todorov, who was shot in 2006.359 
The group made players at the lower levels of the market pay for bank 
warranties that it provided to them (BG-E3). 
The logistics companies are perfectly legal but their warehouses are in 
countries such as Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and after a series of documentary 
transfers the tracks of the merchandise get lost. These transfers are 
done between companies registered in Asian countries as it takes a 
long time to receive a response to an inquiry. Legal payment methods 
are also used between Bulgarian legal producers and wholesale illegal 
merchants: “They pay through their own bank. It is probably concealed 
within their legal purchases for cigarettes and alcohol. However, no 
one has sought indications of problems between invoices and bank 
transfers” (BG-E8).
Middle level
Cash payments are typical at this level. “In June 2012, a Varna-based 
businessman financed the purchase of smuggled cigarettes from Greece 
to be sold later in Bulgaria. He handed in the money personally at 
a meeting in one of his restaurants. He brought €250,000 to pay for 
the import from Athens. The financing was provided in exchange for a 
share in the distribution and payment after sale (BG-E1). When criminal 
entrepreneurs who do not know each other need to do business, various 
methods are applied to ensure against a possible swindle. One method 
is explained by an interviewee:
“The transaction scheme is similar to the one used for returning stolen 
cars for ransom (known as ‘the Indian’ or the ‘one hander’) – one hand 
(the hand that takes the money) does not know where the truck-load of 
cigarettes is. The truck is parked the previous day at a remote location – 
in this case a town in Northern Bulgaria whereas the money is expected 
at the petrol station in Sofia. When the money is exchanged, the buyer 
sends a trusted helper who finds the keys hidden in the vehicle. In this 
case, it was about 140 master cases of the brand Kapital which looks 
like Davidoff for the amount of €60,000. The price is agreed to be lower 
because during the negotiations it became clear that there will be a 
shipment a week” (BG-E1).
Cash upfront became the most common payment method following 
the stabilisation of the illegal market after 2011. In order to collect 
the payment, smaller orders are placed at more frequent intervals. “In 
other words, instead of one, three supplies are made. If payment is 
not advanced, placing an order gets more difficult and only 1-2 are 
allowed” (BG-E6, BG-E10). In this way, the movement of payments 
upstream precedes the movement of the merchandise downstream by 
about a week.
359 Millenium, Колекция: Убитите Босове 6 – Иван Тодоров Доктора [Murdered Bosses Collection, 
Book 6: Ivan “the Doctor” Todorov] (Sofia: Millenium, 2008).
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The costs for operating at a given level are also indicative of the start-up 
capital needed to enter the market. As the understanding of the illegal 
market for cigarettes requires an analysis of both production and trading, 
the respective costs need to be considered separately.
Production
Legal manufacturers who sell illegally
Direct costs involved in this kind of operation include:
• The premises and machines in this case are shared. Data for the 
quantities produced by the main Bulgarian manufacturer indicate that 
between 8 and 11 million packs of both legally and illegally sold 
cigarettes are produced monthly,360 meaning that half of the depreciation 
of machines should be attributed to the illegal merchandise (BG-E16, 
BG-E18).
• The same division ratio applies to materials – tobacco, paper, cigarette 
filters, etc. (BG-E16, BG-E18).
• With respect to the remuneration of workers, costs related to the illegal 
merchandise are referred to as the “third shift” (BG-E15, BG-E17).
Indirect costs involve the marketing – including research, advertising, 
and retail support of brands which do not have a long tradition in 
Bulgaria. Illegal sales capitalise on the effect of this marketing. The 
manufacturer has transferred all the costs involved in the distribution of 
the illegal merchandise – transport, bribery, peddler wages, etc. – to the 
illegal merchants. Many costs associated with the legal side of business, 
however, would not have been made had it not been for the revenue 
from illegal sales (BG-E16, BG-E17, BG-E18).
At the manufacturing level additional costs include political protection, 
the estimates of which vary between €2-3 million to €10 million per year 
(BG-E17, BG-E20, BG-C1); given that the latter number would make such 
a production unprofitable, the former seems more realistic. Corruption 
expenses with respect to law enforcement officers and tax officials are 
considered to be around 10% compared to the amount for political 
protection. Expenses for media advertising (sponsorship), although shared 
with the legal production, are estimated at an additional €2-3 million 
per year, with the same amount needed for product development and 
loan repayment. There are also the reserves that need to be maintained 
which are around 10% of the annual profit (BG-E3, BG-E11, BG-E17, 
BG-C1, BG-C2).
Illegal manufacturers
Illegal factories that deliver good quality products require several types 
of investment:
360 The roughly equal division between the legal and illegal merchandise occurred for the first 
time in 2011. In 2014, data from retail and empty pack surveys and consumer polling indicate 
that the illegal exceeds the legal by 30-40%.
Costs of doing 
business
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• Costs associated with the factory site, usually in inconspicuous 
locations. 
• Equipment costs are related to the acquisition of old cigarette 
production machines which are still abundantly available in Bulgaria 
because of its communist-era specialisation. Maintenance expenses in 
this case are important because spare parts are difficult to obtain and 
can even be imported from China. There were Bulgarian companies 
which used to manufacture machines for the tobacco industry; after 
1990s they specialised in the maintenance of the old equipment.361 
• Costs for additional equipment which conceals the work of the 
factory – said to be on occasion more expensive than the production 
machines – including specially designed air conditioners and insulation 
preventing the smell from giving away the factory, own power 
generators in order to conceal the high consumption of electricity, 
etc. (BG-E8, BG-E12). 
• Expenses for raw materials and consumables. The cost of tobacco is a 
particular consideration as fair quality cigarettes require 20-40 varieties 
of tobacco. The importation of leaves from Brazil, Zimbabwe, the 
United States, Malawi, Argentina, India and other countries need to 
be clandestine – which adds further expense – in order to prevent 
being traced to the factory (BG-E8, BG-E17).
It is difficult to make an estimate of the assets of the manufacturers as 
the equipment has been accumulated over time with the first investments 
going as far back as the early 1990s (BG-Е 17). The social capital of the 
owners is also difficult to measure as most of them are entrepreneurs 
with considerable expert and managerial experience.
There are several sub-groups in this manufacturing category which differ 
in the quality of their product, and the respective cost.
• The production of illicit whites requires minimal investment as 
equipment, materials and labour are cheap. They can not afford much 
counter-surveillance investment, and so are frequently uncovered by 
law enforcement. 
• Then there are those who imitate low end brands where most of 
the quality effort and expense goes into the packaging. They cannot 
produce large quantities as otherwise the legal producers would detect 
it in their sales. Seized production facilities have been estimated at 
around €400,000 per factory.
• The third sub-group are the producers of mainstream brands. The 
Greek Karelia is popular among these manufacturers as it has a large 
market share and is often smuggled untaxed from Greece. Seized 
production facilities have been estimated at around €600,000 per 
factory.
It should be noted that this model works because cigarette factory owners 
are able to move freely abroad. There have been several investigations 
in the EU and in Balkan countries where Bulgarians have been involved 
361 In the last decade, a number of workers and illegal factory equipment originating from Bulgaria 
have been detected in Greece, Poland, Germany, Austria and the former Soviet republics 
(BG-E11).
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(BG-E3, BG-E12). People related to a factory in Greece have been 
later caught in a factory in South-western Bulgaria, or machines from 
an illegal factory in Austria or Germany have later been discovered 
in an illegal factory in Bulgaria close to the Turkish border (BG-E11). 
Unfortunately, too little is known of the cooperation of distribution 
networks in EU countries with Bulgarian manufacturers: how expenses 
are shared, how margins are determined, etc. The cost of various forms 
of mobility (transfer of people, machines, management of raw material 
and consumables) is also unknown. 
trading
High level
The cost of illicit whites in the Dubai factories has been changing, but 
before the 2008 crisis a pack cost between 15 and 30 US cents or 
between €55,000 and €110,000 for a container. Having gone through 
various warehouses and ships, these arrive in Greece at around €200,000 
and €290,000 for a container. Established traffickers paid on average 
€180-€200 thousand, but to get that price they needed to purchase at 
least 2-3 containers. At that time, out of 4 containers only 1 stayed in 
Bulgaria. After 2009, additional investments were required in sustainable 
logistics (transportation and warehousing) and for ensuring the security 
of the supplies (bribing customs and police).
Middle level – regional merchants
At the time of the mass imports of illicit whites from the Greek hub, 
merchants used to buy the pack at 75 euro cents or around €75-€100 
thousand per shipment. Prices have gone down since to 51-56 euro cents 
or €50-€55 thousand per cross border shipment and 44-50 euro cents 
(€44-€51 per shipment) per pack from a legal Bulgarian manufacturer.
These merchants can arrange a shipment directly from a Greek supplier 
thus bringing the price of a master case down by about €50, or around 
20% per ¼ of a shipping container (250 master cases). To get into this 
category, however, these entrepreneurs need to ensure safe passage of 
the border and transportation within the country. During the boom of 
the illegal cigarettes trade there were cases of cooperation among several 
merchants for the establishment of a sustainable smuggling route, as the 
required additional investment is around €20,000.
Middle level – sub-regional merchants
Initially these players bought at between 72 and 82 euro cents per pack 
investing €18-€20 thousand per shipment of 50 master cases, but if a 
smuggling operation is in its early stages it can cost them up to €50 
thousand. There have been instances when a regional merchant would 
suggest a cooperation, whereby he would provide half of a €200-€250 
thousand investment, and another 2-3 smaller partners would come 
up with the other half (BG-E9, BG-E10, BG-E17). Later, the prices for 
a master case at this level also came down, meaning that an entrant 
national	criminal	markets	and	Finances:	illicit	tobacco	trade	 221
would now need an initial amount of around €30 thousand (in addition, 
of course, to being allowed to enter by the established players) (BG-E9, 
BG-E16). There are also smaller traders who need a start-up investment 
of €15-€20 thousand, depending on the region (BG-E10, BG-E17). Local 
level suppliers, when independent entrepreneurs, buy at 77-92 euro 
cents per pack, which requires between €6,000 and €13,000 for 8 to 
15 master cases.
Low level
Street peddlers work for a wage which depends on the location – for 
example, at a popular open air market in the capital Sofia the daily wage 
is €35-40 while in the suburbs it is €10-15.
At peak moments, when there could be up to 300 people working at 
the markets, the peddlers would be guarded thus increasing the price 
of cigarettes due to the expense for security guards. As most of these 
workers come from poor backgrounds, there are additional forms of 
compensation, such as provision of housing for them in apartments 
owned by the local boss or in municipal housing ensured through 
bribery of the local municipal administration.
The average salary the workers at the illegal factories receive abroad 
(usually somewhere in Greece or Central Europe) is € 1000-1200, and 
in Bulgaria is € 500-600 per month (BG-E6, BG-E12).
As could be expected, the profit margin in the illegal cigarettes business 
depends on the mark-ups of the players at the various levels of trade. 
With a production cost of 20-25 euro cents per pack, plus the excise 
and VAT, at least 2.10 euro cents mark-up is needed for a profit. For 
comparison the average retail price per pack of licit cigarettes in 2001 
is just 40 euro cents. An additional factor influencing both sales and 
profits is a kind of “compression” – the diminishing price differential 
between the premium and “value” brands. Because of the rise in the 
excise tax rate, the difference has come down from 50% in 2007 to 
18% after 2010.
In the past 5-6 years, the profit margins have been changing dynamically, 
influenced by the competition among varying sources of cigarettes and 
tobacco362 at the stage of entering the country, further reflecting on the 
prices for end consumers. An additional factor in Bulgaria are differences 
in regional pricing: while in large cities such as the capital city Sofia 
illegally sold premium brands are priced at around BGN 3.50 (€1.75), in 
poorer regions such as the border areas with Greece they can cost BGN 
2.20 (€1.10) or even less (BG-E8, BG-E11).
Margin not only fluctuates, but is also dependent on the length of the 
supply chain. There are typically 5-6 levels, although in border areas 
there can be as few as 3 because the easy access to smuggled cigarettes 
362 The market of HRT is quite different so it will not be considered here.
Profits and profit 
sharing
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allows few distribution levels to 
ensure sufficient profit at low 
risk for the players (BG-E13, 
BG-E18). A key factor is, of 
course, the volume of the orders: 
the differences between an 
order of 250 and of 100 master 
cases are tangible (BG-E8, 
BG-E9, BG-C1, BG-C2). Thus, 
if the margin is, say, 23 euro 
cents per pack, or 32% at 
200 master cases, for larger 
volumes the trader could give 
a discount and bring his margin 
down to 29-30% but receive a 
larger gross amount (BG-C2).
In 2011, the illegal market sta-
bilised at levels that would be 
maintained for the next 3 years; 
the sales are at 2.8 billion piec-
es or 11.6 million packs per 
month (Table 34, above). In that period, the structure of the black ciga-
rette market is approximately as follows: Bulgarian legal manufacturers had 
35-40% of the illegal market, with another 35-40% being illicit whites 
from Greece and the remaining 20% of small scale smuggling and coun-
terfeit brands produced in Bulgaria and the neighbouring countries.
The proposed models are based on the combined knowledge of 
different sources and allow for the enormous (and still growing) margin 
to be traced systematically across the supply chain. On each level there 
are fixed costs such as salaries, depreciation, raw materials, transport 
and infrastructure; however, they are usually shared with legal business 
expenses for both conspiracy and financial reasons. As previously shown 
at the higher levels there are key expenses such as bribery which are 
again shared by the illegal and legitimate side of the business.
The tables below show indicative assessments of the monthly margins at 
the different levels in three of the main schemes. In scheme 1 the main 
illicit cigarette source is a legal Bulgarian tobacco company; scheme 2 
uses cigarettes supplied by the Greek hub while scheme 3 deals with 
small scale smuggling. At each level the margin is calculated by deducting 
all previous expenses per piece along the chain and multiplying it by the 
volume sold monthly.
In scheme 1, the mark-up and margin of the various trading levels for the 
cigarettes of a Bulgarian manufacturer are presented in Table 36.
Scheme 1 (where production cost is €0.20-€0.23 per pack with a retail 
price at €1.50) is applicable only for the big cities. At the smaller and 
poorer local markets the retail price will be in the range €1.10-€1.25 
which means lower margins on every supply level. It is worth noting 
Figure 24. changes in the price diFFerence between preMiuM 
and value brands in bulgaria
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on data from tobacco manufacturers.
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that for the Greek model to work prices and consequently margins 
must fluctuate constantly (BG-E3, BG-E17, BG-C2) and so within a 
month the retail price can vary from €1.50 to €1.35 and back to €1.50 
(BG-E6, BG-E9). Because of this, any margin assessments can be highly 
speculative.
“When all corruption fees (political protection, media support, bribing 
law enforcement officers, tax officials and magistrates) are taken into 
account, out of a revenue of €12-13 million at that time, the net profit 
would have been around €2-3 million. Now [after 2012], however, that 
[the manufacturer] is virtually a monopolist, the net profit could be as 
high as €10 million“ (BG-E20, BG-C1).
When the expenses and the corruption fees363 of the trade are deducted, 
out of an annual gross profit of €300 thousand to €1 million the middle 
level merchants retain around €500 thousand, provided there are no 
damages not covered by the reserve fund. If an incident should happen, 
the profit could be halved; the same applies to second and third levels 
(BG-C2). The issue which remains open is whether the various levels can 
come to an agreement on the sharing of incidental costs, or respectively 
sharing higher profits when they occur.
As regards illicit whites imported from Greece (initially also from Turkey), 
the profit distribution is similar to the one for the legal manufacturer, the 
difference being that level 0 is the Greek hub, while large-scale importers 
share the profit with intermediaries in Greece (Table 37). Here also, 
from a revenue of between €1.2 million and €3.6 million, approximately 
two-thirds goes to cover expenses and corruption fees, with the largest 
additional expense being a “border crossing toll” of around 30% (BG-E3, 
BG-E13, BG-E17, BG-C1, BG-C2).
363 Criminal entrepreneurs refer to them as “participation tax” (BG-C1, BG-C2).
Таble 36. illegal sales in large cities oF the Merchandise 
oF a legal bulgarian ManuFacturer
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on the interviews.
level at which entrepreneur 
operates
Buys/Cost
(€/pack)
Sells
(€/pack)
Monthly margin 
excluding expenditure 
and corruption fees (€)
Level 0, manufacturer (cost) 0.20-0.23 0.44-0.49 ~1,100,000
Level 1, buys 200-250 master cases 0.44-0.50 0.60-0.65 80,000-100,000
Level 2, buys 30-50 master cases 0.60-0.65 0.77-0.82 15,000-20,000
Level 3, buys 8-15 master cases 0.77-0.82 0.92-1.03 2,500-7,700
Level 4, buys 1-2 master cases 0.92-1.03 1.28 1,000-2,000
Level 5, buys 2-14 cartons 1.28 1.54 150-1,200 
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Levels 3 and 4 pushing for larger profit margins has been – together 
with stricter law enforcement and the superior quality of the domestic 
legal producer – an important factor in the shrinking share of illicit 
whites from Greece. They are also involved in dealing in cigarettes 
illegally produced in the country and imported from Greece. If they 
find a contact in Greece, these middle level criminal entrepreneurs 
enter at the price level of the large merchants but pay a premium for 
buying smaller quantities, and also have to pay the border crossing 
“toll” (corruption fee). Further down, the merchants buying from 
them need also a larger profit margin in order to make commercial 
sense to buy the more expensive merchandise. With respect to illegal 
manufacturing the scheme is similar: illegal manufacturers usually work 
with merchants handling 200-250 master cases by giving them a good 
margin and overall earn higher profit thanks to lower cost (no border 
crossing tolls to pay).
The case of entrepreneurs operating networks of ant smugglers in border 
regions is somewhat different. Their operation can be compared to an 
hourglass: in the upper bulb, the entrepreneur hires dozens of individuals 
(usually from socially disadvantaged backgrounds) to make a number of 
“runs” smuggling small quantities from a neighbouring country or the 
duty-free shops. In the bottleneck of the scheme, he then buys up all 
the stock from the ants, pools it together and, in the lower bulb, he 
deals as a wholesaler (Table 38).
At the lowest levels, the income is in the form of a daily or monthly wage. 
Wages depend on the turnover a retailer/peddler can muster, which is 
dependent on the location. The most effective ones can earn €1,250-
€1,500,364 in most cases this being an additional income. Typically, these 
are individuals in night clubs, grocery shops in large cities with a good 
364 The average monthly wage in Bulgaria in 2014 was €400.
Таble 37. prices per pack oF illicit whites and Monthly proFit 
in bulgaria
Source: Authors’ elaboration drawing on the interviews.
level at which entrepreneur 
operates
Buys
(€/pack)
Sells
(€/pack)
Monthly margin 
excluding expenditure 
and corruption fees (€)
Level 1, importer from a Greek 
warehouse
0.50-0.55 0.60-0.65 100,000-300,000
Level 2, buys 200-250 master cases 0.60-0.65 0.77-0.82 40,000-100,000
Level 3, buys 30-50 master cases 0.77-0.82 0.92-0.97 6,000-20,000
Level 4, buys 8-15 master cases 0.92-0.97 0.92-1.08 1,500-13,000
Level 5, buys 1-2 master cases 0.92-1.03 1.28 1,000-2,000
Level 6, buys 2-14 cartons 1.28 1.54 150-1,200
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footfall, the so called “exclusive suppliers”,365 popular mobile vendors,366 
etc. (BG-C4, BG-C9, BG-C2). Then there are vendors in grocery shops in 
smaller towns, other mobile salespersons such as taxi drivers, who can 
make €500-€750 per month. At the bottom of this distribution network 
is the poorest segment of the population – unemployed, pensioners, 
individuals in remote villages. In addition to cigarettes they also sell HRT 
in packages of between 100 grams and a kilo; they earn €100-150 per 
month (BG-E9,BG-E17). 
The financial aspects of the Bulgarian illicit tobacco market are cyclical 
and each new cycle places different demands on criminal capital. 
Additional investment by criminal entrepreneurs in the illicit cigarettes 
business is particularly needed in times of sharp increases of the excise 
tax or of political instability. Conversely, when consumers have adapted 
to the new prices and multinationals demand more sales from their 
distribution networks, this puts additional pressure on customs for more 
revenue and law enforcement becomes more active in seeking seizures; 
in such times criminal entrepreneurs may choose to suspend operations 
(BG-E3, BG-E17). “All criminal markets are cyclical but this is an industry. 
There are industrial processes involved in the cigarettes market and there 
is a considerable momentum created by the production of millions packs 
a day and hundreds of thousands of smokers seeking to buy” (BG-E3).
Most criminal entrepreneurs maintain reserves – a number of master 
cases of each shipment are set aside and revenue from them is placed in 
a reserve fund. This fund has two functions (BG-E3). The first is insurance 
against unexpected losses – such as those made by inexperienced new 
entrants – and additional expenses at turning points of the operation. 
The latter usually arise at times when the network is being restored 
after a critical moment – before its various parts fall into place and start 
operating smoothly the system is vulnerable to various hitches, such as 
365 Owners of industrial enterprises allowing only one illegal cigarettes vendor to enter the 
premises and sell to the workers.
366 Orders are placed over the phone or online and delivered only if the vendor knows the client 
personally. New clients are admitted only after a recommendation.
Таble 38. proFits in an “hourglass” sMuggling scheMe in bulgaria
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on the interviews.
Buys
(€/pack)
Sells
(€/pack)
Monthly margin 
excluding expenditure 
and corruption fees (€)
Level 1, buys 3- 10 cartons 0.77-0.82 0.92-1.03 150-1,200
Level 2, buys up and pools 
8-15 master cases
0.92-1.03 1.28 2,500-7,700
Level 3, buys 2-14 cartons 1.28 1.54 150-1,200
Access to capital 
in critical moments
226 Financing	oF	organised	crime
law enforcement seizures, merchandise being lost or stolen, deceit by a 
trading partner, etc. Seizures in particular can go up by 15-20% at such 
times thus necessitating additional bribery expense for law enforcement 
officers,367 magistrates, lawyers, etc. At the end of the criminal career 
there is also the “exiting” expense – if a criminal entrepreneur wants 
to retire uneventfully he needs to insure himself against prosecution or 
media inquiries (BG-E17, BG-C1, BG-C2).
Although there have been fewer seizures, the damages suffered by crimi-
nals have grown (BG-E17, BG-C1). “If you’ve lost twice in a row and 
you are short on cash, you need to borrow. If you can’t borrow from 
friends, then you will have to pay high interest or give the creditors a 
stake in the business. In any case, they will require a collateral – they 
would have researched you and know what you own. Another blunder, 
and you are out for good” (BG-C2).
The second function of the reserve is related to the need of maintaining 
liquidity of the criminal capital. Money cannot be invested in something 
with limited liquidity such as real estate. “You can’t buy a car or a 
seaside villa, you can’t keep it in the bank. It needs to be in cash in 
high denomination notes, best of all euro” (BG-C1).
At the level of the Greek hub there is a specific form of capital raising – 
network financing. At critical times – such as the second half of 2011 
when it seemed that action would be taken against the hub – players at 
that level mobilised resources within the network. „There were at least 4 
or 5 ships loaded with varying numbers of containers that are just cruising 
around unable to dock as they will be nailed. The merchandise, however, 
has been paid for. Couple of guys went to check what are the chances of 
going through Georgia. […] If they would let us work, enough money can 
be put together, and then they can seize all they want; only if we could be 
allowed to work for a while” (BG-C1). The loss of containers is a calculated 
damage, and in these cases the other players can help, even “the person 
can be allowed not to pay back“ (BG-C1). The only irreparable damage to 
the hub can be inflicted at the political level, in which case even networked 
financing cannot help and other means need to be sought (BG-E17).
In the period 2009 – 2011, the seizure of one container required the 
sale of 3-4 containers to cover the losses. It depends, however, how the 
cigarettes have been seized. If uncovered at the warehouse, then the 
costs are not significant – lawyers, fines, etc. If captured during inland 
transportation, however, the damage could equal the value of a whole 
container. As a result, in recent years cigarettes would not be typically 
stored in warehouses but a kind of mobile warehousing would be used – 
trucks and vans load and offload without going through storage facilities, 
the locations for transfer being arranged at the last minute.
367 An example is the case of an informer who had to leave his van to be loaded by a large 
importer (the conspiracy requirement is to leave the van open with keys hidden somewhere in 
the vehicle). When law enforcement tracked the empty van, a special police unit was called 
in but found nothing in the warehouses. Later, the importer demanded the informer recoup 
the €40,000 he had to pay the police to remove the cigarettes container. The subsequent 
investigation uncovered two police officers who took the money, and had also previously 
prevented several law enforcement operations (BG-E2, BG-E20).
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Another model applies to players down the chain of distribution. The 
creditor is also the head of the distribution network. “If I borrow €1,000, 
in 10 days I need to pay back €1,250. I need to pay back after 20 days, 
the latest. If you are late, he has a group that collects debts. If there 
is a surety, he is also held responsible” (BG-C3). These creditors can, 
however, help when there are problems with the sales, in which cases 
the interest is smaller or the repayment period is longer. “There was 
no interest – just a deadline, depending on the amount borrowed. Of 
course, there had to be a collateral” (BG-C4).
Overall, raising criminal capital at critical moments presents the 
entrepreneurs with a choice between two options. The first option 
is to figure out whether it is cheaper and less risky to transfer funds 
from another illegal business – e.g. VAT fraud or illegal logging – than 
to borrow against high interest – or to seek a co-investor with whom 
to share the profit. The second option is to use money from a legal 
business in which case the downside is the cost for the legalisation of 
the funds. Given that, according to BG-E3, in Bulgaria this cost is not 
high, the demand for expensive external funding would be lower than in 
countries with stricter enforcement of money laundering regulations.
Tobacco smuggling is a common criminal activity in Greece, due to its 
important geographical position situated in the route of the tobacco 
smuggling from Asia or North Africa to Europe. As a result, Greece has 
become a source, transit and destination country. The extent of the 
Greek land and sea borders, the large number of Greek islands and 
long coastline are factors facilitating tobacco smuggling. This cross-border 
criminal activity is operated almost exclusively by organised criminal 
groups consisting of members from more than one nation, with specific 
roles, duties and responsibilities.
Tobacco smuggling and illicit tobacco trafficking are investigated and 
prosecuted by the Hellenic Police, Financial and Economic Crime Unit, 
Customs Office, Coast Guard and the Public Prosecutors. They cooperate 
with each other and with other European agencies, such as Europol, 
Eurojust, OLAF, to synchronise their actions and be more effective. 
This type of smuggling has serious consequences for the economy of 
the member states of the European Union because of lost revenue 
and ill effects on public health (because of the questionable quality of 
contraband tobacco), and in the funding of organised crime.
In the Greek criminal justice system tobacco smuggling was not con-
sidered organised crime until 2012 and, as a result, members of such 
groups when arrested were not convicted for participating in a criminal 
organisation and given mild convictions. This has been a crucial factor 
in relation to the spread of tobacco smuggling in Greece during the last 
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decade. Another key factor is that since 2008 the cigarettes excise tax 
has been increased, so the retail price per packet also increased from 
€2.10 in 2007368 to €3.90 in 2014. This tax policy in combination with 
the widely shared attitude that avoiding tax payment is not a serious 
crime created a considerable interest in illicit whites and caused the 
spread of smuggling. As a result of changing criminal policy, the police 
report on organised crime identified 19 OCGs in 2011,369 while the same 
report for 2005 had only 5.370
Organised crime groups involved in tobacco smuggling are divided into 
those that deal with the illegal importation and transfer of the tobacco 
from abroad to Greece or to Northern and Western European markets, 
and those that deal exclusively with the selling of tobacco products in 
Greek markets.
“There seems to be a range of ‘entities’ involved in cigarette smuggling 
that can be placed on a continuum. […] In addition, there are specific 
‘actors’ in the cigarette smuggling business in Greece including the 
corrupt public officials, and the legal sector.”371
In general, in Southern Europe, a sector of the Italian mafia is one of the 
main dealers in tobacco smuggling and they transport huge quantities of 
illegal tobacco products from Albania, FYROM and Croatia to Sardinia 
and Naples by high speed boats.
Criminal organisations are generally not confined by national borders. 
They often create partnerships within and outside the EU either with 
individuals or with other networks to commit individual or multiple 
crimes. These groups appear to be increasingly involved in the legal and 
illegal market, using experts who are not criminals and also non-criminal 
structures, assisting them in their criminal activities. In addition, they 
enjoy the freedom of movement of capital, goods, people and services 
in the EU. Some criminal organisations, especially indigenous groups, 
move towards low risk – high reward (cigarettes, alcohol, outdoor crime) 
than to high risk crime (drugs).372
This happens for a number of reasons:
• the penal consequences for those who sell illicit cigarettes are lower 
than for drug dealers while the rewards are high in both crimes;
368 G. A. Antonopoulos, “Μετανάστευση, συνομωσία του άλλου και οργανωμένο έγκλημα στην 
Ελλάδα [Alien Conspiracy and Organised Crime in Greece]”, Egklimatologia, Nomiki Vivliothiki 2, 
no. 11 (2011): 38.
369 Hellenic Police, Ετήσια Έκθεση για το οργανωμένο έγκλημα στην Ελλάδα για το έτος 2011 [Annual 
Report on Organized Crime in Greece for 2011], 37.
370 Hellenic Police, Ετήσια Έκθεση για το οργανωμένο έγκλημα στην Ελλάδα για το έτος 2005 [Annual 
Report on Organized Crime in Greece for 2005], 2005, 14.
371 G. A. Antonopoulos, “The Greek Connection(s): The Social Organisation of the Cigarette-
Smuggling Business in Greece”, European Journal of Criminology 5, no. 3 (2008): 6, 28.
372 Bruggeman, “Η καταπολέμηση του οργανωμένου εγκλήματος: δυνατότητες, προβλήματα και 
ευκαιρίες, με ειδικότερη έμφαση Στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση [Fighting Organised Crime: Capabilities, 
Problems and Opportunities, with Emphasis on the European Union”, 316.
Market overview
national	criminal	markets	and	Finances:	illicit	tobacco	trade	 229
• law enforcement agencies focus on drugs trafficking due to their 
serious consequences in social, economic and political terms;
• the capital needed for doing business is smaller in tobacco smuggling 
than in drugs.
Most OCGs have many members – from 15-20 to much more than 
that – both Greeks and foreigners. Greeks usually are the leaders, as far 
as the selling of tobacco in Greece is concerned or taking care of the 
transportation by trucks to another European country, while foreigners 
are responsible for the import. “Roles of the persons involved in tobacco 
smuggling are several and quite different: the wholesaler, the procurers, 
the street vendors, the scouters, the warehouse guards, the legitimate 
shop owners, the thieves – burglars, the drivers, the protectors, the 
deputies, the cashiers and the corrupted officials.”373
Those groups used to change often the lower hierarchy members, who 
are usually foreigners, in order to protect the leaders of the criminal 
groups from being identified by the authorities. It is interesting to note 
that in cases where ships were confiscated, most of the persons arrested 
were from East European countries (Romania, Ukraine, etc.).
Organised criminal groups often use legitimate companies in tobacco 
smuggling. They buy established companies or start new ones which 
are active in legitimate import/export (e.g. frozen foods in a notorious 
case in Athens374) and they add tobacco when transporting the 
products by ship or lorry. In a recent case, the leaders of a criminal 
group had established several companies in Greece and Bulgaria 
and they used them to send products along with illicit tobacco. 
Furthermore, it is known that OCGs are linked with legal businesses 
such as transport companies which occasionally play an important 
role in smuggling the tobacco from the country/place of origin to the 
destination country/place.
A new trend is for criminals to hide the tobacco or cigarettes in 
refrigerated containers (under the floor for example) that contain legitimate 
products for legitimate companies which have no involvement in the 
tobacco smuggling and their owners or their employees know nothing 
about it. After the delivery of the products to the legitimate companies, 
the criminals who had tracked the route of the containers take the 
“empty” containers under their possession by buying or hiring them, thus 
managing to receive the hidden tobacco or cigarettes.
According to the General Secretariat of Inland Revenue, the seizures of 
contraband tobacco products made by all the state authorities during 
the first half of 2013 rose 116% in comparison to the first half of 2012. 
Ninety-two per cent of the 820 confiscations made were related to 
amounts of cigarettes up to 50,000 pieces – a rise of 129%, which 
is more than double in comparison to the first half of 2012. Between 
373 Antonopoulos, “The Greek Connection(s): The Social Organisation of the Cigarette-Smuggling 
Business in Greece”.
374 Lambropoulos, V. “Εταιρείες τροφίμων σε ευρύ κύκλωμα διακίνησης λαθραίων τσιγάρων [Food 
Companies in a Wide Circuit Trafficking Contraband Cigarettes]”, To Vima, October 09, 2012.
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January and August 2013 129,404,100 cigarettes were seized.375 According 
to GR-E5, four billion illegal cigarettes are sold every year in Greece, 
which is about 20% of the total consumption, causing about €600 
million of revenue loss annually.
According to one of the experts interviewed, the Papastratos Company 
loses about €25 million every year (GR-E5). The results of a Phillip 
Morris commissioned study by AC Nielsen of the illicit tobacco market 
in September 2013 (which involved collecting 6,000 empty packs of 
cigarettes in 20 cities in Greece and identifying them as original/legal or 
counterfeit/illegal products) show that:
• 19.5% of the cigarettes sold are illegal and this number is 6.1% higher 
than the previous year (2012);
• three quarters of illegal cigarettes have no information about their des-
tination country (e.g. signs referred to the domestic market, as counter-
feited domestic tax stamps or security marks, pictorial health warnings);
• estimates show that the 
share of illicit tobacco 
consumption increased from 
2.2% in 2008 to 19.5% in 
2013 (Figure 25).
According to the Financial 
and Economic Crime Unit,376 
417 shipments containing 744 
million cigarettes were seized in 
2011; in 2012, 1,151 shipments 
with 456 million cigarettes 
were seized. The latest data 
from the Unit show that in the 
first half of 2013 there were 
162 investigations in relation to 
tobacco smuggling, 64 people 
were charged, 104 cases of 
smuggling were monitored and 
129,404,100 cigarettes were 
confiscated.
In 2011, the Hellenic Police377 
dealt with 417 cases of tobacco 
smuggling, where 19 criminal 
375 Statistics provided by Mavraganis, “Presentation at the Foundation for Economic and Industrial 
Research Conference about the Illicit Tobacco Trafficking”, 50.
376 The Financial and Economic Crime Unit is a body of the Ministry of Finance, specialised 
in financial fraud/embezzlement, money laundering, VAT fraud, etc. It has a subdivision 
responsible for drug trafficking that also deals with tobacco smuggling, because of the serious 
economic consequences of this crime.
377 The Department of Protection of Property Rights of the Hellenic Police deals with the 
investigation of economic crime against individuals, companies or the state. As regards tobacco 
smuggling, the Department mainly deals with sharing information, and after accessing the 
information the Service goes ahead with investigations of certain places or/and vehicles in the 
area. Because the phenomenon has international dimensions, the police investigation extends 
to the level of exploitation channels of international police cooperation.
Figure 25. estiMate oF the share oF illicit tobacco consuMption 
in greece (2008 – 2013)
Source: N. Theofilopoulos, “Presentation at the Foundation for Economic 
and Industrial Research Conference on Illicit Tobacco Trafficking” 
(Athens: Unpublished, 25 November, 2013).
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organisations and 169 members were involved. In addition, it is estimated 
that taxes of €125 million were lost from tobacco smuggling for that year 
only.378 The Deputy Chief of Hellenic Police claimed that the seizures of 
contraband cigarettes conducted by the authorities in 2012 were 176% 
more than in 2011 and the lost taxes are estimated to be about €70 
million.379
According to the Centre of Planning and Economic Research (KEPE) – 
the largest economics research institute in Greece – the consumption 
of illicit cigarettes reached 18.8% in 2012 compared to 15.9% in 2011 
and 12.6% in 2010.380 Insofar as illicit cigarettes are cheaper, this is not 
a surprising reaction to the economic crisis.
The market is structured hierarchically but, according to the Hellenic 
Police, few details are known because arrested offenders are usually 
low in the hierarchy – e.g. the driver or the person who is responsible 
for the warehouse – and so little information can be obtained from 
interrogating them.
“In respect to the distribution of contraband cigarettes, there is an 
open and a closed market. The open market exists in the centre of 
Athens, Thessaloniki and Piraeus or at public markets in specific areas 
throughout the whole city on specific days of the week. According 
to media references there used to be an open market in contraband 
cigarettes in Patras, Heraklion and Larissa in the mid-1990s. The ‘closed’ 
market, on the other hand, is not geographically limited. Finally, violence 
is not an integral part of the cigarette smuggling business in Greece. A 
discount may be given to closed market customers buying medium to 
large quantities of cigarettes.”381
378 Hellenic Police, Ετήσια Έκθεση για το οργανωμένο έγκλημα στην Ελλάδα για το έτος 2011 [Annual 
Report on Organized Crime in Greece for 2011], 36.
379 Statistics provided by A. Stamatakis, “Presentation at the Foundation for Economic and 
Industrial Research Conference on Illicit Tobacco Trafficking” (Athens: Unpublished, November 
25, 2013). The figure refers to revenue leakage from the quantities of the confiscated 
cigarettes, not from the total amount of illegal cigarettes sold in the domestic market for this 
period of time.
380 Centre of Planning and Economic Research, http://www.kepe.gr/images/pdf/Press%20Office/
Press78gr.pdf
381 Antonopoulos, “The Greek Connection(s): The Social Organisation of the Cigarette-Smuggling 
Business in Greece”.
Таble 39. nuMber oF ocgs and lost revenue in tobacco sMuggling 
in greece (2011)
Source: Hellenic Police, Ετήσια έκθεση για το οργανωμένο έγκλημα στην Ελλάδα για το έτος 2011 [Annual Report on Organized Crime in 
Greece for 2011] (Athens: Ministry of Public Order and Citizen Protection, 2013), 36.
Cases Number of OCGs Members Revenue leakage
417 19 169 €125,000,000
Market structure 
and actors
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Organised crime groups who deal in tobacco usually cooperate with 
each other in transporting the tobacco across more than two countries 
(especially when they have to transport a large amounts) as well as in 
selling it to several markets in Greece or abroad (mainly).
Organised crime groups have tobacco smuggling as their main and 
sometimes sole illegal activity and they have members from many countries, 
especially from countries of origin, transportation or final destination of 
the tobacco, such as Northern Cyprus, Turkey, North Africa, Middle East, 
Balkan countries (including Greece) and Eastern Europe. Tobacco usually 
comes from China, Northern Cyprus, Egypt and other countries in North 
Africa, the Middle East, Qatar, Pakistan, Vietnam and the United Arab 
Emirates via sea shipments and is then transported by lorry to other 
countries or Greek cities. Destination countries are mainly the United 
Kingdom, some of the Scandinavian countries (Finland, Sweden), and also 
France, Germany, Poland, Belgium and any other European country in 
which the retail price of cigarettes is high. In Greece, the main routes 
of tobacco smuggling are from the Turkish sector of Cyprus (especially 
Famagusta) to Greek ports (Piraeus, Aigio, Kalamata, etc.), from FYROM 
and other Balkan countries to Greece, and finally from countries of the 
former Soviet Union to Greek islands via Turkey.
When cigarette smuggling OCGs get involved in other illegal activities 
these are usually trafficking in humans, drugs, fuel and arms. In addition, 
they commit a number of “auxiliary” crimes, including forgery of the 
necessary documents for the transportation of the tobacco, falsification 
of documents related to customhouse certification and bribery of officials 
(customs officers). Some of them are also experts in violent crimes 
(usually called “protectors”) taking care of debt collection from vendors 
or peddlers.
Corruption is another tool used by organised crime. It is common for 
corrupt civil servants to assist the OCGs in tobacco smuggling, especially in 
providing information about possible investigations in ports and customs. 
Although according to GR-E2 and GR-E3 “there is no corruption problem 
in tobacco smuggling (and smuggling in general), civil servants do their 
best and they have success in their job, despite the problems they face”, 
GR-E1, researchers, court practice, and recent reports by OLAF insist that 
there is civil servant corruption and that it is a crucial factor in the whole 
tobacco smuggling phenomenon. In a notorious tobacco smuggling case 
in Thessaloniki in 2010, four local police officers were arrested for joining 
a criminal organisation. According to the Hellenic Police,382 an extended 
criminal organisation which had installed an illegal cigarette factory 
in the town of Kassandreia in Chalkidiki and had set up a trafficking 
network in several European countries was dismantled. The investigation 
began in February 2010, by way of information received from OLAF, and 
culminated in September 2010 with the arrest of 20 people (17 Greeks 
and 3 foreigners), including 4 police officers. 
382 Hellenic Police, Δελτίο Τύπου της Γ.Α.Δ. Θεσσαλονίκης για εξάρθρωση πολυμελούς εγκληματικής 
οργάνωσης κατασκευής και διακίνησης λαθραίων τσιγάρων, 30.09.2010 [Press Release of Police 
Headquarters in Thessaloniki about the arrest of criminal organisation manufacturing and trafficking 
contraband cigarettes], September, 30 2010.
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Organised criminal groups prefer sea shipping for the smuggling. A 
ship (referred to as “the mother ship” in the criminal jargon) would 
ostensibly be carrying legal cargo, but when it reaches the shore the 
tobacco (“milk”) is unloaded by using high speed boats (“daughters”) and 
transported to isolated beaches where lorries receive it. After that, they 
keep it in warehouses and they push it to domestic markets or they 
transport it to markets abroad. Thus, sometimes they combine sea and 
land routes, especially in cross-border criminal activities.
According to the Deputy Chief of Hellenic Coast Guard, bills of lading 
and cargo manifests usually contain elements that do not correspond to 
reality, as for example the companies stated to be sending and receiving 
are non-existent or the loading of tobacco products is not certified by the 
authorities of the loading port, but are just signed by the captain. These 
vessels either remain in international waters and offload the smuggled 
goods to smaller vessels in order to introduce them illegally into the 
country or they approach various locations on the Greek coastline and 
land their illegal cargo directly into lorries waiting ashore. According to the 
observations of the Hellenic Coast Guard, offloading areas are typically 
deserted and remote areas with minimal lighting such as Peloponnese, 
Ionian Islands and Crete. Regardless of how the smuggled tobacco products 
enter into the country, their transfer towards Central Europe has been 
observed to occur predominantly from vehicles in external ports via ships 
from Igoumenitsa and Patras. The illegal cargo is either carefully hidden 
inside legal cargo, in the event of vehicles, or in specially designed vaults in 
the vehicle, in the case of transportation of vehicles of all types. Overland, 
tobacco smugglers have used buses (bus, coach exterior), unbeknownst 
to the owners and their drivers, where offenders either carry smuggled 
products as luggage or send it as unaccompanied parcels.383
Another modus operandi is hiding the tobacco products in legal cargo 
(e.g. scrap) and avoiding customs checking and searching. According to 
interviewed experts, there are so many containers arriving in the ports 
of Piraeus, Thessaloniki, Volos and Heraklion that the Custom Office is 
unable to check them all, because they do not have either the personnel 
or the technological equipment to deal with the amount of containers 
(GR-E2, GR-E3). As an example, none of the Custom Offices has X-ray 
machines in order to examine the content of the containers properly and 
Greece is the only EU country that does not have such equipment. It is 
estimated that in Greek ports, only 2% of the total arriving containers are 
checked by the Customs Office. Organised criminal groups awaiting such 
cargo receive information (probably from inside) when their containers 
are spotted by the authorities and nobody appears to receive them. In 
most cases the names and the tax ID number of the legal entities or the 
person who is the formal receiver are fake and the smugglers use forged 
documents or stolen ID cards in order to receive the cargo.
Also popular is the modus operandi known as “fake transit:” criminal 
groups present to the Custom Office a cargo of legal cigarettes as 
383 D. Tsiadis, “Presentation at the Foundation for Economic and Industrial Research Conference 
on Illicit Tobacco Trafficking” (Athens: Unpublished, November 25, 2013).
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transit with final destination a Balkan country (Bulgaria, FYROM, Albania, 
Montenegro, and Serbia), but the cargo never reaches those countries or 
it reaches the destination country and is immediately illegally returned 
and sold on the Greek black market without paying any taxes.
Furthermore, in the region of Attica (which covers the city of Athens) 
the contraband tobacco or cigarettes are usually hidden and kept in 
warehouses in Koropi, Mandra and Aspropyrgos.
Greece is a hotspot of tobacco smuggling in the European Union and in 
2012 it had the 2nd highest percentage point increase in detected illicit 
trade.384 Hotspot areas in Greece are the city centres and street markets 
of Athens, Piraeus and other big cities (Heraklion, Patra, Thessaloniki, 
Volos, Ioannina) and the sellers are, as already noted, mainly foreigners. 
The popular locations of selling/buying products of tobacco smuggling 
in the centre of Athens are mainly Stournari Street, Omonia Square 
and Varvakios Market, where anyone can easily find foreign dealers 
(mainly from Pakistan and India), who sell in public view popular 
brands and illicit whites at low prices (about €1 per pack). In the city 
of Thessaloniki, the hotspots are Aristotelous Square and the area of 
Phillipou Chalkidaion where mainly women sell illicit whites even in 
front of mini markets.
As regards the actors in this business, according to one of the experts 
interviewed, the authorities manage to arrest suspects in less than half 
the tobacco smuggling cases they investigate because almost always the 
criminals use fake names (for companies or persons) in the relevant 
documents making it difficult to track the real identity of the suspects 
(GR-E2). In many cases the organised crime group hire a legitimate 
company to receive the cargo and they involve many other real or fake 
companies, in order to make the connection between them and the 
illicit tobacco difficult. As for the drivers of the trucks that transport the 
illegal tobacco from/to warehouses or Customs Office, they usually do 
not know that they transport cigarettes.
According to another expert, many members of groups dealing in illegal 
tobacco have criminal records full of tobacco smuggling convictions 
(GR-E1). Those people stay in prison for a while and when released go 
back to business using their profits from the past or using money given 
to them by the organisation as a “welcome back gift.” In the meanwhile, 
they never testify against the criminal organisation they belong to and 
in return the criminal group supports them during their dealing with the 
criminal justice system (they hire lawyers, they give them money for the 
period of incarceration, they take care of their family). It should be noted 
that “although the majority of people arrested for cigarette smuggling 
by the Coast Guard are foreigners, this does not necessarily reflect the 
foreigners involvement in this trade but their involvement in these ‘posts’ 
that are vulnerable to (aggressive) law enforcement.”385
384 KPMG, Project Star. 2012 Results.
385 Antonopoulos, “The Greek Connection(s): The Social Organisation of the Cigarette-Smuggling 
Business in Greece”.
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Sources of capital for criminal operations. Profile of financiers 
in criminal operations
“A criminal organisation performs its activities in a manner similar to that 
of a lawful business within the legal market. Criminal activities are able 
to offer services and goods through the use of violence, intimidation 
and corruption. […] In addition, criminal activities are able to deform 
competition when penetrating into the legal economy, since they can 
rely on dirty money and capitalise again in legal entities with the 
proceeds of criminal activities.”386
The source of money used to set up the cross-border smuggling is 
usually other crimes. According to one of the experts interviewed “never 
did someone invest legitimate money in such an operation”, at least 
in the cases he has been handling (GR-E1). All interviewees noted that 
OCGs use proceeds from tobacco smuggling in order to invest in other 
criminal activities in the same field.
In a well-known case of tobacco smuggling, the Supreme Court decided 
that it was proved during the hearing that two members of an organised 
criminal group were guilty of transferring large amounts of money via the 
banking system for the purpose of buying new contraband tobacco.387
Regarding the initiating of their operations, OCGs that want to get 
involved in tobacco smuggling first need to find a contact to lead them 
to a key person or criminal organisation in the production country, in 
order to buy the amount of tobacco; and then they have to arrange 
the transportation and the delivery in Greece. A member of the local 
criminal organisation sometimes travels to the country of production in 
order to arrange the details of the transactions. When the first profit 
comes it is re-invested in further smuggling operations. From then on, 
the business grows and higher profits allow the criminals to expand to 
the next level of trade. In addition, they have available a serious amount 
of money for bribing of civil servants in order to make their smuggling 
operation easier and more effective.
It is not uncommon for successful organisers of smuggling operations 
to invest their profits in buying high technology equipment and bulk 
tobacco in order to set up their own manufacturing of illicit cigarettes. 
In one case, a Greek leader of a smuggling group in cooperation with 
a criminal organisation in Bulgaria invested his profits from crime along 
with money from his Bulgarian partners in setting up such a factory in 
the area of Chalkidiki, near Thessaloniki.388 In 2010, the Department 
of Drug Enforcement managed to locate an illegal cigarette production 
factory in the area of Menidi – near Athens. This factory was producing 
counterfeited Marlboro cigarettes using tobacco of unknown origin and 
many people were arrested (many were from the former Soviet countries). 
386 Bruggeman, “Η καταπολέμηση του οργανωμένου εγκλήματος: δυνατότητες, προβλήματα και 
ευκαιρίες, με ειδικότερη έμφαση στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση [Fighting Organised Crime: Capabilities, 
Problems and Opportunities, with Emphasis on the European Union”, 316.
387 Areios Pagos 461/2011.
388 Areios Pagos 463/2011, Areios Pagos 473/2011.
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27 tonnes of tobacco and 3 million cigarettes were confiscated, along with 
5 high technology machines, 1 truck and other cars. This operation was 
crucial, because the authorities managed to send a message to organised 
crime groups, that they are not able to set up cigarette production 
factories in Greece, and they won’t raise their profits this way.
Much more information is available about the middle and lower level 
criminals than the OCGs leaders. Those at the lower levels reveal nothing 
about their bosses for fear of repercussions against themselves or their 
families. Criminals at the top of the hierarchy own clubs, bars, etc., but 
in general they want their fame in the business to be based on tobacco 
smuggling; they want to be known as “cigarette men” (“tsigarades” in 
Greek).
These kinds of organised criminal groups are “networking” with civil 
servants and they often know if they are being investigated. Their 
relationship with the civil servants protects them and makes crucial 
information available to them whenever law enforcement uncovers a 
cargo with contraband tobacco or cigarettes. In such cases, the criminal 
group abandons the cargo and the opportunity for their arrest disappears 
as the documents of the cargo mention fake names and tax numbers.
The typical method used for payment in the first stage of buying a 
large quantity of tobacco is cash. Sometimes part of the agreed amount 
of money is paid at the time of ordering as a guarantee and the rest 
at the time of receiving the tobacco/cigarettes. In a well-known case 
in Greece, the criminal group’s leader transferred 400 million drachmas 
(about €1.17 million) through companies that he and his partners 
had created in Greece and Bulgaria to another criminal group as a 
guarantee for the funding of illicit trafficking of tobacco and cigarettes; 
part of this amount was paid every time a delivery of tobacco/cigarettes 
was made.389 For this scheme, two Bulgarian citizens had established 
a clothing company in Bulgaria with Greek company managers who 
at the end were convicted in Greece for cigarette smuggling. After its 
establishment the company created another company (a transportation 
company this time) in order to be used in transporting the clothes 
from/to Greece (another clothing company belonging to the same 
Greek persons was involved) or to other European countries. However, 
along with these goods, cigarettes were transported illegally with the 
complicity of corrupt Bulgarian and Greek custom officers. It must be 
noted that the Bulgarian company was based close to the borders 
with Greece and the Supreme Court noted that this company was the 
connection between the Greek leaders of the criminal organisation 
and the Bulgarian OCGs. According to the Court, there were several 
money transactions between the two clothing companies in relation 
to the official merchandise (clothes), and 400 million drachmas was 
paid by bank transfer for every new load of illicit cigarettes. In at least 
two more money transactions, a Bulgarian member of the criminal 
group agreed to take under his possession £650,000 and £142,500 was 
389 Areios Pagos 461/2011.
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imported in Greece from Bulgaria as exchange and he transferred the 
money in drachmas to the Greek clothing company.
As the investors of this kind of operations are usually the leaders of 
the criminal organisation, they ensure that they will take their share of 
the profit by using intimidation; to this end, they hire violent criminals 
who are both their bodyguards and debt collectors. The bodyguards are 
usually criminals who used to be “godfathers” in night clubs and are 
experts in violent crimes.
Following the import of the contraband tobacco and its distribution 
to retailers, payments take place after the sales. That happens mainly 
because the individual retailers cannot afford to pay in cash up-front 
before selling the cigarettes to the public.
Tobacco smuggling usually involves 70% illicit whites (especially the 
brands Gold Mount, Sovereign Gold, Raquel, RGD, Cleopatra, Royal, 
Camelford, Cooper, Camelot) and 30% counterfeit brands (mainly) 
and legal brands (rarely).390 In general organised criminal groups are 
smuggling many different brands: in one warehouse, almost 150 different 
counterfeited brands were found, though most of them were not known 
in Greece. Often, the legal brands are not cleared and they are sold 
in the illegal markets. It is interesting to note that the second largest 
quantity of illicit whites in the European Union was detected in Greece 
(2.8 billion cigarettes).391
Since the 2008 economic crisis in Greece, there has been a significant 
surge in the smuggling of illicit whites because of their low price; 
generally, according to the interviewees, whenever the government raises 
the taxation level there is an increase of the trafficking and selling of 
illicit tobacco products. When the government announces that the price 
of tobacco will be increased, the criminal organisations withhold their 
illegal products from the market for a period of time and only release it 
only after the legitimate tobacco has a new, higher price.
As an indication of the reduced consumption of legal brands, in 2013 the 
number of lawful tobacco selling points in Attica was 6,440, down from 
10,550 in 2009.392 This presumably was the result of the spread of illicit 
trade of tobacco/cigarettes in combination with the economic crisis.
For the tobacco companies in Greece – mainly Phillip Morris (brands 
as Marlboro, Assos, Philip Morris, L&M, Muratti, Zante), Karelias and 
SEKAP – the cost of a legal cigarette pack is €0.50, while for the 
organised criminal groups, the cost of an illegal one is €0.10-€0.15 and 
the end consumer buys it for €1.393
390 KPMG, Project Star. 2012 Results; Newspaper Imerisia, June 30, 2014.
391 Ibid.; Newspaper Imerisia, June 30, 2014.
392 To Choni, “Θέλουν να κλείσουν 2.500 περίπτερα [They Want to Close 2,500 Kiosks]”, To Choni, 
January 03, 2013.
393 Information provided by interviewees from the Hellenic Police and the Financial and Economic 
Crime Unit.
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Additionally, according to the Union of Attica Tobacco Retailers, in 
some cases – especially in the Asian countries manufacturing tobacco 
products – the cost of a pack of 20 illicit cigarettes is about 4-7 cents 
and the selling price is 70 cents, so the profit of the criminal group is 
huge.394
The main products of tobacco smuggling are popular brands or illicit 
whites, but nowadays many people buy hand-rolling tobacco (HRT) in a 
small bag of half a kilo for €10. It is well known in Greece that one kilo 
of HRT costs €20 and it is easily accessible, even online.395
Since the new trend in Greece is selling HRT and not cigarettes, two of 
the experts interviewed believe that for every 10 tonnes of illicit HRT, 
state revenue loses about €2 million from unpaid taxes (GR-E2, GR-E3).
It is well known that some HRT illegal vendors are associates of small 
producers from Greece, who prefer risking and selling their product 
illegally to the public without paying any taxes than selling it to the 
legal tobacco companies.396 This does not seem to be organised criminal 
activity yet, rather an illicit network. But if its expansion follows the path 
that it is expected (due to the popularity of HRT in the black market), 
then it is almost certain that this network will be transformed into a 
criminal group with the features of an organisation. It is also possible the 
already existing criminal groups will turn their attention to HRT, if they 
believe that in this way they will earn more money.
The retailers are almost always foreigners: illegal immigrants from Pakistan 
or Bangladesh, people from Ukraine, Romania or the former Soviet 
Union (especially Pontian Greeks who left the Soviet Union) and they 
sell the illicit tobacco products in the streets or in their shops (e.g. mini 
markets). Some of them used to sell fake products (purses, watches, 
etc.) in the past, but the economic crisis made them change their 
merchandise. They usually take the cigarettes from an apartment in the 
centre of the city held by a Russian-Pontian man; the vendor has only 
one carton with him, and when he is on the road, he hides the other 
cartons in different places close to his peddling location. It is estimated 
that small vendors earn about €1 on each carton and in some rare 
cases their profit may be up to €2, while the price of the carton is 
about €15 on the black market.
In the case of land shipment, it is usual and necessary for the criminal 
group to rent warehouses. In the district of Attica the illegal tobacco or 
cigarettes are usually hidden in warehouses in Koropi, Mandra, Menidi 
and Aspropyrgos (most of the big warehouses have been identified in 
Menidi and Aspropyrgos). There are also smaller warehouses in apartments 
in the centre of Athens and Thessaloniki, where they put the cigarettes 
394 Ibid.
395 Based on information provided from interviewees from the Hellenic Police and the Financial 
and Economic Crime Unit, and Theofilopoulos, “Presentation at the Foundation for Economic 
and Industrial Research Conference on Illicit Tobacco Trafficking”.
396 Paschalis, T. “«Στριφτό» και αφορολόγητο [‘Hand-rolled’ and Tax Free]”, Eleftherotipia, February 05, 
2013.
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that the sellers receive the merchandise in portions in order to make it 
available on the black market. The cost of the rental of a warehouse of 
1,500 square meters is about €2,000 per month;397 other costs include 
buying cars, trucks, ships or other vessels, technological equipment for 
tobacco industry, etc. A significant cost is bribery as corrupt relations 
with the police can either protect a criminal group from prosecution or 
they can be used as a “weapon” against competitors.398
Regarding the cost to the government budget, it is well known that 
contraband tobacco and alcohol are dominated by organised criminal 
groups operating in China, Poland, Malaysia, Thailand, Ukraine, Russia 
and the Baltic countries, resulting in state budgets annually losing millions 
of euros. In developing countries, organised crime penetrates public 
institutions influencing decision making. The profits of countless illegal 
activities are legitimised by experts who are recruited by organised 
crime through their investment in lucrative businesses that provide the 
necessary legal coverage.
In March 2014, OLAF passed on information to the competent Greek 
authorities about three suspect containers arriving in Piraeus in Greece. 
The Greek authorities discovered that two of the three containers were 
in fact loaded with smuggled cigarettes – a total of 1,990 boxes of 
contraband cigarettes. While the first container was loaded with 998 
boxes of RGD brand cigarettes (that is 499,000 packages or 9.98 million 
pieces of cigarettes), the second one contained 992 boxes of Bon 
Classic brand cigarettes (496,000 packages or 9.92 million pieces). Unpaid 
duties and taxes on these smuggled cigarettes amounted to about €3.5 
million.399 Within a week, a similar operation was carried out which 
uncovered 998,000 packs or 19.96 million pieces of cigarettes. Unpaid 
duties and taxes on these smuggled cigarettes amounted to more than 
€3.5 million in this case, leading to a prevented loss of more than €7 
million in two recent operations carried out by the Greek authorities.400 
The investigation continues with authorities seeking to identify the 
intended recipient of these cigarettes, whose identity and address on the 
shipping documents were fake (as noted, criminals appear to receive the 
shipment only when they are sure it is safe, unless the container refers 
to a legitimate business with another existing company which has nothing 
to do with smuggling tobacco).
Generally, one container contains approximately 9.6 million cigarettes and 
the unpaid taxes are estimated to be about €1.4 million. In addition, one 
truckload of HRT contains approximately 10 tonnes of tobacco and the 
unpaid taxes are estimated to be about €1.9 million. According to the 
Greek government, taxes from the legitimate tobacco market in 2013 were 
only €2.5 billion, while in 2011 the taxes were €3.9 billion. This fall in 
receipts may be attributed significantly to the growth in illicit trade.401
397 Areios Pagos 473/2011.
398 Rizava, Οργανωμένο έγκλημα [Organised Crime], 171.
399 OLAF, Press Release No 3/2014, 13 March 2014.
400 OLAF, Press Release No. 4/2014, 19 March 2014.
401 Πασχαλη, “«Στριφτό» και αφορολόγητο [‘Hand-rolled’ and Tax Free]”.
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The legal framework in Greece has no provision about the profits from 
smuggling in general but only covers the value of the contraband goods 
with sanctions depending on that. Thus, the authorities responsible for 
the prosecution of such crimes do not focus on the profits, but on the 
goods and on the structure and function of the criminal organisation. 
The forfeiture of criminal assets is provided for in Article 76 of the Penal 
Code. Additionally, pursuant to Article 46, par. 1 of Law 3691/2008 
on the prevention and suppression of money laundering and of the 
financing of terrorism, the proceeds of any crime falling within the 
scope of this law, or the property acquired directly or indirectly through 
such proceeds, are liable to confiscation. Nevertheless, there is lack of 
statistical data about the confiscated assets or proceeds in general, so it 
is not possible to estimate the profits from smuggling by using a method 
related to confiscation of the proceeds.
On the other hand, the persons involved in tobacco smuggling are, as 
could be expected, unwilling to talk about this mechanism, especially 
those in the lower levels of the hierarchy – who are the only ones 
accessible to researchers – because they fear repercussions if it is found 
out that they have given information about the illicit business.
In general, the retail price of illicit cigarettes is about €1-€1.50 per pack of 
20, while the legal ones cost €3.90. According to Papastratos’ staff, 85% of 
the retail price includes taxes of various kinds (e.g. VAT) and only 15% of 
the total price goes to the industries, the distributors and the vendors.
The possible profit may be estimated if the amount of seized contraband 
cigarettes is multiplied by their usual price on the black market. Table 40 
and Table 41 provide such a calculation based on a retail price per pack 
of €1.5 and wholesale buying of €0.15.
Profits can be transferred abroad in legitimate companies and – with the 
help of tax accountants – can be reinvested through money laundering 
mechanisms. Money laundering takes place in several forms, the main 
ones being the following:
• via legitimate companies listed on the Stock Exchange;
• through gambling – buying lottery tickets or bets from people who 
Profits and 
profit sharing
Таble 40. estiMated proFit FroM seized cigarettes 
in greece (2011 – 2013)
Source: G. Mavraganis, “Presentation at the Foundation for Economic and Industrial Research Conference about the Illicit Tobacco 
Trafficking” (Athens: Unpublished, November 25, 2013), 50.
Year Seized shipments Number of seized cigarettes Potential profit (€)
2011 417 744,000,000 50,220,000
2012 1,151 456,000,000 30,780,000
January-August 2013 - 129,404,100 8,734,776
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have already won, so by showing those documents they can justify 
the source of their illegal money;
• via professional football and basketball companies – by reporting 
higher profit than the real one and have it for themselves as owners 
or by reporting less expenses than the real ones.
A popular method is buying betting coupons and lottery tickets from the 
winners or the bookmakers at a higher price than the amount of money 
that they have won. A Greek cocaine dealer (the notorious Angelopoulos 
case in 2004), claimed that in a few years he had won more than 
€8 million from bets in football games and lotteries. The newspapers 
commented that he must be one of the luckiest people in the world.402
In general, as regards money laundering by organised criminal groups 
in the Balkans, there is a significant information gap. Most of the 
illegal profits are sent back to their home regions and the remainder 
is reinvested in ongoing criminal activities. The problem of tobacco 
smuggling is very extensive due to the easy access of Albanian groups 
to large loads of cheap cigarettes manufactured in Eastern European 
countries. Many countries suffer serious consequences of this trade, 
especially Greece.403
The fact that in Epanodos – a database of the Scientific Center for the 
Rehabilitation of Former Inmates of Correctional Institutions, a body of 
the Ministry of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights – there is no 
evidence of individuals convicted for tobacco smuggling (while 1,286 
persons have visited its office) can be explained by the hypothesis that 
in critical moments the members of organised criminal groups may have 
402 Λ. Βασίλης, “Εμπορος κοκαϊνης κέρδισε 600 φορέσ στο τζόκερ και το στοίχημα σε 12 μήνεσ 
[Cocaine Dealer Won 600 Times in Lotto and Bets in 12 Months]”, To Vima, November 01, 
2013.
403 Bruggeman, “Η καταπολέμηση του οργανωμένου εγκλήματος: δυνατότητες, προβλήματα και 
ευκαιρίες, με ειδικότερη έμφαση στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση [Fighting Organised Crime: Capabilities, 
Problems and Opportunities, with Emphasis on the European Union”, 316.
Таble 41. estiMated proFit FroM tobacco sMuggling in relation 
to the aMount oF packets traFFicked in Four well known 
cases in greece*
      * These four cases and the court verdicts do not cover the organised group’s total criminal activity, but just the last one that 
law enforcement agencies managed to expose.
Source: Supreme Court.
Supreme Court Decision No. Number of cigarette packs Potential profit (€)
1213/2011 1,966,400 2,654,640
769/2011 305,500 412,425
473/2011 17,262,910 23,304,928
135/2010 2,209,920 2,983,392
Access to capital 
in critical moments
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access to capital in order to assist a “colleague” who has just been 
released from prison.
According to interviewees, loan sharks are a common way of financing 
criminal groups. Especially, officials from the Hellenic Police state that 
there are many cases where the criminal groups look to loan sharks for 
the financing of their business. However, the Greek financial crisis has 
blocked the ability of this illegal market to provide large amounts of 
money to those that are in need, not least because there is greater risk 
as far as repayment is concerned. On the other hand, it is in such times 
when loan sharks thrive.
The Hellenic Police estimates that nowadays the amount of money 
given to criminal groups by loan sharks ranges between €200,000 and 
€300,000. These “black bankers” often keep collateral – an expensive 
car or a promissory note that a house will be bought at a lower price. 
Historical background, main features of the criminal market and recent trends
The illicit tobacco trade has a very long history in the UK. In the first half 
of the 18th century, the Isle of Man was used as a warehouse of tobacco 
and other commodities waiting to be smuggled into the mainland. It was 
said that every man, woman and child of the island was involved in the 
illegal tobacco trade in one way or another.404 The contemporary trade 
in illicit tobacco in the UK is an extremely dynamic and mutating market, 
which has an impact not only on British law enforcement authorities, but 
also on their continental European counterparts, since countries such as 
the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany act as transit points for tobacco 
products destined for the UK.405 Since the late 1980s, when the issue 
became a more serious concern for the British authorities, the trade has 
undergone various transformations. Although the amount of seized illegal 
tobacco products has increased since 1999 and remained somewhat 
stable since 2005,406 generally, the nature of the illicit tobacco market 
has been changing. Specifically:
• From the late 1980s and up until the beginning of the 2000s legal 
tobacco manufacturers were involved in the smuggling of billions of 
packs of their own brands. Gallaher (as they were known then) – 
BAT, Philip Morris, and RJ Reynolds – were major actors in the illicit 
tobacco business in the UK (and abroad). They created an illegal
 
404 G. Smith, Smuggling in the Bristol Channel, 1700-1850 (Newbury: Countryside Books, 1989); R. C. 
Nash, “The English and Scottish Tobacco Trade in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: 
Legal and Illegal Trade”, Economic History Review 35, no. 3 (1982): 354-72.
405 P. C. van Duyne and G. A. Antonopoulos, The Criminal Smoke of Tobacco Policy Making: Cigarette 
Smuggling in Europe (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2009).
406 Transcrime, The Factbook on the Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products: Issue 1 – United Kingdom. (Milan, 
2013).
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 market for their own brand of cigarettes in the UK by facilitating the 
exportation of cigarettes and then re-importing them into the UK. 
During that time, the UK became the central hub for contraband 
cigarettes. The Memoranda of Understanding between the Tobacco 
Manufacturers’ Association (TMA) companies and Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs (HMRC) signed in 2002, 2006 and 2013 have 
been instrumental in countering the illicit trade in tobacco products in 
the UK. Tobacco manufacturers are now exporting tobacco to Africa, 
China, India and elsewhere. 
• Since the mid-2000s, counterfeit cigarettes from China and Eastern 
Europe407 (from countries such as Ukraine and Poland) have taken a 
large share of the market in illegally traded tobacco products in the 
UK.408 In 2004, it was estimated that on average over one million 
counterfeit cigarettes were seized every day in the UK.409 Currently, 
there are a number of illegal factories that have been dismantled 
by the authorities in various localities such as Grimsby, Glasgow, 
Aberdeen, Chesterfield, etc.410
• From 2007 onwards, illicit whites started appearing in the UK market. 
In 2012, the UK had one of the highest consumption levels of illicit
 whites in the EU (1 bil-
lion cigarettes) presenting 
an increase of 49% since 
2011.411
• From 2008 onwards coun-
terfeit UK brands of hand-
rolling tobacco (HRT) begun 
to appear in Britain.412
Although the composition of 
the merchandise is changing 
(genuine UK brands, non-
UK brands, and counterfeit 
products), it does not, of 
course, mean that specific types 
of illegally traded cigarettes are 
not present. Currently, the UK 
illicit tobacco market is vibrant, 
with an above average size 
in comparison to other EU 
markets (Figure 26).413
Within this context it should 
be mentioned that although 
407 See A. Shen, G. A. Antonopoulos, and K. von Lampe, “The Dragon Breathes Smoke’: Cigarette 
Counterfeiting in the People’s Republic of China’”, British Journal of Criminology 50, no. 2 (2010): 
239-58.
408 The first significant seizures of contraband cigarettes in the UK were in 2000.
409 HMRC, Counterfeit Cigarettes 2004 (London, 2004).
410 See Transcrime, The Factbook on the Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products: Issue 1 – United Kingdom.
411 KPMG, Project Star. 2012 Results.
412 National Audit Office (UK), Progress in Tackling Tobacco Smuggling.
413 See KPMG, Project Star. 2012 Results.
Figure 26. coMposition oF large seizures oF cigarettes in the uk, 
2004 – 2013
Source: HMRC and UK Border Force data cited in National Audit Office (UK), Progress 
in Tackling Tobacco Smuggling (London, 2013).
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cigarette seizures have been stable since the mid-2000s, the seizures of 
HRT have been steadily increasing. It is also worth noting that along with 
the practical limitations that official statistics possess, counterfeit and 
contraband (but legally produced) tobacco products are sometimes mixed 
in the illegal market; something that affects further the quantification of 
the illegal market. In addition, according to customs intelligence, when 
illicit whites hit the market in Britain, almost immediately a Chinese 
counterfeit version of the illicit white brand Jin Ling also appeared in 
the British market.
According to the TMA,414 consumer spending on tobacco products in 2012 
amounted to an estimated £14 billion, approximately 90% of this was 
cigarettes and 10% hand rolling tobacco. The tax revenue from tobacco 
amounted to £12.1 billion (of which £9.5 billion was in excise duty and 
£2.6 billion in VAT). UK tobacco 
prices are the highest in the 
EU and the total tax burden 
accounts for 88% of the price 
of cigarettes sold in the country 
(Figure 27). The most recent 
consumption figures (2012) show 
that 51.5 billion cigarettes were 
consumed in that year and of 
those 11 billion cigarettes (21%) 
were UK non-duty paid.415 
The percentage of UK non-
duty paid tobacco products 
consumed in the UK constitutes 
16.4% of the overall market. It 
is also interesting to note that 
the UK presented the biggest 
increase in the consumption 
of contraband and counterfeit 
tobacco products in the EU 
from 2011 to 2012 (+6.4%).416
Tobacco products are expen-
sive in the UK and this has to 
be seen in light of the rela-
tive reduced affordability of 
tobacco products in the coun-
try.417 While the high taxation 
rate and the resulting price is 
a great incentive for the smug-
414 TMA, “Facts and Figures”. Tobacco Manufacturers Association, 2014, http://www.the-tma.org.uk/
tma-publications-research/facts-figures/
415 Non-UK duty paid comprises of cigarettes tax paid and non-tax paid from other countries, 
counterfeit cigarettes and illicit whites.
416 KPMG, Project Star. 2012 Results.
417 E. Blecher and C. van Walbeek, An Analysis of Cigarette Affordability (Paris: International Union 
Against Tuberculosis and Lung Disease, 2008); Transcrime, The Factbook on the Illicit Trade in 
Tobacco Products: Issue 1 – United Kingdom.
Market overview
Figure 27. preMiuM cigarette prices (per 20) in the uk, 
noveMber 2013
Source: TMA, “Facts and Figures”. Tobacco Manufacturers Association.
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gling of tobacco products, there are additional factors that play a signifi-
cant role, such as the presence of illegal trading networks, the likelihood 
of being caught and the severity of punishments,418 as well as a culture 
of accepting an illicit commodity as normal and tobacco smuggling as 
a “service” to the public.419 Generally, and compared to other illegal 
markets, tobacco smuggling is a relatively low risk and relatively high 
profit market.
Illegally traded tobacco can be 
bought at houses (also known 
as “tab houses”), at pubs and 
social clubs, shops, flea markets 
and car boot sales, at various 
workplaces or on the street. 
There was also a reference in 
the interviews to taxi drivers 
selling cigarettes in their taxis 
in Northern Ireland (UK-E1). 
Smaller quantities are also 
bought online and sent by the 
post, although the detection rate 
is quite high at the UK postal 
hub (Coventry). Generally, the 
predominant type of selling or 
selling practice depends on 
the locality.420 With regards 
to consumption of illegally 
traded and counterfeit tobacco 
products, there is not a single 
locality that is unaffected in 
the UK. However, there are 
variations at both the national 
level and at the level of the 
borough.421 On the national 
level, and according to data 
provided by the TMA (2013) there appears to be a high percentage 
of illegally traded cigarettes in the overall markets of London, East 
Midlands, Yorkshire & the Humber, South East England, South West 
England and West Midlands (Table 42422). Northern Ireland, Wales and 
Scotland show the smallest percentages in the UK. When it comes to 
hand-rolling tobacco, however, the picture with regards to market share 
changes dramatically, with consumption levels of non-UK duty paid 
products at their lowest in London.423 It is also interesting to note that 
418 See L. Joossens and M. Raw, “Strategic Directions and Emerging Issues in Tobacco Control”, 
Tobacco Control 21, no. 2 (2012): 230-34.
419 S. Wiltshire et al., “‘They’re Doing People a Service’: A Qualitative Study of Smoking, 
Smuggling and Social Deprivation”, British Medical Journal 323, no. 7306 (2001): 203-7.
420 See G. Power, Illicit Tobacco in Southeast London: A Survey of Smokers (London, 2013).
421 B. Williams and J. Williams, Tobacco in London: Attitudes to Smoking in the Capital. (London, 
2002).
422 See also G. Siggens, P. Murray, and S. Walters, West Midlands Regional Illicit Tobacco Survey 
(Billingham, 2010).
423 TMA, The Non-UK Duty Paid Tobacco Market in London.
Таble 42. non-uk duty paid cigarette Market,% in overall 
cigarette trade
Source: TMA, The Non-UK Duty Paid Tobacco Market in London, 2013.
Region Non-UK duty paid (2012)
london 29%
East Midlands 25%
Yorkshire & the Humber 23%
South East England 23%
South West England 23%
West Midlands 22%
United Kingdom 21%
East of England 21%
North East England 20%
North West England 19%
Northern Ireland 18%
Wales 14%
Scotland 12%
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in specific locations there is a concentration of packs from specific 
countries. For example, a relatively recent study in South London 
showed that 20% of the packs collected on the street and analysed 
were Polish. This implies an illicit supply route into specific communities 
in specific London areas.424
There is very little information about the consumer population buying 
illegally traded tobacco. A survey that was conducted in London in 
2001 found that it is younger smokers (47% of those 16-24 years old) 
rather than older smokers (16% of those aged 65+) who reported buying 
contraband/counterfeit tobacco in the 5 years prior to the survey.425 The 
illegal tobacco trade hotspots coincide with areas with higher indices 
of deprivation and unemployment,426 higher proportions of lone parent 
households and higher crime rates.427
There is a link between the illicit tobacco market and legal businesses 
in the UK. Tobacco smugglers/bootleggers may use legal businesses in 
the transport and storage of the illicit goods. In such cases, the active 
involvement of individuals from the legitimate economy can be viewed 
on a continuum of illegality – at one end, some individuals may know 
explicitly that the activities are illegal and at the other end, individuals 
may not know at all.
What is also very interesting in the illegal tobacco business is the 
role of the tobacco manufacturers and duty free shops. Cigarette 
smuggling is another field of enquiry that exemplifies the blurred 
distinction between the “underworld” and the “upperworld.”428 First, 
there is a “systemic synergy”429 between the tobacco industry and 
the cigarette-smuggling business. Over an extended period of time, 
“large-scale smuggling would not be possible without at least the tacit 
connivance of the cigarette manufacturers.”430 It is argued that large 
tobacco companies as well as local companies export vast quantities 
of particular brands of cigarettes to countries where there is no great 
demand for these brands, “turn a blind eye” to cigarette smuggling and 
sometimes encourage it as “a market entry strategy”431 in environments 
that have seen a recent backlash to smoking such as the UK. A senior 
HMRC officer interviewed for the study noted with regards to tobacco 
manufacturers:
424 Power, Illicit Tobacco in Southeast London: A Survey of Smokers.
425 Williams and Williams, Tobacco in London: Attitudes to Smoking in the Capital.
426 See, for example, Wiltshire et al., “‘They’re Doing People a Service’: A Qualitative Study of 
Smoking, Smuggling and Social Deprivation”.
427 DTZ Pieda Consulting, 2000 cited in K. von Lampe, Provisional Situational Report on Trafficking 
in Contraband Cigarettes (Research project “Assessing Organised Crime”, Sixth EU Framework 
Programme, 2005), 21, http://www.organized-crime.de/AOC-DLV18-vR3.pdf
428 P. C. van Duyne, “Organizing Cigarette Smuggling and Policy Making, Ending up in Smoke”, 
Crime, Law and Social Change 39, no. 3 (2003): 285-317.
429 N. Passas, “Cross-Border Crime and the Interface between Legal and Illegal Actors”, in 
Upperworld and Underworld in Cross-Border Crime, ed. P. C. van Duyne, K. von Lampe, and 
N. Passas (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2002), 11-41.
430 von Lampe, Provisional Situational Report on Trafficking in Contraband Cigarettes, 31, 34.
431 L. Joossens and M. Raw, “Cigarette Smuggling in Europe: Who Really Benefits?”, Tobacco 
Control, no. 7 (1998): 66.
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“They are responsible for smuggling of a lot of duty free cigarettes. 
Off the Irish and British coast you have many oil and gas rigs. We 
found that people working on the oil rigs were coming back from 
the rigs by a helicopter with a lot of sleeves432 of cigarettes. The big 
companies [tobacco manufacturers] are responsible for this. 20 million 
cigarettes per year smuggled via the oil and gas rigs. They facilitated 
the smuggling in the gas rig… you can’t smoke on the gas rig for 
obvious reasons” (UK-E5).
In addition, with regards to the role of duty free shops in cigarette 
smuggling he noted: “no one has informed us about… groups getting 
6,000 cigarettes each day in, day out. They [duty free shops] ‘turn a blind 
eye’ because the more cigarettes they sell, the bigger the commission 
they get from the big companies!” (UK-E5).
The illicit trade in tobacco is fragmented with loose networks and groups 
of individuals who may come together for single instances. These instances 
involve what is also known in the customs vernacular as “Kamikaze 
runs”: one off operations, usually of a truckload of cigarettes, using a 
driver who has no criminal record. Alternatively, these loose networks 
and groups of individuals may attempt to maintain longer involvement. 
Large, hierarchical group structures are rare. It is important to note that 
the market in Northern Ireland is quite different from that in the rest 
of the UK. Whereas in Britain the market tends to be fragmented and 
highly competitive with a large number of networks in the business at 
the level of importation, in Northern Ireland the market is oligopolistic, 
controlled by 10-12 major wholesalers (UK-E1). These wholesalers often 
collaborate in importing merchandise.
There seems to be a range of players involved in cigarette smuggling 
that can be placed on a continuum. The smuggling of cigarettes may 
be conducted by individuals and is defined by its relatively small scale. 
These individuals are driven by the price disparities between the UK and 
a number of other countries. They can be British holidaymakers traveling 
to other countries primarily in the summer period, truck drivers on jobs to 
continental Europe, university students,433 and Eastern European migrants 
who have permanently settled in the UK returning to their country of 
origin before coming back to the UK with a quantity of cigarettes.
On many occasions these small-scale smuggling schemes are organised 
by small groups of people. Small trips are taken into neighbouring 
countries (e.g. France), every traveller (“runner”) buys the legal quantity 
of cigarettes allowed for personal consumption and, once in the UK, 
the person who funded the trip collects the merchandise.434 Groups 
trading in illicit tobacco are sometimes clustered around a small core 
of individuals who retain an ongoing presence, around whom more 
432 Master cases containing 10 packs of 20 cigarettes each.
433 See G. A. Antonopoulos, “Cigarette Smugglers: A Note on Four ‘Unusual Suspects’”, Global 
Crime 8, no. 4 (2007): 393-98.
434 See R. Hornsby and D. Hobbs, “A Zone of Ambiguity. The Political Economy of Cigarette 
Bootlegging”, British Journal of Criminology, no. 47 (2007): 551-71.
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transitional individuals become involved. This description is true of a 
smuggling operation we came across where one individual organised 
several tobacco bootlegging operations over a long period of time. While 
his involvement was constant over this period, the vast majority of those 
involved in his operations were involved for short periods. Indeed, some 
individuals were involved for only a single bootlegging operation before 
their involvement discontinued. One such example is Big George435 who 
has been active in the illicit tobacco trade for quite a few years. A 
retired truck driver, he regularly attends major road arteries that connect 
the South and the North of the country that are used by truck drivers 
to rest for the night, and Bed and Breakfast establishments in areas near 
the border (e.g. Kent). He befriends drivers, pays their dinner, drinks 
and occasionally accommodation, and asks them to bring him cigarettes 
from their trip to continental Europe. He gives them the money for the 
cigarettes, the drivers buy them (in the country they are coming back 
from) and he gives them £1,000-£2,000 depending on the trip and the 
quantity they transport (UK-C5).
When it comes to large-scale smuggling, however, this involves networks – 
fluid and dynamic social systems that consist of patterns of relationships 
among people/actors436 and adapt to operational environments and 
forms of social control. In the case of large-scale smuggling, there is 
importation of containers from Eastern Europe (Poland, Ukraine, Russia, 
Lithuania, etc.), China, or Middle Eastern countries, and these are 
schemes that require greater sophistication, planning and financing, and 
involve a constellation of actors. Within these networks, the importance 
of brokers – those actors that bring together two or more disconnected 
parts of the network – and the service they offer was emphasised 
numerous times in interviews:
“Knowledge is everything. Without brokerage nothing happens, nothing 
is going to function. I would not know where to get so many cigarettes 
from… I have no information, I haven’t got a clue” (UK-E4).
The smuggler/traders involved in the illicit tobacco trade have no typical 
profile. The low entry threshold into this market means that a wide 
array of actors may become involved in some way:
“The tobacco trade is ‘every man’s trade’. I can get involved, you can 
get involved” (UK-E4).
“Anyone can get involved as long as they have a small fund to invest. 
So the only difficulty is securing the first amount of money to buy the 
initial quantity of cigarettes and tobacco to import” (UK-C2).
Individuals become involved in tobacco smuggling via trust, familial and 
kinship, and neighbourhood contacts. Prisons are key environments for 
contacts and knowledge about schemes (as with many other criminal 
markets); furthermore, public houses can act as initial points of contact 
435 Big George is a pseudonym.
436 See S. Wasserman and K. Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994).
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(“Pubs as a place in which illegal business relations are formed is 
underestimated”, UK-E2). Finally, an environment of great importance for 
the formation and consolidation of relationships for the illicit tobacco 
trade is legal businesses. Legal businesses also operate as the context in 
which relationships (employer-employee and between/among partners) 
are forged and transformed into criminal business relationships, and the 
dependability of individuals is manifested:
“Trust is an important part, you have to trust people. You have to 
be very secretive, you can’t tell people about it. You have to be 
business minded, because it has to run as a business... The legal 
business context is very important in meeting people and appearing 
dependable, someone who can do the job” (UK-C4).
There are groups of career/organised criminals coming together for a mid-
to-long term period to undertake systematic tobacco smuggling activities. 
However, they are the exception rather than the rule in the business:
“Everyone thinks that there is Mr. Big who will finance criminal 
activities. And, yes, it will happen but in the majority of cases it is 
people throwing the money in to get a profit…” (UK-E5).
Previous research has discussed whether tobacco smugglers are involved 
in other illicit trades and criminal activities.437 Generally, according to 
research for this report, this appears to be dictated by the scale of 
the smuggling scheme. In most small scale smuggling schemes tobacco 
smugglers only deal in tobacco, others in tobacco and alcohol (although 
selling alcohol alongside illicit tobacco products is only common at retail 
level). This relates to the following:
• The practical threshold for involvement in tobacco smuggling is lower 
than for other types of illicit activity. The legal status of cigarettes 
means that theoretically anyone can, at a minimum, bootleg cigarettes 
without extensive criminal contacts. This is quite different for other 
types of organised criminality such as drug trafficking where one may 
need, at a minimum, to be able to procure the illicit goods in order 
to enter into the market (UK-E3).
• The moral threshold for involvement in tobacco smuggling is arguably 
lower than for other illegal markets. As above, the legal status of 
cigarettes and their availability from legal outlets has a neutralisation 
effect on individuals involved in this market.
In contrast, in large-scale schemes, the research highlighted that smugglers 
also deal in drugs and counterfeit products (perfumes, DVDs, luxury 
clothes). According to a senior customs officer interviewed, during a 
recent raid at a storage facility, the HMRC found contraband cigarettes 
alongside stolen goods (motorbikes, mobile phones, etc.) and a significant 
quantity of illegally produced fireworks (UK-E5). In Northern Ireland, 
large-scale tobacco smugglers also deal with drugs and arms and they 
437 A. Seely, Cross-Border Shopping and Smuggling (London: House of Commons, 2002); SOCA, The 
UK Threat Assessment of Serious Organised Crime, 2006/07 (London, 2007).
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are involved in other “soft” illegal markets such as alcohol, fuel and 
counterfeit products. Finally, they are involved in the protection/extortion 
of legal businesses (UK-E1).
Although violence tends to be viewed as an integral part of trading in 
illegal goods and services and as a feature that is important for the 
smooth running of such activities, violence at the higher levels of the 
illicit tobacco market and in the area of street selling is extremely rare. 
However, instances of violence have been noted and seemed to be 
employed in order to protect a criminal actor involved in the trade from 
a leak of information:
“He got the money right and he was going to come and give a 
statement against me so they went and broke his leg…” (UK-C6).
Violence is also implicitly present and influences decision making with 
respect to where one is allowed to market his/her merchandise: “there 
are OCGs in villages around Newcastle that have ‘tab houses’ and you 
can’t go in there and try to sell your own stuff… otherwise you get a 
visit…” (UK-E5).
Finally, with regards to the relationship between the illicit trade in 
tobacco and terrorism/paramilitary groups, primarily in Northern Ireland, 
the majority of experts interviewed were quite sceptical considering that 
this link is increasingly promulgated by government and law enforcement 
rhetoric.438 Overall, there is very little academic or investigative evidence 
to support this link. However, an investigative journalist living in Ireland 
that was interviewed for this study suggested that there is some link 
between the paramilitary groups and tobacco smuggling in Northern 
Ireland, and that proceeds from the tobacco trade are invested into other 
illegal markets:
“In Northern Ireland there is significant financing of the real IRA 
and continuity IRA from cigarette smuggling. Money from cigarette 
smuggling is then introduced into other illegal markets such as drugs 
and firearms” (UK-E1).
Sources of capital for criminal operations. Profile of financiers 
in criminal operations
Start-up capital is required by someone to enter the illicit trade in tobacco 
and the amount depends on the quantity of merchandise they want to 
trade. There is a wide range of sources for initiating tobacco smuggling 
operations. The first concerns small scale smuggling/bootlegging, in which 
small funds from legitimate work and savings are commonly used. 
Using this type of funding allows virtually anyone with a small amount 
of capital to become involved in the business, from holidaymakers and 
immigrants, to students and those working internationally:
438 See, for example, W. Billingslea, “Illicit Cigarette Trafficking and the Funding of Terrorism”, 
The Police Chief 71, no. 2 (2004); OCTF, Annual Report and Threat Assessment: Organised Crime in 
Northern Ireland, 2013.
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“I went on holidays in Majorca in the summer of 2004 for the first 
time and of course, one of the first things I noticed was the price of 
cigarettes. Something like €2-2.50 for Benson and Hedges, Silk Cut, 
Marlboro, stuff that you would buy back home for double that price 
or even more. I was ‘loaded’ in Spain because I was supposed to stay 
for 2 weeks in Majorca with the savings of a year and a half. I decided 
not to spend all my money on booze and instead I bought a couple 
of suitcases of cigarettes which I got back with me when I got home. 
I sold the cigarettes to my friends and people I knew and some of the 
sleeves I sold in the cafés and the pubs that I manage” (UK-C1).
Small amounts of money are invested in the illegal tobacco trade not 
only because larger funds are not widely available to everyone but for 
two additional reasons:
• A bootlegger has access only to a relatively small market, e.g. covering 
a small but very specific population such as the case of two Greek 
students in a university in the north of England supplying cigarettes 
and tobacco to the Greek students of another university.
• Investing less than one could is an intentional ‘detection avoidance 
tactic’ for both the police but also the local extortionists: “… I got a 
little bigger than in the beginning. But I would not like to be big! No, 
and that was intentional. When you are ‘small player’ things are easy. 
You have a little bit of money, you buy cigarettes and tobacco and 
that’s it. If you are big, the lights are on you. People see you, there 
is gossip about your business. Next thing you get is a ‘tax man’ [an 
extortionist] asking for money. It is better if you have a small business 
and you know everyone you sell to. You feel safe” (UK-C1).
The second source that was identified was funds from legal businesses 
that the illicit tobacco entrepreneurs own or manage. This was the most 
straightforward case of funding and the one that tends to be present in 
the majority of the cases at the levels of importation and wholesale. In 
a large number of cases legitimate businessmen or owners of large pieces 
of land (e.g. on both sides of the border in Northern Ireland) invest 
funds in what is called a “conglomerate”, in which legal businessmen are 
asked whether they would be interested in investing £10,000-£20,000 
in a smuggling/importation scheme. The interviewees suggested that 
it is highly unlikely that an investor would “go in a scheme blind and 
say ‘right, here’s £1 million’” (UK-E4). Some investors stick with such 
a conglomerate for prolonged periods of time, some drop out after 
a few importations, and some are involved in a single importation. 
Usually there is a core of investors who know each other through their 
involvement in various other legal (and occasionally illegal) projects and 
who are better positioned in the scheme because they know brokers 
and other strategic individuals involved in the whole process. As the 
scheme becomes more and more successful, important entrepreneurs 
“trim down” their investment so that they enjoy a better return of their 
own investment.
Other similar conglomerates are facilitated by ethnicity. One example 
from the data is that of a Kurdish businessman who was involved in a 
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large scheme importing cigarettes with his Polish brother-in-law and his 
Lithuanian friend. He asked an additional 3 entrepreneurs based in a 
northeast locality – all of whom were Kurdish and owned shops such 
as food stores, kebab shops or car-washing businesses – to contribute 
towards the importation of a container of cigarettes. They invested £20,000 
each and, after the successful importation of the merchandise, decided 
to do it once every month (UK-C3). Individuals investing funds from their 
legal businesses in the UK illegal tobacco market are not necessarily 
businessmen owning businesses in the UK. In our interviews we came 
across a large scheme importing cigarettes from Eastern Europe, which 
involved two major financiers; a Russian businessman and a Hungarian 
businessman based in Germany who financed a German wholesaler and 
expected a return without being involved in the actual smuggling of 
tobacco. The German wholesaler linked to a Sheffield-based importer in 
the UK via an Irish broker.
Illegal profits from legal businesses should also be included in this 
category of sources of capital. The Kurdish wholesaler Aras439 is an 
interesting example. When he was in the process of collecting as much 
money as possible to support a small importation scheme from Poland, 
he “skimmed” (evaded taxes) by not providing receipts for a significant 
part of his transactions, especially transactions involving Polish or other 
Eastern European customers. In addition, according to his estimation, 
for every 5 customers with a total expenditure of £10 or more he 
overcharged each individual by £2. Given that no analytic receipt is ever 
provided in his shop, as well as the fact that it is, as he says, extremely 
rare that a customer notices such an overcharge (especially when a 
customer buys multiple products), this provides a profit of at least £500 
per month. This money was invested in tobacco importation when the 
schemes were still relatively small-scale.
Thirdly, illegal activities and businesses are an important source of 
funds for the illicit tobacco business. Research for this report came 
across individuals heavily involved in cannabis dealing and cultivation as 
well as dealing in other drugs deciding to slowly move into the tobacco 
trade because the risks were very low in comparison: “…the tobacco 
business is like a playground for them…” (UK-E2). It is also not unusual 
for criminals to want to invest a little bit of money into someone else’s 
illegal tobacco scheme. This is usually the case in small localities in which 
everyone is familiar with one another and information about successful 
and profitable schemes flows. Occasionally, these local criminals extort 
their way into a tobacco smuggling scheme in something that could be 
described as a “forced investment”:
“So criminals who want a piece of the cake and invest into someone 
else’s project... Hard men from the local community hear about a 
successful business in the pub and decide that they want to put 
a little bit of money instead of extort. This makes them feel like 
‘businessmen’, and not like some kind of gorillas…” (UK-E2).
439 Aras is a pseudonym.
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In Northern Ireland importers/wholesalers use money from previous 
criminal businesses to invest in tobacco. Once they have a profit from 
cigarettes they invest in cycles. There are also consortia in which 2-3 
criminal entrepreneurs similar to the ones comprising of legal businessmen 
invest a sum towards importing a load of cigarettes and then share the 
profit on the basis of the investment.
Fourth, illicit entrepreneurs in the tobacco business receive loans 
from criminals although this is an extremely rare occurrence which is 
facilitated, again, by personal relationships forged in previous criminal 
and/or legal projects, as part of a favour exchange system and because 
of ‘respect’/ reputation. One of our interviewees, for example, obtained 
a loan from a group of Travellers. This loan derived from the Travellers’ 
profits from their family-based drug smuggling business in a community 
in the north of England. There was no interest involved because some 
members of the same Traveller community had benefited from the 
interviewee in a number of ways. For instance, he offered them small 
jobs working with friends and colleagues, and supplied them with 
old furniture as gifts. In addition, the interviewee’s sons had been 
involved in bare knuckle fighting with members of the local Traveller 
community; something that is culturally valued by the community 
(UK-C2). Interestingly, however, we have not come across any cases of 
loans from legal business people.
Fifth, we came across one illegal tobacco trader who desperately wanted 
to become involved in an imminent cigarette bootlegging scheme and 
who – in the absence of any immediate sources of funding – resorted 
to the services of a local loan shark, borrowing £400 in order to buy 
the merchandise. Unfortunately, because this case was mentioned by 
an expert (UK-E4) and not by the entrepreneur in question, we do not 
possess any further information about the interest, payment agreements 
etc. It should be mentioned, however, that loan sharks are an atypical 
source of cash for small or large-scale tobacco traders.
Finally, some entrepreneurs noted multiple funding sources, which 
amalgamate some of the sources that are mentioned above or include 
some ingenious ways of making money. One of the illegal entrepreneurs 
interviewed mentioned that in his effort to secure the start-up capital 
for a bootlegging scheme he set up a raffle (a small-scale gambling 
competition using numbered tickets) with 19 friends from the travelling 
community. Each of the initiators of the raffle contributed £50 in order 
to buy a second-hand white van, which was used as the prize for the 
raffle. 300 tickets were sold for £20 each. The profit was £6,000 (£300 
per person). The interviewee used his £300 as the start-up capital to 
enter the tobacco trading business: “We could have even done it with 
no van at all, but everyone knows everyone else here. And if you have 
the van it gives you the legitimacy to do this raffle as many times as you 
want” (UK-C2). The rest of the start-up capital needed was borrowed 
from one of his sons who around that time “taxed” a couple of low 
level drug dealers in a neighbouring locality and was involved in bare 
knuckle fighting bets. The amount was £700 which was added to the 
initial £300 from the raffle.
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An investor’s share is ensured by trust. As mentioned earlier, trust is an 
integral part of collaboration and in most of the cases of importation and 
wholesale of tobacco, or in smaller schemes that involve more than one 
investor. This trust is forged primarily in legal business and in previous 
legal and illegal projects.
“You have to have a massive, massive, massive element of trust. They 
have to trust you, like they must love me because every penny I 
made, I showed them, I told them the truth, they got back. They 
never lost a penny because of me, the times when there was a 
loss was when it was in the paper and you had to prove what had 
gone wrong so that’s what I did, had to show them what had gone 
wrong…” (UK-C6).
However, in the case of the “forced investment”, mentioned earlier, by 
an investor or a “consortium” of investors, the major way in which a 
share is entrusted is fear of extortion or use of violence by local criminals 
forcing their way into the scheme:
“These guys are unpredictable and they are not the best partners in 
the world as they do not really know how to do business. They are 
known for their capacity and willingness to use violence more than 
anything else. But if they want to get involved in the business, in your 
business, what do you do? What can you do? Can you say ‘no’? At 
least if they are part of it, they won’t ‘tax’ you. In this case you, as 
an investor [in tobacco smuggling] want to make sure that they get 
their share. Plus you don’t have to pay anyone to protect you from 
others you might want to ‘tax’ you” (UK-E2).
The source of merchandise and the number of suppliers an illegal 
entrepreneur has depends on the scale of the smuggling scheme as well 
as the presence of brokers, which can allow links with wholesalers (and 
financiers) in other countries. Usually small-scale smugglers/bootleggers 
tend to have different types of suppliers who tend to be duty-free shops 
or legal retailers in countries with lower prices of cigarettes and tobacco 
than those in the UK. Very rarely a bootlegger has a number of suppliers 
who span across the legal and illegal continuum. For instance, one of our 
interviewees obtained the merchandise from a number of legal retailers 
in various Spanish towns as well as an illegal wholesaler who operated 
from a warehouse near Athens. Irrespective of the supplier, there were 
no special arrangements with regards to payment. Cash is almost always 
given up-front.
As mentioned earlier, small-scale smuggling schemes are often organised 
by small groups of people travelling into neighbouring countries to buy 
a legal quantity of cigarettes they claim is for personal consumption 
(“runners”). Similar to other small-scale schemes, these operations tend 
to have a number of legal retail outlets as their suppliers. There are 
a number of ways in which a person who funds the “runs” ensures 
that the runner does not steal the money without bringing back the 
merchandise. Firstly, the runners are recruited from the organiser’s local 
Settlement 
of payments
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community and are often members of his/her immediate social circle. 
Secondly, organisers befriend prospective runners involved. One example 
of this is the case of Big George (UK-C5) above, who recruited truck 
drivers. The drivers involved revealed information about their place of 
origin, residence, family, place of work, etc. This information could then 
be used in case something went wrong. This information would be 
obtained before he asked them to participate in the scheme.
Credit is rare in the illegal tobacco business. It is only present in the 
importation/wholesale level (“…I was so far up the chain…. I would 
have got credit”, UK-C4) and only at the initiation of an importation/
wholesale level scheme. Once the first smuggling operation is complete, 
there is available funding to lubricate additional cycles of the business. 
The provision of credit is facilitated by trust among actors involved and 
specifically, the broker who may be able to vouch for the trustworthiness 
of the entrepreneur receiving the merchandise on credit or – in some 
cases – may actively be involved in the smuggling. In case of the 
absence of a broker, credit was facilitated by trust between the supplier 
and the buyer. In all of the cases in which trust was noted, it had been 
cultivated during previous legal projects.
A variety of settlements that do not involve money were also mentioned, 
although these tend to be rather rare in the illegal tobacco trade. 
Specifically, there is direct exchange of cigarettes with other illicit 
commodities such as cocaine. This is the case for more versatile crime 
groups and entrepreneurs and does not involve most of the legal 
businessmen involved in the trade. In other cases cigarette smugglers 
obtain a quantity of the merchandise after conducting free runs for a 
wholesaler in a particular locality: “you do us a run for free and we’ll 
give you a batch of the product” (UK-E5). Or on one extremely rare 
occasion the payment was not done in cash but with an asset: “…it was 
always cash upfront for me, although once I took a boat as payment. It 
was a Sunseeker Tomahawk, I took it because the guy said it was worth 
£150,000 so I took it to a boat broker and he sold it for £110,000 after 
commission and payment for storage I was given a cheque for £75,000 
put it in the business account and cleaned the money” (UK-C4).
In case the merchandise is obtained on credit, there are agreements 
with regards to settlement of payments if there is a contingency such as 
a load being lost, damaged or confiscated by the authorities: “[Lithuanian 
wholesalers] were alright with me because when the stuff went missing 
it was their loss because we had an agreement before we started. I said 
‘listen, if it gets took or customs get involved, I’ve got no connection 
and it’s your loss and end of load…’” (UK-C6).
In wholesale/importation schemes a number of people act as payment 
facilitators. These are usually people who operate as the brokers bringing 
together two or more disconnected parts of the scheme. For example, 
importations in Northern Ireland involve people of Irish origin who live 
and work in China who facilitate the payment process between the 
wholesalers and manufacturers of cigarettes in China or the Chinese 
wholesalers. These Irish brokers have stayed in the country for many 
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years, they speak the language, and they have previously conducted 
business with the Chinese. Financially, it is a simple process; the brokers 
are paid for their knowledge. They are getting paid thousands of pounds 
per importation towards the upper level (wholesale level) of the business, 
or in the case of large deals, they can be paid 1% of the profit made 
by the UK importer. Unfortunately, because of the fragmented nature of 
the business and because brokers tend to operate on the international 
level more information is not available.
In the illegal tobacco trade there are no money collectors in the strict 
sense, as is the case in other trades (e.g. cocaine market), although in the 
case of one interviewed entrepreneur his sons had acted in this capacity 
on a number of occasions. With regards to settlement of payments at 
retail level, customers always paid cash for merchandise. As one of the 
interviewees emphatically noted, “I always got cash for the cigarettes. 
Nobody got credit off me, they paid for them or they didn’t get the goods. 
Simple as that.” (UK-C6). There are usually no records for the settlement 
of payments on the international and national level especially when actors 
from specific groups are involved e.g. travellers. However, during HMRC 
raids lists with orders for tobacco products have been found.
The costs in this kind of business depend on a variety of factors. The 
scale of the scheme and its logistical complexities, the country of supply, 
the legality, the number of actors involved, and a number of unforeseen 
expenses all contribute to the cost.
Buying the merchandise: As mentioned earlier, small-scale smugglers/
bootleggers buy and sell relatively small quantities of cigarettes and 
tobacco primarily obtained from legal retailers. However, occasionally, as 
is the case with slightly bigger schemes, they will be obtained through 
illegal suppliers. Often carrying a couple of suitcases from Spain or 
Greece does not cost anything more than the actual trip to the countries; 
which the bootleggers will have already paid for. The involvement into a 
scheme is often a purely opportunistic one. Other small-scale smugglers 
pay the travelling expenses for their runners plus a small amount for 
their remuneration:
“The initial amount I used for my first scheme was £500. But it was 
part of the holiday, so I am not counting the expenses for the trip 
itself, accommodation, food and drink and so on. I did not plan to 
bring cigarettes when I went to Spain that first time. So in the trips 
after that I planned to spend about £1,000 per trip for cigarettes. 
There is only so much you can carry with you if you are alone. Later, 
when people who travelled every now and then were in the job, I 
needed a little more not only because the amount of cigarettes was 
bigger but also because we needed money for the flights for these 
people… With the students flying back to Greece and those going 
to Spain on holiday even sometimes in January, you needed at least 
£150 per flight, for about 15 trips a year, then another £30 per person 
for their trouble. Plus the money for cigarettes, each person buying 
16 sleeves…” (UK-C1).
Costs of doing 
business
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When small-scale entrepreneurs buy the merchandise from legal retailers, 
the price per pack fluctuates between €2-3.50 depending on the brand 
(€20-35 per master case depending on the brand). When the cigarettes are 
bought from an illegal wholesaler, sleeves of British consumed brands (Regal, 
Benson & Hedges, Silk Cut, etc.) are bought for as little as £10 per sleeve/
master case. Any changes in the price of cigarettes bought from the (legal) 
suppliers were on the basis of the taxation in the country the cigarettes 
were to be legally sold in. With regards to the illegal wholesaler, the 
difference in price over time is on the basis of increased cost of production 
of the cigarettes (see UK-C2). Cigarettes in the wholesale/importation level 
are bought in British pounds for £1 per pack (£500 per box or 50 sleeves). 
The price has not changed over the last few years, neither has the quantity 
a wholesaler purchases. The reason for the unchanged quantities over time 
is that the market/demand the particular importers cover does not change 
and there is only a limited capacity the wholesalers have to push the 
merchandise forward into the UK market (UK-C3).
Producing the merchandise: research studies have shown that illegal 
cigarette factories have been active for many years in several countries.440 
Relatively recently illegal factories have appeared in the UK as an effort 
by illegal entrepreneurs to cut down the costs associated with importing 
cigarettes and tobacco from China, Eastern Europe and other producing 
countries of contraband merchandise. Interviews for this report provided 
examples of illegal factories and costs associated with their establishment 
and sustenance. For example, for an illegal factory in Grimsby, the 
entrepreneurs rented an old warehouse for the venue of the factory for 
as little as £25 per week, and bought the cigarette rolling machine online 
(from alibaba.com) for £7,000. This second-hand rolling machine had been 
previously owned by a major tobacco manufacturer. There was no detailed 
information about specific items that are essential for the production phase 
(compressor, cutter, etc.) and the tobacco. However, it was known that the 
whole operation cost approximately £60,000 to set up.
“We [customs] found a cigarette making machine in an old warehouse 
and the necessary cigarette paper and packaging. They got it from big 
companies. We went to Imperial [Tobacco] and people like that and 
told them ‘we don’t want you to sell them. We want you to smash 
them up…you’re shooting yourself in the foot’” (UK-E5).
Less start-up capital is required in order to establish illicit tobacco 
factories that simply pack tobacco in Britain, such as one discovered 
by authorities a few years ago in Glasgow. For example, in one of the 
cases we came across expenses of £200-300 per month for the venue (or 
even less if the venue is disused), £5,000 to obtain raw tobacco for the 
initial packaging, £1,000 to buy counterfeit packs and £1,000 a month to 
employ two Chinese nationals to pack the tobacco.
transporting the merchandise: Transportation fees vary on the basis of 
the distance covered and the risk of seizures or arrests associated with 
440 See, for example, Shen, Antonopoulos, and von Lampe, “The Dragon Breathes Smoke’: 
Cigarette Counterfeiting in the People’s Republic of China’”.
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specific UK entry points. However, it is possible for the transportation 
fee to be significantly different for an identical distance covered and 
possible risk. For example, according to OLAF (2012), in two separate 
investigations in the UK, one driver received £1,000 per successful 
channel crossing and the other £10,000. In addition, money for cover 
loads during the transportation should be added: a number of really 
low price commodities such as jelly, sand, cattle feed, glass jars and 
cardboard among others, were identified in our research. The heavy 
involvement and/or vulnerability of the transportation industry to “transit 
crimes”,441 including tobacco smuggling, reduces transportation costs 
because goods are smuggled by owners of transportation companies, 
or are planted in their vehicles without their knowledge. For example, 
one interviewed importer was also the owner of a transportation 
company. Drivers working for him during legal international projects 
were unaware that they were also involved in an illegal tobacco 
smuggling operation: “The drivers of the trucks were just given their 
normal wages, they didn’t know about the job. It was a legal job to 
them” (UK-C6).
In another case, the owner of a transportation company and his three 
legal employees travelled to Spain and Greece on legal business, 
transporting fresh foods, fish and wine. The fuel and other expenses 
per trip were paid by the company (or association of companies) that 
originally commissioned the trip. There were no other expenses because 
the merchandise was transported by the four individuals (UK-C2). Basically, 
when the illegal tobacco trader is the owner of a legal transportation 
company, the illegal business is to a great extent facilitated logistically by 
his legal business resulting in less transportation expenses.
Payment to actors in the tobacco business
• Runners: in cases of small-scale smuggling (e.g. amounts as small as 
£30 per runner);
• Brokers: for example, in the case of the Kurdish wholesale interviewed 
(Aras), his Polish brother-in-law and his Lithuanian contact received 
a £2,000 brokerage fee each for their services. Aras’ brother-in-law 
and the Lithuanian individual got £2,000 each for their services per 
container imported from Lithuania to the United Kingdom (UK-C3);
• Couriers: individuals who are trusted with transporting merchandise 
and/or money. For instance, the interviews revealed a case of 
transportation of £1,000,000 tobacco money from the North of 
England to someone in London. The courier received £5,000 for the 
service or 0.5% of the money transported (UK-E4). Unfortunately, it 
could not be established whether this is a standard percentage for 
the couriers in the illicit tobacco business;
• Minders: they are usually people with the physical capital and often 
accompany the money couriers. Unlike the couriers, the minders are 
subcontracted on an ad hoc basis and are paid a standard fee per 
transportation. 
441 E. R. Kleemans, “Organised Crime, Transit Crime, and Racketeering”, in Crime and Justice in the 
Netherlands, ed. M. Tonry and C. J. C. Bijleveld (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 
163-215.
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• Retail/street sellers: these are the individuals who have not invested 
but work for someone else. They receive a daily fee of £50-100 for 
their work.
The above highlights that payments to actors involved in tobacco 
smuggling can differ enormously, depending on their role and the size 
and scope of the operation.
Stashing the merchandise: in many cases tobacco products are simply 
kept in the trader’s house or the houses of relatives and friends. In 
wholesale cases, industrial units (warehouses) are rented to stash the 
merchandise. In the cases identified in the research, these industrial 
units were rented for £50 a month. The security guard working on the 
premises was given a small fee every month to watch and protect the 
particular units rented by the illegal entrepreneurs.
Other costs in the illegal tobacco trade involve:
• Corruption costs: bribing private security officers primarily at airports 
and ports; “turning a blind eye” to the crime groups reclaiming 
merchandise confiscated by customs (as has been the case in Northern 
Ireland); contacting illegal entrepreneurs in order to inform them that 
customs officers are not present. Research revealed that the fee for 
a security guard to contact a criminal group by phone when it is 
safe to collect confiscated merchandise was £300. Corruption is not, 
however, a standard cost of the illegal tobacco trade. For example, in 
the case of a smuggler who used RAF planes to smuggle cigarettes 
into the UK there were no police or customs checks.
• Insurance: Insurance is sometimes bought to protect entrepreneurs if 
their merchandise is seized or lost. Wholesalers buying the merchandise 
abroad could pay an extra £50,000 per 10,000,000 cigarettes (the 
amount of cigarettes in a container) to insure the load. However, “…
as is the case with other insurances, you can never be sure whether 
these insurances pay out” (UK-E4). 
• Extortion: Major criminals and crime families in Newcastle have 
been known to extort tobacco smugglers: “we know you are making 
money from cigarettes and we are going to take a third out of this” 
(UK-E5).
• “test runs”: when a smuggler recruits others for a smuggling scheme 
or a series of schemes, he either selects from a pool of family 
members and acquaintances or he asks individuals to conduct “test 
runs” (with cigarettes or money from cigarettes) in order for the 
group to see whether he is trustworthy. In one of the cases we came 
across, tens of thousands of pounds were given to a prospective 
runner – who was at the time receiving state benefits – to deliver to 
someone for a fee of £40-50.
• “Decoy” expenses: Expenses towards diverting the attention of the 
authorities and/or misleading legal suppliers of tobacco products. It 
is known that when a passenger is flying outside of the EU no tax 
is applicable to HMRC when buying tobacco products (and selected 
spirits) from duty free shops. If the passenger is flying within the UK 
or EU the VAT will be accounted for to HMRC by WDF on behalf of 
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the customer. In one of the identified smuggling schemes, a group of 
5-6 smugglers booked return flights from London Heathrow to both 
Switzerland (outside the EU) and Newcastle, England that arrived at 
their respective destinations at similar times. The smugglers checked 
in for both flights, and after the security checks, they provided 
their boarding passes in order to buy cigarettes at duty free prices. 
After they bought the cigarettes they flew to Newcastle where they 
delivered the merchandise, and back to London. The expenses for 
the flights to Switzerland were what is called here “decoy” expenses 
(UK-E5).
• Unforeseen circumstances only one case was identified in which the 
entrepreneur had to cover unexpected costs involving an individual 
working in his legal company and also unknowingly involved in the 
importation of tobacco. When the driver realised that they were 
unwittingly involved in a tobacco smuggling scheme, he threatened 
to keep the truck if he was not paid £3,000 by his boss (and illegal 
entrepreneur). The issue was resolved by the boss and tobacco 
smuggler giving the employee the amount requested: “…I met him at 
a hotel, asked him what he wanted, he said he wanted more money, 
I asked how much, he said £3,000, it wasn’t much, so I gave it to 
him” (UK-C4).
The profit margin from the illegal tobacco trade in the UK depends on 
a number of variables:
• The type of merchandise sold (i.e. non-tax paid merchandise produced 
in the UK or abroad, illicit whites, or counterfeit products): Generally, 
counterfeit products tend to outweigh profit in all other types of 
smuggling, as they are very cheap to buy and have at least a 200% 
mark-up. “You can buy a sleeve [10 packs] for £2.50 in China and 
you can sell them here in the UK for £35-40. There are people taking 
slices out but you are going to make at least 200% profit” (UK-E5).
The illegal tobacco factory in Grimsby that was mentioned earlier cost 
£60,000 to set up and before customs intervened and dismantled the 
factory (within 3 weeks) the profits had reached over £3,000,000. Legal 
tobacco products bought abroad from retailers appear to have the 
smallest profit margin. According to participants, the worst case scenario 
is that the illegal entrepreneurs will have at least a 75% profit on their 
investment. The profit margins increase with the volume of imported 
merchandise: “If you buy 10,000,000 cigarettes, the costs are going to 
be cheaper. It is the same way cash & carry work…” (UK-E5).
• The position of the illegal entrepreneurs in the supply chain: The 
profits start to diminish as the merchandise moves down the supply 
chain. Someone in the retail market will make on average a profit 
of 50p per pack. In terms of wholesalers sharing profit, payments 
are done when a proportion of the merchandise has been sold and 
moved to a middle-level broker or retailer. The profits are shared 
on the basis of one’s investment. In small-scale smuggling schemes, 
profit sharing is demonstrated according to one’s status within the 
Profits and 
profit sharing
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bootlegging group and longevity of one’s “employment.” Some actors 
with only limited involvement are paid a fixed, low fee for their 
participation. For example, £30, which was the fee paid to runners 
in various schemes identified in the research. Other actors were 
paid via a mixture of cash and cigarettes, enabling them to make an 
additional profit themselves. This opportunity was dependent on ties 
of trust which were established by long term involvement and as an 
acquaintance of the main actor(s) outside of the illegal activity. As a 
result, it is extremely difficult to make generalisations and claims of 
typical methods of profit sharing (UK-E3).
• Accessibility of consumers to illegal retailers: contraband products sold 
via legal outlets (e.g. the Polish foodstuff shop mentioned earlier) or 
pubs where locals attend seem to facilitate transactions.
Marketing/promotion techniques: On the wholesale level, the marketing 
technique is the network itself. The successful “firms” are those that have 
the ability to promote and push the merchandise to people in lower 
levels of the supply chain in the UK. On the local, retail level “fag442 
houses” and known individuals are used to procure cigarettes. Customers 
are sometimes approached on their own door step by a neighbour 
with an offer to buy contraband cigarettes. Marketing/promotion occurs 
somewhat organically via word of mouth as the actors’ status and 
reputation within specific locales (or a pub/workplace) alerts potential 
customers to the availability as well as the quality of the merchandise. 
The longer a bootlegging/smuggling operation is in existence, the lower 
the need to generate advertising becomes, as existing customers not 
only return but spread the availability of the goods via word of mouth. 
The sale of the merchandise via places such as local pubs is often an 
indication of guaranteed high quality products. On the street, a retailer 
may offer a pack of cigarettes to a potentially new customer to lure 
them and establish themselves as their suppliers.443 It should be noted 
however, that the level of demand in many small localities often outstrips 
supply rendering the necessity to market/promote the goods unnecessary. 
442 British slang for cigarette.
443 BBC, Panorama: “Smoking and the Bandits”, 7 March 2011.
Таble 43. expenses and proFit – a uk case study
Source: Interview with UK-C1.
Flight costs
Payment to runners 
for buying the 
merchandise 
Cigarettes/ 
tobacco
total expenses for
a year’s business
turnover
£2,500 (for about 
15 flights)
£450 Approximately 
£6,000 
£8,950 £12,000
Net profit
£3,050
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In one case, research identified entrepreneurs marketing their products 
in areas that were outside their usual business radius; they would attend 
horse racing events in York and Wetherby, or air shows such as the 
Sunderland International Air Show, and took up the opportunity to sell 
contraband cigarettes. Often vending machines selling cigarettes were 
unavailable inside these events (UK-C2).
Spending and investing illegal tobacco profits: Much of the profit 
made is simply spent on hedonistic pursuits: “Life as party! Cars, gold, 
someone I know told me he had ‘more gold on him that you can choke 
a dog with’… dining and wining with local celebrities such as footballers” 
(UK-E4). Money was spent on holidays, providing or lending money to 
family members and friends for a variety of reasons including making 
investments (e.g. one of the interviewees loaned his sister £700,000 
towards the creation of a property portfolio in the United States). Profits 
were also used to pay off debts such as loans or mortgages, buying 
luxury cars and racing bikes, and paying the tax for these items as 
well as preserving them. A pattern that can also be identified is that of 
spending habits that change over time as individuals’ own biographies 
evolve. Young illegal tobacco traders with limited social responsibilities 
prefer to spend their profits on hedonistic pursuits. As their lives change 
and they grow older (getting married and having children), they seek 
to secure their family’s future (e.g. one entrepreneur paid for his son’s 
university education in the United States), as well secure their finances via 
investment in legitimate spheres such as setting up their own businesses. 
Illegal tobacco traders in general tend to invest in night-time economy 
establishments (pubs, bars, clubs) and in property (not only in the 
UK but also abroad in countries such as Spain and – in the case of 
illegal tobacco entrepreneurs from Northern Ireland- in the Republic 
of Ireland).444 In one case, money was also sent to Iraqi Kurdistan in 
order for property to be bought (UK-C3). Illegal tobacco entrepreneurs 
were also found to be investing in the enhancement of their existing 
legal business (e.g. more and better vehicles, bigger premises etc.) or 
in establishing new businesses. Examples include pork pie factories and 
ice-cream factories in South Yorkshire, pawnbrokers and jewellery shops, 
Polish foodstuff shops and Polish hair and beauty salons in areas heavily 
populated by Polish and Eastern European diasporic communities.
Naturally, profits from cigarette smuggling are also re-invested in cycles 
in the illegal tobacco trade. Generally, there is very little commodity 
hopping among the illegal tobacco traders. However, we came across 
entrepreneurs who also invested in separate criminal businesses. One 
example was in counterfeit luxury clothes (UK-C6), another in alcohol 
smuggling from Greece, Italy and France. After his retirement from 
tobacco smuggling, UK-C2 financially supported his sons who established 
a cannabis, cocaine and crack cocaine business in their locality, while 
relatively recently he also became involved in small-scale illegal money 
lending.
444 According to one of the interviewees, cigarette smugglers also have a great deal of land on 
both sides of the border (Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland) – something that also 
gives them the opportunity to move in and out and evade apprehension by the authorities 
(UK-E1).
national	criminal	markets	and	Finances:	illicit	tobacco	trade	 263
The areas of investment are linked to the individual actors’ own contact 
networks and areas of previous experience and knowledge.445 One 
individual with an existing job in food supply sought to expand his 
business using his illicit profits. Actors are typically restricted to investing 
in areas in which they held some prior experience or expertise, therefore, 
examples of investment in offshore bank accounts were rather atypical 
cases since most entrepreneurs did not know people who could assist with 
the practicalities of setting up an account. This difficulty is exemplified 
by the words of one of the criminal entrepreneurs interviewed: “I was 
in it a long time, made lots of money but it was difficult to spend it. 
Yeah, you could buy the best carpets for your house, furniture etc. but 
you couldn’t buy a house or a car… they would start asking questions” 
(UK-C6).
Money laundering: As mentioned earlier, proceeds of crime were 
invested in the establishment of a legitimate business. However, it should 
be noted that illicit proceeds were not laundered through this legitimate 
business thereafter. The legitimate business was, therefore, the product 
of the illicit activity and did not finance the illicit activity itself. Money 
laundering on a sophisticated, complex and systematic scale was not 
evidenced in the research. Illicit profits were used to establish licit 
business interests insofar as this may be regarded as money laundering. 
However, as mentioned above, illicit proceeds were not subsequently 
laundered through these legal businesses once they had been established. 
There was, however, a case of tobacco profits being laundered through 
a legal business owned by an illegal tobacco wholesaler owning a 
transportation company:
“I would transport bands and their productions to different countries 
while they were on tour. I worked for people like The Spice Girls, Bon 
Jovi, Robbie Williams, Olly Murs, etc... I would change the invoice 
from the bands I was working for. If the invoice was for £100,000 
I would change the invoice to £200,000 or £300,000 or would add 
things on to the bill as extras for the bands which was normal in my 
type of business” (UK-C4).
There are a number of critical moments in the illegal trade in tobacco 
which include: (1) the merchandise and transportation means being 
confiscated by the authorities at UK ports and airports; (2) the illegal 
entrepreneurs being arrested and/or fined by the authorities; (3) the 
merchandise being lost; (4) the merchandise being stolen by competitors 
or others; (5) the merchandise being destroyed or damaged (e.g. the 
tobacco products being warehoused in a leaking industrial unit) (UK-E5). 
These critical moments require access to capital not only in order for the 
entrepreneurs to re-enter the business but also to cover legal expenses. 
When the cigarettes and tobacco in small-scale schemes are confiscated 
at the UK border, entrepreneurs easily re-enter the trade by re-investing 
445 See also X. L’Hoiry, “‘Shifting the Stuff Wasn’t Any Bother’ – Illicit Enterprise, Tobacco 
Bootlegging and Deconstructing the British Government’s Cigarette Smuggling Discourse’”, 
Trends in Organised Crime 16 (2013): 413-34.
Access to capital 
in critical moments
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money from their legal work and/or savings. Due to the reasonably small 
scale of the bootlegging operation, the loss of profits did not seem to 
be insurmountable. It appeared that seized shipments are more like an 
inconvenience as the money invested was not so large as to require any 
special/extraordinary action in order for the entrepreneurs to be able to 
re-enter the business. According to the interviewees, entrepreneurs in 
the mid-level of the illegal tobacco business have the biggest problem in 
accessing funding when merchandise is lost because these are relatively 
smaller players who want a larger piece of the action:
“They have a little something aside from legal business and invest it 
in tobacco smuggling. If they lose it, it is more difficult. Depends on 
whether they have some more money aside to get involved again. 
But there are many who can cover for them, there are many who 
can operate as mid-level. I think these are the people who have 
the biggest problem, financially speaking. Because wholesalers have 
money, whereas retailers buy such small quantities that it is not a big 
deal if they lose the merchandise” (UK-E1).
In relation to large-scale schemes, money from previous successful 
importations is re-invested. Because profits are so large and the penalties 
(in comparison to drugs, for example) are low, customs intelligence 
suggests that entrepreneurs do what they call “bulk container rolls”, 
i.e. simultaneous importations of 5-6 containers on the same day 
at different ports throughout the UK. The profit margins are so big, 
particularly with the counterfeit cigarettes, that if one container is 
successful there is still a considerable profit to be made (UK-E4). As 
one of the interviewees also noted: “You do 2-3 successful runs and 
you’ve made a considerable amount of money… you can put some 
to one side to cover legal bills or whatever but then they’ll buy some 
more tobacco” (UK-E5). Thus, effectively, the high profitability of the 
illegal tobacco trade allows the entrepreneurs involved in importation/
wholesale of tobacco products to enjoy relative security from the 
financially critical moments of the trade.
There was reference to a “contingency fund” that existed in the late 
1960 and early 1970s among the dock workers in Hull port, a fund that 
is not still present in the tobacco business. In the late 1960s and early 
1970s dock workers in Hull port used to be heavily involved in small-
scale tobacco smuggling on a daily basis after having established good 
working relations with some members of the ferry crew and other sailors. 
They all invested small amounts of money in the scheme and for the 
first months all proceeds went into a fund that would cover their legal 
defence in case of any arrests by the authorities (UK-E5).
Finally, more organised and resourceful entities can take action instead of 
seeking funds to cover the loss involved when merchandise is confiscated 
by the authorities. For example, there was reference to a couple of cases 
in Northern Ireland in the 1990s, which involved paramilitary groups 
raiding HMRC warehouses in order to reclaim the cigarettes confiscated. 
However, this is not a typical way of solving similar problems in the UK 
illegal tobacco market.
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Loan sharking is not an integral aspect of the financing of the illicit 
tobacco trade. Only two cases were identified. The first involved a 
retailer who resorted to a local loan shark to secure £400 in order to 
participate in an imminent smuggling scheme. The second was a case 
of an illegal tobacco trader who, after retiring from tobacco smuggling, 
invested some of his profits into small-scale illegal money lending.
In many other countries than Sweden, illicit tobacco has historically 
played an important role as a source of income among organised crime 
groups. In recent times, however, narcotics have supplanted it as the 
dominant commodity – even though illicit tobacco still has a central 
role to play in some regions and groups.446 While the great chronicler 
of the Swedish trade in illicit tobacco has yet to make an appearance, 
it is clear that illicit tobacco has played a far less important role for 
organised crime than has the smuggling and bootlegging of alcohol. This 
type of criminality saw the light of day during the days of World War 
I, when the Swedish state instigated a system of alcohol rationing, later 
superseded by an especially stern alcohol policy characterised by high 
taxation.447
According to individuals interviewed for this report, the illicit tobacco 
trade was only a minor problem until the 1990s. The sharp increase in 
the tobacco tax in the 1990s was singled out by several interviewees 
as the starting point for the large-scale trade in illicit tobacco.448 With 
Sweden’s entrance into the EU in 1994, another important precondition 
that got the wheels of the illicit tobacco trade spinning was fulfilled as 
the borders towards Europe were opened up. Prior to this, “there were 
[customs officials] poking their noses in every border crossing”, and 
transporting larger shipments of tobacco was indeed a risky business, an 
ex-smuggler points out (SE-C3). The open borders significantly lessened 
the risks, and consequently shipping considerable quantities into the 
country became possible.
“Back then, whole truckloads were being brought into the country in 
large scale smuggling operations. There were lorries arriving weekly.” 
(SE-C3). There was involvement from established criminal figures, and 
it was they who organised the large-scale schemes. Individuals from 
the Balkan countries got “a certain percentage for every carton passing 
446 K. von Lampe, “Explaining the Emergence of the Cigarette Black Market in Germany”, in 
The Organised Crime Economy. Managing Crime Markets in Europe, ed. P. C. van Duyne et al. 
(Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2005), 209-30; K. von Lampe, “The Cigarette Black Market 
in Germany and in the United Kingdom”, Journal of Financial Crime 13, no. 2 (2006): 235-54.
447 P. O. Johansen, Den illegal sprite. Fra forbudstid til polstreik (Oslo: Unipub, 2004).
448 EBM and SKV, Punktskatter och brottsbekämpningens utmaningar. [Excise Fraud and Challanges for Law 
Enforcement.] (Cooperation between the intelligence units at the Economic Crime Authority and 
the Swedish Tax Agency. Stockholm, 2011); D. Vesterhav, “Bilden av organiserad brottslighet 
i svensk dagspress 1995 – 2002 [The Image of Organised Crime in the Swedish Daily Press 
1995 – 2002]” (University of Stockholm, 2003).
5.4. SWEDEN: FROM SMUGGlING tO WAREHOUSING
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through Montenegro” (SE-C3). They forwarded shipments of cigarettes to 
contacts in Sweden, where criminal entrepreneurs ran the distribution 
networks.
 
Today the situation is different. There has been a decrease in outright 
smuggling in favour of economic crime schemes, and the remaining trade 
in smuggled cigarettes is handled mainly by individuals.449 However, the 
findings in this study indicate that some of these individuals either are 
members of larger networks or act as retailers for them. In this new 
situation, a large proportion of the illicit tobacco which is brought into 
the country gets here by way of companies responsible for importing 
a large number of tobacco shipments, and who at least initially report 
these to the authorities. As a consequence of the EU duty suspension 
regulation – where the excise duty payment is suspended until the 
tobacco reaches the consumer – licensed companies are allowed to store 
these shipments in tax warehouses after importing them.450 Tax payment 
is deferred until the tobacco is picked up from the warehouse – but 
instead of generating tax revenue, the tobacco gets diverted to the black 
market.451 Aside from this, there are also cases where legal haulage 
companies get used as covers for smuggling of cigarettes. 
Establishing whether a tobacco product is illicit is not always straightfor-
ward. The packets often feature the correct warning labels in Swedish, as 
prescribed by law. Besides this, a lot of the cigarettes inside them were 
initially imported legally, and all the relevant documentation is seemingly 
in order. Boxes of illicit tobacco get mixed together with legal tobacco 
in the tax warehouses, and this process is later repeated in the cigarette 
racks of retail shops and convenience stores – everything calculated 
to obstruct successful inspection. Other cigarette packets either lack 
Swedish warning labels or are equipped with foreign language ones.
Counterfeit well-known brand name cigarettes also circulate on the 
Swedish market, although their share of sales is comparably small. 
Interviewees explain this with additional production costs associated 
with the small Swedish market – producing counterfeit packaging with 
warning labels in Swedish rather than, for instance, any of the major 
European languages is less profitable. 
Furthermore, a small share of the illicit tobacco market is occupied by 
shisha tobacco, with the same thing going for the quintessentially Swedish 
tobacco product, snus.452 However, as snus is more or less produced for 
the Swedish market specifically, international legitimate players would be 
hard pressed to justify any smuggling of this product into the country. 
449 SoRAD, Tal om tobak 2012. Tobakskonsumtionen i Sverige 2012 [Numbers on Tobacco 2012. Tobacco 
Consumption in Sweden 2012.] (Stockholm, 2012).
450 EBM and SKV, Punktskatter och brottsbekämpningens utmaningar. [Excise Fraud and Challanges for Law 
Enforcement].
451 SKV, Skattefelskarta [Tax Fraud Map] (Solna, Swedish Tax Agency, 2008); Brå, Storskaliga skattebrott. 
En kartläggning av skattebrottslingens kostnader [Large Scale Tax Fraud. A Mapping of the Tax Fraudster’s 
Costs] (Stockholm: Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention, 2011).
452 A moist powder tobacco product derivative from a variant of dry snuff in Sweden.
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Annual cigarette sales have dropped to 780 cigarettes per person,453 a 
level at which it has remained stable during the last few years. However, 
a new market segment has appeared – the occasional smoker. As is the 
case in many other Western European countries, Swedish ex-smokers are 
concentrated in the generations born in the 1960s or earlier. There has 
been a sharp drop in the popularity of smoking in the country since 
the middle of the 1980s.454 Figures from the early 2000s indicate that 
this trend is continuous.455 In 2010, the share of daily smokers was 13% 
among Swedish women and 12% among Swedish men.456 Another study 
arrived at somewhat lower figures: 8.3% of Swedish women and 11.1% 
of Swedish men were considered daily smokers.457
Smoking is most commonly practiced by individuals with low income 
and few qualifications, as well as among certain immigrant groups. Young 
people are heavier smokers than older ones. In addition, women tend 
to smoke more than men. In 2010, 36% of male secondary grade pupils 
had at least some kind of smoking habit, compared to 43% of their 
female classmates.458
The level of taxation on consumption in Sweden is high, as are the 
excise duty taxes for tobacco. The Swedish consumer might expect to 
pay €5.6 for a packet of cigarettes – this in comparison to the cost of 
€2.9 and €2.7 respectively in neighbouring countries like Poland and 
Estonia.459 At the same time, however, cigarettes are considerably more 
expensive in adjacent Norway (€9.8) as well as in the UK (€8.3), a 
situation which has resulted in Sweden serving both as a destination and 
transit country in the illicit tobacco trade.460
Surveys conducted in recent years indicate that illicit cigarettes occupy 
12 to 17% of the market share in Sweden.461 The popularity of illicit 
tobacco is greatest in a geographic area stretching from the southern 
parts of Sweden up to the Mälaren Valley, with prevalence especially 
high in Skåne County, and in major urban areas. The Öresund Bridge 
in particular is an important link connecting continental Europe and 
453 Statens Folkhälsoinstitut, Tobak. Kunskapsunderlag för folkhälsopolitisk rapport 2010 [Tobacco. 
Knowledge Base for Public Health Policy Report 2010] (Stockholm: Public Health Agency of Sweden, 
2011).
454 Ibid.
455 SoRAD, Tal om tobak 2012. Tobakskonsumtionen i Sverige 2012 [Numbers on Tobacco 2012. Tobacco 
Consumption in Sweden 2012].
456 Statens Folkhälsoinstitut, Tobak. Kunskapsunderlag för folkhälsopolitisk rapport 2010 [Tobacco. 
Knowledge Base for Public Health Policy Report 2010].
457 SoRAD, Tal om tobak 2012. Tobakskonsumtionen i Sverige 2012 [Numbers on Tobacco 2012. Tobacco 
Consumption in Sweden 2012].
458 Statens Folkhälsoinstitut, Tobak. Kunskapsunderlag för folkhälsopolitisk rapport 2010 [Tobacco. 
Knowledge Base for Public Health Policy Report 2010].
459 HUI, Marknaden för oregistrerade cigaretter i Sverige [The Market for Unregistered Cigarettes in Sweden] 
(Stockholm: HUI Research AB, 2013).
460 Brå, Storskaliga skattebrott. En kartläggning av skattebrottslingens kostnader [Large Scale Tax Fraud. 
A Mapping of the Tax Fraudster’s Costs]; RUC, Underrättelserapport Röken. Illegal cigaretthantering. 
[Intelligence Report the Smoke. Illegal Handling of Cigarettes] (Gothenburg, Regional Intelligence 
Centre, 2012).
461 HUI, Marknaden för oregistrerade cigaretter i Sverige [The Market for Unregistered Cigarettes in Sweden]; 
See also Tullverket, Lägesbild Organiserad Brottslighet 2011 [Situational Report Organised Crime 2011] 
(Stockholm, Swedish Customs, 2011).
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southern Sweden. The lowest market share is found in the northern parts 
of the country. Thus, the prevalence of illicit tobacco is a reflection of 
geographical proximity to European markets. 
However, the concentration of illicit tobacco in the south does not 
mean that there are no regional variations. In a mid-sized city such as 
Gävle – located by the coast of the southernmost part of the northern 
province of Norrland – illicit tobacco carries a market share as big as 38 
per cent. This figure was the result of a major survey – in which using 
methods such as test buying and counting discarded packages were 
used – carried out with the cooperation of the Swedish Retail Institute 
(HUI) and the security company Securitas. According to interviewees, 
this significant figure may partly be explained by the presence of a free 
port and by the city’s geographic location, close to both Stockholm 
and a major highway which provides direct access to Norway and the 
significantly higher price level there.
Sources of illicit tobacco
Illicit tobacco is produced in several different areas and is imported 
into Sweden from a number of countries. Legal tobacco manufacturers 
constitute important sources in this trade because they have the advantage 
of being able to offer sought after high-quality cigarettes by well-known 
brands. Previously, the only brand name cigarettes such as Marlboro, 
Prince or Blend were found on the Swedish market. In the words of 
an offender: “You couldn’t sell anything else.” It was too risky trying 
to market inferior goods – the main thing was unloading the shipment 
quickly: “When dealing in larger shipments of 25 pallets, you’d better be 
able to offer quality products” (SE-C3).
Yet another type of brand name products is the national brand, such 
as different Polish cigarettes. These cigarettes are considered house-hold 
names in Poland and are at the same time sought after in Sweden as 
well. However, according to one of the offenders interviewed, these 
cannot compete with Marlboro or Prince in terms of marketability.
The issue of the origin of a cigarette has grown more complex. A highly 
diverse range of nations was identified in the research, including China, 
Eastern European countries like Ukraine, Poland, Hungary, Russia, as well 
as regions like the Middle East, and possibly even Africa.462 This is hardly 
a surprising development, given that it follows the general globalisation 
of legal trade.
Unlike for illegal goods, tobacco is dealt with using both illegal and legal 
retail trade networks. Illicit cigarettes are marketed openly in spaces 
where the access and influence of authorities is limited. From the point 
of view of the offenders, the major advantage of trading out in the 
open is that it is there that their customer base is located. This makes 
the trade in illicit tobacco highly efficient compared to narcotics or 
462 Cf. RUC, Underrättelserapport Röken. Illegal cigaretthantering. [Intelligence Report the Smoke. Illegal 
Handling of Cigarettes].
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prostitution. Furthermore, the fact that legal sales channels “rub off” on 
the products on offer – these are perceived as “white” by customers – 
leads to greater profit margins.463 To consumers, the cigarettes seem 
reasonably priced rather than illegal. Moreover, in one survey, 54% of 
the consumers who participated agreed that “it is acceptable to purchase 
cheap cigarettes” (cheap denoting packets costing SEK 40 (€4.2) or less, 
which does not even cover taxes and fees).464
The extent of criminality
Tobacco sales are the source of roughly SEK 10 billion (€1 billion) in tax 
revenues annually.465 The tax on tobacco thus represents a significant 
source of income for the state. The importance of the tobacco trade 
is clearly reflected in the policy of the current government, with a tax 
hike proposed in order to strengthen the fiscal situation of the state. The 
annual shortfall is calculated to be SEK 2 billion approximately, but this 
figure also includes the sums lost from illicit alcohol sales.
This SEK 2 billion shortfall in revenues may be compared to a total 
tax gap calculated at upwards of SEK 130 billion (€16 billion) by 
the Swedish Tax Agency.466 This loss may not seem that large when 
compared to the larger sums involved. Tobacco obviously becomes a 
marginal phenomenon if compared to the total value generated by all 
trade and production of goods and services. If tobacco is considered 
from a relative point of view, the shortfall in state revenue becomes 
significant. Furthermore, widespread excise tax evasion means that 
free competition is negatively affected. Several interviewees mentioned 
that shopkeepers may find it hard to refuse illicit tobacco when the 
competitor further down the street offers consumers cheap cigarettes. 
Sometimes shopkeepers try to do something about the uneven market 
by tipping the authorities off about competitors who sell illicit tobacco. 
However, at the end of the day, this criminality is underpinned by 
consumers, who enjoy being able to purchase cheap cigarettes.
Obstacles to combating illicit tobacco
While the fight against drugs has been highly prioritised by customs 
and police officers for decades, the commitment towards counteracting 
the smuggling of alcohol and tobacco has been less intense, which 
probably has to do with these goods being considered less “foreign” 
than socially accepted products. With importers now turning from 
smuggling to the more advanced methods of excise duty evasion – 
where companies are used as criminal instruments – this type of 
criminality has become increasingly harder to get at. The primary 
function of the customs – identifying illegally imported goods – has 
463 SKV, Skattefelskarta [Tax Fraud Map]; Brå, Storskaliga Skattebrott. En kartläggning av skattebrottslingens 
kostnader [Large Scale Tax Fraud. A Mapping of the Tax Fraudster’s Costs].
464 HUI, Marknaden för oregistrerade cigaretter i Sverige [The Market for Unregistered Cigarettes in 
Sweden].
465 SKV, Skattefelskarta [Tax Fraud Map].
466 Ibid.; RUC, Underrättelserapport Röken. Illegal cigaretthantering. [Intelligence Report the Smoke. Illegal 
Handling of Cigarettes].
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in part become irrelevant as the very act of importing the goods may 
now in itself be legal.
When illicit tobacco is openly sold in retail shops, this prompts the 
need for comprehensive and joint inspection measures by the police, 
the municipalities, and the Tax Agency. In addition, as the trade at the 
retail level involves smaller quantities spread across a large number of 
entrepreneurs, this naturally makes for less serious individual offences.467 
Yet another problematic aspect is the fact that illicit and legal tobacco 
is often mixed, which complicates the process of establishing to what 
extent the products are untaxed.
Generally speaking, the knowledge of law enforcement of the criminal 
landscape is limited. In the case of advanced excise tax evasion schemes, 
this is often not possible without employing measures like surveillance 
and phone-tapping – resource-intensive methods that are generally 
reserved for types of criminality associated with harsher penalties than 
tobacco-related offences. Such intelligence-led enforcement only becomes 
available when substantial sums are involved, such as a container-load 
of illicit tobacco and revenue shortfalls upwards of SEK 15 million 
(€156,000).
Import and distribution
Interviewees noted that links to organised crime groups are sometimes 
evident already at the point of production. This may be exemplified by 
the fact that Italian and Russian groupings are running factories of their 
own; at least the Russians run operations to get their products into the 
country, either through smuggling or importation. As in other cases the 
illicit cigarettes that are brought in are so called illicit whites.468 Even 
though principals, companies, and brands may come and go, forensic 
analysis has established that the cigarettes in some cases are produced 
in the same location; the same machinery has been used to manufacture 
the cigarettes.
One interviewee added that illicit whites may originate from countries 
characterised by low production costs, where industry groups have 
observed the overcapacity of certain factories. These are kept in 
operation despite the fact that the wheels – supposedly – stay idle 
during large parts of the day. This indicates that they are used to 
manufacture illicit whites in parallel to cigarettes that are intended for 
the legal export market. According to one offender, there used to be 
clear divisions in the market, with one group smuggling counterfeits and 
the other trading in illicit whites. Today the situation is more diverse – 
business is done with whoever is available. Public officials tend to think 
along similar lines because of the plethora of brands that are available 
on the market.
467 Ibid.
468 RUC, “King Size” – Samverkan mot illegal cigaretthantering [King Size – Collaboration against Illegal 
Handling of Cigarettes] (Gothenburg: Regional Intelligence Centre, 2012).
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The need to start looking outside the borders of Sweden was noted 
during the research. In many cases the straw man is the only repre-
sentative on the ground in Sweden; the principals are to be found 
abroad, as is the money. Getting a grip on the complex import 
schemes can also be quite a challenge, a fact which is described by 
a public official:
“We see how containers that are transported across Europe exchange 
identification codes. According to official documents your first 
container contains, say, construction material, the second cigarettes. 
The construction material is being transported between EU countries, 
the cigarettes are just in transit in EU. The shipment containing the 
cigarettes moves on – but now equipped with the documents for the 
other container, and it is free to do so as it appears to be a transport 
between EU countries. Such manoeuvres make the cigarettes hard 
to find.”469
The illicit tobacco business has a quick turnover. Sales channels are 
already in place, and the goods are quickly passed further on to the 
consumers. The only reason one would invest in these kinds of extensive 
logistical networks is to support a business operation which is reasonably 
stable. In fact, it is almost a precondition; bringing the cigarettes into the 
country might be easy but getting them to the consumer is the difficult 
part. This can be done either by setting up an extensive logistics network 
or establishing contacts with different retail shops. Customers may also 
be alerted about incoming tobacco shipments by shop owners; public 
officials responsible for supervisory activities have noticed increased 
activity in the vicinity ahead of arrival. One offender described the 
distribution network as follows:
“The trade is swift. They ring people up to tell them that they are 
sitting on a shipment; they sell it on straight away. Shipments get 
passed on quickly. Maybe a lorry or two gets caught, but the other 
ones make it through the net cast by the customs without a hitch. 
Losing a shipment now and then, that’s something you can afford. But 
everyone involved in the next step in the chain are just waiting for 
the goods to purchase it, pick it up, and sell it on – everyone wants 
to make a buck.” (SE-C1)
Some informants describe vans or lorries pulling of the road and vehicles 
quickly turning up to collect their share of the cargo. It doesn’t take 
long to unload the cargo so that it can be handed over to those in the 
next step of the chain. A law enforcement official described how a lorry 
carrying smuggled tobacco was intercepted:
“As the lorry made a halt in the middle of the night, several pick-up 
trucks turned up. We went into action after they had unloaded 20 per 
469 The report on the illicit tobacco trade in Sweden draws on, among other things, a seminar 
discussion with 19 experts from a number of relevant backgrounds: employed in the tobacco 
industry, at public authorities involved in detecting and investigating the illicit tobacco trade, 
etc. Where no individual code is provided, the quote refers to a view shared at that 
discussion.
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cent of the cargo. The guy who had brought in the shipment – the 
distributor – was sitting in a car only a couple of kilometres away. 
It was he who had called in the people who were collecting the 
shipment.”
In addition, the secrecy requirements are not quite as high for distributors 
of illicit tobacco as for dealers in goods such as narcotics, according to 
one offender. The risks might be slightly increased when the distributor 
utilises legal transport networks, for example bringing in cigarettes and 
legally imported goods side by side. This is because the cargo might be 
inspected by both the haulage firm and the company on the receiving 
end. Another downside is that this makes the shipment much more 
transparent in terms of tracking the distance it has travelled and by 
what route.
The size of distribution networks vary according to the scale of the 
trade. One general rule of thumb, however, is that there are fewer 
middle-men involved compared to the narcotics trade. This might be 
because tobacco is a legal good which anyone can purchase in a regular 
convenience store. Another reason might be that illicit tobacco reaches 
the market through the same channels as the legal and taxed tobacco. 
According to one official there is a lot of illicit tobacco arriving by boat, 
possibly because port security is perceived as being more lax. Another 
alternative is taking care of the shipment out to sea, with goods being 
transferred from larger vessels onto recreational crafts which can then 
easily land without arousing much suspicion.
The middle-men who serve as retailers in the chain of distribution are 
also those the authorities know the least about. Their knowledge is greater 
when it comes to importers, large-scale distributors, and the corner 
shops that end up selling some of the tobacco. Some officials imply 
that some wholesale market spaces are used by retailers of foodstuffs 
who also act as middle-men selling illicit tobacco. In the opinion of one 
offender, these entrepreneurs have not acquired enough competence in 
the Swedish language for them to be able to run businesses that are 
fully legal; they live outside mainstream society and make a living as 
grey-zone retailers.
Further illustrating the importance of having a reliable distribution 
network are the examples, although few, indicating the existence of 
failed retailers. A public official tells of an interrogation of a retailer who 
supposedly had purchased something like 20,000 or 30,000 cigarettes 
from a man he chanced upon in a shopping mall. It is hard to confirm 
the veracity of this story, but it could possibly be interpreted as a sign 
of a failed attempt at setting up a distribution network, leading the man 
to actively seek out retailers instead. This is supported by additional data 
indicating that retailers sometimes have had a hard time locating suitable 
buyers for their goods.
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Players
During the last few years Swedish authorities have stressed the fact that 
organised crime has entered the illicit tobacco market.470 A seminar 
participant describes this process as follows:
“Today organised crime is the same as economic crime. It’s all a big 
mess, with different players hanging out with each other. Having 2 
million cigarettes means that SEK 1 million ends up in your coffers, 
all at the risk of getting 2 years in prison. Try the same thing with 
amphetamine and we are talking about 12 years behind bars.”
However, this in no way means that the odd individual operator cannot 
be found plying his or her trade on the market. These are first and 
foremost private individuals who travel to low-tax countries to purchase 
cigarettes, which they then sell on using their own social network (see 
below on the frequent small-scale illegal imports). According to a public 
official with comprehensive knowledge of the field, the trafficking of 
these operators is usually limited to alcohol; nowadays, the cigarette 
trade is the domain of organised crime. The following picture of the 
individual operator emerges from the description by a public official of 
a small-time player attempting to increase his turnover by formalizing his 
business:
“We have this guy who drives around in his own car to sell his goods. 
Information about his activities spreads through social media. Now he 
is on his way starting his own company. He has learned the ropes. 
He has no need for corner stores as he is living in a smaller town.”
In contrast with smugglers, those who primarily rely on tax warehousing 
were described by interviewees as somewhat more business-like or “the 
scammer type of person.” The smugglers instead tend to be mentioned in 
connection with traditional organised crime and have a high intimidation 
capital (the ability to frighten people due to a reputation of being violent 
or connected to “dangerous” people471). Well-established criminals from 
groups capable of mobilising substantial intimidation capital are most 
commonly seen on the lower levels of the distribution networks. Other 
members of these groups may however assume a more business-like 
profile, and consequently tend to show up in connection to distribution 
networks relying on tax warehousing as well.472 In this way, traditional 
smugglers and economic criminals are brought together, which sometimes 
leads to new constellations being formed. A public official summarises 
this development:
470 Brå, Storskaliga skattebrott. En kartläggning av skattebrottslingens kostnader [Large Scale Tax Fraud. A 
Mapping of the Tax Fraudster’s Costs]; Tullverket, Lägesbild Organiserad Brottslighet 2011 [Situational 
Report Organised Crime 2011]; RUC, Underrättelserapport Röken. Illegal cigaretthantering. [Intelligence 
Report the Smoke. Illegal Handling of Cigarettes].
471 See Brå, Otillåten påverkan mot företag. En undersökning om utpressning [Unlawful Influence against 
Businesses. A Study on Extortion] (Stockholm, Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention, 
2012).
472 See also Tullverket, Lägesbild organiserad brottslighet 2011 [Situational Report Organised Crime 
2011].
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“You notice this when you conduct phone surveillance of people 
[active in organised crime circles]. They are always on the lookout for 
new business opportunities. There is a great capacity for invention. 
They are moving on, from narcotics and alcohol to tobacco.”
Different collaborative efforts between different players are known, 
especially on the retail side – a pattern also seen on the Swedish 
narcotics market.473 These collaborative arrangements have been used for 
mutual trade as well as support in times of crisis. However, few people 
have been able to substantiate this by citing specific examples. Such 
behaviour may therefore not be all that common.
The advisory roles of different types were brought up during the research. 
The main type is the legal advisor probing for legislative loopholes (the 
one used in tax warehousing scheme being one example).474 Another 
example is a lawyer actively seeking out and becoming a partner in a 
criminal tobacco scheme.
Some officials consider the demand for people able to function as business 
intermediaries to be greater than for advisors. Such intermediaries are 
often on a good footing with foreign suppliers and can help out new 
players on the Swedish market by guaranteeing their reliability. There 
are some known cases where interpreters have served in this capacity. 
Another sought-after functionary is the problem-solver, preferably the one 
with a talent for sorting out the logistical structures which often turned 
out to run less smoothly than originally planned. In the words of one 
public official, “their organisational structures are totally chaotic.” On the 
other hand, the well-established players in the world of organised crime 
have very good access to networks and contacts. One public official 
describes these players as follows:
“Individuals who commit crimes through companies holding excise 
tax licenses are suit-wearing multilinguals who know how to conduct 
themselves. They make their own pleas in court and display a 
knowledge which is almost encyclopaedic” (SE-E3).
Two other major factors that influence organisational structures are 
profitability and the extent of a player’s available resources. After having 
studied the local market one seminar participant identified a pattern of 
capital-rich players having control over quite a few more steps in the 
chain of distribution than the others. Most of the others involved are 
independent entrepreneurs who engage in mutual trade in order to try 
to turn a profit for themselves.
Together with results from a previous study on large-scale tax offences, 
the data collected in this research makes it possible to distinguish five 
separate criminal modus operandi used in the illicit tobacco market. 
473 Brå, Narkotikadistributörer. En studie av grossisterna [Drug Distributors. A Study of the Wholesalers] 
(Stockholm: Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention, 2007).
474 See RUC, Supen. Rapport om punktskattebedrägeri med alkohol [A Report on Excise Fraud with Alcohol] 
(Gothenburg, Regional Intelligence Centre, 2012); Brå, Storskaliga skattebrott. En kartläggning av 
skattebrottslingens kostnader [Large Scale Tax Fraud. A Mapping of the Tax Fraudster’s Costs].
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These are: fraud by means of tax warehousing, mixed operations, frequent 
small-scale illegal imports/smuggling, and so called distance trade.
Fraud by means of tax warehousing
As previously mentioned there has been a decline in smuggling in 
favour of schemes in which businesses are used as criminal instruments. 
According to a seminar participant, seventy Swedish companies hold 
excise tax licenses (granting them the right to use tax warehouses) but 
the market is almost entirely dominated by just one of these – Swedish 
Match (which controls roughly 94% of the market). Law enforcement 
intelligence estimates that around 10% of the smaller companies are 
created to be involved solely in illegal business.475 This whole situation 
is largely said to be a product of people learning how to set up 
their schemes by the aid of a manual (which has been seized by the 
authorities) written by someone after having discovered a loophole in 
the law.476 Several of the interviewees confirm this excise duty evasion 
scheme as the most commonly used method for importing illicit tobacco. 
The procurement of companies holding a tax excise license is the basis 
for this type of criminality, companies which are then used to bring 
in large quantities of cigarettes (mainly – these are used for alcohol as 
well).477 This scheme makes importing and transporting the cigarettes 
fully legal. Even though there is a strong association to illicit whites for 
this method it may be used for trading other types of tobacco as well. 
In formal terms the criminal offence is only committed later, when the 
perpetrator neglects to declare the commercial transaction, withholding 
excise duty and VAT. During a respite period of about 70 days the 
culprits can devote themselves to importing as large quantities as 
possible until their company shows up on the radar of the authorities 
because of unpaid taxes and fees. Once the authorities start seeking 
out the company representatives, the whole company board – initially 
composed of respectable and economically well-to-do members – would 
be replaced by the principals with a straw man who doesn’t know 
anything about their activities. If the principals are to secure a steady 
supply of tobacco they must therefore constantly try to acquire new 
companies to assume control over. To the outside observer this might 
look like a business deal between two independent companies, but the 
reality is that the companies are getting replaced while the actual owners 
remain the same.478 As a public official explains:
“We have seen a shift in the pattern of the usage of these companies. 
Nowadays they are sometimes put on hold for 3-4 years until they are 
activated. This indicates that they have other companies under their 
control in the meantime. The bar for going through the application 
475 EBM and SKV, Punktskatter och brottsbekämpningens utmaningar [Excise Fraud and Challanges for Law 
Enforcement].
476 Brå, Storskaliga skattebrott. En kartläggning av skattebrottslingens kostnader [Large Scale Tax Fraud. 
A Mapping of the Tax Fraudster’s Costs]; RUC, Supen. Rapport om punktskattebedrägeri med alkohol 
[A Report on Excise Fraud with Alcohol].
477 Brå, Storskaliga skattebrott. En kartläggning av skattebrottslingens kostnader [Large Scale Tax Fraud. 
A Mapping of the Tax Fraudster’s Costs].
478 Ibid.
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procedure has also been raised. But follow-up inspections are tricky; 
it takes resources of a different magnitude to carry them out. We 
cannot forcibly revoke licenses [of currently inactive companies] – if 
we tried this, they would reply that they were just about to get going 
with the importing business.”
This changing pattern could also have been caused by the fact that 
acquiring a company that holds an excise tax license has become 
increasingly harder. Thus the accumulation of reserves has become a 
prime concern to the offenders. A couple of public officials bring up the 
problems associated with attempting to find out who really signed the 
company papers and who really controls the company.
If players don’t choose to purchase or set up the companies themselves 
(usually working through straw men) they may instead turn to hijacking 
already existing businesses.479 One of the interviewees had been 
approached by some men who assisted him in setting up a company, 
later used to import tobacco, and in his description these advisors come 
across as very convincing and agreeable people. They knew the tricks of 
the trade and just wanted to show him how to go about securing all the 
necessary permits as smoothly as possible – in order for them to later 
start using his company as a criminal instrument in their illegal trade. The 
interviewee describes the cigarettes vanishing into thin air somewhere 
between the border and his tax warehouse:
“As soon as they had crossed the border, they knew the address of 
the bonded warehouse, but then [the driver] was instructed to not 
bother about going there, let’s drive directly to this other location. 
And all this without me knowing anything about it.” (SE-C2)
Mixing illegal and legal operations
The mixing of illegal and legal business practiced by certain entrepreneurs 
came up in the research as especially common in the world of tax 
warehousing. This involves bringing in shipments (often containing the same 
type of product) without paying taxes at all and manipulating receipts 
so that they match the quantities that are officially brought into the tax 
warehouses – a manoeuvre the operators may be more or less talented 
at.480 According to information in a tip-off received by one agency, false 
invoices are offered as a premium service in addition to the cigarettes 
themselves. Sometimes they have been able to establish the authenticity of 
invoices found during inspections by checking the invoice number against 
the records at Swedish Match. In other words, mixing underground and 
above-board activities may be practiced higher up in the distribution chain 
as well as at further down among retailers and store owners.
One public official quotes risk-management as the main reason for 
mixing legal and illegal activities. One of the offenders rather considers 
this strategy as a method for increasing – or creating – profit margins.
479 Ibid.
480 See also RUC, Underrättelserapport Röken. Illegal cigaretthantering. [Intelligence Report the Smoke. 
Illegal Handling of Cigarettes].
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Large-scale illegal imports/smuggling
If the transport is arriving from another EU country, this is referred to as 
importing; in all other cases the correct term is smuggling. Considering 
these together is warranted given the similar nature of their method 
of transportation. As mentioned in the introduction, until a few years 
ago, large-scale smuggling used to be the dominant mode of operation. 
Smuggling still occurs, albeit on a more modest scale. On this, public 
officials, industry representatives, and offenders are more or less in 
agreement. One offender speculates that even though there are still 
lorries being used for transportation, smuggling in general is increasingly 
small-scale. According to a second offender, lorries used to be the 
method of choice, but that people are now using freight-shipping of 
containers as well. A person mentioned in one of the interviews is said 
to have started a legal haulage company which was simultaneously used 
for smuggling tobacco and other goods.
At a later stage, the smugglers pass the tobacco on, either to shops or 
to people in their own private networks, often comprised of small-scale 
individual retailers who purchase 100 or so cartons. An offender says that 
he consistently turns down any offer to buy these cheap cigarettes, since 
he is convinced that there are substances in them that are even more 
toxic than those found in regular cigarettes. A couple of interviewees 
single out a market square as one of the places where such cigarettes 
may be purchased if you know who to ask. 
Frequent small-scale illegal imports/smuggling
When it comes to small-scale imports and smuggling there is no longer 
such a clear-cut connection to organised crime. This is the arena of 
independent operators acting on their own initiative. Nevertheless, 
there are examples where such cigarette running operations are 
coordinated in a way resembling how fencing works. Those involved 
meet up at an agreed upon spot where the cigarettes are to be 
transferred to the buyer. Even though each individual brings only a 
small amount of cigarettes, these will quickly add up to substantial 
quantities. In one example, a businessman owned several corner shops 
and a taxi company at the same time, and he used both businesses 
to facilitate his involvement in the illicit tobacco trade. In addition 
to this, vans are used in intense, small-scale trafficking operations, 
with the vehicles carrying 50,000 – 100,000 cigarettes rolling off the 
morning ferry. Another alternative might be a group of passengers 
filling their suitcases to the brim with tobacco products.481 Often these 
mules are people on long-term sickness or in retirement who are just 
trying to make their money last a bit longer at the end of the month. 
It may also be the case that the smuggling is organised along ethnic 
lines, with groups of Russians and Poles often being identified by 
interviewed offenders.
481 See Tullverket, Lägesbild organiserad brottslighet 2011 [Situational Report Organised Crime 2011]; 
Brå, Storskaliga Skattebrott. En kartläggning av skattebrottslingens kostnader [Large Scale Tax Fraud. 
A Mapping of the Tax Fraudster’s Costs].
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Others choose to operate independently. An offender relates the 
following:
“Some people living in Sweden make some extra money by going 
on ferry trips where they purchase what they then smuggle into the 
country. They make about 3-4 trips a month or so. I can’t understand 
them – there is too much of a risk getting caught and the profits 
are too low. They have to pay for their own ferry tickets, and maybe 
also even the petrol for the drive to the boat and further down into 
Europe. What’s more, they seldom buy more cigarettes than they can 
fill a suitcase with – this doesn’t add up to much money, but lots 
of time and effort. Sometimes they don’t buy more than 10 cartons. 
People make similar trips to Germany in order to purchase liquor. 
The fuel costs alone are enough to make such trips expensive. They 
dream about getting rich, but they do not have any contacts among 
organised criminals. So they go at it alone instead” (SE-C1).
Unlike with synthetic drugs and doping substances, the internet has only 
a very minor role to play when it comes to the trade in cigarettes.482 
Cigarettes might not weigh much, but they are nevertheless quite 
bulky, so the shipping costs makes mail-ordering prohibitively expensive 
for the private consumer. In the very few cases where interviewees 
mention people who purchase cheap tobacco products online, most 
of this trade seems directly targeted at the consumer, with organised 
crime not being involved to any significant extent. On the other hand 
it would seem that the internet is used as an important channel for 
purchasing snus.483
Sources of capital for criminal operations. Profile of financiers 
in criminal operations
Start-up capital was singled out in the research findings as the most 
critical issue. Once the operation is up and running it generates enough 
profit to open up for investing in further criminal schemes. An expert 
explains:
“As the wholesalers need an unbroken flow of goods they need 
motivation to invest using their own resources. The money circulates 
within the system. Once you’ve brought in a shipment, you’ve 
automatically secured the initial capital needed for the next round. 
This makes for a self-financing cycle.”
Several public officials underscore that it shouldn’t be too difficult to 
attract financiers, as the tobacco market is perceived as very stable. 
Financiers happily invest in such a market. This is corroborated by stories 
told by some of the offenders about loans being repaid quickly thanks 
to the enormous profit margins.
482 SoRAD, Tal om tobak 2012. Tobakskonsumtionen i Sverige 2012 [Numbers on Tobacco 2012. Tobacco 
Consumption in Sweden 2012].
483 Ibid.
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Some, although not that many, financiers are said to act on the black 
tobacco market. Often they come from the world of organised crime 
and function as moneylenders or just purchase shares in cigarette ship-
ments. There are also suspicions that some people within the legal busi-
ness community are participating in this trade as financiers. At the very 
least they are using resources from legal activities to invest in criminal 
ones. Financiers rarely busy themselves with the practical side of things, 
but their names pop up in frequently when the trade in illicit cigarettes 
is discussed.
According to research findings, it is likely that co-financing solutions are 
prominent here. This involves a pair or a group of 5-6 people that know 
and trust each other joining forces. Examples are mentioned of members 
in a distribution group taking turns collecting the initial capital needed 
for procuring the next shipment. The person who functions as financier 
in one operation might be in charge of distribution and logistics in the 
next. An offender describes his experiences of this as follows:
“Some guys join up and start pooling money together. The first might 
contribute drug money, the second brings [capital] from economic 
crime to the table, and the third puts in money generated by 
frauds. And so they’ve managed to assemble some initial capital. 
The important thing is to get things, the operation, rolling, just once. 
Then you’ll get your investment back with a profit. The main thing is 
securing ‘short-term start-up capital’” (SE-C3).
Some of the interviewees think that additional economic criminality is 
used to source capital. This might involve, for instance, undeclared work 
(not least in the construction and restaurant sectors), reversed money-
laundering (i.e. making a profit from transforming legal money in bank 
accounts into cash, which can then be used for waging illicit workers), 
VAT and invoice fraud, and asset-stripping of companies. One offender 
and a couple of public officials are familiar with cases where there was 
a connection between the trade in illicit cigarettes and undeclared work. 
In the words of a public official:
“Some people in the construction industry need to secure cash in 
order to pay for undeclared work. A cigarette wholesaler might sit 
on SEK 500,000 in ready money, and thus the construction company 
buys the cash using IOUs relating to other goods or services. This 
means that the real source of the money used for purchasing 
cigarettes might be an honest construction industry entrepreneur, 
and that the cash profits generated by the trade in illicit cigarettes 
pays illicit workers employed by dishonest construction industry 
entrepreneurs.”
According to one offender, things were tougher in the 1990s, when straight-
up smuggling was the dominant mode of operation. Huge quantities of 
cigarettes were moved, and if the authorities were successful, huge 
quantities were also being seized. Back then, it took substantial financial 
reserves to be able to compete successfully – and to survive after having 
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your shipments seized. The same offender claims that things are not as 
bad nowadays:
“If you’ve been in the business for a while you’ve built up considerable 
reserves. Sure, you might lose the odd lorry, but this isn’t the end of 
the world. You can always get back up on your feet again” (SE-C3).
Other interviewees agree that the market’s incredible profitability trans-
lates into financial reserves. One public official relates how Swedish 
customs agents doing surveillance have observed how anxious offenders 
have abandoned their cars and suitcases, sometimes returning if they 
think the coast is clear, but sometimes also just leaving them as they are. 
If the profits are as handsome as indicated by seminar participants and 
as offenders say, then moneylenders should be willing to help out with 
additional capital in critical phases. Wholesalers sometimes grant retailers 
credit, according to intelligence reports.484
The emerging picture is completely different to the one in a previous 
study of the drug market.485 Here, the subject of the credit system was 
brought up in more or less all of the interviews. There were plenty of 
stories about stressed-out distributors frantically driving around trying to 
collect debts from retailers, with the retailers in turn having a difficult 
time trying to scrape together enough cash to be able to repay them in 
time. Such stories were few and far between in this study, the tobacco 
market is instead described as being far less risky.
Settlement of payments is a blind spot for the authorities, and few 
interviewees have anything to say about it. One offender mentioned that 
a single shipment is enough to repay the loan for the initial capital in 
its entirety. This means that a debt can be repaid in less than a month’s 
time. The same individual is familiar with the workings of the illegal 
credit market, and says that a hundred thousand SEK can be borrowed 
against an interest rate of 8,000 a month. Borrowing money to invest 
in the illicit tobacco trade is viewed as a safe investment, although in 
the case of a seized shipment, the debts quickly soar because of the 
high interest rates. As long as creditors know that they’ll be able to get 
their money back with added interest, postponing repayment is usually 
possible to arrange.
Further down the ladder there is the small store owners who can be 
intimidated into selling cigarettes, a situation described by a customs 
officer and a number of people involved in inspections work.486 The 
store owners – perhaps not daring to do anything else out of fear 
of the supplier – sell the cigarettes and hand over the money when
484 RUC, “King Size” – Samverkan mot illegal cigaretthantering [King Size – Collaboration against Illegal 
Handling of Cigarettes].
485 Brå, Vart tog alla pengarna vägen? En studie om narkotikabrottslighetens ekonomihantering [Where 
Did All the Money Go? A Study on the Financial Management of Drug Crime] (Stockholm, Swedish 
National Council for Crime Prevention, 2007).
486 See also RUC, Underrättelserapport Röken. Illegal cigaretthantering. [Intelligence Report the Smoke. 
Illegal Handling of Cigarettes].
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the distributor shows up again. Here, settlement of payment more 
resembles extortion than normal business strategies, for offenders use 
their intimidation capital to secure payment compliance.487
There are many different types of costs associated with the illicit trade 
of cigarettes. Some interviewees and seminar participants underscore 
that costs are low, especially considering the kind of profitability 
involved. In particular those who combine illegal with legal operations 
can cut their costs; after all, they have already taken care of the initial 
investments of legal business, which can then be used for illegal side 
activities as well. This setup is also generally perceived as decreasing 
the risk of being detected, which at least in the long run could be 
considered as a gain in terms of lowered costs. This of course assumes 
that the same people control the legal as well as the illegal operations. 
If someone else’s legal business is used for the transportation there is 
always the risk of being detected by the legal entrepreneur, who may 
report to the authorities.
Production and purchases
There is a limited production taking place inside the borders of Sweden, 
first and foremost of snus and shisha tobacco.488 Undeclared production 
means that purchases and transportation of raw materials such as raw 
tobacco, molasses, and other products must be protected from prying 
eyes. Occasionally the raw tobacco is pretty finely shredded already 
when it is imported, and since raw tobacco is exempt from taxes, 
detection is hampered. Some public officials relate how they have 
discovered counterfeit packaging resembling the looks of a major foreign 
manufacturer of shisha tobacco. In the words of an official:
“The attempt was a rather good one; they had used the same type of 
box, with the right kind of plastic lid and paper cover. The only snag 
was that they designed it with [two of the symbols] in the logo the 
wrong way around, and there was some minor difference in the text 
used on the packaging. The attempt wasn’t 100% successful. I had 
to assist the authorities in identifying this as a counterfeit product” 
(SE-E3).
If the cigarettes that are produced are of substandard quality, this might 
increase the risk of them being detected. An example are the illicit 
whites carrying badly designed warning labels in Swedish. Nevertheless, 
importing tobacco is described as a rather straight forward business 
despite possible pitfalls like these. A container-load of cigarettes might 
cost roughly SEK 1 million (preferably to be paid in advance), but at the 
same time, this shipment is worth about SEK 10 million to the purchaser. 
Bank transfers and invoices are likely used for payments, but there 
have been instances when cash has been used. Cash payment would 
487 Brå, Otillåten påverkan mot företag. En undersökning om utpressning [Unlawful Influence against 
Businesses. A Study on Extortion].
488 RUC, Underrättelserapport Röken. Illegal cigaretthantering. [Intelligence Report the Smoke. Illegal 
Handling of Cigarettes].
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likely lead to more questions being asked by the producers in the legal 
tobacco market, however. One of the interviewees adds that that the 
production cost for a packet of cigarettes (including the cigarettes) is 
SEK 1, this while SEK 55 is a standard retail price.
On the black market, cigarettes which have already been taxed but 
that have been diverted by means of theft can be purchased. Research 
for this report did not identify this as a major problem. The major 
tobacco distributors are responsible for efficiently overseeing their flow 
of goods, and it seems like they consider this a high priority issue. 
An industry employee claims that only small amounts of tobacco gets 
diverted, and it is mostly stolen by employees working on the ferries 
and in airports. As long as the products carry duty-free markings, they 
are easy to detect.
Logistics
The logistics of the tobacco trade differs from many other types of tax 
offences or organised crime schemes in that it is relatively straightforward 
and simple in comparison – the scheme is more or less about the 
distribution of goods to already existing and quickly activated networks.
Some entrepreneurs choose to invest in their own vans or lorries. 
According to one seminar participant, this is done in order to secure 
comprehensive control over the operation and to prevent insight. 
There is less need to involve legitimate business, whose employees 
might react to deviations from a planned route or the unloading of 
shipments somewhere else than at the tax warehouse. Some public 
officials think it probable that at least some of the drivers carrying 
smuggled goods are accompanied by escort vehicles or similar security 
measures. In some cases the offenders send out smaller shipments first 
as a feeler, this because of the huge sums that are involved. It has 
been noticed that multiple vehicles declare the same EMCS control 
code at the border. This method becomes impossible if the authorities 
issue control reports and check the codes that are declared, thereby 
increasing the risks (and consequently also the costs) for the illegal 
entrepreneurs. This type of problem is present in other European 
countries as well.
It becomes necessary to secure apartments, smaller industrial spaces, 
or warehouses for the production, repackaging, and storage of larger 
quantities of merchandise.489 These kinds of facilities are easily rented, 
and if the offender is running illegal and legal business in parallel they 
are already available. Authorities may grow suspicious if the facilities are 
oversized in relation to the lesser quantities of legal products that the 
warehouses are supposed to be housing.
In the case of small-scale smuggling and importing of goods transport 
vehicles become unnecessary. Here, logistics is limited to buying tickets 
489 RUC, Ragnarök. Slutrapport (Malmö, Regional Intelligence Centre, 2014); Brå, Storskaliga skattebrott. 
En kartläggning av skattebrottslingens kostnader [Large Scale Tax Fraud. A Mapping of the Tax Fraudster’s 
Costs].
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to travel by boat, air, or some other means of transportation, and using 
bags or suitcases to carry the tobacco in.
Wages and compensation
Some of the interviewees claim that it is easier to distribute tobacco 
than, for instance, drugs. As there are fewer people involved, there is 
no need for as many wages or fees.490 One offender mentions that 
important contacts are made during times of imprisonment. The contacts 
increase the chances of being offered better jobs in the criminal market. 
One such job could be transporting tobacco into Sweden.
A powerful position in the illicit tobacco market may be coveted enough 
that people who step back are richly compensated if they transfer their 
established contacts and market shares to a successor, all according to 
an offender:
“Lots of people reason that they’ve done their stint for now. There are 
more people who make their bit of money and then step back than 
those who grow too greedy. It is not uncommon for people pulling 
out of the business to hand it over to someone else in exchange for 
a certain percentage of the profits” (SE-C3).
Surely remunerations vary in this market, as it does in other markets. 
In our data, there are examples of people getting paid SEK 10,000 – 
30,000 for taking care of a transport. According to one offender, 
drivers sometimes unknowingly transport the illicit tobacco, something 
they of course receive no extra compensation for. Some interviewees 
provided examples of drivers who receive extra pay “under the table”, 
or of transports being followed by escort vehicles – an indication 
that something suspicious is going on. One specific case is said to 
have involved tens of thousands of Swedish kronas in bribes. One 
interviewee came across cases of drivers who at least claim that they 
have been intimidated into taking on transport assignments, although 
some interviewees and seminar participants believe that unwitting 
collaborators are more common than intimidated ones.
Assignments involving small-scale imports are taken care of by people 
who are not in the position to negotiate. What kind of money they are 
making is unknown, but there is no one who thinks there are major 
sums involved. An expert describes the situation as follows:
“In the case of the corner shops, the cigarette traffic is taken care 
of by unemployed and individuals on welfare. To us, it would seem 
that they get paid peanut money for this, but to them it is a lot of 
money. One can, for example, earn SEK 5,000 for driving a vanload 
of cigarettes to Norway.”
490 Brå, Vart tog alla pengarna vägen? En studie om narkotikabrottslighetens ekonomihantering [Where Did 
All the Money Go? A Study on the Financial Management of Drug Crime].
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Security costs
In contrast to trade in goods such as narcotics, the security expenses 
associated with the tobacco trade are far lower.491 According to some 
seminar participants, risks are also outsourced to different accomplices. 
These accomplices can transport larger shipments of tobacco or act as 
straw men paid to assume positions in the companies during the period 
of tax evasion. This arrangement protects the organisers/distributors. In 
addition, it is quite possible to discuss the trade rather openly, and the 
demand for cheap cigarettes among the law-abiding public is strong.
As the distribution seems especially legal when using tax warehouses 
there is no need for stealth. Costs are mainly limited to compensating 
straw men and making sure there are new businesses ready as the 
lagging tax debts catch up with the previous company. According to an 
interviewee, the costs associated with setting up such a company are 
around SEK 140,000 (€17,000). He had heard that the company market 
value was approximately SEK 400,000-500,000 (€50-60,000). This figure 
is corroborated by a Swedish Tax Agency employee:
“We investigate the financing of companies applying for tax warehouse 
licences before we authorise them. There is no exact set limit, but 
some hundreds of thousands of SEK are involved. On [the classified 
online advertisement site] blocket.se one can find such companies for 
sale at prices ranging from SEK 300,000 to 400,000, so that’s probably 
more or less what they cost.”
The fact that setting up the companies is so time-consuming, coupled 
with their time-limited usefulness, indicates that organisers make sure that 
they have access to a constant pool of companies, either through efforts 
of their own or by acquiring them as off-the-shelf companies. Players that 
are especially cautious run several companies at the same time, which 
they switch between when doing business inside of Sweden. It is thought 
that replacing a company used for trading with a legitimate foreign supplier 
all too often causes mistrust on the side of the supplier and endangers 
the relationship with them.492 The companies that hold tax excise licenses 
are central institutions to the Swedish tobacco market, legal as well as 
illegal. A public official tells of companies that were just started suddenly 
reporting a turnover of SEK 42 million. The lifespan of these companies 
is 9 months at the most, after which the company is terminated. Bringing 
in large quantities quickly is therefore an urgent priority.
There are signs that distributors attempt to modify their schemes if they 
perceive an increased risk of getting caught. They also try to modify their 
approach if they discover regulatory or law enforcement loopholes. One 
such example is the transition from smuggling to excise duty evasion. One 
491 Ibid.; J. Skinnari, “The Financial Management of Drug Crime in Sweden”, in Cross-Border Crime 
Inroads on Integrity in Europe, ed. P. C. van Duyne et al. (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2010), 
189-215; L. Korsell, D. Vesterhav, and J. Skinnari, “Human Trafficking and Drug Distribution in 
Sweden from a Market Perspective – Similarities and Differences”, Trends in Organized Crime 14, 
no. 2-3 (2011): 100-124.
492 Brå, Storskaliga skattebrott. En Kartläggning av skattebrottslingens kostnader [Large Scale Tax Fraud. 
A Mapping of the Tax Fraudster’s Costs].
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offender relates how he went from using transport lorries to containers 
back in the days because he thought it would reduce the risk of 
detection. Such changes may however confer additional direct costs (for 
purchasing/renting containers) and temporarily reduced capacities.
The efforts of inspection authorities may also prompt retailers into putting 
more effort into hiding their cigarettes.493 During inspections, browsing 
through the packets or checking back-office spaces is often enough. 
Offenders and officials alike agree that it is harder to purchase illicit 
cigarettes in communities where there is an active inspection program. A 
police officer describes the experience of working with inspections carried 
out by the police, the Swedish Tax Agency, and the municipality:
“If we’ve been working the retail shops hard they grow increasingly 
cautious about whom they are selling to. It is mostly regulars who 
get to buy. When they ask for the cigarettes they are told that they 
should come back later the same afternoon. Then they go and get 
the cigarettes from their storage somewhere.”
The experiences of working with tobacco inspections in Malmö has led 
to some positive experiences, especially since the representatives of the 
local authorities successfully secured the trust of shop owners, allowing 
them to purchase cheap cigarettes despite not being regulars. Some 
interviewed officials suspect that the lion’s share of the cigarettes is 
probably hidden in a storage facility. Cars parked nearby are sometimes 
used for intermediate warehousing. In some cases the titles to these 
mobile warehouses were held by straw men. The lessened visibility of illicit 
cigarettes signals that illicit cigarettes are forbidden and makes them less 
accessible to the common smoker. This is especially true for distributors 
who – in contrast to the small shop owners – only offer their goods to 
their own closed social circles. According to interviewees, these circles 
consist of clubs or social networks, often featuring a high proportion 
of individuals of the same ethnic background as the distributors of the 
cigarettes.
Other types of security are the previously mentioned escort vehicles, as 
well as counter-surveillance activities directed against law enforcement. 
There are confirmed cases of smugglers putting the Swedish customs at 
a ferry port under surveillance. This involved taking photos of customs 
officers outside the entrance and tracking their movements, suggesting 
that a larger organisation is responsible for the cigarette trafficking. 
Another method used is to tip off customs about a coming shipment, 
so that they will concentrate their forces on this transport and possibly 
missing out on others.
The mutual trust between involved parties is especially important for 
reducing security costs.494 According to officials, the profitability strengthens 
493 RUC, Ragnarök. Slutrapport.
494 Brå, Storskaliga skattebrott. En kartläggning av skattebrottslingens kostnader [Large Scale Tax 
Fraud. A Mapping of the Tax Fraudster’s Costs]; Brå, Vart tog alla pengarna vägen? En studie om 
narkotikabrottslighetens ekonomihantering [Where Did All the Money Go? A Study on the Financial 
Management of Drug Crime].
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this loyalty, and those who are left out fear the powerful principals. 
While other organised crime markets are characterised by greater use 
of violence, things are comparably calm on the illicit tobacco market. 
Since there is enough money to be made on the market, a hypothesis 
is that players can secure stable positions of power. There is no need to 
use violence to collect debts or solve conflicts about market shares. Yet 
there is one type of situation where intimidation is often involved. Public 
officials and intelligence reports both mention cases of shopkeepers 
being pressed into selling illicit tobacco.495 One official had experiences 
of inspections during which weapons were found; perhaps the profitable 
nature of the illicit tobacco trade means that there is an increased risk 
of violent robberies, which is unlikely to come to the attention of the 
authorities. Yet another official described how the illicit tobacco trade 
led retail shops engaging in price wars, with violence being the end 
result. Perhaps the violence that does occur on this market tends be 
relegated to areas outside of the more organised networks of distributors. 
Another possibility is that given the amounts of money involved in the 
higher levels of the organisation makes people too scared to talk to the 
authorities. An interviewee, who had been drawn into the illicit tobacco 
trade against his will, describes the situation as follows:
“The thing is that they never had any honest intentions and if their 
intentions aren’t honest and they’ve got this kind of money, then I’d 
rather opt to protect myself and my family. Because should I try to 
point somebody out or try to find out where they are, then things 
might take a turn for the worse; for me, my family, our relatives, 
and so on. And this was also the advice given to me by my lawyer; 
according to him these sums are so large that the people responsible 
for the whole thing probably aren’t the kind of people you’d really 
want to single out or have prosecuted” (SE-C2).
A final type of cost is the management of cash. There is always a risk 
of theft associated with cash, and in today’s society it has become 
increasingly hard to handle large amounts of cash without attracting 
attention. Offenders therefore prefer to have cash transferred into bank 
accounts as soon as possible despite the risk that authorities could trace 
these transactions. According to one offender, it has become much harder 
to have dirty money transferred into the banking system, in Sweden as 
well as other parts of Europe. This is the result of tighter regulations 
governing money-laundering and foreign transactions into tax havens.496
As mentioned earlier, profits in the illicit use of tax warehousing are 
considerable. One official mentioned that a container-load of cigarettes 
brings profits in the region of SEK 6–7 million. Since these kinds of 
operations could hardly be run by one single individual, the eventual 
495 RUC, Underrättelserapport Röken. Illegal cigaretthantering. [Intelligence Report the Smoke. Illegal 
Handling of Cigarettes].
496 Brå, Storskaliga skattebrott. En kartläggning av skattebrottslingens kostnader [Large Scale Tax Fraud. 
A Mapping of the Tax Fraudster’s Costs]; J Skinnari, “Svart och kriminell ekonomi [Illicit and 
Illegal Economy]”, in Gå på pengarna! Antologi om tillgångsinriktad brottsbekämpning. [Follow the 
Money! Anthology on Criminal Assets Recovery] (Stockholm: Swedish National Council for Crime 
Prevention, 2014), 29-46.
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shares of the players who jointly finance a shipment are never really that 
spectacular.
As with other illegal markets, revenues are never evenly distributed. 
According to one official, the big earners here are the importers. Drivers 
and other helpers are hardly the ones who are getting rich – to these 
accomplices it might seem that they are making a lot of money, but 
these sums are small in relation to the business as a whole. They are in 
a similar situation to those running the corner shops where consumers 
buy the tobacco, for whom the main reason for offering illicit tobacco 
is because it helps them to break even or turn a modest profit. On the 
other hand, there are also cases where the side business of selling illicit 
tobacco seems profitable, as shopkeepers manage to pay fees and fines 
following visits from supervisory authorities. An offender summarises the 
situation:
“The smugglers bringing Russian cigarettes into Sweden make a lot 
of money. How much you earn is determined by the size of your 
shipment. A distributor in Sweden pays SEK 30 apiece for cigarette 
cartons. This means that you make between SEK 15 and 100 per 
carton, depending on how much you can sell them for” (SE-C1).
Another method the organisers may use to increase their profits is to 
trick someone further down the chain into taking all the risks and then 
scamming them out of their expected winnings. The most blatant example 
of this is hijacking of businesses that hold tax warehouse licenses in 
order to import large quantities of merchandise. An interviewee relates 
his experiences of such a scam:
“As long as you got this company going you could sell it later and 
make a rather hefty profit from it. I used my capital share, which 
was worth SEK 100,000. And then there were some running expenses, 
some application forms and so on, but I’d get back five times that 
amount. You can sell the company once you got it up and running. 
You just appoint new board members and directors and sell it, 
because securing an excise tax license is a hard thing to do. And 
once I was authorised I was supposed to sell the company without 
ever having to bring any goods into the country at all. /…/ A profit 
of SEK 400,000 – to my mind, this seemed pretty good for just a few 
years of work” (SE-C2).
Some seminar participants considered the possibility for the profits 
from the illicit tobacco trade being used to finance other types of 
crime.497 One seminar participant considered that this makes excise 
duty evasion much more serious than other types of economic crime: 
rather than white-collar criminals who want a little extra, the tobacco 
business is used to finance other types of criminality, often of a more 
serious nature. A public official related the case of an illegal gambling 
den which was partly financed by money from the illicit tobacco 
497 RUC, Underrättelserapport Röken. Illegal cigaretthantering. [Intelligence Report the Smoke. Illegal 
Handling of Cigarettes]; RUC, Supen. Rapport om punktskattebedrägeri med alkohol [A Report on Excise 
Fraud with Alcohol].
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trade. In some cases an illegal nightclub is used as a marketplace. 
Furthermore, interviewees claim that there are often other illegal 
goods – such as illicit alcohol, narcotics, pirated brand-name products, 
stolen goods, or similar items – to be found where illicit tobacco is 
offered.
Sweden is sometimes seen primarily as a transit country to Norway, as 
the criminal entrepreneurs know that there are even greater profits to be 
reaped there;498 another destination country is the United Kingdom.499 
A specific case was described by a public official:
“Another wholesaler active in the region is involved in trading across 
the Norwegian border. Large quantities end up there; significantly 
higher taxes means that there is more money to be made if the 
cigarettes are brought there. Nevertheless they sell off some of the 
cargo on the way there, possibly because they want to be able to 
cover for any losses should they get caught in some control as they 
try crossing the border into Norway” (SE-E3).
Significant parts of the profits are thought to be used for conspicuous 
consumption500 – nights out on the town, gambling, cars, clothes, traveling 
to foreign countries, etc. – which can leave the offenders with little left 
at the end of the day. In the words of a public official: “They live 
in run-down 1970s detached houses that are sold for SEK 700,000 on 
property websites.” A significant proportion of them are unable to move 
to areas with higher status because of insufficient funds, and many on 
the lower levels of the distribution could be heavily indebted. An official 
described a case in which law enforcement officials found IOUs revealing 
that people down the chain owe the organisers as much as SEK 700,000, 
possibly from gambling debts.
Those who earn more also tend to be better at managing their profits. 
An official participating in the seminar believed that that there is a 
difference between dealers in tobacco and drugs in that the former 
tend to be more business-minded and manage to save up money for 
use in other activities. The tobacco distributors invest in legal companies 
or purchase real estate, moves that also help in laundering money. In 
some cases they only make such investments and transactions outside 
of the country. The players may also be members of international 
groupings that are active in other countries, where they tend to purchase 
their real estate.501 In cases when the legal businesses run by criminal 
entrepreneurs are not doing very well they can get propped up by 
injections of illegal proceeds.
498 RUC, Underrättelserapport Röken. Illegal cigaretthantering. [Intelligence Report the Smoke. Illegal 
Handling of Cigarettes].
499 Ibid.; Brå, Storskaliga skattebrott. En kartläggning av skattebrottslingens kostnader [Large Scale Tax Fraud. 
A Mapping of the Tax Fraudster’s Costs].
500 Skinnari, “Svart och kriminell ekonomi [Illicit and Illegal Economy]”; Brå, Vart tog alla pengarna 
vägen? En studie om narkotikabrottslighetens ekonomihantering [Where Did All the Money Go? A 
Study on the Financial Management of Drug Crime]. Brå, Storskaliga skattebrott. En kartläggning av 
skattebrottslingens kostnader [Large Scale Tax Fraud. A Mapping of the Tax Fraudster’s Costs].
501 RUC, Ragnarök. Slutrapport.
national	criminal	markets	and	Finances:	illicit	tobacco	trade	 289
Aside from the financiers in the illicit tobacco market, loan sharks were 
also mentioned as investors. According to an interviewed official, there 
are a few individuals active in a Swedish city who lend criminals money 
at a 10% monthly interest with the size of the loans ranging from SEK 
500,000 to SEK 1,000,000 (€52,000-€104,000). Loan sharks fulfil an 
especially important role among ethnic minorities, where chances of 
securing bank loans are slim.502 One criminal entrepreneur mentioned 
that a specific network of ethnic cigarette-dealers probably got off the 
ground by borrowing from individuals within their own ethnic milieu as 
they could not apply for a regular bank loan. Several of his friends are 
professional moneylenders. There is a large illegal credit market catering 
to the needs of people who cannot get a loan on the regular credit 
market for one reason or other.
The consumption of cigarettes in Belgium increased after the Second 
World War. In the Belgian-Luxemburg Economic Union, around 8.5 
billion cigarettes were consumed in 1950. The sales of cigarettes rose to 
16.9 billion cigarettes in 1980 
and declined to 11.6 billion in 
1997.503 The high number is 
due to the increased purchases 
made by British tourists 
because cigarettes were priced 
twice as high in the UK than 
in Belgium.504 Due to sharper 
controls at the UK borders, the 
sales of cigarettes decreased 
from 2001 onwards. In 2011, 
9.9 billion cigarettes were sold 
in Belgium.
The fiscal revenues from to-
bacco products in Belgium 
have increased significantly 
over a period of thirty years. 
Anticipating a different method 
of collecting excises in January 
2011, producers built up ad-
ditional stock in 2010. As a re-
sult, ostensibly fewer cigarettes 
were sold in 2011.505 In 2012, 
502 Brå, Otillåten påverkan mot företag. En undersökning om utpressning [Unlawful Influence against 
Businesses. A Study on Extortion].
503 OIVO, Documentatiemap roken [Documentation File on Smoking].
504 Ibid.
505 Ibid.
5.5. BElGIUM: tHE RISE OF tHE IllICIt WHItES
Introduction
Figure 28. Fiscal revenue FroM tobacco products in belgiuM
Source: OIVO, Documentatiemap Roken [Documentation File on Smoking] (Brussels, 2012), 
73; Belga/TE, “Tabak steeds grotere bron van inkomsten voor schatkist 
[Tobaco Source of Increasing Larger Revenues for the Treasury]”, Knack, 2013.
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and also in 2014,506 the government increased the excises on cigarettes507 
which will increase fiscal revenues.
Due to the lower prices on tobacco products, Belgium has been an 
interesting country for smokers in France and the UK. Within a decade, 
the prices for cigarettes in France increased by €2.96 (in 2009). This is 
also the reason why the Belgian coast and on the border with France is 
dotted by tobacco shops.
Belgium is generally being recognised as an attractive country for cigarette 
smugglers. Due its geographical location at the heart of the European 
Union and the port of Antwerp it is considered to be an attractive 
operating base for smugglers. Most contraband found or confiscated in 
Belgium was not meant for the domestic market, but for transport to 
other countries.508
There are relatively low punishments for smuggling.509 On the one 
hand, the maximum prison sentence remains rather low: until 2013, 
a maximum prison sentence of 2 years could be imposed for fiscal 
fraud. In 2013, however, the government introduced a new law that 
created a new crime – serious fiscal fraud – that can be punished by 
a prison sentence of maximum five years.510 However, considering the 
fact that in other countries (such as in Italy) a person can receive up to 
15 years imprisonment,511 the punishment in Belgium remains relatively 
low. Smuggling is punished by a maximum prison sentence of one year. 
The fines, on the other hand, can be high. In 2010, a 33-year old man 
was sentenced to a fine of €185,000, after the police found 18,300 
packs of cigarettes in his home.512
Finally, there are a lot of storing facilities in and around Belgium’s 
main port of Antwerp (one of the largest ports in the world).513 In 
a period of almost two months, the Belgian customs authorities had 
confiscated 151 million counterfeit cigarettes (six containers) in the port 
of Antwerp.514
506 S. Delafortrie and C. Springael, Accijnzen Op Tabak Verhoogd [Excises on Tobacco Increased] 
(Brussels, 2013).
507 Belgisch Staatsblad, “Programmawet van 22 Juni 2012”, Belgisch Staatsblad (Brussels, 2012). 
art. 39.
508 T. Vander Beken et al., “Crossing Geographical, Legal and Moral Boundaries: The Belgian 
Cigarette Black Market”, Tobacco Control 17, no. 1 (2008): 60-65.
509 A. Balcaen, K. Verposet, and T. Vander Beken, Situation Report on the Cigarette Black Market 
in Belgium (Report of the Sixth Framework Program: Assessing Organised Crime: testing the 
feasibility of a common European approach in a case study of the cigarette black market in 
the EU, unpublished, 2006).
510 CTIF-CFI, 19e Activiteitenverslag 2012 [Activity Report] (Brussels, 2013).
511 Balcaen, Verposet, and Vander Beken, Situation Report on the Cigarette Black Market in Belgium.
512 Itobac, Boete van 185.000 euro voor illegale sigarettenhandel [Fine of 185,000 euro for Illegal Cigarette 
Trade], 2010.
513 Joossens and Raw, “Cigarette Smuggling in Europe: Who Really Benefits?”; Vander Beken et al., 
“Crossing Geographical, Legal and Moral Boundaries: The Belgian Cigarette Black Market”.
514 X, “Crombez vernietigt miljoenen illegale sigaretten [Crombez Destroys Millions of Illegal 
Cigarettes]”, Deredactie.be, June 29, 2012.
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Moreover, the illicit tobacco trade is not a priority for the Belgian 
government.515 It is not mentioned in the National Security Plan 2012 – 
2015516 and is not being monitored by members of the central directorates 
of the Belgian Federal Police (BE-E2).
Besides being a transit country, there is also a market in Belgium for the 
illegal cigarette trade. A study of street vending in Brussels517 indicates 
that it is a practice that has reportedly been initiated by certain members 
of the Polish community in Brussels who started selling Polish cigarettes 
to each other informally some years ago. These practices gradually 
evolved to a black cigarette market in Brussels.
A number of Belgian institutions are competent to fight this phenomenon. 
First of all the customs authorities (part of the Federal Government 
Service Finances) which collects excises and taxes. Customs are also 
responsible for the fight against contraband and counterfeit. The 
police services focus on the perpetrators involved in contraband and 
counterfeiting. Customs, however, do not investigate these activities and 
merely confiscate the goods which may impede police investigations as 
confiscations might alert the criminals. It is therefore not always easy 
to create synergies in the field.518 This was also reflected in the data 
gathered during this study. While data from the customs authorities 
provide general insights into the market structure and actors, data from 
the police provide more information on the financial constructions 
and financial management of the illegal tobacco trade in Belgium. In 
case the customs authorities make a seizure of cash, the competent 
judicial authorities are informed about the seizure and take over the 
investigation. Every year the Belgian customs administration makes 
a number of referrals concerning suspicions/seizures of cash to the 
Financial Intelligence Processing Unit (CTIF-CFI).519 In 2012, 1,308 
referrals were made to the CTIF-CFI.520 Within the Belgian Federal 
Police, the Directorate of Combating Economic and Financial Crime is 
competent of investigating the illegal tobacco trade, but considering the 
fact that the phenomenon is not a priority for the Belgian government, 
the Directorate is not engaged with the illegal tobacco trade (BE-
E2). Within the decentralised Belgian Federal Police, only one unit is 
permanently investigating this crime: the organised excise fraud section 
of the economic and financial crime unit of the Federal Police of 
Antwerp (BE-E2).
515 D. Boels and N. Klima, “Waar rook is, is vuur? Straatverkoop van niet-legale sigaretten. [No 
Smoke without Fire? Streetvending of Illegal Cigarettes]”, in Illegale En Informele Economie, ed. 
D. Boels et al. (Antwerpen/Apeldoorn: Maklu, 2013), 71-92.
516 Federal Police, Nationaal Veiligheidsplan 2012 – 2015 [National Security 2012-2015] (Brussels, 2012).
517 Boels and Klima, “Waar rook is, is vuur? Straatverkoop van niet-legale sigaretten. [No Smoke 
without Fire? Streetvending of Illegal Cigarettes]”.
518 J. Buys, “Fraudebestrijding in België: quo vadis? Een blik in de reisbrochure [Combating Fraud 
in Belgium: Quo Vadis? A Look at the Travel Leaflet]”, De Orde van de Dag 51 (2010): 17-28.
519 The CTIF-CFI, established by law in 1993, is a central part of the Belgian preventive anti-
money laundering and counter-terrorist financing system, and is an independent administrative 
authority with legal personality supervised by the Ministers of Justice and Finance.
520 E. Rottiers, Belgian Customs Authorities, National Investigations, 2014.
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While the illicit cigarette trade slowly declines at the European level, 
it increases in Belgium. A study conducted in 2013 by KPMG, found 
that 7.6 percent of the cigarettes smoked in Belgium were illegal; this 
corresponds to 790 million cigarettes. The share of illegal cigarettes has 
been rising for a third year in a row and costs the Belgian Treasury 
around €145 million in evaded excise tax.
Illegal cigarettes are divided into three categories: smuggled, counterfeit 
and illicit whites. The sales of the latter are particularly on the rise. At 
the moment, around 60 million out of the 790 million illegal cigarettes 
consumed in Belgium are reported to be illicit whites. Throughout 
Europe, the consumption of illicit whites increased by 15 percent in 2013, 
while the illicit cigarette trade declined from 11.1 percent in 2012 to 
10.5 percent in 2013. Consumption of illicit whites grew from 17.1 billion 
to 19.6 billion cigarettes in 2013, 33 percent of overall counterfeit and 
contraband consumption.521
The number of counterfeit and contraband cigarettes declined in Belgium 
which was found to be driven by a decrease in Belarusian, Russian and 
Polish volumes.
According to KPMG, the primary flows of counterfeit and contraband 
comes from East European markets. However, KPMG asserts that counterfeit 
cigarettes do not appear to be a significant issue in Belgium as they only 
521 KPMG, A Study of the Illicit Cigarette Market in the European Union. 2013 Results.
Market overview
Figure 29. ManuFactured counterFeit and contraband cigarette 
voluMes and share oF overall consuMption in belgiuM, 
2006 – 2013
Source: KPMG, A Study of the Illicit Cigarette Market in the European Union. 2013 Results, 38.
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make up 5.8% of the counterfeit and contraband;522 counterfeit Marlboro 
cigarettes originate from illegal factories in China.523
Contraband cigarettes, on the other hand, are more popular. The largest 
contraband brand is L&M, largely smuggled from Poland and Russia. 
Winston is the second most popular contraband and smuggled from 
Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine.524 Another study has found that 
Belgium mainly serves as a transit country through which cigarettes are 
being smuggled mostly to the United Kingdom,525 corroborating the 
findings of KMPG that there is a flow from east to west.
A number of authors have claimed that the legal tobacco industry is 
involved in the illegal tobacco trade as well.526 Others argue, however, 
that – partly because of the lawsuits brought against the tobacco 
industry – the European Commission and the industry have reached 
agreements that force the industry to take action against counterfeited 
cigarettes. The tobacco industry also invests a great deal of money in 
tracking counterfeit cigarettes.527
522 Ibid.
523 Boels and Klima, “Waar rook is, is vuur? Straatverkoop van niet-legale sigaretten. [No Smoke 
without Fire? Streetvending of Illegal Cigarettes]”.
524 KPMG, A Study of the Illicit Cigarette Market in the European Union. 2013 Results.
525 Vander Beken et al., “Crossing Geographical, Legal and Moral Boundaries: The Belgian Cigarette 
Black Market”.
526 Joossens and Raw, “Cigarette Smuggling in Europe: Who Really Benefits?”
527 Boels and Klima, “Waar rook is, is vuur? Straatverkoop van niet-legale sigaretten. [No Smoke 
without Fire? Streetvending of Illegal Cigarettes]”.
Figure 30. counterFeit and contraband cigarettes in belgiuM 
by countries oF origin, billion pcs
Source: KPMG, A Study of the Illicit Cigarette Market in the European Union, 44.
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Generally, cigarettes are being supplied to the black market through 
bootlegging and large-scale smuggling of brand-named or counterfeit 
cigarettes.528 The difference between bootlegging and large-scale 
smuggling is that while bootleggers do pay lower excise taxes, large-scale 
smugglers try to avoid paying them altogether. Bootleggers exploit the 
price differences of tobacco products between countries.529 Prices for a 
pack of 20 cigarettes differ greatly among the EU member states. In 2013, 
a pack of 20 cigarettes cost around €4.88 in Belgium. In all neighbouring 
states, except for Luxemburg (€3.95) a pack of cigarettes was more 
expensive: €8.15 in the UK, €6.50 in France, €5.29 in the Netherlands, 
€5.02 in Germany.530 Bootleggers would, for example, purchase tobacco 
products in Luxemburg, pay excise taxes in that country, but sell them in 
the UK on the black market. The organisation of these activities usually 
does not require sophisticated schemes or investments as cigarettes are 
transported by car or van.531
While bootleggers tend to shuttle between countries, large-scale smugglers 
attempt to import as many cigarettes onto the black market at once 
by using trucks or containers. Large-scale smugglers would need more 
sophisticated schemes and bigger investments as they require knowledge 
528 Vander Beken et al., “Crossing Geographical, Legal and Moral Boundaries: The Belgian Cigarette 
Black Market”.
529 Hornsby and Hobbs, “A Zone of Ambiguity. The Political Economy of Cigarette Bootlegging”.
530 KPMG, A Study of the Illicit Cigarette Market in the European Union. 2013 Results.
531 Vander Beken et al., “Crossing Geographical, Legal and Moral Boundaries: The Belgian Cigarette 
Black Market”.
Figure 31. contraband cigarettes in belgiuM by brand
Source: KPMG, A Study of the Illicit Cigarette Market in the European Union, 45.
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of customs procedures and experience in transporting containers 
abroad.532 Large-scale smuggling is based on the misuse of the in-transit 
system that allows a temporary suspension of customs duties, excise 
taxes, and VAT payable on goods originating from or destined for non-
EU countries. There are two possibilities to abuse that system: either 
the cigarettes never leave the EU and are being sold on the domestic 
black market or they are indeed being shipped abroad, but re-imported 
illegally afterwards.533
With regard to the cigarettes that are being shipped, a distinction is 
made between genuine brands and counterfeit cigarettes. The latter 
are often imitations of brand-named cigarettes, including the packaging, 
seals and stamps.534 A Belgian study conducted in 2006 indicated that 
most counterfeit cigarettes seized by the Belgian customs authorities 
originate from non-EU countries such as China and Russia.535 More 
recently, illicit whites have become increasingly popular in Belgium, 
according to the KPMG study; the main brand sold in Belgium appears 
to be Yun Yan.536
A number of supply lines have been identified by researchers.537 The 
first supply line is from China to Belgium, which primarily consists 
of counterfeit cigarettes; the second supply line originates in Greece. 
Greek smugglers would supply cigarettes to Bulgarians who transport the 
merchandise to Belgium where it is being distributed by members of the 
Polish community. The cigarettes supplied by the Greek do not originate 
in Greece, but Cyprus. There is also a smaller supply line organised 
by bootleggers from Eastern Europe who distribute cartons of cigarettes 
bought in their home country.
Counterfeit cigarettes produced in China are being transported by 
shipping containers. Several intermediate stops are made to conceal the 
origin of the cigarettes. Cover loads and forged documents serve to hide 
the true nature of the products being shipped. Cigarettes originating in 
Eastern Europe and Greece are transported by road.538 In the Belgian 
case file analysis,539 the method most frequently used in transporting 
cigarettes was to hide them behind licit merchandise in trucks or 
containers. Cigarettes were also hidden in secret compartments of the 
vehicle, in the cover load or elsewhere in the vehicle. The study also
532 L. Joossens, How to Combat Tobacco Smuggling through the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control (Proceedings of the WHO Second World Conference, Durban, International Chamber 
of Commerce, 2001).
533 von Lampe, “The Cigarette Black Market in Germany and in the United Kingdom”; Boels and 
Klima, “Waar rook is, is vuur? Straatverkoop van niet-legale sigaretten. [No Smoke without Fire? 
Streetvending of Illegal Cigarettes]”.
534 von Lampe, “The Cigarette Black Market in Germany and in the United Kingdom”.
535 Vander Beken et al., “Crossing Geographical, Legal and Moral Boundaries: The Belgian Cigarette 
Black Market”.
536 KPMG, A Study of the Illicit Cigarette Market in the European Union. 2013 Results.
537 Boels and Klima, “Waar rook is, is vuur? Straatverkoop van niet-legale sigaretten. [No Smoke 
without Fire? Streetvending of Illegal Cigarettes]”.
538 Ibid.
539 Vander Beken et al., “Crossing Geographical, Legal and Moral Boundaries: The Belgian Cigarette 
Black Market”.
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concluded that compared to the techniques used in drug trafficking, 
the methods of concealing cigarettes and tobacco products were less 
sophisticated.540 Cigarettes are spread over several trucks in order to 
make sure the cigarettes arrive at their final destination and, if caught, 
the driver would receive low punishment.541
Once at their destination, the cigarettes are being stored and spread over 
several warehouses. Within 38 hours the cigarettes are loaded on other 
vehicles to supply customers. Street vendors hide their stock between 
parked cars, behind lampposts, in shops or houses.542 The transportation 
of the contraband seems to rely heavily on legal transport means. 
Numerous legal actors are involved in the illicit tobacco trade: rental 
companies, transport companies, car rental companies, warehouses, 
maritime personnel, customs officers, shipping companies, banks. Most 
legal actors are not aware they are being used in the illegal tobacco 
trade, though questions are being raised whether or not owners of 
warehouses are as innocent as often thought.543
Information provided by the Belgian customs authorities indicates in 
which stages of the supply chain operations of organised crime groups 
have been involved in Belgium: the transportation of illicit whites, the 
production, transportation, distribution on both the wholesale and 
retail level of genuine brands, and the production and transportation 
of counterfeit brands.544 As mentioned above, the judicial authorities 
in Belgium have the competences to investigate the illegal cigarette 
trade with regard to the persons involved and have therefore identified 
additional stages of the supply chain in which criminals have been 
engaged: the production of illicit whites, the distribution (wholesale and 
retail) of illicit whites and counterfeit brands.545
A Dutch study546 identified different functions and levels in the illegal 
tobacco trade:
• The local level with local vendors who directly sell to consumers or 
to other vendors;
• International traders who function within multinational networks;
• Intermediaries who get the cigarettes to the market; 
• Professional transporters who are mainly involved in the cross-border 
transport of the contraband. These are legitimate licensed firms or 
one-man enterprises;
• Isolated groups of individual entrepreneurs who buy large quantities 
of tax free cigarettes legally.
540 Ibid.
541 Boels and Klima, “Waar rook is, is vuur? Straatverkoop van niet-legale sigaretten. [No Smoke 
without Fire? Streetvending of Illegal Cigarettes]”.
542 Ibid.
543 Ibid.
544 Interview with E. Rottiers, Belgian Customs Authorities, National Investigations.
545 Interview with K. Van de Perre, Belgian Federal Police Antwerp, economic and financial crime 
unit, section on organised excise fraud.
546 van Duyne, “Organizing Cigarette Smuggling and Policy Making, Ending up in Smoke”.
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A Belgian study found that the majority of those involved in the illicit 
cigarettes trade worked as intermediaries (39.3%), followed by international 
traders (29%), professional transporters (25.2%) and local traders (6.5%).547 
Similarly to the Netherlands and Germany,548 in Belgium there was a 
significant level of interaction between tobacco smugglers and legitimate 
entrepreneurs; the latter were mainly found in the transport business 
(truck drivers) or logistics (warehouse managers). In Greece, additional 
functions include street sellers, scouts or lookouts, warehouse guards, 
kiosk owners, truck drivers and protectors.549
In Brussels, there are largely two groups that operate on their own 
territory: East European vendors (Poles and Romanians) and North 
African vendors (Moroccans, Tunisians and Algerians). A 2013 study550 
identified four functions in street vending: vendors, errand boys, 
customer recruiters and observers. Not all vendors use errand boys, 
whose main function seems to be guarding the cigarette stock during 
market hours. The role of observers is open to debate as a police 
officer in the study assumed there must be observers in play, while 
a street vendor claimed that is merely fiction. The latter argued that 
the vendors recognise police officers from a distance. Concerning 
the relation between the two groups identified in the study, the 
researchers posit two hypotheses. The first one is that both groups 
operate independently from each other. Based on their information, 
observations and interviews, however, Boels and Klima have found 
more evidence that supports a second hypothesis: the East European 
group serves as a supplier to the North African group and some of the 
latter group would even work for the East Europeans. This would mean 
that the East European group would have access to a larger market. In 
terms of modus operandi, the study found that warehouses are being 
changed regularly to avoid detection and false shipping documents are 
being used. The different branches of the organisation would be kept 
separate: both the supply chain and distribution chain would be stand-
alone operations in order to avoid the risk of taking down the whole 
organisation once one link of the chain is detected. Cash payments 
are also being kept completely separate from the transportation of the 
cigarettes. Street vendors would only know their supplier.
According to the Belgian customs authorities, the modus operandi used 
by the smugglers is container shipments, overland shipments and ant 
smuggling of illicit whites, counterfeit brands and genuine brands (without 
having paid excise and VAT duties).551 This is quite similar to the modus 
operandi found by the police.552
547 Vander Beken et al., “Crossing Geographical, Legal and Moral Boundaries: The Belgian Cigarette 
Black Market”.
548 See van Duyne, “Organizing Cigarette Smuggling and Policy Making, Ending up in Smoke”; von 
Lampe, “The Cigarette Black Market in Germany and in the United Kingdom”.
549 Antonopoulos, “The Greek Connection(s): The Social Organisation of the Cigarette-Smuggling 
Business in Greece”.
550 Boels and Klima, “Waar rook is, is vuur? Straatverkoop van niet-legale sigaretten. [No Smoke 
without Fire? Streetvending of Illegal Cigarettes]”.
551 Interview with E. Rottiers.
552 Interview with K. Van de Perre.
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There are indications that those involved in the illicit tobacco trade are 
organised. An organisation active on the black cigarette market would 
consist of around 10 to 20 people.553 According to the Belgian customs 
authorities, most organisations are internationally based organised crime 
groups. When a seizure is made in one country it is often seen that the 
organisation continues its criminal activities in another area/country.554
Based on Belgian customs and prosecution files concerning the illegal 
tobacco trade in the period from 2000 to 2006, 243 persons involved 
in cigarette smuggling were identified; ten of them were women.555 
The women performed various subsidiary functions within the different 
networks: car owner or company owner. The modal age of those 
involved was between 35 and 45, but the vast majority was older than 
35 years. The majority of the suspects had a Belgian nationality. Of those 
suspects with another nationality, three were dominant: British, Dutch 
and Polish. Out of the 44 cases studied, family connections between the 
suspects were found in eight cases. In 28 cases use was made of legal 
transport companies that were set up as legal companies. In 25 cases 
warehouses were being used to store the cigarettes. Not surprisingly, 
the vast majority of suspects identified were (n=73) were either truck 
drivers (n=24) or business managers, employees at transport companies 
or shipping agencies, lessees of warehouse etc. (n=49).
Sources of capital for criminal operations. Profile of financiers 
in criminal operations
Based on the cases they have worked on, the Belgian Federal Police 
assert that criminal organisations involved in the illegal tobacco trade 
have the necessary means to start a smuggling operation. They do not 
need external financiers or investors as they re-invest the profits from 
one smuggling operation to initiate and sustain the next (at least this is 
what has been found during the investigations). Those involved in the 
illegal tobacco trade often have a criminal background.556
The connections between the cigarette smugglers and investors are 
reported to be diverse: in some cases family relations have been 
found;557 in other cases there were also legal business links. A number 
of managers of shipping offices often seem to re-appear in cases 
concerning the illegal tobacco trade. Finally, there are a number of 
criminal and ethnic links as well. During the previous five years, the 
police reported that they have been dealing with Turkish, Greek and 
Polish criminal organisations.558
553 Boels and Klima, “Waar rook is, is vuur? Straatverkoop van niet-legale sigaretten. [No Smoke 
without Fire? Streetvending of Illegal Cigarettes]”.
554 Interview with E. Rottiers.
555 Vander Beken et al., “Crossing Geographical, Legal and Moral Boundaries: The Belgian Cigarette 
Black Market”.
556 Interview with K. Van de Perre.
557 Vander Beken et al., “Crossing Geographical, Legal and Moral Boundaries: The Belgian Cigarette 
Black Market”.
558 Interview with K. Van de Perre.
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With regard to the modus operandi, there is a preference for cash 
transactions because they are difficult to trace.559 According to information 
received from the Belgian customs authorities, declaration formalities are 
mostly paid for in cash; the rent of illegal warehouses is also mostly paid 
for in cash. Most cash transfers are carried out by cash couriers who are 
mostly people at the bottom of the organisation.560
As in other criminal markets (such as organised VAT fraud), the way 
payments are being settled depends on the level of trust among the 
actors. The standard operating procedure is that everything is paid cash 
up-front. This is especially the case when new entrepreneurs enter the 
market.561 In their study, Boels and Klima interviewed a street vendor 
who told them that he started out as a customer recruiter. He did not 
have sufficient means to start his own business and buy cigarettes from 
a supplier. The reason might have been that the customer recruiter had 
to pay everything up-front.
There were a number of cases in which payments were settled after 
the delivery of a container of cigarettes but this only occurred when the 
actors have been cooperating with each other during a certain amount 
of time. In some cases revolving credit has been used as well (payments 
are done when a proportion of the merchandise has been sold). With 
regard to buying cigarettes from a supplier/vendor, police investigations 
have shown that payments occur simultaneously.562
Police investigations have also brought to light that criminal organisations 
do not hire specific personnel that facilitate the payment process. Very 
often, known persons are engaged for the settlement of payments: high 
ranking persons within the organisation or people that can be trusted, 
especially in international cases. In some cases, the money was also 
being transported by the truck driver who initially brought the container 
with cigarettes to the place of destination. It also occurred that someone 
from within the organisation is appointed to change money in currency 
exchange offices. In short, the criminal organisations involved in the 
illegal tobacco trade tend to do everything by themselves due to lack of 
trust. Complex money laundering schemes, payment platforms or bank 
accounts are not used very often, according to the police.563
The costs in this kind of business vary and depend on the nature of the 
“project” that is being set up. In a recent case, the police discovered 
that it costs around €100,000 to ship a container filled with counterfeit 
cigarettes from China to Belgium. Included in this amount are the costs 
for production in China, the transportation (within China, from China 
to Belgium and within Belgium), customs and other costs. Roughly 
estimated, criminal organisations pay €0.10 per counterfeit pack all 
559 Boels and Klima, “Waar rook is, is vuur? Straatverkoop van niet-legale sigaretten. [No Smoke 
without Fire? Streetvending of Illegal Cigarettes]”.
560 Interview with E. Rottiers.
561 Interview with K. Van de Perre.
562 Ibid.
563 Ibid.
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costs included. These cigarettes are being sold for €0.15 or €0.175 per 
counterfeit pack to the vendors or traders. The criminal entrepreneurs 
will probably ask a higher price once they sell the cigarettes to the end 
customers, but the police focuses on large-scale distribution and not on 
the sales being made to individual customers.564
In the study conducted by Boels and Klima,565 a Polish street vendor told 
them he buys cartons of cigarettes from his supplier for around €20 a 
carton. That supplier would buy the cigarettes in Russia or Ukraine for 
around €17 a carton. After a raid in Brussels, the police confiscated 130 
cartons of cigarettes and €3,685 cash money.566 In other words, buying a 
significant number of cartons can be considered as a threshold for street 
vendors (especially when one likes to make an interesting business deal 
with the supplier). A hundred cartons would cost €2,000, but considering 
the amount of money and number of cartons seized by the police, a 
street vendor or supplier would need more to meet the demand.
Based on the cases the police have investigated during the past five 
years, the criminal organisations were operational for about one year 
before being caught. Although the profit made during this short period 
of time depends on a number of factors, one may very well conclude 
that the illegal tobacco trade is quite lucrative. Information about 
two investigations was provided by K. Van de Perre to illustrate this 
assertion.567 In the first investigation which ran between 2012 and 2013 
around 290 million counterfeit cigarettes were seized. During the second 
investigation which ran between 2013 and 2014, that figure amounted to 
160 million. These cigarettes were a mere portion of the total number 
of cigarettes traded in those years. Numerous containers, filled with 
cigarettes, passed the borders without ever having being checked by 
the police or customs. The police therefore asserts that the number of 
confiscated cigarettes are peanuts compared to the ones that have been 
sold on the market. Only during the second investigation the illegal 
capital of the organisers had been calculated. The criminal organisation 
would have earned around €39 million between 2013 and 2014. As the 
police had no information about the costs the criminal organisation had 
made, the costs had not been deducted from this amount.
The profits and payments within the organisation are reportedly being 
shared based on the position within the organisation. The profits are 
transferred entirely to the top of the organisation. According to Van de 
Perre,568 in all cases he has investigated only the top of the organisation 
live a luxurious life, while the warehousemen, drivers and others on 
the bottom of the organisation receive little from the profit made by 
the illegal tobacco trade. The same study asserts that those involved in 
564 Ibid.
565 Boels and Klima, “Waar rook is, is vuur? Straatverkoop van niet-legale sigaretten. [No Smoke 
without Fire? Streetvending of Illegal Cigarettes]”.
566 Nieuwsblad, “Illegale handel in sigaretten opgerold [Illegal Cigarette Trade Shut Down]”, 
Nieuwsblad.be, 2010.
567 Interview with K. Van de Perre.
568 Ibid.
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the illegal tobacco trade, live a less luxurious life compared to those 
involved in other crimes such as money laundering, drugs and human 
trafficking.
Interviews with cigarette vendors and errand boys suggest that errand 
boys do not have a high position in the organisation and that they 
are being paid less than the vendors. A Polish street vendor would 
earn around €50 on a Sunday. Errand boys, however, earn more than 
customer recruiters, as vendors have to rely on the former to protect 
the cigarette stock. Customer recruiters would earn one euro on each 
carton that is being sold.569
Because the payments largely occur up-front or by delivery, and the fact 
that the money is usually transported by people they can trust, financers 
and investors are quite sure they would get their share of the profit.570 
The money earned from the tobacco trade is being transported physically 
to the entrepreneurs, often in the country where these entrepreneurs 
reside. No complex banking or company structures are being established 
to channel away the money. These profits are usually spent on personal 
expenses and a lavish lifestyle. Some re-invest the profits in another 
illegal tobacco trade scheme; others re-invest the profits in property or 
other assets.571
When caught, most organisers operating at the black cigarette market 
tend to recommence their activities or continue with their activities as 
soon as possible. Based on police investigations, it appears that criminal 
entrepreneurs take into account setbacks. They keep in mind that some 
of the shipments can be seized and they calculate the differences in 
the overall price. Criminal organisations have a built-in risk analysis. 
Similar measures have already been discussed above (like spreading the 
cigarettes over several trucks or warehouses). One or more losses can be 
compensated by next shipments.572
In most cases risks are being shared. For example, the risk in the 
transportation of the cigarettes between the place where they were 
produced to the place of shipment is being carried by organisation A 
(the Chinese organisation, for example). Organisation B (the criminal 
organisation that distributes the cigarettes in Belgium) bears the risks 
from the place of shipment to the place of distribution. Payments are 
made based on the risks.573
569 Boels and Klima, “Waar rook is, is vuur? Straatverkoop van niet-legale sigaretten. [No Smoke 
without Fire? Streetvending of Illegal Cigarettes]”.
570 Interview with K. Van de Perre.
571 Ibid.
572 Ibid.
573 Ibid.
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Organised crime in France has remained at constant levels, with a high 
tendency to blur the limits between legal and illegal spheres, often 
coming close to being white collar crime. Furthermore, the growing role 
of the internet in purchase methods enables new patterns of criminal 
business.
The criminal statistics État 4001574 only relate to crimes brought to the 
attention of the police and the gendarmerie. Organised crime appears 
in 21 crime indicators in État 4001, corresponding in 2012 to 28,770 
offences and crimes – 1% of the total recorded criminality. Actually, the 
physiognomy of organised crime has shifted towards more “productive” 
activities (drug trafficking, human trafficking, gambling, counterfeiting) and 
fewer predation activities. Bank robberies, for example, have significantly 
decreased between 2012 and 2013 (-44%), as well attacks of armoured 
vans (-16%).575
Drug trafficking still dominates organised crime in terms of turnover, level 
of profit and the number of people involved. In 2013, cannabis seizures 
have increased (75.7 tonnes or +39.15%), among which 70.9 tonnes of 
resin (+38.7%) and 4.8 tonnes of marijuana (+45%); cocaine seizures are 
stable at 5.61 tonnes in 2013. With the number of prostitutes in France 
estimated at 30,000 (2013), human trafficking is also a very lucrative 
activity. Recently, forty-five procuring networks linked with transnational 
organised crime have been dismantled in France: 26 from Eastern 
Europe, 7 from Africa, 6 from Latin America, 4 from Western Europe 
and 2 from China.
In France, the financing of organised crime is neglected both by the 
law enforcement and the judiciary, and by the research community. 
To a certain extent, this is a blind spot in the intelligence analysis 
dealing with organised crime. Public policies in the field of security are 
still focused on the act of crime itself. Judicial investigations focus on 
predicate crimes and to a much lesser extent on the profits and the way 
they are laundered; investigators are interested in the preparation of the 
crime when it enables them to prevent the commission of the crime.576 
When police carried out a search, discovering cash is attributable to the 
574 État 4001 is a collection of institutional statistics based on a terminology of 107 indexes 
corresponding to the nature of offences. It has 12 columns allowing the counting not only the 
number of incidents recorded and brought for the first time to the knowledge of the police or 
the national gendarmerie, but also incidents revealed, or offences for which people are held in 
custody or held as suspects. The central directorate of the police collects and classifies these 
statistics.
575 Observatoire national de la délinquance et des réponses pénales, La criminalité en France. Rapport 
annuel [Crime in France. Annual Report], Paris, 2014.
576 Art. 450 1 of the Criminal Code: “a criminal association consists of any group formed or any 
conspiracy established with a view to the preparation, marked by one or more material actions, 
of one or more felonies, or of one or more misdemeanours punished by at least five years' 
imprisonment. Where the offences contemplated are felonies or misdemeanours punished by 
ten years' imprisonment, the participation in a criminal association is punished by ten years' 
imprisonment and a fine of €150,000. Where the offences contemplated are misdemeanours 
punished by at least five years' imprisonment, the participation in a criminal association is 
punished by five years' imprisonment and a fine of €75,000”.
5.6. FRANCE: lOW RISKS AND COMFORtABlE PROFItS
Introduction
national	criminal	markets	and	Finances:	illicit	tobacco	trade	 303
product of crime and not to the preparation stage. In brief, there is no 
evidence of systematic knowledge on the process of financing criminal 
activities.
In France, SIRASCO577 – the intelligence service within the judicial police 
specialised in organised crime – lacks reliable data on this topic. To the 
extent that the issue is researched, it is when there is a link between 
organised crime and terrorist acts. An appropriate approach would be 
indirect, such as investigating the profit generated by trafficking, where 
the political and media pressure is on depriving criminals of the fruits of 
their crimes. From a historical point of view, the fact that France was a 
colonial empire meant there were a lot of exchanges (goods, individuals, 
capital, etc.) between colonies (South-east Asia, Africa, West Indies) and 
mainland France. Opium, kif, piasters578 or cigarettes were among the 
main objects of illegal activities.
In the history of organised crime in France, there is a kind of founding 
episode. The story took place on 4 October 1952, when a Dutch cargo 
ship, “Combinatie”, left Tangier with 2,700 cigarettes boxes on board but 
was hijacked and looted not so far from the Corsican coast. The captain 
was an experienced trafficker and seems to have been an accomplice. In 
fact, he obtained the reimbursement of the boatload from the insurance 
company. The smugglers won on both sides, the insurance premium and 
the profit generated by the sales of diverted cigarettes. These actors 
used part of the profit in an international drug trafficking of heroin from 
Turkey to France and from there to North America known as the “French 
connection”.579
Fast forward to 2012, and most of the 62,133 tonnes of tobacco sold 
in retail shops was in the form of cigarettes (51,456 tonnes). The net 
decrease compared with 2011 (-3.4%) was the sharpest drop since 2005. 
However, one out of five cigarettes smoked in France was not purchased 
in a French tobacco retail shop. Cross-border purchases account for three 
quarters of the cigarettes smoked, and the remainder come from duty-
free shops, bought online and contraband purchases. In 2012, customs 
seized 371 tonnes of tobacco, or 20% less than in the record 2011 year. 
The turnover generated by tobacco was €17.9 billion in 2012, up 2.3% 
compared with 2011. Nearly 9% of the turnover went to the tobacco 
retail shop owners, 13% to manufacturers and distributors, and practically 
78.5% to the state, which thus collected €14 billion in taxes (including 
VAT) in 2012, nearly 1.8% more than in the previous year.580
577 Abbreviation for Le Service d'Information de Renseignement et d'Analyse Stratégique sur la 
Criminalité Organisée.
578 Kif is a mix of tobacco and hashish, during the French Protectorate (1912 – 1956), there was 
a formal regulation of cannabis named “Régie du Kif et des Tabacs”. Piaster was a currency 
from the Cochin China (former French colony), the different change rates between France and 
this region was illegally exploited to earn money in fast trading.
579 Colombié, Lalam, and Schiray, Les acteurs du grand banditisme français au sein des économies 
souterraines liées au trafic de drogues [The French Milieu within the Illegal Economy Linked to Drug 
Trafficking].
580 Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances, Douane, résultats 2013 [Customs Results 2013]. Bureau 
Information et Communication, 2014.
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After a decrease in daily tobacco use from 2000 to 2008 among 
17-year-olds, the trend reversed from 2008 to 2011, increasing by 10%. 
In this age group, 32.7% of boys and 30.2% of girls smoked on a daily 
basis. In 2011, French 15-16 year-olds ranked 6th in Europe in terms of 
tobacco use in the preceding month. Daily tobacco use among 18-75 
year-olds was up from 2005 (28%) to 2010 (30%). This increase was 
greater in women than in men.
In 2012, customs recorded 
10,968 offences (13,258 in 2011) 
linked with tobacco and ciga-
rettes smuggling. 371 tonnes 
of tobacco were seized (462 
tonnes in 2011), which repre-
sents a value of €80 million. 
Among the 371 tonnes seized, 
263 tonnes were cigarettes (i.e. 
71%); 45 cases involve seizures 
of higher than one tonne.581
In France, the difference be-
tween registered cigarette sales 
and cigarettes reported as be-
ing smoked was approximately 
20% in 2010.582 Most of this 
difference can be explained 
by legal tax avoidance (cross-
border shopping in neighbour-
ing countries) rather than by 
large scale smuggling. France 
is considered a transit country 
regarding the illicit flows of tobacco because the major destination 
countries are the UK and Ireland, a large part of cigarettes disseminat-
ed around the country, close to the biggest agglomerations. According 
to a customs officer based in Paris (Customs Regional Directorate): “[…] 
even if the smuggling is organised by criminals, the latter are not estab-
581 Direction générale des douanes et des droits indirects, Rapport annuel de performance [Annual 
Performance Report] (Paris: Ministère de l’économie et des finances, 2013).
582 N. Lalam et al., L’observation du marché illicite du tabac en France [Observation of the Illicit Tobacco 
Market in France] (Paris: INHESJ, OFDT, 2012).
Таble 44. daily consuMption oF tobacco products by age and gender 
in France (in %), 2010
Source: French Institute for Health Prevention and Health Education (INPES), Health Barometer 2010.
18-25 years 
old
26-44 years 
old
45-64 years 
old All Male Female
Share 10 12 24 17 25.9 8.5
Figure 32. total tobacco sales in France (cigarettes, hrt and other 
types oF tobacco, in tonnes), 2004 – 2013
          * Other tobacco types include cigars and cigarillos, pipe tobacco, chewing 
tobacco and snuff.
Source: Logista, 2014.
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lished in France. We find re-
lays there, but no nerve cen-
tre. The head is based espe-
cially in Eastern Europe and 
the Balkans.”
The French market remains in-
teresting for the smugglers de-
spite the existence of a quite 
regulated legal supply chain 
taking into account the mo-
nopoly of distribution and the 
strict control by French cus-
toms. A specific development 
is the decrease of cigarette 
sales (volume) and the rise in 
value (Figure 32). Hand-rolling 
tobacco (HRT) is increasingly 
popular among smokers for fi-
nancial reasons.
Otherwise, the main distributor 
of cigarettes in France – 
Logista – has been a victim of 
armed robberies and some of 
its trucks have been assaulted 
by commando groups using the same methods as in assaults on cash-
in-transit vans.
As evident from Figure 33, public health considerations have increased 
significantly the taxation of cigarettes (price rise is mostly due to 
higher tax and excise), which prompts smokers into searching for illegal 
cigarettes. OCGs, therefore, consider it useful to invest in smuggling and 
counterfeiting them.
In France, three main supply networks of illicit tobacco can be 
distinguished,583 which more or less correspond to the classification made 
by Luk Joossens:584
• large-scale organised smuggling involves the illegal transportation, 
distribution and sale of large consignments of cigarettes and other 
tobacco products. Large-scale smugglers generally avoid all taxes on 
tobacco products either by diverting them from the legal market while 
they are in the wholesale distribution chain (where they are transported 
untaxed), in transit between their country of origin and their declared 
destination, or by smuggling counterfeit tobacco products.
• Small-scale smuggling or bootlegging involves the purchase, by 
583 Here, the case of cigarettes smuggled by tobacco multinational companies will not be analysed 
as it deserves a separate study.
584 L. Joossens, Effective Tobacco Control Policies in 28 European Countries (Brussels: European Network 
for Smoking Prevention, 2004).
Figure 33. Mean annual selling price (€) oF the Most popular 
cigarette brand (pack oF 20) and hrt (40 graMs) in 
France, 2000 – 2013
Source: French Customs Authority (2014).
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individuals or small groups, of tobacco products from low tax 
jurisdictions in amounts that exceed the limits set by customs 
regulations, for resale in high tax jurisdictions.
• Ant smuggling refers to organised and frequent crossing of borders 
by a large number of individuals with relatively small amounts of low 
taxed or untaxed tobacco products.
This classification is relevant in the case of France:
• The networks linked to the traditional “Milieu”585 and transnational 
criminal organisations that are involved at the wholesale level;
• The networks of independent groups with a strict division of 
labour (supervisor, storer, fund raiser, etc.);
• the micro-networks, some based on ethnic ties.
One of the keys to understanding the financing needs of cigarettes 
smuggling is to have a rough idea of cost-accounting aspects. Whether 
the activities take place in France or abroad will have an impact on the 
nature and volume of capital and labour costs. There is no evidence of 
illicit factories producing cigarettes in France even though there was an 
attempt in Marseille (see below). If the involvement of legal factories in 
the international smuggling seems to be evident,586 in France this aspect 
is not very well researched. Tobacco companies deny that they increase 
supply into lower-tax jurisdictions to boost sales, but a close observation 
of Andorra refutes this claim. There are, of course, the agreements with 
the world's 4 largest tobacco manufacturers that EU has signed during 
the 2000s. On the other hand, the lobbying of these manufacturers 
remains important in France, especially among members of the French 
parliament587 trying to influence the legislation.
According to customs officers, France is still a transit country because 
UK and Ireland are countries where the mark-ups are significant. French 
OCGs offer their logistical skills to other groups (from Italy, Russia, Balkan 
countries). Integrated structures from the production to the distribution 
are not common.
An example of the type of player is a wholesaler arrested in the port 
of Marseille as the organiser of a network involving two captains of 
merchant ships. Cigarettes were bought in duty free shops all over the 
Mediterranean and illegally imported in France (4,000 cartons each 
month). The investigators point out that the income was around €40,000 
a month and the business had lasted for many years suggesting that 
a few port employees must have been corrupt.588 In another instance, 
585 A term used for a type of high profile organised criminals operating in the metropolitan areas 
of France; also referred to in French as “grand banditisme”.
586 In the 2000s, the European Commission launched civil proceedings against RJ Reynolds (RJR), 
Philip Morris International (PMI) and Japan Tobacco International (JTI) for involvement in 
cigarette smuggling and money laundering, and applied for an injunction to prevent smuggling 
in the future.
587 E.g. Club des parlementaires amateurs de havanes (The club of cigar-admiring members of 
parliament).
588 Direction régionale des douanes de Marseille, service presse, [Regional Customs Directorate in 
Marseille, Press service], 2014.
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in 2014, in the south of France (Vitrolles) the French authorities seized 
in a customs clearance agent 10.5 tonnes of cigarettes in a container 
from China. It seems that the cigarettes were intended for the domestic 
market because the health warnings on the packs were in French. In 
the same affair, the investigators discovered 11,579 pairs of shoes (Nike 
and Converse) in a warehouse. This example suggests that criminal 
entrepreneurs are involved in several businesses without knowing how 
the process of financing operates. The market value of these 520,000 
cigarette packs was estimated at €3.5 million. A customs officer of 
Marseille suggests that “it is very likely that many clandestine warehouses 
are linked together in the south of France even if it is difficult to prove, 
which gives an idea of the organisation.”
Wholesale level
Most of the actors of wholesale smuggling are career criminals, either 
involved exclusively in the illicit tobacco trade or in other transnational 
crime such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, or counterfeiting.
The economies of scale dictate that the quantities at stake at this level 
should be over one tonne of cigarettes. On average, each euro invested 
can expect between two and three euros in return, which makes 
the activity very profitable. Of course, the possibility of criminals being 
arrested and the merchandise being seized exists but is very low. “French 
organised crime has moved into the trafficking of cigarettes – and of 
meat – because the profitability is huge and the penal risks lesser 
than those in drug trafficking.”589 Thus, there is a discrepancy between 
the profitability of this illegal activity and the severity of the possible 
sentencing – less than 2 years.
In France, in most cases at the wholesale level, cigarettes smuggling 
is intertwined with the business of commodity counterfeiting (shoes, 
clothes, luxury products). An infamous criminal arrested in the beginning 
of the 2000s – “Jacky Le Mat”590 – was involved in an attempt of 
cigarettes manufacturing in the suburbs of Marseille. The Russian mafia 
lent their support to this project. Police officers have discovered many 
machines likely to produce cigarettes in huge quantities which were 
expected to be transported in stolen refrigerator trucks in order to 
supply the French market. These groups try to maximise profits through 
collaborative agreements with one another, like a producers' cartel. 
Contract enforcement, however, could be a problem: whereas the 
breakdown of a legal cartel may lead to a price war, the breakdown of 
agreements among illegal organisations tends to result in violence.
Small-scale smuggling
According to law enforcement bodies, the two levels (wholesale and 
retail) are compartmentalised. They suggest that the retailers pay for 
their orders in cash, the quantities handled being dozens of cartons. For 
589 Interview with an officer at the Directorate of Customs in Marseille, May 14, 2013.
590 Jacques “Jacky Le Mat” Imbert is a French organised crime leader who first came to prominence 
in the 1960s Marseille.
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each carton, they earn between €20 and €30. Part of the distribution 
is done by undocumented immigrants, especially in Paris and Marseille, 
some of them also implicated in thefts. It may be excessive to define 
this method of selling as organised crime, but it is undoubtedly a mode 
of informal economy.
In France, a group known to be involved in ant smuggling are the 
Senegalese Mouride591 migrants. New routes are set up so as to mobilise 
various religious resources, but are a means of search for new commodities 
or new contacts for business. A minority among them get involved in 
illegal activities such as trafficking of crack cocaine, cigarettes smuggling 
or counterfeiting. Prior to the sharing of profits the financing is made 
by a collective of several individuals. Their ability to travel in the major 
cities of the developed world is a real asset for quick-selling.
The city of Marseille in the south of France is an important crossroad. 
The informal trade there is quite dynamic and supervised by informal 
“notaries”592 since it needs powerful intermediaries to function. Being 
recognised as people of word and honour, they are dispute settlers, 
and ease tensions in case of conflict, thus maintaining certain order in 
these networks which are always in motion. These illegal commercial 
relationships (fluid and less structured) operate thanks to participants 
keeping their word since there are neither written contracts nor legal 
guarantees that accompany formal business.
Sources of capital for criminal operations
The history of the French Milieu tends to confirm the hypothesis of 
separate function between the financiers and the operatives. The former 
participate in the financing of cigarette imports without being in contact 
with the merchandise; the latter take care of the organisation from the 
contacts (supply), transportation, storage, counter-surveillance, and the 
distribution. The fundraisers expect a return on capital which is usually 
decided ex ante.
The close links between the financiers and the operatives (friendship, 
family, etc.) point to the crucial role of trust between the players. 
Moreover, the time during which the capital is mobilised will vary 
widely according to different factors, such as the distance, the means of 
transport, whether a sea route or air transport is chosen and the state 
of the demand.
Proceeds from other crimes have also been used to finance cigarette 
smuggling. In South-East France, armed robbery is considered as the 
591 Religious movement initiated by Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba in the city of Touba (Senegal), 
as a transnational religious company. Mourides are settled throughout the world, and have 
created a transnational trade organisation. The message of this brotherhood is inspired by a 
kind of Weberian “salvation by labour”. The Mouride ethos has been transformed in a real 
business spirit – to make money is all the better perceived since it enables the financing of 
the brotherhood.
592 A. Tarrius, La mondialisation par le bas. Les nomades des économies souterraines [The Parallel 
Globalisation. The New Nomads of the Underground Economy] (Paris: Balland, 2003).
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way to begin a criminal career. In the hierarchy of criminal activities, 
this type of offence will provide a strong reputation for the perpetrator 
in the underworld. Gradually, this way of launching an illicit business 
has spread in most of the French regions (North, Ile-de-France, Rhône). 
French “grand banditisme” has targeted the centre-fort, the place where 
the armoured vans gather to count the paper money. Armed robberies 
against these centres (around 150 in France)593 are justified, firstly, by the 
fact that the amount of money is quite significant and, secondly, by the 
difficulty of assaulting banks and postal offices.
Since the beginning of the 1970s, French organised crime has exploited 
the illegal slot machines placed in cafes, bars and restaurants. In the 
eighties, members of parliament were worried of homicides linked 
to the “war of slot machines”. “To ensure guaranteed colossal profits 
without any great effort, a whole organisation was set up with front 
companies and straw men as managers.” 594 For an investment of less 
than €4,000, a slot machine can yield between €100 and €300 a 
day, which is divided between the broker and the manager. The rate 
of return of these machines oscillates between 40 and 50% (against 
85% in casinos).595 Some organised crime groups could own at least 
593 Délégation à la prospective et à la stratégie, Criminalité organisée [Organised Crime] (Paris, 
October, 2008).
594 P. Piazza, “Les machines à sous en France: Orientations étatiques et addiction au jeu [Slot 
Machines in France: State Directives and Gambling Addiction]”, Psychotropes 13 (2007): 3-4.
595 J.-M. Costes and J. Etiemble, “Taux de retour au joueur, addiction et blanchiment [The Return 
Rate to the Gambler, Addiction and Money Laundering]”, Les Notes de l’Observatoire Des Jeux, 
no. 1 (2012).
Figure 34. distribution oF criMinal activities in France according 
to risk and proFit
Source: T. Colombié, N. Lalam, and M. Schiray, Les acteurs du grand banditisme français au sein des économies souterraines liées au trafic 
de drogues [The French Milieu within the Illegal Economy Linked to Drug Trafficking] (Paris: INHESI, Ministère de l’Intérieur, 2002).
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100 machines, generating significant profit. Part of this money is being 
reinvested in criminal activities such as drug trafficking and tobacco 
smuggling.
Although the issue of the specialisation of OCGs in one type of crime 
remains controversial, as evident from Figure 34, cigarette smuggling is 
in the same group of high reward and low risk crimes as illegal slot 
machines. Interviews tend to confirm the versatility of OCGs, having as 
their final goal the making and laundering of money. The distribution 
along the vertical axis of risk and horizontal of profit provides a static 
picture and of course there are many combinations. The criminals could 
use alternatively legal and illegal resources, or a mix of them. The 
financiers make a basic calculation including risks of being arrested and 
goods being seized versus the rate of profit in a certain period of time.
At the small scale smuggling level, retailing cigarettes is within the reach 
of migrants with no resources, coming from emerging and developing 
countries (China, Tunisia, Libya). To launch a retail business, many actors 
are prone to use their own money, however, some ethnic groups rely 
on mutual aid.
The profitability of cigarette smuggling is quite high, according to a 
customs administrator in the Intelligence and Investigation Directorate of 
the French customs: “A container can hold 10 tonnes of cigarettes. In 
reality, we find between 6 and 8 tonnes by container which amounts to 
€2.8 million in commercial value.”
Because of the proximity of Andorra where the price of cigarettes is low 
compared to those in France, the smuggling of tobacco products has 
grown these last years, in particular around the city of Toulouse. The 
protagonists are former cannabis dealers and they use fast cars. This type 
of smuggling is hierarchically structured, having at its lowest level around 
thirty street peddlers (place Arnaud Bernard, in Toulouse). In six months, 
one smuggler had put in place an organisation selling 3,000 cartons 
bought in Andorra and transported by cars; his business has generated 
a profit of €40,000.596
Customs intelligence officers mentioned the development of water pipe 
tobacco smuggling from UAE. The narghileh bars are places where this 
product can be found; the legal revenue from these bars is used to 
finance the illegal purchase of this type of tobacco.
One key aspect that needs to be taken into account relates to the 
individual vs collective financing variable. In the first case, one individual 
could raise the total amount of the investment, which seems to be rare 
but possible; in that sense, the opportunity cost should be low. At the 
high levels of the business, this person is a well-established criminal, 
frequently known as a “juge de paix.”597 According to the Director of 
596 Direction de la sûreté départementale de Haute-Garonne et Service national des douanes 
judiciaires [Local Public Security Police and National Customs Judicial Enquiries Department].
597 Justice of the Peace.
Profits and 
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the National Customs Judicial Enquiries Department, collective financing 
is more common due to the possibility of sharing risk. The organisers 
ask different persons if they are interested in financing an operation of 
cigarettes importation, a process that could be named the “financing 
round.” They use arguments such as the rate of profit, the speed of 
return on investments and risk analysis. Among the investors, the level 
of contribution could be evenly spread or quite different, depending on 
the mark-up and material considerations.
In cigarettes smuggling, when a contract is defaulted on (internal reasons 
can include betrayal, denunciation; external reasons could be disruption, 
seizures), quite often the player at fault becomes indebted and will work 
free of charge for the criminal organisation. This situation of indebtedness 
will be valid for one time or more depending on the amount of money 
at stake. Unlike in drug trafficking, murder is exceptional in cigarette 
smuggling. Globally, the risks associated with cigarette smuggling are lower 
than those of drug trafficking, particularly the penal risks. Consequently, 
costs of shipments are lower in the first case (for instance the cost of 
corruption). In case of loss, it is easier to recover because of the high 
profit rate.
The tontine is a peculiar form of cooperation in the field of credit. 
The loan is made without any interest, any guarantee and any market. 
Although this practice dates back to the 17th century, globalisation has 
given a new boost to these exchanges, such as the remittances between 
developed and developing countries. A tontine includes also the mutual 
obligation that bind the members of a group. “If someone doesn’t abide 
by the adopted code of honour, the individual risks cutting all ties with 
the community and becoming a pariah.”598 The capacity to recover the 
598 M. Lelart, La tontine [The Tontine] (Paris: AUPELF-UREF, 1990).
Таble 45. sources oF Financing by sMuggling level in France
Source: N. Lalam, D. Weinberger and A. Lermenier, Etude portant sur la mise en place d’un dispositif experimental d’observation de 
la consommation de tabac issu de la contrebande [Study on an experimental implementation of an observatory of illicit tobacco 
consumption], Rapport pour la Mission interministérielle de lutte contre la drogue et la toxicomanie, Paris, July 2011.
Source level Illegal source legal source Hybrid
Wholesale 
smuggling
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• Totality 
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smuggling
• Fraud (means of payment 
or state allowances)
• Drug dealing
• Thefts and receiving
• Wages 
• Personal savings
• Mutual aid (informal 
finance)
N/A
Access to capital
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debt is high due to social and moral constraints. Members of the tontine 
network pool their monetary savings, to be lent alternately to each of 
them (a kind of credit cooperative). The members of the tontine share 
similar interests or common relations which strengthen the social control 
and guarantee the functioning of the system. In the tontine, money 
circulates very quickly. The tontine evolves in a framework at the edge of 
the legality without being systematically illegal. It escapes the regulation 
of public authorities. Part of the small scale cigarettes smuggling in Africa 
(Senegal, Mali, Cameroun, Benin, Togo, Mauritania) and in Asia (China, 
Vietnam) is financed by this system.
A similar system is the hawala,599 “an informal channel for transferring 
funds from one location to another through service providers – known 
as hawaladars – regardless of the nature of the transaction and the 
countries involved.”600 It exists and operates outside of, or parallel to 
formal banking or financial channels. Actually, hawala works by transferring 
money without moving it, which allows for the establishment of a 
network for conducting the transactions. In that sense, trust appears to 
be fundamental to implement the system. Hawala is understodd in its 
role in money laundering, but not much as part of criminal financing 
in general. In a context of asymmetric information, under which the 
information gap will be exploited if, by doing so, the better-informed 
party can achieve some advantage. But the role of trust limits this 
kind of opportunistic behaviour and strengthens loyalty. In the case of 
cigarettes smuggling, it is therefore an important component on both 
sides, operational and financial. 
The Czech Republic is a historically important hub of the European 
illegal tobacco trade. Today, the territory of the country is valued not 
so much for its market but as a centre of money laundering and a 
relaxation place for white-collar criminals from Eastern Europe. As for the 
market, according to the experts interviewed, is has two key features: 
there is strong fragmentation of its distributional dimension and being 
a high-profile and risky business causes demand to outstrip supply.
The only persistent trend in the illegal tobacco business is the so called 
“eastern trail” which starts in post-Soviet countries (Russia, Ukraine, 
Moldova, Belarus) and uses upper (Poland) or lower (Hungary – Slovakia) 
routes to transport genuine brands without paying excise and VAT duties 
to the countries in Western Europe, incl. the Czech Republic. En route, 
long-vehicle transportation is substituted by “car-trains” consisting of 
several cars traveling together, having one pilot car in the front and one 
599 According to the country, the name changes: Fei-Ch'ien (China), Padala (Philippines), Hundi 
(India), Hui Kuan (Hong Kong), and Phei Kwan (Thailand).
600 M. El-Qorchi, “Hawala. How Does This Informal Funds Transfer System Work, and Should It 
Be Regulated?”, Finance and Development 39, no. 4 (2002).
5.7. CZECH REPUBlIC: FINE-CUttING PROFIt IN DISORGANISED 
 IllICIt tRADE
Introduction
national	criminal	markets	and	Finances:	illicit	tobacco	trade	 313
counter-surveillance car in the rear. The Asian sea route (China – Western 
European sea ports, Balkan route) which was continually perceived as 
one of the dominant ways to import illegal tobacco products in the past 
is not clearly functioning nowadays. Similarly, the traditional Balkan path 
is considered to be just a back-up plan in cases of strong police and 
customs profiling of the eastern trail.
A shift is identified also in the area of the production of counterfeit 
cigarettes, which used to be exclusively the domain of the Vietnamese 
community. However, currently the production is both ethnically diverse 
with the presence of Czech, Ukrainian and Moldovan people and 
marginalised because of its easy detection by law enforcement. It has 
been mostly replaced by the trade in fine-cut tobacco.
Nowadays, the illegal tobacco market in the Czech Republic is 
strongly decentralised and consists especially of cigarettes and tobacco 
imported from East European and Balkan countries.601 Decentralisation 
and fragmentation hinders research of the financial management of 
the business with illegal tobacco products, where the only identifiable 
common pattern is cash payment.
In 2013, the total cigarette market in the Czech Republic declined by 
an estimated 3.3% in comparison with the previous year to 19.8 billion 
pieces, mainly reflecting the impact of increasing prices, the unfavourable 
economic environment, the increased prevalence of an illicit trade in 
tobacco products and the continued growth of lower-taxed fine-cut 
tobacco (CZ-E8). However, according to the Ministry of Health of the 
Czech Republic,602 the smoking rate has not decreased and reaches up 
to 30% of the population.
PMI holds the leading position in the tobacco business in the Czech 
Republic (other important official actors are British American Tobacco, 
Imperial Tobacco, Japan International Tobacco, Geco, Danczek or 
Tobacco Trading International) holding up to 50% market share. This 
means that the illegal tobacco trade affects especially PMI’s profits. The 
overall share of illegal tobacco products is around 3% of national 
consumption,603 with the exception of the city of Cheb (Western-
Bohemia) in which according to CZ-E8 and CZ-E9 the consumption of 
illegal tobacco products reaches 14% of the total tobacco consumption. 
As will be later explained, this exception is caused by the close position 
of Cheb to German borders.
Between 2009 and 2012, there was a continual increase of detected 
cases of illegal tobacco trade; however, at the same time the overall 
amount of seized illegal cigarettes decreased. This trend is in contrast 
with apparent seizures of other tobacco products.
601 KPMG, A Study of the Illicit Cigarette Market in the European Union. 2013 Results.
602 Ministry of Health, Zpráva o zdraví obyvatel České republiky [Report on the Health of Czech Citizens], 
2014.
603 KPMG, A Study of the Illicit Cigarette Market in the European Union. 2013 Results.
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The illegal tobacco market is characterised by several interconnected 
modes of operation – import-exports, distribution and production 
(Table 47). A further breakdown reveals three patterns of export/
import according to transit routes between the country of origin 
and the final destination. The prevalent pattern is importing genuine 
brands from Eastern Europe, warehousing them in the border areas 
with Poland and Slovakia and then distributing them further. The 
basic financial advantage of importing genuine brands from Eastern 
Europe to the Czech Republic lies in the price difference between licit 
and illicit cigarettes. The retail price of 1 package of licit cigarettes 
is approximately €3 which is twice the price of a smuggled legal; 
in the case of illicit whites the difference is more than three times 
(1 package = €0.90).
The common distribution model is through the network of warehouses 
and retailers (i.e. bars, restaurants, kiosks, etc.). The warehousing system 
is based on the distribution from the unloading yard to plenty of 
warehouses alongside both sides of the border. These warehouses can 
be small storage spaces (e.g. a garage) or larger storage facilities where 
the contraband merchandise can be easily hidden among other goods. 
Afterwards, it is sold to a network of retailers who buy the products 
directly from the warehouses or via taxi drivers or similar mobile services 
that deliver the products to them. In the case of unloading the cigarettes 
in Poland, Polish or Czech smugglers export them using cars or ant 
smuggling to the Czech Republic.
In terms of the consumption of illicitly imported cigarettes, the most 
affected regions are the Moravian-Silesian Region (with several distribution 
nodes – Český Těšín, Karviná, Bohumín, Ostrava), the West-Bohemian 
Region (Cheb, Pilsen and Vietnamese markets), the Karlovy Vary region 
(Karlovy Vary, Aš and Vietnamese markets), the Usti Region (especially 
the Vietnamese markets), the Central Bohemian region, the Liberec 
region (Czech-Polish borders) and Prague (especially the Vietnamese 
markets and the Russian-speaking community). While post-industrial 
regions (the Moravian-Silesian region, the Usti region) are characterised 
by economically marginalised consumers, Czech-German regions (the 
West-Bohemian region, the Karlovy Vary region) are focused on German-
Таble 46. voluMe oF the illegal tobacco trade in the czech republic 
(2009 – 2012)
Source: Annual Reports of the Customs Administration.
Year 2009 2010 2011 2012
Number of detected cases 368 404 681 749
Cigarettes (million pcs) 40 29 10 17
Tobacco (tonnes) 142 118 143 431
Revenue leakage (million €) 6.1 5.8 1.84 21.02
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speaking consumers (or distributors). The capital Prague includes all of 
these trends simply by being the biggest Czech city. Czech smugglers 
can also bypass the local market and transport the contraband to foreign 
countries:
„In one of the cases there were 16 Czech people sentenced who 
were specialised in exporting cigarettes to the UK, Germany and 
France. In the latter case they had been able to deliver special 
cigarettes directly to the Algerian community. Legal cigarettes were 
transported from Ukraine, smuggled trough the Czech Republic and 
sold to clients on the border with Germany. Germans had been 
demanding them because of their quality which is much higher than 
hand-rolled cigarettes made by the Vietnamese” (CZ-E6).
Another modus operandi is subsequent or alternative to the already 
described one and remains largely undetected: the one-man distribution. 
Its main players are former cigarette smugglers or other individuals 
who buy the tobacco leaves in Poland, chop them, place the fine-
cut tobacco into packages (150-500 grams) and sell it in the Czech 
Republic.
Additionally, the smuggled cigarettes can also be transited from 
the warehouses alongside the borders to the Vietnamese markets 
by Czech, Russian or Ukrainian distributors. The Vietnamese markets 
(Figure 35) are concentrated along the Czech-German border with the 
exception of two big markets in Prague and Brno, and one market 
Figure 35. localisation oF the vietnaMese Markets 
in the czech republic
Source: PMI.
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on the Czech-Austrian border. These markets are considered to be 
16 autonomous units with a hierarchy existing on the basis of close 
family relations and a cell distribution system. Illegal tobacco products 
are usually placed in a kind of special central warehouse outside 
these markets to make the merchandise invisible. The retail in the 
Vietnamese markets is run by know-how and “know-who” principles: 
genuine customers are recognised according to formal markers (car 
plates, appearance, accent); the decision to sell or not is usually in the 
hands of an experienced local boss.
The centre of Vietnamese business is the Sapa bazaar in Prague, a place 
which involves untraceable movement of money, immigration fraud, 
drugs and warehouses full of counterfeit goods. Laundering of the money 
is easily achievable due to the huge amounts of fast selling merchandise. 
Since most of the payments are based on cash, the transgressions are 
difficult to monitor and identify. The situation is even more complex due 
to the existence of informal Vietnamese banking system called “chuyen 
tien” which is similar to the hawala.
During the last few years, one of the major shifts in the illegal 
tobacco business is the replacement of the production of counterfeited 
cigarettes by the trade in hand-rolling tobacco (HRt). The reason is that 
chopping tobacco and selling it in packages or bags is less challenging 
and detectable than the defective and risky production of counterfeited 
cigarettes. Apart from other players, research has identified a strong 
involvement of Polish organised criminal groups, especially in the Czech-
Polish border areas. The presence of these groups in the Czech Republic 
is usually explained by the opportunity to exploit the differences in the 
taxation of fine-cut and whole tobacco leaves.
Таble 47. Model oF the illegal cigarettes Market 
in the czech republic
Model
type of 
opera-
tion
Merchan-
dise
Country of origin
Destination 
country
Mode of 
transpor-
tation
Players
Distribution/
Customers
Export-Import 
Post-Soviet 
territory – 
Poland 
route
Export/
Import
Cigarettes Ukraine, Russia, 
Moldova, Baltic states 
(via Hungary, Slovakia
Poland Car-trains, 
green way
Ukrainian, 
Russian, 
Moldovan 
groups
Wholesale to 
Polish players
Subsequent 
Poland-
Czech 
Republic 
route
Export/
Import
Cigarettes Ukraine, Russia, 
Moldova, Baltic states 
(via Hungary, Slovakia)
Czech 
Republic
Car-trains Polish, 
Czech 
groups
Wholesale 
to Polish or 
Czech players
Asia route Export/
Import
Tobacco Asian countries 
(Vietnam)
Europe Sea routes, 
long-
vehicles, 
vans, cars
Vietnamese 
groups, legal 
companies
Logistics plan
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Таble 47. Model oF the illegal cigarettes Market 
in the czech republic (continued)
Model
type of 
opera-
tion
Merchan-
dise
Country of origin
Destination 
country
Mode of 
transpor-
tation
Players
Distribution/
Customers
Distribution
Cross-border 
warehouse 
model
Distribu-
tion
Cigarettes, 
HRT 
Poland Czech 
Republic
Cars 
(Schengen), 
ant 
smugglers
Polish, 
Czech 
groups
Warehouses, 
wide spectrum 
of customers 
who sell it 
further
One-man 
business 
model
Distribu-
tion
Cigarettes, 
HRT
Poland Czech 
Republic
Cars One-man 
business 
model
Selling to 
acquaintances
Inland 
warehouse 
model
Distribu-
tion
Cigarettes Czech Republic Czech 
Republic
- Czech, 
Polish, 
Post-Soviet, 
Vietnamese 
groups
Warehouses, 
wide spectrum 
of customers, 
re-distribution 
to Vietnamese 
markets
Direct 
cross-border 
model
Distribu-
tion
Cigarettes Ukraine, Russia, 
Moldova, Baltic states 
(via Hungary, Slovakia)
Czech 
Republic
Cars Post-soviet 
groups
Russian-
language 
community
Foreign 
players 
cross-border 
model
Distribu-
tion
Cigarettes Ukraine, Russia, 
Moldova, Baltic 
states (via Hungary, 
Slovakia), counterfeited 
cigarettes
Czech 
Republic 
(Vietnamese 
markets)
- Vietnamese German cities 
close to the 
border
Production
Production HRT Poland, 
Czech 
Republic
Czech Republic Cars Wide 
spectrum 
of players
Warehouses, 
direct sales
Wholesale
Financing and financial management of the illegal tobacco trade in 
the Czech Republic is embedded in social relations far exceeding the 
particular business deals.
Sources of capital for criminal operations
Considering the fact the roots of the illegal tobacco trade that affects 
the Czech Republic are located in the post-Soviet territory, the tracing of 
the source of the capital for initiating the business is quite challenging. 
There was an agreement among interviewees that the organisers of the 
trade and the financiers/investors are different entities. The financiers 
provide the money for the organisers who are responsible for hiring 
people willing to be part of the business as drivers-smugglers. The 
organisers are also responsible for ensuring the vehicles required for the 
Financing 
and financial 
management
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
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smuggling, arranging customers, final destinations and also trans-border 
shipments to Central and Western Europe.
Generally speaking, the illegal tobacco trade in the territory of the 
Czech Republic is not linked to hierarchically organised criminal groups. 
Quite the opposite, the network of actors responsible for the distribution 
of illegal cigarettes is – apart from Vietnamese groups – fragmented, 
decentralised without any crucial key nodes. Hence it follows that the 
source of the capital for initiating the distribution business is not generally 
definable. However, there are several identifiable ways of sustaining the 
business. The most common way is investing money from a legal activity 
(e.g. trade in foodstuffs, gaming devices, restaurants) which makes the 
illegal tobacco trade not the main business activity but as a side business 
of mostly legal business transactions. The estimated ratio of legal to 
illegal capital is 70:30.
Another way to sustain an illegal cigarettes business is using the financiers 
or investors who are not directly active in the business, their role being 
limited to providing funding. However, the socioeconomic spectrum 
of those financiers/investors is so varied that it is not possible to 
provide any general characteristics. Their business involvement is usually 
anticipated rather than detected:
“There are some cases when guys start as petty tobacco smugglers, 
or they find someone who is willing to invest his money and finance 
their business. Usually, they are their acquaintances from a previous 
career. Whoever they can find…” (CZ-E4).
An illegal financing method is re-investing proceeds from VAT fraud. 
It is used sporadically due to the risky nature of the illegal tobacco 
trade and higher profits from illegal business other than cigarette fraud. 
The more frequently used model is reinvesting money from small scale 
smuggling in order to expand the trade. It is typical for the Vietnamese 
branch of the illicit networks: illegal tobacco products (cigarettes or 
HRT) are just one of the many commodities in a wide spectrum of 
traded merchandise.
As regards illegal HRT, there are two regular ways in which the actors 
can establish their own criminal operations. One of the common 
ways is using legal companies which buy raw tobacco leaves which 
are not subject of taxation in the Czech Republic. At the same time, 
these companies apply for a concession for setting up the operations 
to fine-cut the tobacco. Right after the purchase of the tobacco, 
the leaves are fermented, aromatised, chopped and packaged. The 
packaging – the final step of the process – makes the products 
subject to taxation. During the period of setting up the business these 
companies not only produce officially taxed tobacco but unofficially 
they continue to chop tobacco after hours and sell it untaxed to 
distributors.
Another traditional figure symbolising the permeability between legality 
and illegality is a person or a group of several people who run a 
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takeaway business offering a wide spectrum of goods including illegal 
cigarettes and illegal HRT. This figure can be illustrated in the short story 
related by one of the interviewees:
“We arrested Mr. X this January. Mr X. started his career as money 
changer before 1989. During the 1990s he was involved in numerous 
legal and illegal activities using several takeaway kiosks in the Moravian-
Silesian region. Mr. X was officially homeless and registered in the 
municipality but in fact owned several luxury cars and had personal 
bodyguards at his disposal. In the course of time, he left the takeaway 
business and started to produce just fine-cut tobacco from leaves 
bought in Poland” (CZ-E7).
The transactions between the smugglers from the former Soviet countries, 
retailers and customers without exception are being done in cash. 
Bartering or its variations are not recognised. The same cash principle 
applies to distribution schemes because of not only the high-profile 
nature of business but primarily the direct hand-to-hand sale of illegal 
tobacco products which makes the business dynamic. There exists a 
wide spectrum of retailers – acquaintance networks, bar and restaurant 
owners, small warehouse operators etc.
The Vietnamese markets are known for their wide spectrum of goods 
(mobile phones, pre-paid cards, drugs, etc.) and services (massage, night 
clubs) where the profits from illegal tobacco products are mixed with the 
profits from other legal or illegal goods and services.
The payment for illegally produced HRT is without exception a cash 
payment. In the case of raw tobacco bought in foreign countries for 
the production of HRT the classical payment schemes are settled. These 
schemes involve officially registered companies and bank transactions.
The overall costs of organising the car-trains smuggling from the eastern 
neighbours of the Czech Republic are estimated to include petrol and 
other expenses for 3-7 cars (incl. caravans), wholesale cost of the traded 
cigarettes, remuneration for the drivers and brokers in the places of 
transhipments and in the final destinations, accidental expenditures. One 
fully loaded van can transit 2,500-3,000 cartons; however, the usual 
truckload is around 1,500 cartons.604 As regards manufacturing, apart 
from the costs which are inherently connected with the running of a 
half legal and half illegal business mentioned above, there is the cost 
of a tobacco cutting machine which is between €200 and €20,000 
depending on the requested volume. The Vietnamese community has 
at their disposal tobacco cutting machines imported from Vietnam, the 
604 The prevalent size of the smuggled goods can be illustrated with the claim of the speaker of 
the Customs Administration of the Czech Republic for the South Moravian Region Gabriela 
Kokrhelová on the occasion of the arrest of a Czech van driver who was consequently 
accused of smuggling 1,800 cartons of cigarettes. She claimed that the amount was quite huge 
compared with the other similar arrests (Česká televise Brno, “Úlovek celníků: Řidič dodávky 
pašoval skoro dva tisíce kartonů cigarette [Customs’ Dragnet: Van Driver Smuggled Nearly 
2 Thousands Cartons of Cigarettes]”, May 24, 2014).
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original price of which is not known. In the case of the production of 
regular cigarettes from this tobacco, the expenses for papers, packages 
and filters need to be added (as mentioned, however, this kind of 
production has significantly decreased during the last years.
The package cost in the countries of origin is about €0.40, while in the 
destination country it is €1.5-€2, which means the profit can reach up 
to €25,000-€30,000 per van load. In the cases of cars (approximately 
500-1,000 cartons) the profit is between €5,000 and €10,000. This 
profit is, however, shared between a number of stakeholders: financiers, 
organisers, smugglers, distributors and other actors in the business. This 
means, the financiers, organisers and smugglers never reach these 
amounts because of the need to sell the contraband to distributors 
for a bargain price (€0.60-€1.20). The same applies to the distribution 
process: costs and profits of distribution schemes are highly variable 
depending on the demand, the quantity discount arranged and transport 
expenditures. 
Given the involvement of broad spectrum of actors in the tobacco 
trade networks consisting of a variety of legal and illegal activities, 
there is lack of information about profit sharing. There are no generally 
recognised rules but rather each group applies an informal system of 
rules and obligations which emerge from various aspects of the mutual 
relationships where the business aspect is just one among many. In the 
case of the smuggling from the post-soviet territories, the supposition is 
that the profit gained from illicit tobacco trade is partially re-invested in 
another cycle of the trade. 
The Vietnamese community differs in the existence of a general financial 
system which also covers profit sharing. It is built around an informal 
network of underground bankers (the hawala) and money transfer 
services (Western Union) where high amounts of cash can be divided 
into smaller cash units undetectable by law enforcement. In their case 
the profit is usually reinvested in real estate expanding their commercial 
spaces in the city centres of the Czech Republic or is sent back to 
Vietnam. 
Similarly, little is known about the system of sharing the profit from 
HRT and it is not even monitored by law enforcement agencies or the 
customs service. Attention is focused on concrete cases which are usually 
constructed around evidence referring to a concrete single transaction 
and thus usable in the prosecution of a predicate crime, not to the 
general process and mechanism of transactions. 
Overall, the multitude of players involved in this illegal business dissipates 
the profit within the whole network:
“Cigarettes smuggling? It s´ just for the greenhorns. The worst business 
you can do... It used to be like that, it is true even today and in the 
future it will be the same” (CZ-C2).
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As mentioned above, the profit from illegal tobacco products is mixed 
together with the profit gained from other legal and illegal activities. 
That is why access to capital at a critical moment is influenced by the 
overall business of the players. Short-term loans are provided by people 
included in network of acquaintances or, more often, by official, 
semi-official or unofficial companies lending the money at an interest 
rate. There are approximately 50,000 individuals registered as credit 
tradesmen in the Czech Republic and 33,651 non-bank credit subjects 
registered by the Financial Arbiter. According to the study Secure 
Credit Navigator605 the market share of non-bank loans is around 
35% (€2.9 billion). The main reason for using non-bank institutions 
are credit conditions and higher interest rate imposed by banks on 
consumer lending. These institutions range from companies with 
brand credibility (e.g. Provident, Home Credit, Cetelem) to completely 
unknown and predatory entities charging high rates and unclear rights 
and obligations. Some of the latter are considered to be established 
for money laundering purposes.606 Although this kind of crediting is 
perceived as socially disrupting, it is not defined as organised crime in 
the official documents.
Accessing to capital at critical moments in the Vietnamese community 
is provided by the mechanisms for raising communitarian capital. This 
does not mean the whole Vietnamese community is involved in criminal 
activities but that mutually connected family and business channels 
cover also investments in illegal activities. The significant feature of 
the Vietnamese community is limited mobility between social classes, 
although there is no single hierarchical system. To put it differently, 
“there exist varying degrees of connectivity and seniority, meaning that 
although there is no single and united Vietnamese criminal organisation, 
common interests and family ties connects the units and hold them 
together.”607
Accessing capital at critical moments in HRT production does not differ 
from the other parts of the business, as sources include legal or other 
illegal activities, personal savings, short-term loans with unknown interest 
rates or the use of legal or semi-legal bank companies.
The illicit tobacco trade represents one of the oldest illegal activities of 
Italian OCGs. In particular, it is around the 1950s and 1960s that the 
high level of cigarettes consumption (estimated in 90,000 tonnes a year) 
and State taxation acted as facilitating factors for the growth of the 
605 EEIP, Navigátor bezpečného úvěru [Navigator of Secure Loan] (Charles University, 2013).
606 High interest rates combined with high penalties for delay or default allow these lenders to 
forfeit real estate used as collateral which then becomes the subject of money laundering 
(People in Need – Rozhodně ně (2014): Byznys s dluhy: Licha [Loan business: Loansharking]).
607 P. Kupka and T. Šmíd, “The Outsiders: Vietnamese Crime Groups in the Czech Republic”, Jane’s 
Intelligence Review, 2011 23, no. 12 (2011): 40-43.
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illegal cigarette market at the national level, thus creating a profitable 
opportunity exploited by Italian criminal entrepreneurs.608
In particular, the evolution of this illicit market is characterised by two 
distinct phases, with the police operation “Primavera”609 functioning as 
a key dividing event:
• In the first period (between the 1950s and the 2000s), the illicit 
tobacco market in Italy represented the initial and very profitable 
illegal activity of Italian OCGs (the Camorra, the ‘Ndrangheta, Cosa 
Nostra and Sacra Corona Unita) that, in this way, had been able to 
foster the recovery of economic growth employing different individuals, 
residing especially in deprived areas of the country. Due to the type 
of products smuggled and their low prices, the number of persons 
involved (estimated, for example, at 15% of the total population 
residing in the city of Brindisi, region of Apulia) the illicit tobacco 
market expanded rapidly, thus becoming accepted and, in some cases, 
supported at the social level (IT-E1, IT-E15, IT-E7, IT-E11). Tobacco 
products at this time consisted mainly in contraband cigarettes, with 
smugglers adopting a modus operandi aimed at avoiding police control 
at borders or officials control at customs, and tobacco manufactures 
in many cases as compliant suppliers (IT-E1, IT-E2).610
• In the second period (2000s to nowadays), resulting from the 
counteraction attempts of Italian and European authorities (e.g. police 
operation “Primavera”, national laws, and agreements between EU 
institutions and major international tobacco companies), the scenario 
of the illicit tobacco market has consistently changed in the following 
features: 1. a renewed interest of traditional Italian OCGs (especially 
the Camorra and the Sacra Corona Unita); 2. the appearance of new 
criminal organisations from Eastern Europe (due to the opening of 
borders), the former Soviet Union and Asia; 3. the formation of new 
alliances and business joint ventures among criminal entrepreneurs 
used to introduce illicit tobacco products not previously traded on the 
national market (e.g. counterfeit brands and illicit whites), imported in 
huge quantities through container shipments or lorry trucks to hide 
the merchandise at customs (IT-E1, IT-E4, IT-E15).
Indeed, at present, the national illicit tobacco market appears to be 
undergoing a renewed expansion, also due to the contingent economic 
crisis, displaying vibrant and mutating dynamics, while involving the 
interplay of different actors (see section on market structure and actors).
608 G. Nanula “Il contrabbando come fonte di finanziamento della mafia” [Contraband as a Source 
of Mafias Financing] (Guardia di Finanza, Palermo, 18-19/11 2009).
609 The operation “Primavera” was carried out in 2000s by the Guardia di Finanza, National Police 
and Carabinieri in the region of Apulia, which has represented since the beginning a key area 
of tobacco smuggling carried out by the collaboration between the Sacra Corona Unita and 
Albanian/Montenegrin smugglers. This counteraction originated as a response to the heavy 
contraband phenomenon that was becoming more and more widespread and violent, having 
also caused the death of some officials. See La Repubblica, Duemila uomini in Puglia contro 
i contrabbandieri [Two Thousand Policemen in Apulia Against Smugglers], February 2000.
610 See also F. Calderoni “A New Method for Estimating the Illicit Cigarettes Market at the 
Subnational Level and Its Application to Italy”, Global Crime 15 (2014): 51-76; L. Joossens, PACTE. 
Industry and Market Response. Work Package 5. Illicit Tobacco Trade in Europe: Issues and Solutions, 
2011.
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Data on consumers of illicit tobacco products in Italy are limited. 
Available research estimate a slight decrease of smokers in the general 
population between 1990 and 2010 (from 26% to 23%), and, on the 
contrary, an increase of ITP smokers since 2010 (10% in the first months 
of 2013, 6.4% in 2012 and 3.3% in 2011.611 The latter present differences 
in regard to the areas of the national territory: people are more aware 
of possible health damages in the Northern regions and thus less likely 
to buy this type of products; less worried and more used to this illicit 
market are smokers in the Southern regions where individuals, also for 
the different socioeconomic conditions, turn to ITP more frequently 
(IT-E3).612 Furthermore, one expert (IT-E15) has suggested higher levels of 
use of contraband cigarettes among the juvenile population compared 
to other age groups, due to lower levels of affordability and awareness 
of eventual health risks. 
As for the expenditure on tobacco products, according to Nomisma,613 
it amounted to €18.9 billion in 2011, with an increase in value of 3% 
compared to 2010 (€18.4 billion), and with a 74.5% out of the total 
corresponding to tax revenue in the same year (€10.9 billion for excise 
duty and €3.1 billion for VAT). Although prices of tobacco products 
are not the highest in Italy compared to other EU countries (e.g. the 
average price of a pack of 20 cigarettes is around €4.58), taxes on 
tobacco products have constantly and gradually increased during the 
last years, with repercussions on customers’ affordability.614 The latter 
has been also undermined by the present economic crisis, affecting 
mainly lower social classes in which smoking prevalence appears to 
be higher.
Indeed, the slight but constant decrease in the volume of cigarettes sold 
starting from 2010 (-1.8% in 2011; -5.3% in 2012 and -6.3 in 2013) can 
be interpreted as the choice of customers for other tobacco products: 
from low priced cigarettes (from 0.8% to 2.5% of the legal consumption 
in the period between January and October 2013), HRT (+47.3% in 2011 
compared to 2010), to e-cigarettes.615
Consistently, some experts (IT-E1, IT-E3, IT-E2, IT-E15) and authors616 have 
argued that the increasing tax burden which results in higher prices of 
611 Nomisma, La filiera del tabacco in Italia. Impatto socioeconomico ed aspetti di politica fiscale. XVI 
Rapporto [The Tobacco Supply Chain. Socio-economic Impact and Fiscal Policy Issues. XVI Report], 
2012.
612 See also Transcrime, European Outlook on the Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products, 2015.
613 Nomisma, La filiera del tabacco in Italia. Impatto socioeconomico ed aspetti di politica fiscale. XVI 
Rapporto [The Tobacco Supply Chain. Socio-economic Impact and Fiscal Policy Issues. XVI Report].
614 KPMG, Project Sun. A Study of the Illicit Cigarette Market in the European Union. 2013 Results.
615 Philip Morris Italia, Audizione di Philip Morris Italia Srl su Accise e Tabacchi [Audition of Philip Morris 
Italy on Excise Duty and Tobacco Products], 2013.
616 Nomisma, La filiera del tabacco in Italia. Impatto socioeconomico ed aspetti di politica fiscale. XVI 
Rapporto [The Tobacco Supply Chain. Socio-economic Impact and Fiscal Policy Issues. XVI Report]; 
F. Calderoni, M. Angelini, S. Favarin, Italy: the Factbook on the Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products 2; 
Commissione parlamentare, Relazione sulla contraffazione nel settore del tabacco [Report on 
Counterfeiting in the Tobacco Sector], 2012; Philip Morris Italia, Audizione di Philip Morris Italia Srl su 
Accise e Tabacchi [Audition of Philip Morris Italy on Excise Duty and Tobacco Products; Censis, Nuove 
regolazioni del mercato dei tabacchi lavorati: le posizioni degli attori, il rilievo economico, l’atteggiamento 
dei cittadini [New Regulations on the Market of Tobacco Products: Actors Roles, Economic 
Importance, Citizens Attitudes], 2011.
Market overview
324 Financing	oF	organised	crime
tobacco products represents a significant factor for the presence of the 
illicit tobacco trade (ITT) in Italy. In this regard, different estimations are 
available at the national level, although not updated and regular, that 
underline how the ITT “passed from high levels until the 1990s to very 
low ones at the beginning of the 2000s”,617 while starting to increase 
again in recent years.
In particular, Nomisma618 has estimated the ITT in the years 2009 – 2010 
at about 3.2% of the total legal consumption, corresponding to a volume 
of 2.8 billion cigarettes, among which 413 million pieces being counterfeited 
(Table 48). Furthermore, the illegal market value is estimated at €615 million, 
with €485 million representing the amount of loss in tax revenue by the 
State. As for the years 2011 and 2012, the incidence of the ITT on the total 
legal consumption was estimated respectively at 3.3% and 6.4%.619
In most recent years, there has been a decline in counterfeit and 
contraband (C&C) tobacco products “as a share of the total consumption 
in 2013”620 at the European level, a trend which is in line with 
consumption at the national level: between 2012 and 2013, both the 
overall consumption of manufactured cigarettes and of C&C tobacco 
products decreased from €7.29 billion in 2012 to €3.68 billion in 2013 
(-50% drop in consumption), (Table 49). In this regard, several factors 
have been contended: 1. Additional law enforcement activity in areas 
recognised of being at risk (streets and ports), and especially in the city 
of Naples where contraband of cigarettes accounts for the 30% of the 
national ITT; 2. The withdrawal of “Classic”, heavily counterfeited in 
Ukraine and becoming increasingly recognised as illicit brand; 3. The 
617 F. Calderoni, “A New Method for Estimating the Illicit Cigarettes Market at the Subnational 
Level and Its Application to Italy”, Global Crime 15 (2014): 51-76, 57.
618 Nomisma, La contraffazione delle sigarette in Italia. Presentazione del Primo Rapporto Nomisma 
[Cigarettes Counterfeiting in Italy. Presentation of the First Report Nomisma] (Rome: June 2011).
619 Nomisma, La filiera del tabacco in Italia. Impatto socioeconomico ed aspetti di politica fiscale. XVI 
Rapporto [The Tobacco Supply Chain. Socio-economic Impact and Fiscal Policy Issues. XVI Report].
620 KPMG, Project Sun. A Study of the Illicit Cigarette Market in the European Union. 2013 Results, 10.
Таble 48. estiMations oF the illicit tobacco trade in italy. 
years 2009 – 2010 and % variation
      * The illegal market does not correspond to the sum of the counterfeit and contraband cigarettes since one pack can 
produce both law violations at the same time.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Nomisma (2011).
2009 2010 2009 – 2010 (average)
Cigarettes 
(millions)
Incidence of legal 
consumption
Cigarettes 
(millions)
Incidence of
legal consumption
Cigarettes 
(millions)
Incidence of
legal consumption
Counterfeit 305 0.3% 520 0.6% 413 0.5%
Contraband 2.438 2.7% 2.419 2.8% 2.429 2.7%
Illegal 
market*
2.741 3.1% 2.926 3.4% 2.833 3.2%
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effect produced by the introduction of the “super-low” segment that 
maintaining stable prices have prevented customers to turn to the illicit 
market (4% of overall market share in 2013).621
Besides the price of tobacco products and the role of the economic 
crisis that may be at the basis of ITT in Italy, other key factors have 
been underlined: 1. The presence of organised crime groups involved, in 
particular native ones (see section on market structure and actors), due 
to the high profits and the low risks of being detected and apprehended, 
while exploiting consolidated routes used for other criminal activities (e.g. 
cocaine trafficking); 2. Medium to high levels of corruption; 3. The lack 
of a national plan to counteract the ITT; 4. The geographical position of 
Italy as a key destination and transit country for the illicit tobacco trade, 
especially perpetrated by sea routes.622
Illegal tobacco products arrive to Italy through three main entry points: 
the Adriatic Sea, the Tyrrhenian Sea and the Eastern European border 
(Croatia) reaching the region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia, with Italian ports 
as the most vulnerable places for smuggling.623 As indicated by data on 
seizures provided by the Customs and Monopolies Agency, National Anti-
Fraud and Control Directorate for 2012, gathered during the interview 
and in line with more recent data provided by experts (IT-E1, IT-E2, 
IT-E5, IT-E3, IT-E8), illicit tobacco products are imported from:624
621 Ibidem, A. Greco, “Crolla in Italia il contrabbando di sigarette: -50% nel 2013” [Cigarettes 
Contraband Collapse in Italy: -50% in 2013], La Repubblica, June 2014.
622 F. Calderoni, M. Angelini, S. Favarin, Italy: the Factbook on the Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products 2.
623 Transcrime, European Outlook on the Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products; Commissione parlamentare, 
Relazione sulla contraffazione nel settore del tabacco [Report on Counterfeiting in the Tobacco Sector].
624 It is specified that: the port of Ancona is situated in the region of Marche (Central Italy) on the 
Adriatic cost; the port of Bari in the region of Apulia (South of Italy) on the Adriatic cost; the 
port of Gioia Tauro in the region of Calabria (South of Italy) on the Tyrrhenian cost; the port 
of Genoa and La Spezia in the region of Liguria (North West of Italy) on the Tyrrhenian cost; 
the port of Trieste in the region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia (North East of Italy) on the Adriatic 
cost; the port of Naples in the region of Campania (South of Italy) on the Adriatic coast.
Таble 49. total ManuFactured cigarette consuMption. 
years 2009 – 2013 and % variation 2012 – 2013
Source: Authors’ elaboration on KPMG (2013).
Billion cigarettes 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2012 – 2013 %
Legal domestic sales (LDS) 89.16 87.05 85.47 78.74 74.04 6
Outflows -0.92 -0.93 -1.01 -0.93 -0.78 16
Legal domestic consumption (LDC) 88.24 86.12 84.46 77.81 73.25 6
Non-domestic legal (ND(L)) 1.46 1.09 1.12 0.84 0.84 1
Counterfeit and contraband (C&C) 3.04 4.55 4.81 7.29 3.68 50
Total non-domestic 4.50 5.64 5.93 8.13 4.52 44
total consumption 92.74 91.76 90.39 85.94 77.77 10
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• Eastern European countries such as Montenegro, Moldavia, Romania, 
Bulgaria, by land routes and reaching the city of Trieste;
• Eastern European countries such as Montenegro and Albania to the 
ports of Venice, Ancona, Bari;
• Greece to the ports of Venice, Ancona, Bari;
• United Arab Emirates to the port of Gioia Tauro and Saudi Arabia to 
the port of Genoa;
• Northern African countries such as Egypt reaching the ports of Trieste 
and La Spezia;
• China to the port of Genoa, Taranto, Naples.
In particular, contraband cigarettes seized by regional and provincial 
custom agencies amounted to a total of 12,357,031 packs in 2012, 
imported mainly from Greece (5,498,383 packs), United Arab Emirates 
(2,227,754 packs) and Egypt (1,944,709 packs), hidden in container 
shipments carrying other legitimate or counterfeit products. The highest 
quantity remains on the national territory (4,378,680 packs), while the 
higher volumes are further exported to Montenegro (1,960,000 packs), 
Greece (1,800,300 packs), Belgium (739,490 packs) and Germany (687,430 
packs).625 Lesser quantities are also exported to the United Kingdom 
(IT-E7, IT-E8, IT-E2, IT-E1). Once ITP reach the national territory, the major 
destination areas are the regions of Lombardy, Apulia, and Campania, 
with the latter considered to be the place more frequently used to sort, 
storage and distribute the merchandise at the wholesale and retail level 
(IT-E10, IT-E9, IT-E19).
Among the different types of 
ITP, Italy has been recording 
high growth of illicit whites, 
especially starting from the 2000s 
(IT-E14, IT-E15, IT-E1). In 2010, 
106 tonnes out of a total of 280 
contraband cigarettes seized; 
while in 2011, 141 tonnes out 
of 240 of contraband cigarettes 
seized.626 Furthermore, one 
expert (IT-E15), reported for 
the first semester of 2013, a 
75.5% of illicit whites seized in 
the national territory. In 2012, 
main brands of illicit whites 
intercepted at customs have 
been Gold Mount, Raquel, 
Richman, Jin Ling, together with 
other legal brands (Table 50).
At the same time, as pointed out 
by some experts (IT-E1, IT-E15)
625 Data provided by the Customs and Monopolies Agency, National Anti-Fraud and Control 
Directorate during the interview with the appointed expert and referring to 2012.
626 Commissione parlamentare, Relazione sulla contraffazione nel settore del tabacco [Report on 
Counterfeiting in the Tobacco Sector].
Таble 50. Main cigarettes brands conFiscated at custoMs in 2012
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Customs and Monopolies Agency, National Anti-Fraud 
and Control Directorate (2012).
Brands No. of packs % total
Gold Classic 2,099,732 17.0
Ronhill 1,978,480 16.0
Capital 922,915 7.5
Gold Mount 895,254 7.2
Raquel 877,100 7.1
Richman 828,330 6.7
Jin Ling 509,580 4.1
Brooks 500,00 4.0
Marlboro 439,653 3.6
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new type of tobacco products have entered the national market during 
the last years. These are produced by tobacco manufacturers to be sold 
online to companies, mainly located in Eastern Europe, that in turn supply 
duty free shops. This trend resembles to one of the 1990s and 2000s 
when Switzerland was used to sell cigarettes in virtue of legal licences to 
Montenegro, that once imported were further diverted to Italy through 
maritime transportation (via motorboats), (IT-E1, IT-E15). Indeed, in 2014, 
a major case involved an Italian tobacco manufacture, named Yesmoke 
(situated in the municipality of Settimo Torinese, region of Piedmont), 
that was seized because of suspected €70 million of evaded taxes for 
cigarette contraband through fictitious exportations carried out among 
EU and extra EU companies. 627
The illicit tobacco market in Italy is particularly fragmented into the 
interplay of various actors: from native OCGs (the Camorra, the Sacra 
Corona Unita, and to a lesser extent the ‘Ndrangheta and Cosa Nostra) 
and foreign OCGs, to more or less organised criminal organisations 
(mainly foreigners) and individuals, (IT-E10, IT-E9).628
As contended by one expert (IT-E2), at present the illicit tobacco trade 
seems to be characterised by the territory in which criminal organisations 
are settled within the country: 1. The regions such as Campania and 
Apulia, where the more traditional and historical Italian OCGs (respectively 
the Camorra and the Sacra Corona Unita) reside, structured more as 
oligarchic organisations with a clear definition of tasks and duties among 
members; 2. Criminal organisations, mainly of Eastern European origin, 
with members located in metropolitan areas (e.g. cities of Milan, Turin, 
Rome) acting as points of reference and controlling from 5 to 15 
affiliates. These criminal entrepreneurs, characterised by different roles 
and modus operandi within the ITT, may either collaborate or act as solo 
criminal entrepreneurs.
In the first case, it is then possible for larger networks to be formed in 
virtue of business opportunities and type of relations among smugglers 
(i.e. stable vs. occasional), (IT-E1, IT-E5, IT-E3, IT-E7, IT-E19).
“In our investigation we started from a small Polish group, but soon 
we discovered different groups all connected and already knowing each 
other in virtue of previous joint ventures and/or mutual support (e.g. a 
group needs a courier/a mean of transport and ask to members of the 
other groups). A real network” (IT-E1). “The [same] investigation revealed 
the involvement of 301 individuals of the following nationalities: Italian, 
627 M. Peggio, “Sequestrato per contrabbando lo stabilimento Yesmoke di sigarette a Settimo 
Torinese” [Seized Yesmoke Company in Settimo Torinese for Cigarettes Contraband], La 
Stampa, November 2014. It is underlined that the tobacco manufacture Yesmoke has been 
recently reopened by the owners. For further information on this case see also D. Turrini 
“Smokings, docufilm su azienda che sfidò i big del tabacco. Ma propietari in cella [Smokings, 
Documentary on the Company that Challenged the Tobacco Big Manufacturers. Owners in 
Jail], IlFattoQuotidiano, December 2014.
628 See also F. Calderoni, “A New Method for Estimating the Illicit Cigarettes Market at the 
Subnational Level and Its Application to Italy”; F. Calderoni, M. Angelini, S. Favarin, Italy: 
the Factbook on the Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products 2; Commissione parlamentare, Relazione sulla 
contraffazione nel settore del tabacco [Report on Counterfeiting in the Tobacco Sector].
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Greek, German, Russian, Ukrainian, Polish, Moldavian, Kazakh, Bulgarian, 
Slovak, Romanian, Latvian and Argentinian”.629
Loose and fluid networks of variable dimensions exist within the national 
illicit tobacco market, in order to share costs and risks of tobacco 
smuggling operations among groups, diversify routes of trafficking, and 
provide mutual support. Although participating in joint ventures, these 
groups tend to remain separated because they are in charge of and 
specialise in each distinct phase of the smuggling operations. Indeed, 
individuals operating within these networks carry out specific and distinct 
tasks: transportation (e.g. couriers, drivers), unloading (unloaders, dockers), 
storage (warehouse keepers), selling (wholesalers and retailers), payment 
(intermediaries, couriers). The aim is to avoid reciprocal knowledge as 
to guarantee the safety of groups involved (IT-E14, IT-E1, IT-E2, IT-E5, 
IT-E11). For this reason, some experts have underlined the key role of 
intermediaries (IT-E1, IT E-7), useful to connect potential buyers and 
suppliers, and guaranteeing for the deal. Furthermore, their strategic 
function is to ensure constant contact among the groups involved, as well 
as the arrival of the products, being usually located in the destination 
areas (both in Italy and other EU countries).
“Intermediaries are key persons, functioning as trusted linkages among 
groups. They are useful to keep contacts with couriers transporting ITP 
that in many cases do not know the Italian language. The Neapolitan 
buyer, for example, would have problems in being acknowledged 
about variations occurred (e.g. delays in delivery, change of routes 
due to police control), so there is the need of persons able to 
communicate with both sides of the operation. During the last years 
and in regard to cases of collaborations between Camorra clans and 
Ukrainian criminal entrepreneurs, we have detected Eastern European 
intermediaries residing in Naples representing the trait d’union between 
the two groups” (IT-E1).
In the second case, criminal organisations present a more ‘centralised’ 
structure and are based on familial, kinship or ethnic bonds. The bosses 
are usually the financiers and the organisers of the entire smuggling 
operations with direct contacts with suppliers. Roles and duties are 
extremely separated among members and are functional to carry out all 
the necessary phases of trafficking as well as to avoid the circulation of 
information, reducing in this way the risks of apprehension. At the same 
time, other external individuals are recruited to perform specific tasks 
(IT-E3, IT-E18, IT-E5).  
“We detected a group presenting an oligarchic structure, capable 
to perform all the necessary steps to accomplish tobacco smuggling 
operations. At the top level there were three Ukrainian bosses investing 
equal capitals to purchase the ITP. Among them, one was in charge of 
logistics, one of transportation, and one of finding couriers for further 
distribution throughout the national territory. Individuals of the same 
629 Trentino Corriere Alpi, Traffico illecito di sigarette lungo il Brennero, maxi sequestro della Finanza [Illicit 
Cigarettes Trade Through the Brennero Route, Huge Seizure of Guardia di Finanza], January 2015.
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nationality were also recruited in Italy in order to identify warehouses, 
recover vehicles for transportation and contact possible clients” (IT-E3).
High/middle and low segments are active within the national illicit 
tobacco market which are characterised by different scale of tobacco 
smuggling operations, nationalities of smugglers, countries of origin of 
ITP and modus operandi. In particular, high/middle segments include both 
native and foreign OCGs that organise large scale smuggling operations, 
manage production and/or importation of huge quantities of tobacco 
products and their further distribution throughout the national territory 
and to other EU countries. Low segments, involve small groups (more 
or less organised) or solo criminal entrepreneurs mainly of foreign origin, 
that arrange small importations of ITP to be further sold especially to 
compatriots.
Importation and wholesale levels
High/middle segment – large scale smuggling operations
At this level, both native and foreign OCGs are active within the national 
illicit tobacco market exercising different roles. As pointed out by the 
majority of experts (IT-E15, IT-E17, IT-E18), Camorra clans located in Naples 
are nowadays the criminal entrepreneurs that import huge quantities of 
ITP, while at the same time controlling strategic areas of arrival and 
transit, and the further distribution within the national territory. “34.3% 
(more than 115 tonnes) out of the total illicit tobacco seizures occurred 
in Italy in 2013 was registered in the region of Campania” (IT-E15). In 
particular, the Camorra imports illicit tobacco products collaborating with 
the Sacra Corona Unita and the ‘Ndrangheta (to a lesser extent), and 
with other groups of smugglers from China, the former Soviet Union 
(Russia, Georgia, Belarus), Eastern Europe and Greece. Collaborations 
with Maltese and Turkish criminal entrepreneurs, although in minor 
cases, are also present (IT-E7, IT-E8, IT-E1).
Support from Italian OCGs is obtained having at disposal strategic 
ports (such as Bari and Brindisi on the Adriatic coast and Gioia Tauro 
on the Tyrrhenian coast) where tobacco products arrive from Eastern 
European countries, China and Russia. The Sacra Corona Unita especially, 
controls the arrival of container shipments and cooperates with Camorra 
transporting the merchandise by land (e.g. vehicles, lorries) to warehouses 
located in the region of Campania (especially in the city of Naples); 
while at the same time being involved in national distribution as well 
(IT-E17, IT-E2).
Camorra clans are also in contact with groups of Neapolitan smugglers 
(made of 5 up to 15 members), named “paranze”, active in the areas 
of Naples and in the nearby provinces as well as in the region of 
Apulia (IT-E16, IT-E15). The latter manage tobacco smuggling operations 
independently, importing ITP from Eastern European countries, although 
submitted to the permission of Camorra clans for both operating and 
selling. While, on the one hand, Camorra families may also finance these 
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tobacco smuggling operations, on the other (and in more recent times), 
they have started to charge smugglers with payments per each master 
case entering these local illicit markets (IT-E15, IT-E2).630
Similarly, collaborations between the Camorra and foreign criminal 
entrepreneurs such as Chinese, Russian, and Eastern European (Romanian, 
Ukrainian, Moldavian, Polish, Bulgarian, Hungarian, Slovak), are 
fundamental in order to purchase and import ITP. Indeed, as underlined 
by some experts (IT-E1, IT-E7, IT-E10, IT-E14), in most cases the latter 
manage production, importation, storage and final delivery of contraband 
cigarettes to the former. For example, joint ventures with Chinese OCGs 
exist as to import to Italy huge quantities of counterfeit cigarettes. Indeed, 
these groups own and manage illegal factories (almost 80% located in 
the provinces of Guangdong and Fujian) producing counterfeit tobacco 
products directed to Italy via container shipments and further introduced 
into the illegal national market in virtue of the cooperation with Camorra 
clans (IT-E14, IT-E4, IT-E1, IT-E15). Nevertheless, counterfeit cigarettes are 
not intended for the Neapolitan illicit market, being instead subsequently 
diverted to the cities located in the Northern regions (e.g. Lombardy, 
city of Milan). As suggested by one expert (IT-E15), “Neapolitans smoke 
good quality cigarettes being able to discern among products. They do 
not smoke Chinese brands, which indeed are not present in their illegal 
local markets”.
Eastern European criminal organisations either collaborate with Camorra 
clans or act as autonomous groups of smugglers cooperating with each 
other. In particular, these groups produce illicit whites and, in many cases, 
import them to Italy together with contraband cigarettes. While in their 
countries are also in charge of storing ITP coming from Russia and China, 
in Italy they mainly supply Camorra families and other groups of similar 
origin. Furthermore, these groups act as importers, brokers (mediating 
between Italian buyers and Eastern Europe suppliers), warehouse keepers 
and transporters for the former. 
“We have detected a group of Moldavians active in the area of the city 
of Pesaro [central Italy] with intermediaries settled in Greece. Tobacco 
products were transported by ships to the port of Ancona and from 
there by lorries to the city of Pesaro to be stored. The loads were 
intended for a Camorra clan, revealing strong links among these groups. 
The latter are always present, together with the Sacra Corona Unita. 
Furthermore, Camorra clans have also contacts with Ukrainian and Polish 
criminal groups that import ITP from Romania and Hungary” (IT-E7).
With regards to the role of Eastern Europe criminal entrepreneurs within 
the illicit tobacco national market, experts (IT-E1, IT-E2, IT-E7, IT-E17, 
IT-E18) agree that these entrepreneurs need, in the initial phase of 
smuggling (dated back to the beginning of 2000s), to establish alliances 
with Italian OCGs and in particular the Camorra as to operate within the 
630 As suggested by one expert (IT-E15), this practice has a long history, being in use since the 
beginning of this type of illicit activity. Indeed, Raffaele Cutolo, one of the main bosses of the 
Nuova Camorra Organizzata involved in tobacco smuggling used to charge €2.50 per each 
master case.
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national territory. Nevertheless, at present, it seems that these organisations 
have been able to open independent channels of importation and further 
distribution. For example, Ukrainian, Polish, Moldavian, Hungarian and 
Slovakian, that have been settled in Italy for a long time, have gradually 
acquired prominence, visibility and credibility as to establish themselves 
at the top levels of the smuggling chain. “Criminal groups from the 
Eastern Europe (Ukrainian, Polish, Moldavian) started to appear in the 
national illicit tobacco market around 2005/2006. From that time, they 
have developed and rooted rapidly” (IT-E1). Indeed, in the hinterlands 
of different Italian metropolitan cities, the ITT is now managed by the 
same ethnicities assisted by Arabs recruited for minor tasks (e.g. retail 
selling), (IT-E2). 
In general, as explained by one expert (IT-E2), OCGs and more organised 
crime groups adopt a common step by step modus operandi in order to 
organise and carry out tobacco smuggling operations: 1. Arranging initial 
contacts with foreign suppliers to verify availability of the merchandise, 
quantity, quality and price; 2. Starting negotiations through coded 
messages or cryptic languages. “We have intercepted a Greek smuggler 
owning 50 mobiles and phone cards using them randomly, and another 
Italian smuggler from Apulia that used to discard his mobiles after 
every 7 calls. He would then  communicate from a public telephone 
box changing alphanumeric codes to transmit his new numbers” (IT-E1); 
3. Organising procedures for the illicit transportation; 4. Recovery and 
storing in temporary warehouses; 5. Distribution through retail markets.
Importation of ITP to Italy occurs through container shipments or lorries 
depending on whether suppliers are respectively Chinese, Russian or 
Eastern European used to deliver huge quantities of tobacco products. 
In both cases, the latter may be transported together with other 
commercial goods (e.g. pieces of furniture, animal food cans, engine 
tanks, vegetables) or counterfeit products (e.g. clothes, shoes, gabs, 
accessories) especially when Chinese groups are involved, or hidden in 
the interspaces of transports (IT-E2, IT-E7, IT-15, IT-E5). “I suppose that 
the use of vegetables, for example, reside in the similarity of weight 
compared to ITP, alternatively the use of cold storages depend on the 
impossibility for customs to control without products getting altered” 
(IT-E14). 
“At some point of our investigation we detected a supplier working with 
criminal entrepreneurs in Naples. He was a Kazakh with a Greek passport 
supplying huge quantities of illicit tobacco to Italy recovered from Southern 
East Asia and Bulgaria. He used to take care of the consignment of the 
merchandise: illicit cigarettes were unloaded in the port of Brindisi, Bari, 
Ancona accompanied by fake dispatch notes declaring as final destination 
the North of Europe. In practice, once cigarettes were unloaded, dispatch 
notes were replaced by the intermediary of the Kazakh-Greek smuggler 
reporting the city of Naples as final destination.
The Kazakh-Greek smuggler has delivered many loads this way, organising 
the transportation of illicit cigarettes that were hidden in container 
shipments together with several and different commercial products. His 
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criminal organisation in Greece is rooted and wide, and linked to 
numerous compliant transportation companies” (IT-E1).
Thus, in order to transit through customs, dispatch notes are falsified 
in terms of products, quantity and destination. At the same time, 
container shipments for example, are more likely to cross several 
different transhipment spots (among countries and in a same country) 
as to hide the origin of the merchandise (IT-E7, IT-E1, IT-E8). In other 
cases, smuggling is facilitated by the direct control of OCGs of strategic 
delivery spots, as it is for Chinese groups in the port of Taranto (region 
of Apulia), and Camorra clans in the ports of Naples and Salerno (region 
of Campania), (IT-E1).
Companies that provide commercial products to hide ITP, as well as 
transportation services are owned by smugglers (usually registered to 
straw men), or compliant individuals. “We have discovered cigarette 
packs hidden in the structure of wooden doors, made for sure by a 
colluding factory since introduced during the production cycle” (IT-
E1). In other cases, transportation can be managed either by unaware 
companies exploited by traffickers, or holdings acting as filters to hide 
the identity of criminal entrepreneurs which are the effective owners and 
organisers of the smuggling operations (IT-E14). As for transporters (e.g. 
truck drivers), some experts agree that unaware individuals are not the 
rule (IT-E2, IT-E1, IT-E14).
Eastern European criminal organisations (e.g. Ukrainians) also import 
ITP employing cars (with double-bottoms) and vans, transporting larger 
numbers but separate loads (around 40 kilos up to 5,000 kilos in total), 
decreasing this way the likelihood of interception of all the merchandise. 
“This Ukrainian group was used to import huge quantities of contraband 
tobacco through high-powered cars (Mercedes, BMW). Loads left from 
the city of Chernivtsi in Ukraine, crossing the Romanian customs thanks 
to complicit officers. Using outriders (in some cases couches transporting 
unsuspected Ukrainian citizens coming back to Italy for work), the loads 
of tobacco reached the hinterland of the city of Milan to be further 
stored in rented garages run by affiliates” (IT-E3).
Corruption of customs officials is considered by some experts (IT-E1, 
IT-E15, IT-E7) to represent a means used by smugglers to run tobacco 
smuggling operations smoothly. Cases of corruption have been identified 
pertaining both to Eastern European and Italian officials. The latter, 
indeed, may facilitate importation of contraband tobacco products either 
by avoiding controlling suspected loads, or approving irregular dispatch 
notes.
Once ITP reach the Italian territory, loads are then divided into smaller 
ones and transported by cars, vans, campers, lorries (carrying from 100 
kilos [100 master cases] to 9,000 kilos [900 master cases]) by recruited 
couriers or lorries to be stored in huge quantities in warehouses located 
in the Northern and Central regions as to avoid the risks of police 
seizures. From these locations, the smuggled tobacco is subsequently 
delivered to the main distribution areas for retail selling (IT-E15).
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Low segment – small scale smuggling operations
At this level of operation, the illicit tobacco trade appears more 
fragmented involving different smugglers either linked to small criminal 
groups or acting as solo criminal entrepreneurs. Again, a prominent role 
is exercised by Eastern European (Belarusians, Ukrainians) but also North 
Africans (Egyptians, Senegalese)631 transporting ITP in lesser quantities 
(i.e. bootlegging), and selling them mainly to circumscribed circles of 
customers, that are usually compatriots, family members or friends.
“In the city of Bologna we detected an inside man working for an 
Ukrainian and Moldavian group. His clients were 99% Ukrainians living 
in the area. Cigarettes were sold to acquaintances, friends and relatives 
that were used to make orders. In some cases he would deliver the 
cigarettes, in other clients would come to pick them up” (IT-E1).
More generally, these actors purchase small quantities of tobacco products 
(exceeding the legal limits) in other countries exploiting differences in 
prices among countries. The merchandise can be transported by land, 
air or sea, hidden in travelling bags or suitcases. The following examples 
have been reported:
• East European (e.g. Ukrainian, Romanian) exploiting legitimate travels 
and means of transport (e.g. coaches and minibuses) to import ITP 
(hidden in bags) together with passengers, luggage containing personal 
belongings and other goods. An example is the importation by 
Ukrainians of contraband cigarettes/illicit whites through trips made 
by caregivers from their home country to Italy (IT-E4).
• Egyptian individuals travelling with many bags from Egypt to Italian 
airports importing cigarettes of foreign (produced in their country) 
and EU brands acquired at a very low price compared to Italy. The 
products are sold to country-fellow men. The same method is used 
by Eastern European importing cigarettes with EU brands (IT-E6).
Retail level
At the retail level, the illicit tobacco trade in Italy is characterised by the 
coexistence of different markets related to the type of actors involved 
(i.e. OCGs/criminal groups, solo entrepreneurs) and areas within the 
country (North, Centre and South). “Retail selling could be defined as 
South and North models, with a prominent role of Camorra in sorting 
loads and directing them to Southern and Northern markets on the basis 
of the quality of ITP” (IT-E1).
In the regions of Campania and Apulia, the presence of Italian OCGs 
(Camorra and Sacra Corona Unita) has brought to the creation of open 
631 It has been pointed out by one expert (IT-E10) that the modus operandi of North Africans 
(i.e. Senegalese) may also include the use of container shipments. Indeed, they import small 
quantities of cigarettes using luggage of couriers travelling by plane, or they introduce illicit 
tobacco in Italy through shipping the products via ship cargos. The latter may also transport 
other counterfeit products, foodstuffs, medicines, commercial goods and typical African 
products in the same loads.
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markets where illicit tobacco products are sold in the streets. The city of 
Naples is an example of stalls selling contraband cigarettes and located 
in different neighbours where individuals are recruited for this purpose, 
performing work shifts. This illicit widespread market has become almost 
a “normal” commercial activity especially for inhabitants (IT-E15).
“Once the groups of Neapolitan smugglers (paranze) have introduced the 
illicit tobacco in the national territory, they get in contact with wholesalers 
(named ‘bozzatori’) that in turn supply stalls where the retail distribution 
occurs. In some cases, it is wholesalers (bozzatori) that manage stall 
networks. Clients are mainly Neapolitan aware and used to this market 
and able to recognise quality illicit tobacco products” (IT-E15).
At the same time, contraband cigarettes are sold in private apartments 
known by customers. A similar method of selling is carried out by Eastern 
European individuals (e.g. Ukrainian, Moldavian, Romanian, Polish) in the 
Northern parts of the country, although illicit cigarettes can be found 
hidden in cars/vans in daily/weekly ethnic markets where they sell 
other commercial products as well. Clients are either family members, 
friends, acquaintances, residing in the same areas, or North Africans (e.g. 
Egyptians). These covert markets are present mainly in the North of Italy, 
that is areas not controlled by Italian OCGs and corresponding to the 
ones where higher presence of Eastern European citizens is registered, 
functioning as networks of retail distribution. Examples are the markets 
of Cascina Gobba and Molino Dorino in the city of Milan or Porta 
Palazzo in the city of Turin (IT-E4, IT-E5).
Financing and financial management depend on the criminal entrepreneurs 
involved in tobacco smuggling and the scale of operations. Due to the 
interplay of very different actors within this market, start-up capital to 
initiate and sustain the trafficking may come from illegal and legal sources 
and from personal savings as well. At the same time, besides OCGs 
(as for example the Camorra), a common characteristic of smugglers 
structured in smaller and less organised crime groups is the involvement 
only in this type of illegal activity where they are able to consolidate 
their criminal career, while guaranteeing this way not only huge profits 
but also constant financing of smuggling operations.
Sources of capital for tobacco trafficking and profiles 
of financiers
Illegal sources of financing and criminal careers
Italian OCGs organising tobacco smuggling operations (the Camorra and 
the Sacra Corona Unita) are, due to their criminal background and 
profile, involved in other criminal activities. In the case of the Camorra 
some experts (IT-E1, IT-E15) have underlined the coexistence of different 
organised crimes being perpetrated that range from drug trafficking, 
extortions, loansharking, counterfeiting. All of them represent sources of 
financing of the illicit tobacco trade, which in turn provides capital to 
Financing 
and financial 
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be further reinvested. “It is more likely that the Greek smuggler would 
have €300,000 in cash to be reinvested in other tobacco smuggling 
operations” (IT-E1). Similarly, Chinese crime groups finance tobacco 
smuggling operations with profits gained from counterfeiting (IT-E15, IT-E2, 
IT-E3, IT-E1).
In general, these OCGs are able to finance and sustain the trafficking 
without turning to external financiers. Furthermore, capital acquired may 
also constitute a source of investment into other criminal activities. For 
example, Camorra clans lend money to persons or families in need 
through what is called ‘neighbourhood loansharking’: “This system exists 
only in the city of Naples where smugglers with availability of money 
lend small sums of money to individuals for their ordinary expenses 
(e.g. €500 to the lady that has to pay gas or phone bills). They are 
mainly acquaintances, paying back at high interest rates to affiliates in 
charge of collecting the loaned sums of money” (IT-E1).
Nevertheless, in most cases criminal entrepreneurs involved in the illicit 
tobacco market, whether more or less organised, invest capital exclusively 
in tobacco smuggling operations. As pointed out by one expert (IT-E1), 
only in very few cases smugglers may decide to join drug trafficking. 
The majority starts with tobacco and remains in this market where they 
develop their criminal careers. At the basis of this choice, there are 
both practical reasons as well as ethical and moral motivations. On 
one side, the nature and the dynamics of the two markets are different 
(e.g. origin and prices of the product, routes of smuggling, type of 
customers), (IT-E3). On the other, smugglers perceive drug trafficking as a 
real criminal activity, more risky and with a higher social impact. In their 
opinion, tobacco smuggling regards legal products sold by the State, thus 
consisting in committing a minor crime, tax evasion mainly. The “not to 
blame” perception of their role within this market is well explained by 
an Italian high profile ex smuggler as follows:
“I am a much respected person. Everyone loves me and is respectful 
since I am a brave man. Gifted with uncommon courtesy and elegance. 
I cannot say to be a saint, but in my feelings, I could say to be a saint 
criminal. Circumstances made me lead my life according to society rules, 
for which I am a criminal, but my spirit is more similar to the one of 
a benefactor”.632
Thus, when smugglers are at the beginning and in need of initial capital 
turn to external financiers either belonging to the criminal milieu or legal 
entrepreneurs.
“In different cases, we have detected the participation of external 
financiers, facilitated by acquaintances in contact with the criminal 
organisations or thanks to the action of intermediaries. These individuals 
are not involved in tobacco smuggling operations, although investing 
capital coming from other illegal activities (e.g. drug trafficking, frauds, 
632 F. Capecelatro, Lo spallone. Io, Ciro Mazzarella, re del contrabbando [The Smuggler. Me, Ciro 
Mazzarella, King of Contraband], (Milan: Mursia, 2013), p. 51.
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gambling, counterfeiting) and receiving the invested money back plus 
lump sums or alternatively agreed cents per each carton or pack sold” 
(IT-E15).
Italian OGCs, both the Camorra and the Sacra Corona Unita, employ 
a system called “puntate”, dated back to the 1980s and 1990s, to 
gather the amount of money required among different external financiers 
(IT-E1, IT-E7, IT-E17, IT-E15). Indeed, during these years in the region 
of Campania and in particular in the city of Naples, before the arrival 
of the load from Montenegro, smugglers were used to visit different 
important and wealthy families and to collect the money on the basis of 
the quantity ordered to be further carried to Switzerland. Once cigarettes 
were recovered, they were distributed among families on the basis of the 
initial investment. The families would have then sold the products and 
kept the profits (IT-E7). Similarly, in the city of Brindisi (region of Apulia) 
a virtual bank was created by smugglers where different individuals 
external to the operations invested money that was subsequently used to 
buy contraband cigarettes. The invested capital was periodically returned 
with accrued interest (IT-E1). Nowadays, as explained by one expert 
(IT-E1) a similar method exists, since regarding customers anticipating the 
sums of money needed to purchase the loads of tobacco:
“At present in the city of Naples, there is a form of ‘call-up’ financing, 
consisting in previous agreements between wholesalers and customers on 
the quantity of master cases to be ordered. The latter would proceed 
with anticipated payments, while the former would contact suppliers. It 
is a sort of capital collecting” (IT-E1).
A similar specialisation has been pointed out by experts for Eastern 
European smugglers as well (IT-E9, IT-E1, IT-E3, IT-E6), that at present 
sustain tobacco smuggling operations mainly investing profits gained. 
Indeed, financiers are members of the criminal organisation, usually at 
the top levels, that in most cases are not involved in the operations, and 
may reside abroad in the countries of origin. Nevertheless, at the initial 
stage, source of financing may be acquired committing minor crimes 
such as thefts of vehicles, commercial products, thefts in apartments, 
robberies, credit card frauds. For example, Polish, Ukrainian, and 
Moldavian criminal entrepreneurs were used to perpetrate cars thefts 
to gather start-up capital, since implying low initial costs (e.g. number 
plates and documents) and allowing consistent earnings: “A stolen car in 
Ukraine can be sold at €20,000” (IT-E1). Once the business is thriving, 
sources of financing come exclusively from illicit tobacco trade. At the 
same time, some groups start with small tobacco smuggling operations, 
being able in short time to expand their illicit activity as to have no need 
of other sources of capitals besides the profits acquired.
“During our investigations we detected a group of Moldavians composed 
of seven members that have started to smuggle tobacco carried in 
bags and suitcases during coach trips on the route Romania-Italy. After 
a period of time, we intercepted the same group smuggling 1 tonne 
and 800 kilos of contraband cigarettes hidden in marble slabs and 
transported by lorry” (IT-E1).
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Legal sources of financing
While during the first period of the tobacco illicit trade in Italy 
(1990s – 2000s) criminal entrepreneurs used to be involved solely in this 
market, at present the engagement in both legal and illegal activities 
characterises the modus operandi of smugglers, in particular belonging to 
high-middle segments. The latter are active mainly in running trading 
businesses (pubs, import-export/construction/food companies), that may 
either represent start-up capital to enter the illicit tobacco market or a 
continuous source of financing (IT-E1, IT-E3, IT-E7). Indeed, in the first 
case, one expert (IT-E3) described an Ukrainian criminal group financing 
tobacco smuggling operations in the initial phase with proceeds gained 
in running a construction company, dismissed once the trafficking have 
started to grow allowing for illegal capitals to be invested. In the second 
case, the strict co-existence of legal and illegal activities was mentioned 
(IT-E3) in regard to an Egyptian group, owning and managing a café 
in the city of Milan, where clients could smoke the smuggled tobacco 
using narghile.633 At the same time, if on one side legal activities are 
functional to hide tobacco smuggling operations and laundering profits, 
on the other they allow entrepreneurs to benefit from EU funds for the 
sustainment and implementation of the businesses, that in turn may be 
employed into the tobacco trade: “In one investigation we have detected 
a lorry truck coming from Ukraine transporting loads of illicit tobacco 
intended for an Italian company. It then resulted that, to acquire the 
illicit tobacco products, the owner had used funds received from the 
European Commission” (IT-E2).
Financial joint ventures
Besides the cooperation among groups of smugglers (Italian and foreign 
OCGs, more or less organised criminal organisations) in relation to 
each phase of the tobacco smuggling operations, joint ventures can be 
formed aimed at gathering capital to purchase products, sustains costs 
and increase profits. These alliances regard both high and low segments 
and are functional to enter the market at first as well as to sustain 
the illicit activity over time. Furthermore, they can be formed in virtue 
of previous and well-tested business relations, temporary agreements 
concerning single tobacco smuggling operations, or contacts provided by 
intermediaries (IT-E15).
Depending on cases financial partnerships can involve Italian OCGs, 
foreign criminal entrepreneurs of East European origin (e.g. Ukrainians, 
Polish and Moldavian), or Italians and Eastern Europeans (e.g. the 
Camorra and Ukrainians or Russians). For example, in the region of 
Campania, small groups of smugglers operate together with Camorra 
clans providing financial resources to acquire the tobacco products. 
The latter, although remaining external to the different phases of the 
smuggling operations, only purchase the merchandise that is indeed 
distributed by smugglers both at the wholesale and retail level. In the 
633 Water-pipe.
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end, Italian OCGs receive the revenues and smugglers are paid for 
the service provided with profit margins. Capital acquired, in line with 
this well-tested collaboration, is then invested for subsequent tobacco 
smuggling operations (IT-E2).
These financial joint ventures among criminal entrepreneurs based, in 
most cases, on reciprocal trust and knowledge, are not only functional 
to finance tobacco smuggling operations, but also to preserve smugglers 
from situations where capitals are lacking or from different unexpected 
episodes (see next section). Indeed, although the use of violence among 
partners does not emerge as a typical trait of this illicit market, retaliations 
can occur when agreements are not respected or trust is betrayed as to 
re-establish own control and reputation: “In 2000, we have assisted to 
a dispute settlement among smugglers in the city of Brindisi resulting in 
three homicides due to a failed tobacco smuggling operation involving 
all of them” (IT-E17). At the same time, since criminal organisations may, 
in some cases, operate in other criminal markets, financial joint ventures 
allow for capital compensation, that is the possibility to partly repay 
back financiers through other valuable illegal goods (e.g. counterfeit 
products, drug, arms) when, for example, occurs a delay in the selling 
of tobacco products.
Settlement of payments
Compared to other criminal markets (e.g. cocaine), the illicit tobacco 
trade is usually managed by smugglers active at all the levels of the 
operation (high/medium and low) through a common scheme of payment 
which is cash-up front (IT-E2, IT-E1, IT-E5, IT-E3, IT-E6, IT-E7, IT-E16, 
IT-E15, IT-E13). In this regard, some experts (IT-E1, IT-E3) have underlined 
two main reasons: a general lack of trust among smugglers characterising 
this illicit market and the necessity for suppliers to avoid the risk of 
remaining unpaid (i.e. critical moments, or the impossibility to sell all 
the merchandise).
In one case, for example, although cash up-front payment was agreed 
between two groups of smugglers (Italians from the Centre of Italy 
and Polish) operating through the intermediation of Neapolitan criminal 
entrepreneurs (residing in the region of Campania), a particular form 
of guarantee was requested by the Polish suppliers. Since tobacco 
products were imported through fictitious transactions of glasses, an 
export international credit was opened via bank services, thus assuring 
the payment of the products (i.e. tobacco) via legal bank transfer in case 
of problems. “Neapolitans were in charge of recovering the loads at 
customs, probably corrupting some officials, and of the consignment in 
a nearby area. Actually, at delivery tobacco was paid cash up-front with 
the guarantee remaining unused, but if, for example, Neapolitans were 
not able to recover the load, suppliers would have still been paid. The 
loss was Neapolitans’ responsibility, not of Polish suppliers” (IT-E1).
Exceptions exist to this general scheme, which are revolving credit and 
part payment arrangements (IT-E7, IT-E15, IT-E1). Nevertheless, when 
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the tobacco is not paid cash up-front, smugglers may in some cases 
ask for the anticipated payment of the entire loads, especially at the 
initial phase of the business relationship where trust and credibility 
are yet to be built, thus functioning as a form of guarantee of the 
smuggling operations (IT-E2, IT-E19). Consistently, one expert (IT-E2) has 
underlined how this type of arrangement has appeared in more recent 
times due to the economic crisis, which in turn can impact on the 
possibility to sell all the tobacco products acquired, or to repay back 
suppliers rapidly.
Revolving credit and part payment arrangements
Revolving credit and part payment schemes are agreed among buyers 
and suppliers during the negotiation phase (definition of quantity, price, 
time and place of delivery) that precede tobacco smuggling operations. 
At this point, responsibilities in regard to the loads smuggled are also 
decided as to prevent retaliation in case of unexpected circumstances 
(IT-E15).
In particular, the first type of agreement consists in the possibility to 
receive the tobacco products and to pay suppliers after selling, while the 
second is based on multi-step payments usually carried out as follows: 
part during the negotiation phase to demonstrate the commitment and 
reliability of buyers, another part before sending tobacco products as to 
cover logistic expenses, and a final part when loads are delivered (IT-19, 
IT-17, IT-E5, IT-E6).
As underlined by some experts (IT-E1, IT-E15, IT-E7), these settlement of 
payments are used only when trust characterises the business relationships 
among criminal entrepreneurs or when groups detain solid credibility 
within the illicit tobacco market, as this is the case for example of 
Camorra clans (IT-E1, IT-E15).
“A Greek smuggler was used to come to Italy together with the loads 
of cigarettes. He then stayed in Naples two or three days waiting 
to collect the money after the selling by Neapolitan buyers. In other 
cases he would employ couriers for this purpose, while if difficulties 
occurred, the Greek would allow the purchase on credit also of huge 
quantities of cigarettes since these smugglers have being knowning each 
other for a long time. In two occasions Neapolitans faced problems in 
selling the merchandise quickly (2 or 3 days) to wholesalers and the 
Greek went back to Greece waiting for the payment to arrive later” 
(IT-E1).
Furthermore, revolving credit or part payment arrangements are also 
facilitated by the difference in prices of illicit tobacco products between 
countries of suppliers and buyers. Indeed the former can purchase the 
merchandise at a very low cost, without the need to make considerable 
investments (IT-E15).
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Methods of payment
Illicit tobacco products are paid mainly in cash, and in few instances 
using other legal methods (when tobacco is transported with other 
commercial products in container shipment) or exchanging valuable goods 
(form of compensation between groups as for example the payment of 
a consignment of drugs in a subsequent moment with quantities of 
tobacco of equal value), (IT-E1). In both high and low segments, specific 
actors are in charge of facilitating the payment process.
Cash settlements of payments
The most used means of payments is cash, either at delivery or after having 
sold the tobacco products on an agreed time scale among smugglers. 
Cash is less detectable, transfers are harder to be reconstructed by law 
enforcement and in case of apprehension couriers do not encounter 
heavy consequences. Consistently, as it occurs within cocaine trafficking, 
one expert (IT-E14) has in particular underlined the facilitating role of large 
denomination notes (e.g. €500 banknote) allowing criminals to carry huge 
amounts of money through small means of transport (bags, suitcases).
Individuals (i.e. money couriers) in charge of consigning cash to 
suppliers are present both in OCGs and more or less organised criminal 
organisations, and can be either internal members or persons recruited 
for this purpose (IT-E7, IT-E5, IT-E3, IT-E17, IT-E19). In particular, in 
case of OCGs, bosses or trusted affiliates are in charge of delivering 
further payments to suppliers, after other individuals have collected 
the money derived from selling (i.e. money collectors), (IT-E14, IT-E1). 
“They use facilitators and transporters that are part of the organisation 
since employed every fifteen days” (IT-E5). In case of minor groups 
(e.g. foreign criminal entrepreneurs from Eastern Europe), payments 
can be also managed by tobacco transporters or couriers, especially 
when they occur at the same time of delivery or when groups have at 
their disposal means of transport that allow to hide cash (i.e. double-
bottomed vehicles), (IT-E1, IT-E15, IT-E7).
“There have been cases in which specific individuals were in charge of 
collecting the money and transferring it to the suppliers. It depends on 
the type of organisation involved and quantities of tobacco smuggled. 
For example, we have detected a group of Ukrainians using a variety of 
means of transport from cars, vans, and in one occasion even an unused 
German ambulance. In some cases, cash is collected and transported 
by dispatch riders that accompany the vehicles transporting the loads of 
tobacco. The boss of the foreign organisation that recovers the money 
often travels in the cars of dispatch riders” (IT-E1).
On the contrary, solo entrepreneurs that contraband cigarettes travelling, 
for example, by plane exercise both roles; indeed they import the illicit 
tobacco products, transporting at the same time the money back as 
to purchase other quantities: “when smuggling is by air, actually no 
facilitators are needed. The quantity of tobacco is small and travelling 
with €1,000 cash is not liable to suspicion” (IT-E6).
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Non-cash settlement of payments
Legitimate transactions are employed by criminal entrepreneurs, especially 
when dealing with large scale tobacco smuggling operations (IT-E14, IT-E15, 
IT-E8). In these cases, tobacco products are more often concealed in 
containers transporting other commercial products, thus the merchandise 
can be paid through the issue of regular invoices between import-export 
companies. The latter may be either compliant or owned by OCGs and 
registered to other family members.
Besides regular shipping or land transportation of commercial products, 
the use of bank accounts and shell companies has been reported, again 
registered to the same individuals, and located especially in off-shore 
jurisdictions. “The worrying aspect is the use of a legal supply chain 
which, in the context of marketing of legal goods, distributes or pays 
for contraband products. In other words, the buyer simulates a legal 
transaction but he is actually purchasing loads of illicit tobacco products” 
(IT-E14).
Costs of tobacco smuggling operations are variable depending on 
different factors: 1) Type of tobacco products (e.g. counterfeit, branded, 
illicit whites) and quality; 2) Country of origin; 3) Scale of the operations 
(i.e. logistics and number of individuals involved).
When organising large scale tobacco smuggling operations, both OCGs 
and less or more organised criminal organisations need consistent start-
up capital (IT-E1). Nevertheless, the amount required depend at first on 
the type of tobacco products purchased. In the opinion of one expert 
(IT-E7) prices present in the illicit market for contraband cigarettes have 
in general increased, starting from the 1990s due to the appearance 
of new products (e.g. illicit whites). Indeed, if one master case of 
Marlboro cost around €300-€400 20 years ago, nowadays it costs around 
€700-€800, with illicit whites costing in comparison much less, around 
€200-€300 per master case, at the national level (Table 51). Consistently, 
it has been underlined an increase of 40% in the price of tobacco 
products between 2010 and 2012.634
“Small smuggling operations have limited costs, while larger ones from 
200 kilos to 5 tonnes of tobacco imported require more financial and 
material resources. Indeed, costs vary consistently. Furthermore, it also 
depends on the type of product acquired: it is different if smugglers buy 
counterfeit or branded Marlboro (the former cost 50% less), or if they 
buy Jin Ling coming mainly from Belarus” (IT-E1).
“The price per pack of contraband cigarettes may range from €1.30-
€1.50 to €2-€2.50. The latter price, which is higher, refer to cases 
in which branded and top quality cigarettes are smuggled (e.g. Red 
Marlboro, Marlboro Lights) or other brands produced by major tobacco 
companies such as Philip Morris, British American Tobacco” (IT-E3).
634 F. Calderoni, M. Angelini, S. Favarin, Italy: the Factbook on the Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products 2.
Costs of doing 
business
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The costs of purchasing the loads of illicit tobacco products also 
depend on the place of supply, that is directly from producing tobacco 
companies, or from warehouses located in both transit or destination 
countries. Furthermore, agreements between smugglers on which players 
is taking the risk of transportation and method of payment can impact 
on the final price of the merchandise, as well as the quantity bought 
and the type of relationship among buyers and suppliers (e.g. occasional 
versus well-tested), (IT-E1, IT-E3, IT-E7, IT-E6, IT-E5). For example, in 
countries of Eastern Europe a master case of illicit whites acquired 
by producers costs around €70-€100, while in warehouses located in 
Greece or Montenegro the cost goes up to €350-€500. If acquired in 
Italy delivered by suppliers taking the risk of transportation, the price 
is around €800-€900 (IT-E2). At the same time, when payments are 
made through revolving credit, in most cases, the price of cigarettes is 
overcharged compared to cash payments (IT-E6).
While, on one side, importation of small quantities of cigarettes to the 
Italian territory imply very low costs, as contended by one expert (IT-E6), 
especially when couriers travel by plane (e.g. €500 for transportation plus 
the cost for the tobacco products), on the other, groups of smugglers 
involved in large scale smuggling operations sustain higher costs related 
in particular to logistics (means of transport, renting of warehouses and 
employees). For example, if tobacco is delivered by land or sea, the 
price of one carton of cigarettes may vary up to €2. “Ukrainians sell to 
Neapolitans at €18 per carton since transported by cars or vans, while 
the Greeks at €20 since transported by container shipments. But then it 
depends also on the quantity acquired” (IT-E1).
Таble 51. exaMples oF costs For purchasing illicit tobacco products 
at the wholesale level in italy
      * Counterfeit product.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on collected data.
Region/country
of supply
type of illicit tobacco
product
Cost of purchase(€)
Master case
Eastern Europe Illicit whites 200-300
Bulgaria/Macedonia Illicit whites 350
Italy Illicit whites 700
Italy Counterfeit Marlboro 600
Italy Marlboro 1,200
Italy (Naples) Chesterfield Red and Blue 625
United Arab Emirates Richman 350
China Jin Ling* 400-500
Pack
North Africa Local brands 1.50-2
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The actors employed are either members/affiliates or external recruited 
individuals. In particular, the former are remunerated through profit 
sharing, while the latter with monthly, weekly, daily payments or lump 
sums (IT-E1, IT-E3, IT-E14, IT15, IT-E6, IT-E16). Compared to other illegal 
markets (e.g. cocaine trafficking), some experts (IT-E3, IT-E7) have pointed 
out how external employees are more frequently paid in cash than in 
part of the smuggled tobacco loads (e.g. in-kind payments). “There 
are individuals receiving €50-€100 a day to unload or transport the 
merchandise; others, such as warehouse keepers, are paid with monthly 
salaries varying from €1,000 to €2,000” (IT-E15). At the same time, in 
the case of OCGs, other actors that remain completely external to the 
tobacco smuggling operations are employed to perform specific tasks and 
paid lump sums as well. Examples refer to foreign individuals in charge 
of buying and registering telephone cards or storehouses, paid €500 for 
this service (IT-E1).
The existence of a price list has been underlined by some experts 
(IT-E1, IT-E14) in regard to high-middle segments operating within the 
illicit tobacco trade, with remunerations fixed on the basis either of the 
role and tasks accomplished, or the skills, importance and reliability of 
employees (Table 52). “Italian professional lorry drivers, for example, 
may take from €35,000 up to €50,000 per trip. Indeed, they organise 
not only the trip, recovering the merchandise and the goods to hide it, 
but also the transit in more safe routes together with dispatch riders” 
(IT-E1). Furthermore, the country of origin of the employees is another 
Таble 52. exaMples oF costs related to run tobacco sMuggling 
operations in italy
Source: Authors’ elaboration on collected data.
Role of individuals Remunerations
Intermediary €50-€250 per master case
East European car driver €200 per trip
East European lorry driver €600 per trip
Italian professional lorry driver €35,000-€50,000 per trip
Unloader (warehouses) €50.00-€100.00 per day
Unloader (transferring containers at ports) €50,000
Warehouse keeper €500 per service (storage)
Stable driver/warehouse keeper €1,000-€2,000 (monthly salary)
Air courier €200 per trip
Other individuals (registering phone cards, 
transferring money)
€500 per service
Official at Eastern EU customs €500 per service
Official at Italian customs €10,000
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discriminating variable for the amount of payments since compared to 
life standards of the different areas. Some experts (IT-E14, IT-E1, IT-E6) 
have indeed argued that North Africans and Eastern European are paid 
less than Italian counterparts.
“There are groups of smugglers preferring to use individuals that appear 
completely external to the organisation, such as more or less unaware 
transporters of vegetables to whom the illicit tobacco loads are consigned 
without revealing the content and paid €400 for 18 hours of work. On 
the contrary, larger loads are entrusted to members that are paid with 
higher remunerations since transporting an entire illegal load facing more 
risks” (IT-E14).
Major costs are then sustained for importation since at the retail level 
and in street markets they consist mainly in acquiring bags to transport 
cigarettes and in organising very basic stalls. Furthermore, smaller 
quantities of tobacco are kept in apartments or garages of retailers, 
friends or acquaintances (IT-E1).
Besides individuals employed, other expenses may be also faced by 
smugglers at all the levels of operation, i.e. costs related to unforeseen 
circumstances (e.g. arrestee of members, theft of loads by competitors, 
police seizures) and corruption. The former are usually charged in the 
total price of the tobacco loads, being this way difficult to identify 
precisely, while the latter were indicated to be lower in East European 
countries and non-EU countries compared to Italy (IT-E1). As for the 
costs related to promotion techniques, one expert (IT-E15) has contended 
that due to the economic crisis, the illicit tobacco market has flourished 
again, pushing consumer trends to levels similar to the phase previous to 
the operation “Primavera”. Thus, smugglers are not in need of promoting 
cigarettes.
At the same time, as underlined by one expert (IT-E14), it is possible 
for criminal entrepreneurs, especially OCGs, to cut costs mainly in 
two ways: 1. Owning import-export companies trading in licit goods, 
used also to carry out tobacco smuggling operations. Indeed, the latter 
are perpetrated through the solely payments of commercial products, 
and supported by logistics already available; 2. Acquiring, through 
loansharking, legal companies with a well-established reputation within 
the legal market but facing economic difficulties. Thus, in a first 
moment, the debts of the owners secure collaboration and allow them 
to exploit logistic services and warehouses; while in a second moment 
the impossibility to repay back lenders facilitates the acquisition of 
the companies, in some cases accomplished through the introduction 
of OCGs members into the advisory boards. In general, criminal 
entrepreneurs prefer this second option since decreasing the possibility 
to be intercepted (IT-EX1).
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According to experts (IT-E15, IT-E1, IT-E16, IT-E18) and in line with previous 
research635 proceeds from the illicit tobacco trade are consistent: “Profits 
gained through tobacco smuggling allow the sustenance of an entire 
family involved in retail selling as well as the accumulation of thousands 
of euros by high level criminal entrepreneurs” (IT-E15).
Nevertheless, the actual amount gained by criminal entrepreneurs 
operating in this illicit market depend on different factors: the level of the 
operation (high/medium and low segments), the type of tobacco products 
smuggled, the location of the illicit tobacco markets at the national level 
(i.e. Northern, Central, Southern areas of the country) and the number 
of groups/actors in the supply chain. Indeed, higher profits are gained 
when buyers and suppliers are able to arrange importation directly, using 
own already available resources (i.e. import-export companies, means of 
transportation, drivers, warehouses) and at least one intermediary (IT-E1). 
More generally, some experts (IT-E1, IT-E15, IT-E17, IT-E6) have pointed 
out that profit margins gained by smugglers are almost double the initial 
investment, while reporting the following examples:
• at the wholesale level a pack of cigarettes costs around €1.7-€2.5, 
while at the retail level around €3.5-€5, allowing to earn around €2 
per pack;
• a master case of contraband cigarettes is purchased at around €100 
in countries of suppliers, and introduced into the wholesale market at 
around €500-€1,000 depending on the type of products;
• a master case of good quality branded cigarettes (e.g. Marlboro, Philip 
Morris) is sold at €700 by suppliers and at €1,000 by wholesalers so 
that profits are around €200-€300 per master case;
• Ukrainians sell to wholesalers at €1.60 per pack, while retailers in 
markets/streets at €2.80-€3, with a profit of €1.50-€2;
• A pack of cigarettes from North Africa costs 0.70 cents-€1.00, which 
is sold at the retail level at €3.
Profit margins decrease during the tobacco smuggling chain with 
individuals at the higher levels receiving the larger amounts. Within 
OCGs and more or less organised criminal organisations (both Italian 
and foreign) financiers and organisers are the individuals receiving 
the larger amounts of profits, in accordance with the risk taken in 
the smuggling operations and the amount of the initial investments. 
Whereas employees and retailers mainly gain revenues from respectively 
fixed salaries and the selling of tobacco products. For these reasons, 
investment schemes are strictly related to the level of the operation 
within the illicit tobacco market (IT-E1, IT-E7, IT-E13, IT-14, IT-15).
Investment schemes
At lower levels (medium-low segments), the better part of the profits 
is used for personal expenses and to raise the life standards of 
635 See F. Calderoni, “A New Method for Estimating the Illicit Cigarettes Market at the Subnational 
Level and Its Application to Italy”; F. Calderoni, M. Angelini, S. Favarin, Italy: the Factbook on 
the Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products 2.
Profits and 
profits sharing
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criminal entrepreneurs. Especially in regard to foreign smugglers, some 
experts have underlined the acquisition of luxury items or goods (high-
powered cars, yachts, etc.), the latter registered more often to straw 
men, relatives or family members (IT-E15, IT-E7, IT-E17): “in the city 
of Naples, we intercepted elderly women to whom motorcycles were 
registered” (IT-E1).
Profits are also invested in continuing the illicit tobacco trade, both in 
high/medium and low segments. A characteristic of this illicit activity, 
as underlined previously, is its almost exclusive involvement of actors, 
thus money is mainly used to finance subsequent tobacco smuggling 
operations and to expand this illicit activity. Many groups of smugglers 
save part of the profits as “rainy day” funds, useful to sustain critical 
moments (i.e. payment of legal assistance to arrested members and 
support to their families, investing in subsequent operations after eventual 
seizures or stealing of loads by police or competitors), (IT-E7, IT-E18).
Foreign smugglers operating at medium-low levels, and especially from 
Eastern Europe, send back profits to the countries of origin, via money 
transfer services or through cash transportation, while maintaining a low 
profile in Italy (IT-E7, IT-E2, IT-E5). Criminal entrepreneurs active at the 
high level (Italian and foreign OCGs such as for example Chinese and 
Russian) invest into the legitimate economy, preferring the acquisition 
of business companies, real estates, restaurants, general stores, and 
tourist facilities, especially in the Northern part of Italy. Indeed, cash 
is laundered and further reinvested into the legal economy through 
complex money-laundering processes that may involve the use of banks 
(in some cases with the support of complicit officers) and bank accounts 
(especially in off-shore zones), business companies registered to family 
members or straw men, allowing criminal entrepreneurs to perform 
fictitious transactions of goods (IT-E1, IT-E14, IT-E). As stated by one 
expert (IT-E1), the deposit of revenues into accounts in Swiss banks by 
Camorra clans was widespread during the “golden times” of cigarettes 
contraband in Italy, and this method is still in use.
“There have been smugglers linked to Camorra clans offering their know-
how and bank accounts to families of Cosa Nostra for both running 
other criminal activities (e.g. cocaine trafficking) and favouring the flows 
and laundering of proceeds coming from tobacco smuggling (e.g. deposits 
in Camorra clans bank accounts)” (IT-E1).
At the same time, the economic crisis, in the opinion of some experts 
(IT-E1, IT-E14, IT-E17), is at present a facilitating factor for the laundering 
of profits, as well as the acquisition of legal companies, mainly through 
loansharking, to be further employed for this purpose and for arranging 
tobacco smuggling operations. “Huge amounts of illegal money previously 
deposited into bank accounts had indeed been introduced into the legal 
economy due to the financial crisis. Although criminal entrepreneurs may 
lose part of their capital in this process, the remaining part becomes a 
source for investments into different legal businesses. Many smugglers, 
indeed, interrupt their criminal career at some point in life: owning and 
managing trading companies (e.g. olive oil production) or restaurants, 
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hotels, represent assets also to recycle themselves as ‘unsuspected’ 
individuals, while securing own retirement” (IT-E14).
In general, all smugglers (OCGs, more or less organised criminal 
organisations, solo criminal entrepreneurs) active within the illicit tobacco 
market are able to continue operating although facing critical moments 
(e.g. arrestee of members, stealing of loads by competitors, police seizures). 
Sources of capitals to re-enter the business correspond to the finances 
used to initiate illicit tobacco smuggling operations, i.e. money coming 
from other type of criminal activities, legal businesses, external financiers, 
personal savings or small loans borrowed by friends or acquaintances. 
Nevertheless, the capacity to maintain the illicit tobacco activity varies 
in terms of profile and criminal career of smugglers.
In case of high/middle segments (native and foreign), the part of capital 
that have being saved and not intercepted by the authorities represents 
the main source for continuing the smuggling, also thanks to trusted 
individuals acting as reliable substitutes in cases of arrest of other 
members of the organisation. When capitals are not readily available, 
individuals at the top levels are able to re-establish contacts with both 
financiers and suppliers quickly due to maintained trust and reputation; 
while players at the lower levels are often assisted by the group and 
then reintegrated into the business once out of prison. Furthermore, the 
latter receive legal assistance together with other forms of aid for their 
family members (e.g. a monthly salary to arrestee families in the case of 
Camorra clans), (IT-E1, IT-E15, IT-E3, IT-E7, IT-E16).
“More often they go back to the tobacco business. Although vehicles 
used for smuggling are detected and couriers arrested, after a period of 
detention it happened to find the same individuals, using different and 
bigger means of transport” (IT-E1).
“There is real specialisation. Once out of prison, members re-enter 
the illicit tobacco trade. Usually, financiers do not experience judicial 
problems so they can continue lending capital. Indeed, in most cases 
individuals arrested belong to the lower levels (couriers, lorry drivers, 
wholesalers, unloaders)” (IT-E15).
“Smugglers remain smugglers for their entire lives. In some cases we 
recognise the same voices during interceptions. They are specialised and 
exploit channels and contacts previously detained” (IT-E7).
Mutual assistance exists among members which favours the reintegration 
into the tobacco business (IT-E1). At the same time, some experts have 
pointed out other ways allowing to continue to operate (IT-E1, IT-E7, 
IT-E15, IT-E16). First, the practice of preserving rainy day funds: “A real 
fund is present within groups, and usually foreseen, as to sustain critical 
moments. It is used to compensate losses of loads, seizures, but also 
to assist arrestees and their families, to rent means of transport, assure 
the silence of individuals or to corrupt officials when needed” (IT-E1). 
Second, the possibility to receive tobacco on credit as to restart and 
Access to capital 
in critical moments
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acquire capitals as well as repay back eventual previous debts, in virtue 
of trusted and well-tested relations with suppliers or intermediaries.
On the contrary, there are cases in which criminal entrepreneurs are not 
capable to re-enter the illicit tobacco business, especially small groups 
of smugglers that have not at their disposal saved capitals or trusted 
contacts with suppliers. As a result, responses may range from dismissal 
of the illicit tobacco trade to the involvement in other illegal activities 
(e.g. counterfeiting, organised VAT frauds).
“In some instances they are not able to restart once apprehended 
and their capital and material resources seized. This can happen with 
small groups lacking financial support. Nevertheless, some members may 
‘recycle’ themselves in other illicit activities, for example the alternative 
energy sector. We have detected ex-smugglers being managing directors 
of companies dealing with wind turbines or solar panels, maintaining a 
criminal profile since perpetrating frauds” (IT-E1).
This section contains the results of four country studies of VAT fraud as an 
organised crime activity. Large-scale, organised VAT fraud has a number 
of commonalities and differences with illicit cigarettes and drugs: unlike 
the latter, VAT fraud does not deal in a particular substance and is thus 
not a market in the same sense; like cigarettes but unlike drugs it causes 
serious revenue leakage; similar to both illegal tobacco trade and drug 
trafficking VAT fraud is aggravated when performed on an international 
scale; VAT fraud has a somewhat higher entry threshold than the other 
two criminal fields of operation; it is a much more white-collar type of 
crime than the other two. Most importantly from the point of view of 
analysing its financial implications, VAT fraud – similar to illegal cigarettes 
but unlike the drug trade – has numerous points of interface with the 
legal economy and especially with legal financial institutions.
Most of the criminal schemes described in the following chapters are 
common to EU countries. Thus, particular attention is paid to the intra-
community variety of VAT fraud in the country reports.
The country studies draw on existing research and policy analyses, as 
well as on original research carried out with the assistance of both 
experts from the public and private sectors, and criminal entrepreneur 
who have operated in this criminal field. The sources have been coded 
in order to preserve their anonymity. The first two letters of the code 
indicate the country (e.g. CZ – the Czech Republic), “E” indicates an 
expert, while “C” means criminal entrepreneur. The description of the 
background of the individual sources referenced can be found in the 
“List of interviewees in the section on organised VAT Fraud” in the 
Annex.
Organised VAT fraud has been one of the major organised crime threats 
for Bulgaria in recent years. After human trafficking, this is the second 
biggest source of revenues for organised crime, surpassing lucrative crimi-
nal activities such as drugs and illicit tobacco.636 What makes organised 
VAT fraud such a big threat are the direct fiscal damage and the distor-
tion of the competition in entire economic sectors. The heavy depend-
ence of the public budget on VAT tax revenues makes it specifically 
vulnerable to this kind of crime. The scale of these criminal activities in 
636 CSD, Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2010 – 2011.
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certain economic sectors such 
as construction, manufacturing 
and trade in electronics, oil, 
vegetables, meat, sugar, and 
grain has distorted competition 
and forced legitimate compa-
nies either to get involved in 
some kind of fraud or leave 
the market. As a result, organ-
ised VAT fraud proves very re-
silient and hard to tackle, since 
the abrupt suppressing may 
lead to various undesired eco-
nomic and social costs such as 
steep rise of prices for socially 
sensitive goods637 or bringing 
companies in affected sectors 
to insolvency.
The VAT tax was introduced 
in Bulgaria in 1994, when it 
replaced the turnover tax.638 Currently it is the most important source of 
revenues for the country: it contributes up to 33% of the total central 
government revenue and amounted to 9% of the country GDP in 2013 
(Figure 36). In comparison, the corresponding share in the EU-27 for 
the period 2000 – 2011 was 21% or 7.5% of GDP.639 For the EU-15, 
the share of VAT in their general government revenue is even below 
19%.640 This simple comparison shows that currently Bulgaria is the EU 
country most heavily dependent on its VAT revenues and therefore most 
vulnerable to organised VAT fraud.
Until 1997, organised VAT fraud was not a big issue for the tax authorities 
in Bulgaria. The galloping inflation and the long statutory time limits 
for credit refunds rendered such schemes unprofitable in the first years 
following the introduction of the VAT taxation in the country. The 
establishment of the currency board in Bulgaria in 1997, which resulted 
in rapid reduction of inflation rates, changed gravely the situation with 
fraudulent tax refund schemes. Thus, the second half of the nineties saw 
the first high-profile organised VAT fraud schemes and it took a couple 
of years for the government to respond with the first countermeasures 
such as closing existing legal loopholes, establishing a large taxpayers 
637 For example, VAT evasion schemes in Bulgaria often concern goods such as vegetables or 
bread. Countering VAT evasion may lead to a steep rise in prices of such commonly purchased 
food products, thus affecting the purchasing power of many households and especially the low 
income ones.
638 Initially the tax was introduced with a rate of 18% in 1994, only to be raised to 22% in 1996 
and finally was set at 20% in 2000, and has not been subject to further changes since. The 
general VAT rate of 20% is applicable to all goods and services traded in Bulgaria, except 
the services of tour operators and tourist agencies, which are taxed at a reduced VAT rate 
of 9%.
639 CASE, Study to Quantify and Analyse the VAT Gap in the EU-27 Member States – Final Report (The 
Hague: CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, 2013).
640 Eurostat, Taxation Trends in the European Union. Data for the EU Member States, Iceland and Norway. 
(Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014).
Figure 36. vat revenue in bulgaria (1998 – 2013)
Source: Ministry of Finance and National Statistics Institute.
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unit and anti-fraud unit, restructuring the tax audit area and monitoring 
for VAT losses.641
Before the accession of Bulgaria to the European Union in 2007, the 
VAT evasion schemes were related both to conventional tax evasion and 
unlawful tax refunds. Conventional tax evasion schemes were related 
either to underreporting of taxable sales or to overstating of taxable costs 
to claim larger tax credit. Unlawful tax refund schemes, which are also 
known as organised VAT fraud and were based on fictitious transactions 
and fictitious traders, also proliferated. Most common were fictitious 
export schemes, missing trader schemes, X-type fraud schemes.642
The accession of Bulgaria to the European Union in 2007 created new 
opportunities for VAT fraud for which the tax administration was not fully 
prepared. Becoming part of the single EU market, Bulgaria was obliged 
to introduce the EU legislation on VAT, as well as to adopt the common 
EU regime for VAT taxation of intra-community supplies. Within the 
internal market goods are traded freely and without exercise of customs 
control at the borders. The common VAT regime on intra-community 
supplies is based on the so called destination principle, whereby the 
taxation occurs in the country where the goods are consumed and in 
line with the rate and conditions of that country. Following this principle, 
zero rate of VAT tax is applied to exports of goods to another member 
state. The zero-rating principle means that VAT tax on exports is levied 
at zero rate, while at the same time the supplier keeps the right for tax 
credit (and eventually for tax deduction or tax refund) on his domestic 
purchases. In order to be eligible for such zero rate of VAT, both the 
supplier and his trading partner must possess valid VAT-registration in 
their own countries.643
This regime has proved vulnerable to fraudulent abuse of its credit 
mechanism long before Bulgaria joined the single market, despite the 
many anti-fraud measures introduced on national and EU level in the last 
two decades.644 Thus, along with the already existing VAT fraud schemes, 
new and modified types of schemes emerged in Bulgaria – i.e. missing 
trader intra-community frauds (MTIC) and carousel frauds.645
The exact scope of the organised VAT fraud problem is hard to estimate. 
Most often the so called tax gap is used as proxy indicator. The VAT 
tax gap is top-down estimate of tax non-compliance, which is measured 
641 K. Pashev, “Countering Cross-Border VAT Fraud: The Bulgarian Experience”, Journal of Financial 
Crime 14, no. 4 (2007): 490-501.
642 Ibid. X-type fraud schemes are modified version of the missing trader scheme, which emerged 
after the introduction of a specific VAT account for all VAT registered enterprises in 2002. The 
VAT account was intended only for incoming and outgoing VAT payments and was introduced 
as a measure to counter missing trader fraud. The emergence of X-type fraud schemes soon 
proved it inefficient, so the VAT accounts were abolished in 2007.
643 M. Keen and S. Smith, “VAT Fraud and Evasion: What Do We Know and What Can Be Done?”, 
National Tax Journal LIX, no. 4 (2006): 861-87.
644 A. Aronowitz, D. Laagland, and G. Paulides., Value Added Tax Traud in the European Union 
(WODC, Amsterdam: Kugler Publications, 1996); National Audit Office (UK), HM Customs and 
Excise: Tackling VAT Fraud (London, 2004).
645 CSD, Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2010 – 2011.
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as the difference between the theoretical tax liability according to the 
tax law and the actual revenue collected. It is not a mere indicator of 
organised VAT fraud, insofar as it also captures legitimate tax avoidance, 
tax noncompliance due to insolvency or delayed payments, as well as 
statistical errors.646 Still it is the best indicator available for measuring the 
scale of the problem, as well as for drawing comparisons across countries 
and capturing trends in tax non-compliance over given periods of time.
The most recent estimates of the VAT gap for Bulgaria were provided in 
two studies on the VAT gap in the European Union, which were assigned 
by the European Commission.647 According to these studies the VAT gap 
in 2012 was 20% of the VAT total tax liability or 2.4% of GDP, whereas 
the average VAT gap for EU amounted to 16%. Generally, Bulgaria falls 
in the group of countries with VAT gap higher than the average for 
EU along with the countries from Central and Eastern Europe (Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Romania) and 
Southern Europe (Greece, Italy, Malta, Spain). The two estimations of 
CASE draw on two different databases, which have been a product of 
different statistic methodologies and therefore are not really comparable. 
Generally the trend for the period 2009 – 2012 is more or less stable 
(Figure 37).
Bottom-up estimates based on 
extrapolating data on individual 
companies and detected frauds 
provide a more precise picture 
of unlawful VAT refunds and 
deductions or the criminal VAT 
evasion.648 This kind of data is 
generally not publicly available, 
so such estimations could be 
carried out only by the tax au-
thorities, which have access to 
operational data. Such assess-
ments were carried out in 
Bulgaria in 2010 and 2013 by 
the National Revenue Agency 
(NRA) for the period 2005 – 
2009 and 2010 – 2012.649 The 
estimates of NRA for 2005 – 
2008 indicate steady upward 
trend coinciding with the ac-
cession to the EU and the 
economic boom just before 
the economic crisis, which re-
646 Reckon LLP, Study to Quantify and Analyse the VAT Gap in the EU-25 Member States (London, 
2009).
647 CASE, Study to Quantify and Analyse the VAT Gap in the EU-27 Member States – Final Report; CASE, 
2012 Update Report to the Study to Quantify and Analyse the VAT Gap in the EU-27 Member States.
648 Reckon LLP, Study to Quantify and Analyse the VAT Gap in the EU-25 Member States.
649 National Revenue Agency (Bulgaria), Tax Gap Analysis (Restricted report, Sofia, 2010); National 
Revenue Agency (Bulgaria), Tax Gap Analysis of Organised VAT Fraud (Restricted report, Sofia, 
2013).
Figure 37. trends in vat gap, top-down estiMate For bulgaria 
(2009 – 2012)
Source: CASE, 2012 Update Report to the Study to Quantify and Analyse the VAT Gap in the 
EU-27 Member States.
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versed in 2009 (Figure 38). However, it should be noted that the NRA 
assessment covers only the missing trader fraud, whereas the CASE es-
timate also includes the legal VAT avoidance, conventional VAT evasion, 
insolvencies and delayed payments.
In contrast with the top-
down approach, the bottom-
up approach for assessment 
of the VAT gap also provides 
more detailed picture in 
terms of breaking the gap to 
components such as type of 
taxable supplies, vulnerable 
sectors and domicile of missing 
traders detected. The analysis 
of NRA has identified the most 
vulnerable sectors by type of 
goods and services misused 
for VAT fraud schemes. The 
bulk of the fraudulent schemes 
concern goods such as grain, 
meat, fuels and sugar, which 
take the lion’s share with 
over 40% of all unlawful VAT 
fraud refunds. The services 
which are most often misused 
in fraudulent schemes are 
related to construction and 
advertising. In an attempt to 
arrest the growing number of 
unlawful VAT refunds related 
to grain exports, the Bulgarian 
government adopted reverse 
charge VAT taxation650 for these 
goods in the middle of 2014.
The analysis of NRA also reveals 
that more than sixty percent 
of all missing traders are 
registered in the Sofia region, 
which is the region with the 
most vibrant economy in the 
country. The tax authorities 
report that the average number 
of detected missing traders 
for the period 2007 – 2012 
is 2,453 companies, while the 
average number of “clients” of 
such companies is fourteen.
650 Reverse charge VAT taxation differs from the regular VAT taxation as the VAT tax is paid by 
the supplier instead of the client.
Figure 38. trends in vat gap, bottoM-up estiMate For bulgaria 
(2005 – 2012)
Source: NRA (2010, 2013).
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Figure 39. prosecution statistics on vat Fraud cases in bulgaria
Source: Annual reports of the Prosecution’s Office and investigation authorities for the 
years 2008 – 2013.
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The overall shrinking of the VAT gap in the period 2008 – 2012 can be 
partially explained by the increased attention and efforts of the Bulgarian 
authorities to this type of crime. An example in support of this is the 
increasing number of bills of indictment and convictions for the period 
2008 – 2012 (Figure 39), which suggests for increased efforts by the law 
enforcement agencies and the Prosecution’s Office to tackle this type of 
crimes. Until 2008, the Prosecutor’s Office also did not follow closely 
crimes related to VAT fraud and they were reported within the broader 
category of tax crimes. Since then VAT fraud crimes are specifically 
highlighted in all annual activity reports among the crimes of significant 
public interest. The prosecution statistics show steady increase of the 
number of cases brought before court and persons convicted in the 
period 2008 – 2012, although it was followed by a rapid decline of 
almost 70% in comparison with 2012.
Unlike the traditional criminal markets such as drugs markets and 
illicit tobacco, organised VAT fraud appears to have far more complex, 
multifaceted and multilayer nature. First of all the profile of the actors 
involved in the VAT fraud networks is very diverse – some of them have 
a clear criminal background, whereas others come from the legitimate 
business or are part of the public administration. The fraudulent networks 
actually mimic legitimate business activities, so although they function 
as organised crime group, in practice the authorities face legitimately 
established business entities conducting from entirely legal to purely 
fictitious business transactions. The business models of these fraudulent 
networks or the embezzling schemes are also very diverse: while some 
aim at evasion of tax liabilities, others aim at unlawful deduction of VAT 
liabilities or unlawful VAT refunds from the state budget. Furthermore, 
focusing solely on VAT fraud appears to be quite short-sighted, insofar as 
VAT fraud is often part of or linked to other kinds of tax fraud such as 
customs and excise duty fraud or corporate tax evasion (BG-E5, BG-E10). 
VAT fraud could also be linked to some other organised crime activities 
such as money laundering (BG-Е20), illicit alcohol production (BG-E11), 
and smuggling of fast moving consumer goods (BG-E10).
Key actors
The fraudulent networks are usually described as a circuit of legal entities 
performing chains of fictitious transactions in order to embezzle the VAT 
refund mechanism. However, the network of individuals behind these 
schemes who actually benefit from the fraud should also be a matter of 
consideration. Thus, the description of the key actors should refer not 
only to the legal entities involved, but also to the perpetrators abusing 
these legal entities as vehicles for the fraud.
The role of corporate entities in VAT fraud schemes
The various types of corporations used as vehicles for fraudulent VAT 
chains are usually categorised according to their specific roles in the 
criminal schemes. Some of them are classic fictitious traders registered 
Market structure 
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with the only purpose to enable the fraud, while others are compliant 
companies that benefit from these schemes. Furthermore, some of these 
actors can be identified in all schemes, whereas others are specific only 
for certain schemes.
The “missing traders” are key actors in most of the schemes and in 
Bulgaria they are widely known as “a fuse.” They are limited liability 
companies formally registered in the name of straw persons. The role 
of the missing traders is to document fictitious sales and purchases 
and abscond or go insolvent without remitting the VAT to the budget. 
These companies have neither personnel, nor assets or any capacity for 
commercial activities. Usually, when tax authorities attempt to inspect 
or audit such companies they find only a post box at the official 
address declared at the time of the registration. In contrast to other 
EU countries, in Bulgaria missing traders are only rarely registered by 
foreign citizens or by offshore owners with undisclosed identity (BG-E1, 
BG-E16). Bulgarian criminal networks also register missing traders abroad 
for perpetration of schemes involving intra-community deliveries to other 
member states. Their role is to document the fictitious importation of 
the goods (BG-E10, BG-E13, BG-E19).
The “buffers” are the other common actor in most of the fraud schemes. 
The role of the buffers might be performed either by real companies or 
shell companies registered in the name of straw persons much like the 
missing traders. The buffers are introduced as compliant intermediaries 
in the fraudulent schemes to document fictitious purchases from the 
missing trader and sell the goods to the final recipient of the goods. In 
most cases the goods flow through more than one buffer in order to 
provide higher credibility to the fictitious transactions and conceal the 
link between the missing trader and the actual recipient of the goods. 
Thus, criminal networks hamper the detection of the fraudulent chain. 
Usually both missing traders and buffers receive the goods only on 
paper, whereas in practice the goods are directly delivered to the actual 
recipient.
“Crossed invoice” companies are also often used as part of most 
types of fraudulent schemes. Their role is to additionally complicate the 
detection of the fraudulent schemes. To certain extent their role is similar 
to the role of the buffers. Crossed invoicers declare purchases and sales 
of real goods and services from and to real traders. At the same time 
they also register fictitious sales to missing traders, thereby nullifying their 
VAT liabilities to the budget (BG-E1).
The schemes involving intra-community deliveries or exports to third 
countries also involve the so called “brokers.” The broker may be a bogus 
company registered in the name of a straw person, which purchases on 
paper goods from real traders and declares intra-community delivery to 
a missing trader in another member state or export to third country. 
Upon the declared supplies abroad the bogus company claims a VAT 
refund to the budget. However, use of such “dummy companies” without 
any commercial capacities is quite risky, insofar as the normal practice 
of NRA is to perform audits upon any claim for VAT refund. Therefore, 
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such scenarios are rarely perpetrated, being vulnerable to easy detection 
and practically impossible without direct involvement of NRA officials. 
Usually the role of the broker is performed by real traders that perform 
intra-community deliveries or exports to third countries on a regular 
basis as part of their normal business. Accepting the role of brokers in 
such fraudulent chains they use the opportunity to obtain deduction of 
their VAT liabilities on inputs, while at the same time receive a certain 
fee for their complicity from the ring leaders of the fraudulent network. 
They might also benefit from purchasing goods below market value, thus 
receiving the opportunity to legally increase their profits (BG-E1).
“Final recipients” are the actors that generally benefit from the opportunity 
to purchase goods or services at prices below market value. Usually 
these are retail companies or manufacturers, but may be companies from 
any business sector (e.g. construction, tourism, etc.). They are registered 
in the country and are fully tax compliant. Final recipients may or may 
not be aware of their involvement in the fraudulent scheme (BG-E4).
“Conduit companies” or exporters are actors that appear in schemes 
involving intra-community acquisitions and imports from third countries. 
These are companies registered abroad and are usually fully compliant. 
Conduit companies are either manufacturers or wholesalers performing 
intra-community deliveries or exports, which do not profit from the 
frauds as such, but receive the normal profit as in any other business 
transaction. They may or may not be fully aware of the perpetrated 
schemes, but generally benefit from being able to find market for their 
goods which under other circumstances might not be as competitive.
The fraudulent chains are also aided by various facilitators, which are 
not directly involved in the frauds, but play significant role in their 
realisation. Usually these are real companies that are fully tax compliant, 
which provide certain services for a pre-agreed fee to the fraudulent 
networks, while being or not being fully aware of the fraudulent schemes 
taking place. Among the important facilitators are the accounting service 
providers, also known in Bulgaria as “accounting houses.” They not 
only bring specific expertise in tax law and procedures, but in many 
cases facilitate the registration of the bogus companies that act as 
missing traders, crossed invoicers, buffers or brokers. The accounting 
houses actually take over the accounting, settlement of payments and 
communication with tax authorities of the shell companies. Usually this 
is done through issuing of a power of attorney to an accountant from 
such accounting houses along with an electronic signature. Thus, the 
accountant has the right to represent the company to the NRA, as well 
as to authorise bank transactions. However, the accountant usually has 
partial knowledge on the real activities of the shell companies, their 
volume or the actual destinations of the financial flows.
Equally important is the facilitating role of the transportation and 
logistics companies. The fraudulent networks turn to transportation 
companies, since besides the documentation for the origin of the goods 
(contracts, invoices) and the financial documentation (payment orders, 
bank statements, receipts), they are also required by law in case of tax 
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audit to present to tax authorities documentation that proves the actual 
movement of the goods. This is where transportation companies step 
in. It is possible for the transportation company not to be aware of 
the fraudulent scheme it is facilitating, but interviewees report that in 
most cases VAT fraud networks collaborate with the same transportation 
companies (BG-E1).
In order to provide the VAT network with the necessary documentation, 
the company usually transports the goods abroad only to return them 
back or performs a shipment within the country but forges documentation 
for international shipment. Thus, in case of a tax audit, the transportation 
company can justify that the international shipment has really taken 
place and present documents for accompanying costs. Issuance of 
transportation documentation without performing any shipment is rarely 
practiced, as it is perceived as risky and vulnerable to easy detection 
from tax authorities (BG-E1).
Criminal network actors
The criminal networks that perpetrate organised VAT frauds should not 
be mistaken with the corporate vehicles they employ for their fraudulent 
activities. Behind any fraudulent chain of legal entities are the individuals 
that actually commit the crime. They can best be described as a criminal 
network or a ring with three levels of participation – the inner circle 
players, the outer circle players and the facilitators.651
The inner circle players are the ring leaders or the actual organisers and 
financiers that directly profit from the fraudulent schemes. In most cases 
their names would not appear on any document or in the companies 
directly involved in the fraudulent operations. The ring leader and the 
financier might be one and the same person, although this is not always 
the case. However, the ring leader not only provides the money for the 
fraudulent scheme, but they also act as a guarantee to the tax compliant 
companies that appear either as final recipients of the goods (big retailers, 
manufacturers or exporters) or are involved as transportation companies. 
They might also secure protection against investigations and tax audits 
through corrupting public officials and trading in influence.
The profile and social background of the ring leaders is diverse and 
depends on the nature and scale of the fraud perpetrated. Some of them 
are owners of well-established legitimate companies (BG-E1, BG-E3, BG-
E4, BG-E19), whereas others are professional fraudsters with experience in 
smuggling of excise goods or various fast-moving consumer goods during 
the nineties in Bulgaria or other tax crimes (BG-E10, BG-E13). Along with 
that, many career criminals that have participated as actors in organised 
VAT fraud schemes have at some point started their own rings (BG-E3).
Ring leaders who own well-established legitimate businesses can be 
among the so called “oligarchs” – powerful businessmen well positioned 
on local or national level who accumulated their capital in the nineties 
651 Aronowitz, Laagland, and Paulides., Value Added Tax Traud in the European Union.
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through various shady or criminal practices such as siphoning state-
owned companies, rigging privatisation deals, insolvency frauds, excise 
and custom duty frauds or corrupting public procurement tenders. Their 
social background is usually from the old communist party nomenklatura, 
former high-ranking executives of state companies or high-ranking officers 
from the security services. They have capitalised on their political links to 
profit from the large scale property re-distribution in the nineties.652
Unlike them, small scale fraudsters are rather high-risk entrepreneurs, 
who have been involved in one way or another in previous excise 
and organised VAT frauds or other tax crimes. In most cases, they 
neither possess the economic capacities, nor the political links of the 
oligarchs. Thereby they are more vulnerable to become targets of police 
investigations and tax inspections (BG-E4).
The practical implementation of the fraudulent schemes is entirely 
designated to the outer circle players. The outer circle players include 
actors with various roles – straw men, proxy persons, recruiters, 
supervisors, accountants. Straw men are usually illiterate persons from 
disadvantaged backgrounds who are lured to provide their identity for the 
registration of missing trader or buffer companies. They are remunerated 
with small amounts of money in advance and promised to receive some 
small monthly salary. Many of them are from the Roma community, 
but they could also be foreign citizens (e.g. Macedonian, Romanian), 
immigrants, terminally ill or disabled persons or simply people in need 
and are regularly replaced (BG-E1, BG-E22). Somewhat similar is the 
role of the proxy persons, who receive power of attorney on behalf of 
the missing trader companies and agree to represent them to banks or 
other institutions. Proxy persons are used to deposit or withdraw vast 
amounts of cash in favour of or on behalf of the missing-traders and 
receive a small fee for each of these missions. Both straw person and 
proxy persons are not aware or are aware to a limited extent about the 
fraudulent nature of their activities (BG-E22). Buffer persons are usually 
exposed to less risk and are not replaced so often as straw persons that 
act as missing traders. Therefore they receive monthly remuneration and 
a small percentage of the invoices issues (BG-C2).
Straw men and proxy persons are quickly replaceable and are the ones 
who usually face administrative sanctions or criminal charges in case 
the tax authorities or law-enforcement detect the fraudulent scheme. 
Therefore, fraudulent VAT networks are constantly seeking and recruiting 
new ones, as they need to change them every six or so months. This is 
usually the task of the recruiters, also known as lieutenants, who are also 
part of most criminal networks (BG-E13, BG-E22). Other important outer 
circle actors are the accountants. They provide not only bookkeeping 
services, but also manage the bank transactions and provide tax expertise. 
The criminal network and all the other outer circle actors are usually 
coordinated by a supervisor (also “captain”) who is usually a person 
trusted by the ring leader. The supervisor is responsible for the day-to-day 
management, the payment to all other actors involved in the scheme, 
652 CSD, Organised Crime in Bulgaria: Markets and Trends.
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as well as accounts the profits to the ring leaders. The lieutenants, the 
accountants and the supervisors do not appear in any of the companies 
involved in the fraudulent chain and receive fixed remuneration along 
with bonuses for each successful cycle of the scheme.
Figure 40. exaMple oF role distribution in a Missing trader scheMe 
For the export oF grain
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on interviews.
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Corrupt tax, customs and law enforcement officers can also be 
categorised as part of the outer circle actors. Their role is indispensable, 
insofar as no fraudulent scheme would last long time without their 
complicity. They could assist the fraudster on a fee-for-service basis or 
in some occasions by getting directly involved in the criminal networks. 
In the latter case the corrupt public officials act in favour of companies 
which are involved in fraudulent activities over a long period of time 
(BG-E1). Equally important is the role of the corrupt bank officials, as 
they are the ones that actually witness the fraudulent money transactions 
and have the discretion to decide whether to report the suspicious 
financial transactions to the authorities as they are prescribed to do by 
anti-money laundering legislation (BG-E22).
The third and outmost level in the fraudulent network is the level of the 
so called facilitators. These are legitimate businessmen that generally are 
not aware (or at least it is very hard to prove that they are aware) of 
the fraudulent activities. Their companies might appear in the VAT fraud 
chains as conduits, buffers, final recipients, exporters or transportation 
companies. While some of them would receive a fixed fee for their 
services and turning a blind eye to the fraudulent activities, others 
would benefit from finding a market for their goods or services or from 
purchasing goods below market value.
Proper categorisation of existing fraudulent schemes related to VAT 
evasion first of all requires clear distinction between conventional tax 
avoidance and organised VAT fraud. As it was already mentioned, VAT 
tax avoidance is related to undervaluing of sales receipts or overvaluing 
of inputs with the objective of hiding tax liabilities. It is carried out 
on individual level by otherwise legitimate entrepreneurs. Conversely, 
organised VAT fraud abuses the tax refund mechanism and is pursued 
through a network of real and fictitious suppliers with accomplices 
within the tax and law enforcement authorities. Unlike tax avoidance, 
criminal VAT evasion schemes often involve inflating the value added 
in order to claim larger tax refunds. Fictitious transactions and missing 
traders are indispensable for organised VAT fraud.653 On the other 
hand, certain organised VAT fraud schemes facilitate individual tax fraud 
through providing fictitious invoices to legitimate companies that are 
trying to lower their tax liabilities (BG-E2, BG-E4).
The types of organised VAT fraud are pretty much the same across all 
countries that have adopted the VAT tax. The differences between the 
countries are largely related to the proliferation of certain schemes over 
others. The fraudulent schemes are usually classified based on the type 
of taxable supplies. In its analysis of the tax gap in Bulgaria (2013), the 
NRA identifies 5 basic types of organised VAT fraud schemes: fraudulent 
schemes related to domestic supplies, fraudulent schemes related to 
export to third countries, fraudulent schemes related to import from 
third countries, fraudulent intra-community acquisitions, and fraudulent 
intra-community deliveries.
653 Pashev, “Countering Cross-Border VAT Fraud: The Bulgarian Experience”.
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The NRA reports that until 
2007 organised VAT frauds 
were predominantly related 
to domestic supplies, whereas 
only a small share of the frauds 
(less than 10%) was related to 
imports or exports. Fraud related 
to intra-community acquisitions 
and intra-community deliveries 
spurred for the first time in 
2007 with the accession of 
the country in EU. Five years 
later, frauds related to intra-
community acquisitions had 
become the predominant type 
of VAT fraud in the country 
with 62% of all refunds related 
to such fraudulent schemes – 
a six-fold increase over the 
period 2007 – 2012. The frauds 
related to intra-community deliveries also steadily increased and reached 
almost 16% of the unlawful VAT refunds (Figure 41).
Fraudulent schemes related to domestic supplies
The fraudulent schemes related to domestic supplies involve fictitious 
transactions or transactions with fictitious traders that take place within 
the jurisdiction of the country. These fraudulent schemes are usually 
related to provision of advertisement or construction services, as well 
as sale of agricultural products. Three modalities of such fraudulent 
schemes were reported – the “invoice mills”,654 the “invoice bazaars” 
and domestic missing trader fraud.
The invoice mills seem to be a particularly widespread form of organised 
VAT fraud and involve criminal networks that provide fictitious invoices 
to legitimate companies willing to diminish their VAT tax liabilities. Most 
of these invoice mills are built around the accounting houses, some of 
which provide services for hiding tax liabilities in addition to the entirely 
legitimate accounting services. There are also entirely criminal “mills”, 
which exist for the sole purpose of forging and selling fictitious invoices 
to legitimate companies willing to evade VAT taxes. These services are 
also known as “clearing of VAT duties” and are provided on a fee-for-
service basis. The fictitious invoices are issued by specifically established 
shell companies which are registered by straw men with no income. The 
shell companies act as typical missing traders and provide receipts for 
fake sales or fake purchases and eventually fail to remit the collected 
VAT to the state budget (BG-E1, BG-E2, BG-E4, BG-E20).
There is a peculiar sub-type of these invoice mills that largely functions 
as an open market, where anyone can buy a fictitious invoice right on 
654 Keen and Smith, “VAT Fraud and Evasion: What Do We Know and What Can Be Done?”
Figure 41. trends in vat gap coMposition in bulgaria by type 
oF supplies
Source: NRA (2013, 2014).
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the street for 10-30% of the VAT value indicated on the invoice. The best 
term that describes this modus operandi of the fraudulent VAT networks 
is “invoice bazaar.” Such bazaars currently operate around the Iliyantsi 
marketplace in Sofia and the so called “Sunday market” in Dimitrovgrad, 
which are the two biggest and most prominent marketplaces for smuggled 
and counterfeit goods in Bulgaria.655 The provision of fictitious invoices at 
these marketplaces emerged as a supplementary service for the traders 
that were purchasing wholesale merchandise from these marketplaces 
and therefore needed documents for the tax authorities.656
Unlike invoice mills that usually provide their services both to small 
and medium businesses, the invoice bazaars serve mainly small traders 
who want to evade VAT or corporate tax duties. In contrast with the 
regular invoice mills, in many cases the fictitious invoices sold at these 
bazaars are entirely fake (i.e. use VAT numbers of non-existing or already 
bankrupt companies). Sometimes the invoice dealers also sell falsified 
invoices, which are filled in using hijacked identities of existing companies 
(BG-E1). Registering of missing trader companies on behalf of straw men 
is also practiced. The organised criminal groups that perpetrate this crime 
are mostly of Roma ethnicity, but they also collaborate with accounting 
houses. The groups usually have three-level structure, which includes 
street dealers, supervisors and ring leaders, as well as facilitators such as 
accountants and corrupt law enforcement officers (BG-E4).
The domestic missing trader fraud schemes usually involve medium and 
big businesses. They were quite popular in the construction sector during 
the boom in construction in the period 2004 – 2008. Such schemes 
were set up by many construction companies and commercial property 
investors in order to unlawfully deduct the VAT due. The schemes 
involved introduction of phantom companies that are commissioned as 
subcontractors to perform the construction and installation works, as well 
as using shell companies as suppliers of construction materials. These 
phantom and shell companies are registered in the name of straw men 
and act as missing traders or cross-invoicers.
In many cases, the same bogus companies that are introduced as 
subcontractors of construction and installation works are also used as 
an instrument to use undeclared labour and evade payments for income 
taxes, social security and health insurance contributions. Similar schemes 
are perpetrated in the agricultural and food processing sector through 
contracting bogus companies as fictitious suppliers of agricultural products 
or labour providers (BG-E4).
Fraudulent schemes related to intra-community deliveries or export
A popular kind of fraudulent scheme related to intra-community deliveries 
or export to third countries is fictitious export. In fictitious export 
schemes the exporter carries out the transaction on paper applying 
655 These marketplaces emerged in the 1990s, when the contraband was thriving in the country, 
but gradually lost their importance with the accession of the country to the EU and the rise 
of the standard of living.
656 CSD, Transportation, Smuggling, and Organized Crime (Sofia, 2004).
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zero VAT rates, while in reality sells the goods domestically on the grey 
market without invoices and subsequently claims tax credit refund on 
the inputs. Some of these schemes involve real exports of goods, but 
with overstated value. These types of fraudulent schemes are particularly 
widespread for products such as grain, cigarettes and fuels (BG-E11, BG-
Е20). Fictitious intra-community deliveries gained momentum after 2007, 
following the accession of Bulgaria to the European Union and largely 
replaced fictitious exports to third countries. The reasons were similar as 
in the case with the MTIC fraud on acquisitions – the relaxed physical 
control over the flows of goods within the single market turned these 
schemes into less risky and easier to perpetuate in comparison with 
exports to third countries.657
Another widespread type of fraudulent schemes related to intra-commu-
nity deliveries or export is missing trader fraud on exports. In contrast 
to the fictitious export schemes, this scheme involves real cross-border 
transactions and is usually related to agricultural produce. The fraud is 
perpetrated through introduction of a missing trader between the farmers 
and the exporting company. The missing trader purchases agricultural 
produce (grain, sunflower seeds, etc.) from small farmers who are not 
VAT registered and sells it up the chain to the exporter with the VAT 
included. Another similar scenario is to register missing trader companies 
as agricultural producers. Under this scenario the products are purchased 
from real farmers without any documentation and the missing traders 
provide invoices with VAT included. In both cases the missing traders 
accumulate VAT liabilities, but go insolvent or abscond without remitting 
the tax to the budget (BG-E15, BG-E22).
Acquisition fraud
Fraudulent schemes related to intra-community acquisitions and import 
from third countries can generally be categorised as acquisition fraud. 
These schemes are typically commodity based and involve a bogus 
company that acts as a missing trader and supplies real goods from 
abroad for consumption at the domestic market. The missing trader 
embezzles the VAT debited and sells the goods on price equal or 
below market value. Missing trader fraud related to import from third 
countries was more common before the accession of the country 
to the European Union, after which it was largely replaced with 
missing trader intra-community acquisition fraud. The reason was the 
alleviation of the customs controls on the flow of goods from other 
Member States, when Bulgaria became part of the single market. This 
effectively removed the necessity for complicity of corrupt customs 
officers in order to run such fraudulent schemes and ultimately turned 
intra-community frauds to more attractive for organised crime.658 The 
fraudulent networks constantly adapt the schemes as a response to the 
efforts of the authorities to effectively counter them. Therefore, criminal 
networks often change the countries of origin for the goods in order 
to evade detection.
657 Pashev, “Countering Cross-Border VAT Fraud: The Bulgarian Experience”.
658 Ibid.
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MTIC fraud on acquisitions affects all kinds of fast moving consumer 
goods such as meat, sugar, dairy products, fruits and vegetables (BG-E4). 
The most basic form of this fraud is to purchase goods at zero VAT 
rate from a trader based in another member state and then sell them 
at the grey market domestically without receipts or invoices, thus 
evading the remittance of the VAT due to the state budget. Generally, 
this scenario repeats the well-known schemes for smuggling of goods 
with the only difference that the movement of goods across EU is 
not subject to customs control, so there is no need to evade it (BG-
E4). Similar widespread scenario for this kind of fraud is to purchase 
goods from abroad through a missing trader company and sell them 
to legitimate retailer or manufacturer. Under this scenario the missing 
trader accumulates the VAT paid by the legitimate traders up the 
supply chain, but does not remit it to the budget. The VAT embezzled 
is paid by the final recipient of the goods – i.e. some manufacturer or 
retailer (BG-E3, BG-E4). A third scenario is to couple the acquisition 
fraud scheme with subsequent fictitious export, thus embezzling the 
VAT through a refund from the state budget. In this case the goods 
are usually sold on the grey market without any receipts or invoices 
(BG-E10, BG-E13, BG-E19).
Missing trader fraud related to import from third countries is still 
perpetrated, although on a lesser scale. It is related mostly to import of 
goods from China and Turkey, which are two of the biggest trade partners 
of Bulgaria outside EU. These schemes along with embezzling of the VAT 
tax, also involve evasion of customs duties through various techniques 
such as understating the value of imported goods, misrepresentation 
of the origin or misclassification of the goods of imported, incorrect 
declaring of quantity of goods. Missing trader fraud related to import 
from third countries concern goods such as vegetables, apparel, toys, 
home appliances, construction and building materials (BG-E7, BG-E-10).
Carousel schemes are a more sophisticated type of criminal VAT fraud, 
which involves repeated rounds of cross-border transactions, whereby the 
traded goods move in a circular pattern (in a “carousel”). The fraudulent 
chain starts with a missing trader that imports goods at a zero VAT rate. 
Unlike in the acquisition fraud schemes, the goods are not destined for 
the domestic market but are sold through a chain of business-to-business 
transaction chains within the country only to be re-exported again at 
zero VAT rate, thus providing the last trader in the supply chain (the 
“broker”) with the right to claim VAT refund on the inputs. The chain 
of transactions is repeated over and over again, stealing the VAT on 
each occasion.659 The imports and the exports could be either to other 
member states or to third countries. Usually the chain involves series of 
fictitious transactions, the role of which is largely to conceal the link to 
the zero-rate trader at the end of the chain, as well as to inflate the 
value of the traded goods and thus provide for a larger VAT tax credit 
to be claimed.660 According to the NRA (2013) carousel fraud is not a 
659 F. Borselli, Organised VAT Fraud: Features, Magnitude, Policy Perspectives (Rome: Banca d’Italia, 
2011).
660 K. Pashev, Corruption and Tax Compliance. Challenges to Tax Policy and Tax Administration (Sofia: 
Center for the Study of Democracy, 2005).
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big threat for the Bulgarian budget and currently does not contribute to 
more than 2-4% of the organised VAT fraud gap.
Figure 42. basic scheMes For acQuisition Fraud involving deliveries 
oF sugar FroM other MeMber states
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on interviews.
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Abuse of customs procedure for transit of goods
Apart from the fraudulent schemes described above, another kind of VAT 
fraud is related to abusing the customs regimes related to goods imported 
from third countries. This kind of fraud has not been so widespread after 
the accession of the country to the EU, as it was replaced by frauds 
related to intra-community supplies, but remains persistent nevertheless. 
According to the Community Customs Code which is applicable in 
all member states, goods travelling between two points of a customs 
territory, via another customs territory, or between two or more different 
customs territories, are allowed temporary suspension of VAT, customs 
and excise duties. The tax and duties are levied at the destination point 
of the imported goods. The movement of goods between the 28 EU 
member states, the EFTA countries (Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein and 
Switzerland) and Turkey are subject to the common transit regime (also 
known as customs procedure 4200). The transit regime should not be 
confused with the TIR661 regime regulating the movement of goods which 
begins or ends outside the Community, or is effected between two 
points in the Community through the territory of a third country.
The fraudulent networks abuse the transit regime by placing the imported 
goods under the customs transit procedure and declaring them as delivery 
for another member state or third country. The usual countries of origin 
for the goods are China, Turkey and to a lesser extent – the Western 
Balkan countries. The goods are leaving the country only on paper, 
whereas at the same time they are sold at the domestic market (BG-E14). 
In order to enable such schemes, shell companies are registered in other 
member states that act as importers. Many of these fraudulent schemes 
rely on the complicity of customs officers and involve unlawful unloading 
and reloading of the goods on other vehicles, manipulation of the 
documentation on origin, quantity or value of the goods with the aim 
to evade customs duties, replacement of the goods and accompanying 
documentation before customs clearance (BG-E13).
Many of the interviewees shared the opinion that to set up a VAT fraud 
scheme criminals do not need initial capital or that only a minimal 
initial investment is needed, since once operating the schemes become 
self-sustaining (BG-E3). This might be true for conventional VAT evasion 
schemes, where it comes to “cooking” accounting books or utilising 
tax optimisation techniques, or to low profile schemes such as the 
invoice bazaars and the invoice mills. However, organised VAT fraud 
schemes involving trade in real goods or services require substantial 
initial investment in order to cover the value of the commodities or 
services that are purchased. Furthermore, in order to start importing large 
quantities of certain goods, apart from possessing the actual resources 
to make the purchase, companies usually also must demonstrate to their 
suppliers abroad financial capacity and reliability through presenting bank 
guarantees or letters of credit.
661 Transports Internationaux Routiers.
Financing 
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management
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Many of the interviewed experts stated that along with the financial 
capacity, far more important for entering and surviving in a given VAT 
fraud niche appears to be the social capital and reputation of the 
persons involved. Securing political or administrative protection would 
not only provide for establishing and surviving in this business, but can 
also aid in securing the needed financing.
What distinguishes organised VAT frauds from the typical criminal markets 
such as the drug market is that fraudulent chains mimic legitimate business 
transactions and therefore the flows of illicit and licit money are inter-
mixed. This makes it very hard to distinguish between legitimate, grey and 
entirely criminal sources of money which are used to set up the crime.
Sources of capital for criminal operations. Profile of financiers 
in criminal operations
The ring leader as a financier (self-financing)
Many of the experts interviewed contended that in most cases the big play-
ers in organised VAT fraud schemes are actually well-established legitimate 
traders or manufacturers in certain economic sectors. Therefore they finance 
the organised VAT fraud schemes with revenues from their legitimate 
business or sometimes with personal savings. Examples were provided for 
the sugar and confectionery industry (BG-E3, BG-E4, BG-E11, BG-E18), the 
alcohol industry (BG-E17), the meat industry (BG-E4, BG-E22).
As mentioned earlier, most of these well-established businessmen 
involved in VAT frauds can best be described as oligarchs with political 
and economic influence either on local or national level. Therefore they 
utilise this influence when perpetrating organised VAT fraud schemes. 
Examples were provided for the sugar and meat industry, where all big 
VAT fraud actors were actually the owners of the biggest manufacturing 
and wholesale companies (BG-E4).
The funds may originate from the legitimate revenues of the companies 
they own, but actually very often much of these funds result from 
unaccounted grey revenues. The size of shadow economy in Bulgaria 
reaches 31% of the GDP or about €12 million in 2013 and is one of 
the highest in EU, whereas the average share for EU-28 is only 18%.662 
The big players in the organised VAT frauds actively employ various grey 
practices in their otherwise legitimate businesses and according to some 
of the experts interviewed at least half of their business is practically in 
the grey sector (BG-E17, BG-E20). It is this vast shadow economy that 
creates the nurturing environment for the emerging and sustaining of 
the fraudulent VAt schemes and a number of other criminal activities 
such as excise goods frauds, corruption to name a few.
Among the grey practices mentioned were various tax optimisation and 
conventional tax evasion techniques such as use of undeclared labour, 
662 F. Schneider, The Shadow Economy in Europe (VIZA Europe, 2013).
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sale of excise goods without excise stamp (e.g. liquors), overstating 
the losses due to normal spoilage (e.g. with sugar processing or sugar 
packaging), declaring loss due to depreciation or decay (e.g. with 
perishable goods – fruits, vegetables), understating quantities of goods 
sold or overstating value of inputs. A typical example was provided with 
the sugar manufacturing industry, where the producers usually incur 
2-3% losses due to normal spoilage. However, they declare 9-10% losses 
due to normal spoilage and subsequently sell the written-off amounts of 
sugar without invoices (BG-E13). Somewhat similar scheme was described 
in relation of import of fruits – company imports bananas, sells them 
without invoice and after 30 days writes them off the books, accounting 
for loss due to decay (BG-E5).
Thus the owners of these companies accumulate unaccounted grey 
revenues stemming from avoidance of payment of VAT tax, corporate 
tax, income tax, social and health security contributions. Part of the grey 
revenues are invested to grow their licit business or to buy political and 
administrative protection through corrupting politicians or public officials. 
However, part of it is subsequently invested in entirely criminal VAT fraud 
schemes.
Certainly, ring leaders also invest own revenues from criminal sources. 
Mostly revenues from previous VAt fraud cycles are re-invested in new 
operations, as well as money from other kinds of tax frauds such as 
excise or customs duty frauds (BG-E1, BG-E3). Somewhat similar is the 
case with former tax or customs officers that invest funds accumulated 
through corruption in initiating VAT fraud schemes (BG-E20). However, 
fraudsters that are involved in low-profile schemes such as invoice 
mills or are operating on a smaller scale might also invest money from 
other criminal businesses. An example was provided of a ring leader 
of fraudulent VAT scheme who was also notorious for his extortion 
racketeering, loansharking and money laundering activities (BG-E15). 
Apparently, some criminal entrepreneurs act opportunistically and easily 
switch from VAT frauds to excise frauds or loansharking.
External source of financing
Big players in organised VAT fraud rarely turn to external sources of 
financing, since they already possess substantial financial and economic 
capacity. However, being well-established economic players, it is not 
difficult for them to obtain a bank loan for example (BG-E17). An 
example was provided with a notorious ring leader of VAT schemes 
related to intra-community supplies of sugar and meat. In 2010, he 
received €23 million in the form of bank guarantees and loans from 
a Bulgarian bank institution through two companies under his control. 
Allegedly the funds were invested in VAT fraud schemes (BG-E3). The 
case subsequently became public, when the ring leader was charged by 
the Prosecution’s Office for criminal evasion of VAT taxes and the two 
companies failed to repay the credits to the bank.663
663 Mediapool, “Прокуратурата разследва кредити за 46 млн. евро, отпуснати от ПИБ без 
‘елементарна проверка’ [The Prosecutor’s Office Investigating Credits for €46 million Granted 
by FIBANK without a ‘Basic Examination’]”, Mediapool.bg, February 27, 2014.
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In contrast with the big players in organised VAT frauds that rely primarily 
on self-financing, small and middle scale players in most cases do not 
possess the economic capacity needed to secure financing from their 
own sources, neither the financial credibility to apply for a loan. Thus, 
they often have to turn to alternative sources of financing to complete 
a VAT fraud cycle. Such external sources of financing might be illegal 
lenders, trade credit from manufacturers or exporters, and advanced 
payments from customers.
Several of the respondents provided examples in which the money for 
the VAT fraud scheme had been provided by an illegal lender (“black 
financier”). The criminal entrepreneur that was interviewed shared that 
he has started his fraudulent scheme involving import of mobile phones 
by obtaining a loan from a typical loan shark. The loan was for €25,000 
with a monthly interest of 1%, whereas the collateral was his personal 
apartment and a promissory note for the sum. He managed to repay 
the loan in two years, but as the scale of the scheme grew up the 
loan shark decided to step in the business as a partner and investor. 
He extended his credit line but lowered the interest to 0.5 per cents 
monthly (BG-C1).
Other respondents reported similar cases, where such illegal lending 
was used to set up VAT fraud schemes. The illegal lender was a 
notorious fraudster from the Black Sea city of Varna, also known for 
various property crimes, smuggling of goods, organised VAT frauds, 
excise and customs duty frauds (BG-E22). legitimate businessmen 
were also reported to provide initial financing of VAT fraud schemes 
(BG-E20).
Alternative source for securing initial financing for a given VAT fraud cycle 
appears to be setting agreements with manufacturers or exporters to 
provide the goods on credit. An example was provided for a criminal 
player that used to work for one of the big VAT fraud ring leaders in the 
sugar industry sector. He managed to secure delivery of several tonnes 
of sugar on a trade credit from a Greek manufacturer and thus initiated 
his own VAT fraud ring (BG-E4).
A similar approach is to secure the funding through advanced payments 
of the customer that would be the final recipient of the goods (BG-E1, 
BG-E3). An example was given of a complex acquisition fraud scheme 
involving importation of fast-moving consumer goods and their subsequent 
fictitious re-export to Kosovo, where the financing of each cycle was 
secured by advanced payments from the retail traders in Bulgaria that 
were final recipients of the goods (BG-E13).
In any case, trusted relations and sound reputation are indispensable 
for acquiring external financing. Therefore, usually actors that have already 
been part of such VAT fraud networks and have gained certain credibility 
can receive financing through such means.
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A closer examination of the VAT fraud chains reveals that two separate 
and yet linked flows of money can be distinguished in all fraudulent 
schemes. The first flow is pertinent to the settlement of payments between 
the fictitious and legitimate companies which are part of the fraudulent 
chain. This flow mimics legitimate trade transactions and therefore all 
payments between these companies are settled through regular bank 
transfers and declared officially to tax authorities. Therefore this flow 
could be labelled as the “clean money flow.” This flow initiates with the 
purchase of the goods by the missing trader and their subsequent sale 
to the buffer companies up the chain to the customers that are the final 
recipients.
The second flow of money relates to the settlement of payments between 
the individuals behind the fraudulent chain of companies such as 
captains, lieutenants, accountants, straw men, proxy persons and corrupt 
public officials. Some of the actors (straw men and proxy persons) are 
paid on fee-for service basis, whereas others (captains, lieutenants and 
accountants) receive a fixed monthly remuneration. In contrast with the 
first money flow, the payments are usually settled in cash (BG-Е22); thus, 
this flow could be labelled as the “dirty money flow.”
The two money flows intersect in the bank accounts of the missing 
trader (or sometimes the buffer), which is the in-out point and most 
vulnerable part of the scheme. The missing trader is a shell company per 
se and therefore does not have any assets or financial capacity. In order 
to purchase goods or services, the missing trader bank accounts need to 
be provided with income by the ring leader. This is the moment when 
the dirty money flow feeds into the clean money flow. Subsequently, the 
VAT embezzled within the fraudulent transactions is accumulated in the 
missing trader bank accounts and is eventually withdrawn or transferred 
in favour of the ring leader. At this point the clean money is converted 
back to dirty money, which can be invested in a new fraud cycle or 
laundered for the benefit of the ring leader.
As missing trader bank accounts are the most common target of tax 
and law-enforcement authorities, VAT fraud networks employ a variety 
of risk mitigation strategies to evade potential freezing or seizing of the 
money. In order to conceal the suspicious nature of the transactions, as 
well as the origin of the funds, fraudsters usually declare false premises 
for the transactions. For example the initial income to the missing 
traders account is disguised as advanced payment, intercompany loan, 
instalment for raise of capital or capital increase, unspecified payment 
through offshore accounts. Similarly the VAT embezzled might be 
declared as payments for consultancy services and transferred to an 
offshore bank account abroad (BG-E5). However, it seems that in 
most cases fraudsters usually resort to not very complicated strategies 
for concealment of the origin of the funds such as depositing the 
sums in cash with the assistance of proxy persons that act as agents 
with power of attorney. Less common is the introduction of offshore 
companies in such schemes as an instrument to conceal the origin of 
funds and hinder the detection and tracing of the chain of transactions 
(BG-E3).
Settlement 
of payments
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Another common strategy to mitigate the risks of detection and freezing 
is to keep the accounts of all actors involved in the scheme in the same 
bank and thus speed up the transfers. As a rule, all bank transactions are 
ordered in a single day at the end of the working week. Thus fraudsters 
minimise the risks of the accounts being frozen before all payments are 
completed and the defrauded VAT is withdrawn in cash or transferred 
to a safe offshore account (BG-E2).
The practices described above are possible, insofar as most VAT fraud 
networks operate with the aid of complicit bank clerks. Apparently, 
fraudsters are highly dependent on the acquiescence of the banks and 
bank officers. The assistance of a bank clerk is crucial not only for speeding 
up the transactions, but also for evading the anti-money laundering rules 
regarding suspicious transactions. Complicit bank clerks sometimes also act 
as informers in case there is inquiry about the accounts of the fictitious 
companies from the authorities. The clerks may act with or without 
the knowledge of the branch manager. However, many of the experts 
interviewed shared that it is a widespread and regular practice to feed 
the accounts of the missing traders with depositing large sums in cash. 
Similarly, in most cases the VAT embezzled is also regularly withdrawn 
in large sums in cash. This highlights flagrant violations of the anti-money 
laundering rules, insofar as such transactions should not be possible to 
remain unnoticed for a long period of time. However, apparently banks 
often fail to report such suspicious transactions, as senior management 
in many banks does not want to lose valuable customers and turns blind 
eye to such practices (BG-E3, BG-E4, BG-E22).
The size of the costs for initiating and perpetuating a VAT fraud scheme 
is a good indicator for the amount of initial capital needed to enter 
this criminal business. The analysis of the criminal financing related to 
organised VAT fraud shows that regardless of the type of schemes, the 
costs encountered by the fraudulent networks differ mainly in scale. 
However the structure of the costs is more or less similar. Since most of 
the schemes are based on trade in real goods or services, the lion’s share 
of the costs relate to the purchase of the goods or services. The only 
exception from this rule are the low profile schemes such as the invoice 
bazaars and the invoice mills, which are not trade-based but rather 
provide fictitious documents on a fee-for-services basis. Apart from the 
costs for purchase of real goods or services, the rest of the costs such as 
costs for registering bogus companies, fees for straw men and facilitators, 
corruption fees for public officials and remuneration to the actors from 
the outer circle of the fraud ring, are common for all schemes.
Costs related to purchase of real goods or services
Purchase of real goods usually requires substantial initial investments, 
especially when it comes to intra-community supplies or imports/exports. 
Most manufacturers, commodity markets, big wholesalers or exporters 
trade only in large quantities. They usually set a minimum order quantity, 
which may reach up to several hundred or even a thousand tonnes for 
products such as sugar, grain or fuel. Similarly, final recipients such as big 
Costs of doing 
business
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retailers or manufacturers also have requirements for minimal quantities 
and regularity of supplies. Thus, in order to set up a VAT fraud scheme 
based on import/export or intra-community supplies of real goods, a 
criminal network would need to invest a substantial amount of money. 
The investment would be justified as dealing in larger quantities is more 
profitable, insofar as it allows for economies of scale through cutting on 
the other expenses such as transportation, storage, bribery.
Several examples were provided in the interviews that reveal the size of 
these kinds costs. In a case related to VAT fraud with intra-community-
acquisition, the scheme started with a purchase of 200 tonnes of sugar 
worth of over €100,000 (BG-E4). On a second case related to VAT 
fraud with sugar, there were 5,000 tonnes imported from Moldova, so 
the investment only for the purchase of the product was about €2.5 
million. Another expert reported a VAT fraud case related to export of 
grain, where the criminal network invests €250,000 for the purchase of 
the grain (BG-E22). However, the size of the costs depends on the type 
of VAT scheme implemented. Acquisition frauds, where the goods are 
delivered only to be directly sold on the grey market would be possible 
even with low investment. Conversely, acquisition schemes aiming at 
selling the goods to big retailers apparently require much substantial 
investment that only criminal players with substantial financial capacity 
and established reputation could secure.
Furthermore, in most cases the goods or services, which are supplied to 
the final recipients of the fraudulent networks, are sold at prices below 
market value. This is the instrument of the fraudulent networks to secure 
market for their goods or services, whereby they lure legitimate companies 
through offering them discounted prices. However, such discounts can 
also be categorised as costs for the fraudulent network.
Costs related to logistics and transportation
Since many of the VAT fraud schemes are trade-based, costs related to 
transportation, storage and other logistics are indispensable part of all 
expenditures. In order to prove that the declared trade transactions are real, 
the fictitious traders need to provide not only documents for the origin of 
the goods (invoice) and payment documents (bank orders, receipts), but 
also transportation documents (bill of lading, CMR or consignment notes). 
Usually the transportation is by road, although big schemes may include 
maritime transportation as well. In order to keep these costs as low as 
possible, the bulk of the schemes related to intra-community supplies 
or imports/exports are usually set up to include legitimate or fictitious 
traders in the neighbouring countries such as Greece, Romania, Turkey, 
Serbia, Macedonia, Ukraine. For example, to have a truckload of sugar 
(about 22 tonnes) from Greece costs about €180,664 so the costs to ship 
2,000-2,200 tonnes of sugar would amount to €18,000.
Sometimes other logistic costs are also incurred. These could be related 
to storing of the goods or packaging. Packaging companies are a common 
664 Administrative Court Plovdiv, Case 3227/2012, Decision 359/11.02.2014.
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actor in many of the MTIC frauds, where they may appear as buffer or 
broker companies (BG-E16). They are included as many of the goods are 
imported in bulk and are required to be packaged and labelled before 
being sold in the retail outlets. The costs for packaging of 1 tonne of 
sugar are about €60,665 so for 2,000 tonnes, this amounts to €12,000. In 
schemes related to export of grains, storage costs are also an important 
expenditure. For excise goods frauds, storage costs are even higher, as 
only licenced warehouses can be used. Perishable goods such as meats, 
vegetables and fruits also may require specialised transportation and 
storage and more expensive packaging.
Costs related to remuneration of outer circle actors
Outer circle actors such as straw men, proxy persons, lieutenants, captains, 
accountants are usually paid on a fee-for-service basis. Straw men usually 
receive €25-€50 for allowing their identity to be used for registering a 
missing trader company; in addition to that they may receive €200-€250 
per month as a salary to act as an official representative of the fictitious 
company. Proxy persons are paid a fixed fee for each occasion they deal 
with bank institutions or tax authorities as agents with power of attorney 
from the fictitious company – one of the respondents mentioned a fee 
of €10-€25 per occasion (BG-E22). Buffer persons are also paid on 
a monthly basis along with certain percentage of each invoice issued. 
According to one of the respondents who was acting as an owner of 
a buffer company in a VAT fraud scheme, he was receiving a monthly 
salary of €500-€1,000 and 0.5% of the value of each invoiced issued 
by his company (BG-C2).
Lieutenants and captains usually receive a fixed monthly remuneration, 
as well as certain bonuses with the completion of each fraudulent cycle. 
A captain supervising a fraudulent ring may receive from €1,000-€2,000 
up to €5,000-€7,500 monthly depending on the scale of the activities 
(BG-E20). Lieutenants were reported to receive about €500 per month 
(BG-E21). Accountants are also paid a pre-agreed sum as a monthly 
salary, except if the group works with an accounting house which 
charges a percentage per each invoice. One of the offenders interviewed 
reported that they were paying to the accounting house 1% of the value 
of each invoice issued (BG-C2), while another respondent reported about 
20% of the embezzled VAT (BG-E21).
Costs related to establishing or acquiring a company
Registering a company in Bulgaria is relatively easy and an inexpensive 
process. Following the latest amendments of the Bulgarian Commerce 
Act in 2009, the initial capital required for establishing a limited liability 
company is only €1. Given that registration fees are about €150, these 
costs should not be an important barrier to the fraudsters. However, in 
order to demonstrate and prove capacity of a given fictitious company 
to the tax authorities, they might need to rent an office, warehouse 
665 L. Lekova, “Хипермаркети подбиват цената на захарта [Hypermarkets Undercut the Price of 
Sugar]”, Pressadaily.bg, August 06, 2012.
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or other commercial venues. They would also need to hire personnel. 
However, most missing trader companies would rather rent an office and 
hire workers for a week and only in case they have information about 
an upcoming tax audit (BG-E3).
Costs related to corruption
Corruption fees are an inherent part of the costs for initiating and 
perpetrating VAT fraud schemes. All respondents have discussed about 
the role of complicit officers from tax, customs and law enforcement 
institutions. The corrupt practices mentioned included selling of 
information (BG-C2), securing administrative protection against tax audits 
(BG-E20), securing administrative protection against customs control on 
goods imported or exported to third countries (BG-E10), admitting 
selected vehicles to enter through external border without exerting 
proper customs control (BG-C1), not exerting inland control by the 
customs mobile units (BG-C1, BG-E10), manipulation of the electronic 
system for registration of vehicles entering or leaving the country 
(BG-E11, BG-E17), forging of false or fictitious documents for import, 
export or transit of goods (BG-E13).
The analysis of the data suggests that the size of the corruption fees 
depends on the level of involvement of the respective public official, 
as well as on the level of risk he undertakes. However few of the 
respondents reported specific sums for the bribes paid. Table 48 
summarises several examples for corruption fees that were reported by 
the respondents.
Таble 53. reported size oF bribes For various corrupt practices 
in bulgaria
Corrupt practice Perpetrators Fees as reported (€) Source
Selling information about upcoming
tax audits.
Tax officer 150-200 per signal BG-C2
Allowing selected vehicles to enter 
the country without exerting proper 
customs control.
Customs officer 300-500 per van (Turkish 
cargo – apparel, perfumery)
BG-E10
Allowing selected vehicles to enter 
the country without exerting proper 
customs control.
Customs officer 1,750 per truck
(mobile phones)
BG-C1
Not exerting inland customs control
by a specialised customs mobile unit.
Customs
mobile unit
250 per truck
(mobile phones)
BG-C1
Not exerting control by a customs 
mobile unit.
Customs
mobile unit
1,750-2,500 per truck
(Chinese cargo)
BG-E10
Falsifying documents for import,
export or transit of goods.
Customs officer 250 per truck BG-C1
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Many of the experts interviewed provided examples for size of damage 
to the state budget established within investigations on specific cases. 
The damage established in one of the cases was €2 million (BG-E15), 
whereas in another was up to €13 million (BG-E13). However it should 
be noted that damage to the budget is neither equal to the actual 
revenues of the fraudulent networks, nor to their profits. First, the 
business models of the VAT schemes differ, so revenues may derive from 
different sources. Furthermore, part of these revenues is used to cover 
the costs of the fraudulent operation, so the profit margins also differ. 
Various opinions were shared regarding exactly how much of these 
revenues remain as a profit for the ring leaders.
Invoice bazaars and mills are fee-for-service based, so the revenues 
derive from the fees collected from the companies paying for fictitious 
invoices. Usually the fee is determined as a percentage of the VAT 
“cleared” on behalf of the customer. Experts reported that the fees 
are usually 10-15% of the VAT cleared, so if a VAT fraud ring clears 
€100,000 of VAT tax, the fraudsters will receive €10,000-€15,000. 
However, fraudsters have to cover various operational costs – accounting 
services, establishing missing trader companies, corruption fees, etc.
Acquisition fraud schemes and fictitious export schemes, which aim at 
selling goods domestically on the grey market without invoices or receipts 
profit from the mark-ups on the goods traded. As the goods are traded 
without VAT included, which is 20%, the fraudsters can afford to trade 
them below market value on the licit market and achieve mark-ups of 
10-15% at the expense of the VAT taxes evaded. However part of these 
revenues are supposed to cover transportation and storage costs, costs 
for establishing missing trader companies, as well as bribes.
Far more complex is the business model of MTIC schemes, which aim to 
accumulate VAT through purchases and sales to tax compliant companies 
and thus target the VAT credit mechanism instead of directly profiting 
Таble 53. reported size oF bribes For various corrupt practices 
in bulgaria (continued)
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on the interviews.
Corrupt practice Perpetrators Fees as reported (€) Source
Manipulation of the electronic system 
for registration of vehicles entering
or leaving the country.
Border guard 
officer
400-600 per week BG-E11
Securing administrative protection 
against customs control on goods 
imported or exported to third 
countries.
Senior official 
at the Customs 
Agency
25,000 per month/300,000 
per year
BG-E10
Profits and 
profit sharing
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through grey sales. Within these schemes, the size of the revenues from 
a given VAT fraud cycle is equal to the VAT tax embezzled by the 
missing trader(s), which amounts to 20% of missing trader’s purchases. 
Certainly, if the fraud ring manages to sell the imported or delivered 
goods with a mark-up on the price, this also contributes to the overall 
profit from the fraud activities. However, some of the experts claimed 
that in many cases the fraudsters sell the goods at the price they have 
purchased them abroad (BG-E4). Selling the goods with a minimal or 
without any mark-up would be possible only if the fraudulent network 
operates on a really large scale. The turnovers of the fraudulent networks 
should allow the embezzled VAT to cover all operational costs (e.g. 
transportation, fees for actors involved, corruption fees, etc.) and provide 
for substantial profit of the ring leaders. The analysis of the data shows 
that this could be achieved only with fraudulent turnovers exceeding one 
million euro for a given fraud cycle.
Table 49 attempts to reconstruct the costs and profit of an intra-community 
delivery fraud cycle, building on the information of one particular case 
concerning trade in wheat grain (BG-E22). However, as the information 
on all expenses was not known to the expert interviewed, data from 
several other interviews was also incorporated. The example is just for 
illustrative purposes, as much of the important details about costs and 
profits are based on assumptions. In this example the fraudulent scheme 
is put up by an owner of a big grain wholesale company. The wholesaler, 
who is the ring leader, provides the initial capital for purchase of 600-
660 tonnes of wheat grain from framers without invoices. Subsequently, 
through a fraudulent network of missing trader companies, the ring 
leader forges invoices to the wholesale company in order that the latter 
can prove VAT taxable purchases to the tax authorities. After selling the 
wheat grain with 43% mark-up to a big exporter, the missing traders 
accumulate the VAT and abscond without remitting it to the budget. The 
costs for the VAT fraud cycle are calculated for a one-month fraud cycle 
and account for the involvement of 6 missing traders and 2 buffers.
Few details were given in the interviews as to how the profits a shared 
between the inner circle actors in the VAT fraud networks. Some experts 
reported that the supervisor keeps 10% of the embezzled VAT tax 
and the rest remains for the ring leader (the owner of the wholesale 
company), as was in the case provided as an illustration in Table 49 (BG-
E22). Other respondents reported that the ring leader keeps 20-30% of 
the embezzled VAT tax (BG-E3). Most likely, profits depend on a number 
of factors such as number of actors involved, scale and complexity of 
the fraud scheme, levels of risk.
The profits from the VAT fraud operations are invested in various ways. 
Apparently investing in new fraudulent schemes or expanding existing 
ones is most widespread (BG-E3, BG-E20). Common strategy is to invest 
in real estate (BG-C2, BG-E1, BG-E3, BG-E20), as well as to keep some 
money in safety deposit boxes or in a bank accounts abroad as a “rainy 
day fund” (BG-C2, BG-E1, BG-E3). There was also a report from one 
of the experts interviewed about investing money from VAT frauds in 
loansharking (BG-E7).
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VAT fraudsters like any other criminal entrepreneurs face the risk of 
being investigated and prosecuted, as well as their money or assets 
being seized. Therefore they have to meet incidental expenses (such 
as loss of money or litigation expenses) or secure capital to restore 
business. Various scenarios for access to financing on such occasions 
were commented by the experts. First of all, the big players among 
ring leaders were believed to be able to manage in such cases by their 
own resources, since most of them also have large legitimate businesses, 
personal savings and various investments both in the country and 
abroad (BG-E3).
Small scale players rather rely on their social capital, as in many 
cases they anyway operate with advanced payments from customers 
or trade credit from their contractors abroad. One of the experts 
interviewed provided a notable example in support of this – notorious 
Таble 54. costs and proFits For a vat Fraud scheMe related 
to export oF wheat grain
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on the interviews.
type of cost Item costs (€)
Overall costs 
(€)
Establishing shell companies
(6 missing traders and 2 buffers)
200-300 per company 2,500 
Straw men’s remuneration
(6 straw men)
200 per person/month 1,200 
Buffer’s remuneration (2 buffers)
2,500 per person/month + 0.5%
of the value of each invoice
2,050 
Lieutenant/recruiter (2 lieutenants) 500 per month 1,000 
Captain/supervisor 1,000 per month 1,000 
Accounting company
1-1.5% of the value of each
prepared invoice
2,100 
Purchase cost of grain
(600-660 tonnes) 
320-350 per tonne 210,000 
Transport (30 trucks,
1 truck ->20-22 tonnes)
50 per truck 1,500 
Corruption fees per month 5,000 
Total investment per one month cycle 226,350 
Sell price (500 per MT without VAT) 300,000 
Net revenue 73,650 
VAT refund expected 60,000 
Profit (VAT + net revenue) 133,650 
Access to capital 
in critical moments
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VAT fraudster from Plovdiv received a trade credit of 200 tonnes of 
sugar from his former Greek counterpart in order to get back into 
business (BG-E4).
The problem with securing capital to get back into business concerns 
mostly trade-based schemes. However, fraudsters running fee-for service 
based schemes can easily resume their business at any time, since all 
they need is their reputation and contacts.
The value-added tax was introduced in Belgium in 1971 and replaced 
a number of consumption taxes such as the transfer tax (1921) and the 
tax on invoices (1923) which were originally meant to defray the costs 
of World War I.666 It was a European tax system that was turned into 
national legislation in order to achieve the objectives of the Treaty of 
Rome to create a common European market.667 The VAT is an important 
source of tax income of governments. In the EU, the VAT income 
amounts to more than €700 billion annually.668 In Belgium, the VAT 
accounted for 26.5% of total revenues of the Belgian state in 2012.669 But 
each year the Belgian National Treasury loses around 15% to 16% of all 
potential VAT income. In 2011, on a total of €30.9 billion VAT revenue, 
€4.9 billion in VAT collected by businesses never made it to the National 
Treasury.670 This difference between the theoretical tax liability and the 
actual revenue collected is called the VAT gap. In Belgium, the VAT gap 
was around 13% between 2005 and 2007, but increased significantly in 
the period between 2008 and 2011 to 16% due to the financial crisis. 
Although this loss of tax revenue has several causes,671 it is partially the 
result of (organised) VAT fraud.
Because of its broad taxable base and high rates, the VAT system is an 
attractive target for organised criminals.672 In Belgium the regular tariff for 
goods and services (new cars, cosmetics, home appliances) is 21%.673 In 
666 K. Vyncke, “De impact van BTW op ondernemingsgroepen: BTW-eenheid naar Belgisch, 
Buitenlands en supranationaal recht. [The Impact of VAT on Business Groups: VAT Unit 
according to Belgian, Foreign and Supra National Law]” (Leuven: KULeuven, 2009).
667 A. Claes, BTW-Carrousel: De fiscaal- en strafrechtelijke aanpak en de gevolgen voor de organisatoren, 
medeplichtigen en hun afnemers. [VAT Carousel: The Fiscal and Criminal Approach and the Consequences 
for the Organisers, Accomplices and Their Customers] (Gent, 2005).
668 European Commission, Clamping down on cross-border VAT fraud, Press release, 13 February 
2014.
669 Belgische Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers, Begrotingen van ontvangsten en uitgaven voor het 
begrotingsjaar 2013 – Algemene toelichting [Budget of Receipts and Expenses for the Budget Year 
2013 – General Explanation] (Brussel, 2012).
670 CASE, Study to Quantify and Analyse the VAT Gap in the EU-27 Member States – Final Report.
671 Such as bankruptcy, statistical errors, late payments, evasion, miscalculations and the 
performance of tax administrations (Ibid.).
672 J. Swinkels, “Carousel Fraud in the European Union”, International VAT Monitor, no. March/April 
(2008): 103-13.
673 There are two other tariffs: 6% for socially significant products and services (food, transportation, 
agricultural services) and 12% for certain goods and services that have an important economic 
or social objective (coal, margarine, subscription television).
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the early 1980s, however, the VAT amounted to 25% with a luxury tax 
of 8% (for televisions and videos, for example).674
As early as 1974, three years after the introduction of the VAT, a Belgian 
VAT inspector fled to Spain after he had embezzled €3 million of VAT 
revenues through a classic VAT carousel.675 As a criminal phenomenon, 
organised VAT fraud has been known to the Belgian police since the 
end of the 1970s. It was not, however, until 2002 that the police could 
rely on accurate and reliable information with regard to the scale of 
the fraud and the different methods being used by fraudsters.676 The 
reason for this delay is that for a long time there was no specific 
regulation on the cooperation between fiscal and judicial authorities. 
While as of 1980 the public prosecutor could summon the assistance of 
fiscal investigators, the cooperation between fiscal and judicial authorities 
gained momentum when fiscal experts were being seconded to the 
public prosecutor’s office in the beginning of the 1990s, and at the turn 
of the century a VAT fraud section was established within the Federal 
Police677 and a liaison cell between the judicial and fiscal authorities was 
created.678 The Support Cell Carousel Fraud679 was operational in 2001 
and provided a coordinated and comprehensive view on VAT fraud. 
Fiscal fraud, including organised VAT fraud, now is high on the Belgian 
political agenda. Tackling fiscal fraud is a priority for the police and is 
denoted as such in the subsequent National Security Plans of 2004-2007, 
2008-2011 and 2012-2015.
Based on data gathered by the Belgian Federal Police, the Support Cell 
Carousel Fraud and the Special Internal Revenues Service680 trends in 
organised VAT fraud can be identified. Organised VAT fraud in the 1980s 
concerned sales of cars, televisions, videos and computers, followed by 
mobile phones and electronics in the 1990s. Fraud involving informatics 
and computers took the lion’s share of VAT fraud cases between 2000 
and 2003. Fraud involving petrol, either through fictitious export, un-
declared import or misusing lower tariffs by purchasing abroad and selling 
domestically was minimal around the year 2003.681 Around the turn of 
674 B. Staes and A. Buedts, BTW carrousel fraude [VAT Carousel Fraud] (Brussels, 2011).
675 M. Van den Abeele, “Fraude carrousel [Carousel Fraud]”, in Face à la criminalité organisée en 
matière fiscale. [Confronted with Organised Crime in Fiscal Domains], ed. A. Zenner (Liège: Luc Piré 
Electronique, 2001).
676 M. Holsteyn, Vademecum georganiseerde BTW-fraude [Manual on Organised VAT Fraud] (Brussels, 
Belgian Federal Police, CDGEFID, 2004).
677 The VAT fraud section of the Central Office for Combating Organised Economic and Financial 
Delinquency (CDGEFID). This office is part of the Directorate for Combating Economic and 
Financial Crime (DJF) of the Belgian Federal Police.
678 Staes and Buedts, BTW carrousel fraude [VAT Carousel Fraud].
679 The Support Cell Carousel Fraud (Ondersteuningscel Carrouselfraude, OCS) of the Special 
Internal Revenue Service is a multidisciplinary organisation composed of experts from the 
police, the treasury, and the public prosecutor’s office. Its aim is to collect and share 
information on organised VAT fraud (E. Pearson, Maatregelen Op Europees En Nationaal Vlak Om 
B.T.W.-Fraude Aan Banden Te Leggen. [European and National Measures to Counter VAT Fraud] (Brussels, 
2010). Through data mining, it seeks to proactively counter VAT fraud (Federale Gerechtelijke 
Politie, Jaarverslag 2009 [Annual Report] (Brussels, 2010).
680 The Special Internal Revenue Service is a department of the Treasury (Federal Public Service). 
Its objective is to combat large-scale, organised fiscal fraud, including organised VAT fraud.
681 OCS, Un état des lieux sur la fraude organisée à la T.V.A. Années 2000 à 2003 [Inventory of Organised 
VAT Fraud. 2000 to 2003] (Brussels: Cellule de Soutien (O.C.S.) à la lutte contre les carrousels 
T.V.A., n.d.).
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the century, organised VAT fraud shifted towards immaterial assets and 
services in the gas and electricity market.682 With the enlargement of 
the EU in 2004 and 2007 organised VAT fraud flourished due to the 
expanded market sizes (BE-E1). More recently, criminal organisations 
discovered a gap in the carbon emissions market that allowed them 
to commit fraud through the carbon emissions trade. The first time 
Belgium was confronted with carbon emission fraud was in 2009 with a 
loss of €79 million.683 A recent phenomenon in organised VAT fraud is 
fraud on the silver market. While VAT is not levied on gold, it is levied 
on silver. A British firm bought jewels in other member states, but the 
goods never arrived; instead they were being sold under the counter 
in Belgium.684 Although access to the internet enables a globalisation 
of organised VAT fraud, according to the coordinator of the Support 
Cell Carousel Fraud the number of organised VAT fraud cases today is 
lower than ever before.685 Despite the optimism, more recent figures 
show a rise in serious organised VAT fraud cases.686 According to the 
Belgian Federal Police (CDGEFID), insufficiently strict inspections by the 
Treasury and technical adjustment in processing VAT data which has 
caused delays might explain the increase.687 This suggests that the police 
do assume that there is a real rise and more inspections are needed to 
prevent organised VAT fraud.
The market of organised VAT fraud permeates different segments of the 
economy. News and media coverage from the last five years report 
organised VAT fraud in economic sectors such as restaurants, food and 
beverage distributors, the wholesale of machines, lorries, computers and 
cars. In the annual reports of the Belgian Financial Intelligence Processing 
Unit (CTIF-CFI),688 a breakdown is made of the types of goods that were 
used in organised VAT fraud (Figure 43). Cars, car parts, IT, hi-fi and 
video players appear to be among the most frequent goods in organised 
VAT fraud.
The CTIF-CFI receives information from informants689 on suspicious 
financial transactions and, after processing the information, passes it on 
to the authorities. The number of cases referred to the Belgian authorities 
has declined steadily over the years. Whereas in 2003 140 cases of 
682 Conseil Interparlementaire Consultatif de Benelux, Visite de travail à l’administration belge de 
l'inspection spéciale des impôts. Thème de la visite: “Fraude carrousel” [Work Visit to the Belgian Special 
Internal Revenue Service. Theme of the Visit: Carousel Fraud] (Brussels, 2013).
683 Ibid.
684 Federale Gerechtelijke Politie, Jaarverslag 2012 [Annual Report].
685 Conseil Interparlementaire Consultatif de Benelux, Visite de Travail...
686 Bové, “Criminelen verdienen miljoenen dankzij lakse BTW-controle [Criminals Earn Millions 
Thanks to Lax VAT Audits]”.
687 Ibid.
688 The Belgian Financial Intelligence Processing Unit (CTIF-CFI), established in 1993, is an 
independent administrative authority with legal personality supervised by the ministers of justice 
and finance. CTIF-CFI is in charge of processing suspicious financial facts and transactions 
linked to money laundering and terrorism financing reported by institutions and individuals 
specified in the law of 11 January 1993.
689 Certain financial institutions and individuals have a legal obligation to report suspicious financial 
transactions to the CFIT-CFI. Those are, among others, the National Bank, credit institutions, 
the Postal Services for its financial services, payment institutions, insurance companies, 
management companies, etc.
Market overview
national	criminal	markets	and	Finances:	Vat	FraUd	 381
Figure 43. nuMber oF vat Fraud cases by types oF goods in belgiuM
Source: Annual reports of the CTIF-CFI, 2009 – 2013.
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organised VAT fraud were 
referred, this number dropped 
significantly to seven in 2012. 
According to the CTIF-CFI this 
is the result of the preventive 
approach by the judicial and 
fiscal authorities.690
Of course, the number of 
cases passed on by the CFIT-
CFI is merely a fraction of 
the total number of organised 
VAT fraud cases. According to 
statistics gathered by the VAT 
fraud section of the Federal 
Police, there were 111 cases of 
organised VAT fraud in 2011.691
A study by the Belgian State Audit Office in 2009 collected information 
from the Support Cell Carousel Fraud and the Special Internal Revenues 
Service which gave an indication on the evolution of organised VAT 
fraud in Belgium.692 Table 50 provides an overview of the number 
of cases the Special Internal Revenues Service has finalised and the 
690 CTIF-CFI, 19e Activiteitenverslag 2012 [Activity Report].
691 Federale Gerechtelijke Politie, Jaarverslag 2011 [Annual Report].
692 Rekenhof, “Intracommunautaire BTW-fraude [Intra Community VAT Fraud]”.
Figure 44. nuMber oF organised vat Fraud cases reFerred 
to the authorities by the cFit-cFi in belgiuM
Source: Annual reports of the CTIF-CFI, 2009 – 2013.
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amount of VAT fraudsters have 
to redeem.
Not all organised fraud cases 
involve large sums of VAT. Of 
the total amount of VAT that 
has been embezzled in 2005, 
2006 and 2007, fifteen cases 
take the lion’s share: respec-
tively 55%, 75% and 72%. 
Recovering VAT proves to be 
an arduous task. Concerning 
the fifteen biggest cases, the 
Special Internal Revenues 
Service has been able to re-
cover merely a fraction of the 
VAT still due.
Because of the difficulties in 
recovering embezzled VAT, 
Belgian judicial and fiscal au-
thorities invest in data mining 
by the Support Cell on month-
ly or quarterly VAT declara-
tions.693 As the authorities are 
not able to investigate every 
VAT declaration due to limited 
resources, cases are being se-
lected based on pre-defined 
parameters. Since 2004, data 
mining enabled the authorities 
to better detect companies that 
pose an increased fraud risk. 
Various mathematical models 
are being used on combined 
transactional data focused on 
different types of fraud: buffers, 
conduit companies, and cross 
invoices. Besides these models, 
data mining models from Eurocanet (the European Carousel Network) 
are being used as well.694
Recently, the Belgian State Secretary for Combating Social and Fiscal Fraud 
presented the Social Network Analysis project – a project that has success-
fully been tested in the Benelux – to the European Commission. Through 
this instrument, all fraud analyses are being brought together in one method 
which enables the visualisation of fraud mechanisms in real time.695
693 Federale Gerechtelijke Politie, Jaarverslag 2009 [Annual Report].
694 Rekenhof, “Intracommunautaire BTW-fraude [Intra Community VAT Fraud].”
695 Benelux, “Benelux presenteert aan Europa oplossing om BTW-fraude sneller op te sporen 
[Benelux Presents Europe a Solution to Faster Track VAT Fraud]”, Benelux Press Release, May 07, 
2014.
Figure 45. nuMber oF organised vat Fraud reports – 
belgian Federal police
Source: Federale Gerechtelijke Politie, Jaarverslag 2011 [Annual Report] (Brussels, 2012).
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Таble 55. vat claiMed by the belgian special internal revenues service 
FroM carousel Fraud
Source: Rekenhof, “Intracommunautaire BTW-fraude [Intra Community VAT Fraud]” 
(Report of the Belgian Court of Auditors to the Parliament, Brussels, 2009), 43.
Year Claimed VAt (€)
Number of finalised 
VAt cases 
2007 75,773,882 127
2006 115,577,751 125
2005 99,201,895 146
2004 127,256,181 163
2003 230,019,465 205
2002 338,498,739 167
2001 413,020,064 471
2000 448,549,423 329
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As a result, the financial damages 
to the Belgian National Treasury 
gradually declined, with the 
exception of the year 2009 
due to carbon emission fraud. 
In 2012, a historical low was 
reached which was attributed 
by the State Secretary to the 
speed of detection of the 
fraud.696 
This steady decline seems to 
have lulled the tax administra-
tion into thinking that organised 
VAT fraud was under control 
because in 2013 there was 
a sharp rise of damages to 
€48 million. According to the 
Federal Police, this sharp rise 
is partially due to an internal 
decision within the tax 
administration. In 2010, the 
administration had decided to 
decrease the burden they put 
on companies by immediately 
sending an inspector each time 
a company claimed a large 
VAT refund. Consequently, 
some companies – even when 
they were requesting millions 
of euros of VAT returns – 
were no longer troubled by 
a visit by the VAT inspector 
for up to two years. Moreover, 
technical adjustments caused 
several months delay in processing VAT data, slowing down fraud 
detection.697
Based on an analysis of 320 large VAT fraud cases, eight modus operandi 
were identified by the Support Cell Carousel Fraud in 2004:698
i. In 37.3% of the cases a missing trader was involved. A missing 
trader is a company that does not meet its VAT obligations either 
by not returning a VAT declaration, returning a declaration of zero 
activities or returning a declaration but not paying the VAT that is 
696 J. Crombez, “Nieuw laagterecord voor BTW-fraude [New All-Time Low for VAT Fraud]”, 2013, 
http://www.s-p-a.be/artikel/nieuw-laagterecord-voor-btw-fraude/
697 Bové, “Criminelen verdienen miljoenen dankzij lakse BTW-controle [Criminals Earn Millions 
Thanks to Lax VAT Audits]”.
698 OCS, Un état des lieux sur la fraude organisée à la T.V.A. années 2000 à 2003 [Inventory of Organised 
VAT Fraud. 2000 to 2003].
Таble 56. share oF recovered vat in the 15 biggest Fraud cases 
in belgiuM
Source: Rekenhof, “Intracommunautaire BTW-fraude [Intra Community VAT Fraud]”, 44.
Year
Share of embezzled amount
that was recovered
2007 0.0001%
2006 0.032%
2005 0.004%
Market structure 
and actors
Figure 46. daMage by organised vat Fraud in belgiuM, Million €
Source: L. Bové, “Criminelen verdienen miljoenen dankzij lakse BTW-Controle 
[Criminals Earn Millions Thanks to Lax VAT Audits]”, De Tijd, June 26, 2014; 
Federale Gerechtelijke Politie, Jaarverslag 2012 [Annual Report] (Brussels, 2013), 45.
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due. Companies that are used as missing trader can be recently 
established or being re-activated. The manager of the missing trader 
is often a low-ranking person recruited by the organiser who is 
promised to earn a lot of money in a short period of time. Fake 
identities are being used when no straw man is found. The company’s 
headquarters is often merely a post office box. Usually after a few 
months, the straw man disappears and the company’s administrative 
seat is abandoned. Missing trader intra-community fraud (MTIC) 
remains one of the most important forms of organised VAT fraud 
in Europe and is reported to generate €100 billion losses to EU 
member states.699
ii. In 20.7% of the cases organised VAT fraudsters used a buffer 
company. In the flow of invoices, this company comes after the 
missing trader and shields the organizer from the missing trader. 
Generally, the buffer company complies with the VAT regulations. 
In that way, a buffer company serves two purposes: making it more 
difficult for investigators to uncover the VAT fraud on the one hand 
and provide credibility to the invoices directed to the customer. 
The study revealed a geographical distinction in Belgium: whereas 
missing traders are primarily found in Brussels and the Walloon 
region, buffers are mainly found in Flanders.700
iii. An increasingly popular method used in organised VAT fraud, is 
crossing invoices which accounts for 18.7% of total cases. The 
missing trader is harder to detect and it enables the organiser 
to maximise the profits. A company that does not return a VAT 
declaration will be quickly detected by the authorities. By crossing 
invoices, partially based on fictitious figures, the VAT declaration 
will show a small amount of VAT due and the fraud will not 
immediately draw the attention of the authorities. Crossing invoices 
is the trademark of small groups or groups of specialised organisers. 
Some schemes were active for over three years.
iv. False intra-community deliveries make up 10.8% of the cases. 
Goods are reported as being supplied to another EU member state 
(and thus exempt from VAT), but are sold on the domestic black 
market instead. This method is closely related to the fictitious export 
and takes advantage of the slow and often lacking cooperation 
between the member states.
v. The in-and-outers are found in 9.1% of total cases. The in-and-
outer is used to evade taxes in other member states. For example, 
goods are obtained by Company A in Belgium from a member state 
(company B in the UK, for example) and immediately redirected, 
usually to the country of origin (in this case, company C in the 
UK). The customers are always the missing traders based in the 
member state of destination. In most cases goods are actually being
699 Europol, SOCTA 2013. EU Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment.
700 OCS, Un état des lieux sur la fraude organisée à la T.V.A. années 2000 à 2003 [Inventory of Organised 
VAT Fraud. 2000 to 2003].
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 delivered, even when these goods return to the country of origin. 
Organisers of this kind of VAT fraud are, according to the Support 
Cell, often well-known VAT fraudsters.
vi. False invoices were being used in 3% of the cases. False invoices 
are found in different markets, but are not an often used method 
in organised VAT fraud. The profits are limited compared to more 
traditional modus operandi. False invoices are often issued by isolated 
fraudsters with a large number of consumers.
vii. The roots of false intra-community deliveries can be found in the 
fictitious export of goods which occurred in 0.2% of the cases. 
Although these methods share a common objective, the difference 
is that while false intra-community deliveries occur within the EU, 
fictitious export is directed towards third countries. False transport 
documents and/or false customs stamps are needed to mislead 
border controls.
viii. The last method identified in the Support Cell analysis, is fraud 
with the margins of the sale of second hand cars. The taxation 
on the sales of second hand cars is subject to a special regulation 
that avoids VAT being paid on the price in total, but only on the 
profit margin. This system is being used by fraudsters on cars that 
are subject to the normal VAT regulation. In most cases second hand 
cars, such as short-term leasing cars are bought in another member 
state (often Germany) using the intra-community delivery and sold 
with a low profit margin on both the domestic, but also the South-
European market.
A review of recent news cov-
erage of organised VAT fraud 
not only corroborates the find-
ings of the Support Cell, but 
also sheds light on the goods 
and services involved and the 
amount of VAT revenues col-
lected by the organisers. A first 
economic sector that is often 
mentioned in news coverage 
of organised VAT fraud is the 
truck, trailer and cars trade. 
Investigating a case of meat 
fraud in 2009, the police dis-
covered a VAT carousel involv-
ing trucks. The organiser and 
two straw men bought a trans-
portation company that was 
used as a cover for a parallel 
circuit in the trade of trucks. 
Police investigators discovered 
that money from the meat fraud was being laundered through truck 
companies. Through numerous buffer companies they managed to em-
Figure 47. breakdown oF the Modi operandi oF organised 
vat Fraud in belgiuM
Source: OCS, Un état des lieux sur la fraude organisée à la T.V.A. années 2000 à 2003 
[Inventory of Organised VAT Fraud. 2000 to 2003], 13.
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bezzle millions of euros in VAT revenue.701 Another VAT fraud scheme 
involving trucks and trailers was unearthed two years later. 35 suspects 
and 12 Belgian and Dutch companies stood trial in 2012.702 In 2014, the 
Federal Police arrested two car dealers on charges of large scale VAT 
fraud the sales of cars. The fraud was organised through a limited li-
ability company with false VAT declarations. The Belgian treasury missed 
out on €3 million.703
Another economic sector vulnerable to organised VAT fraud is the 
catering industry. In 2002, a large fiscal fraud was detected with two 
beverage stores that were taken over by brewery Alken-Maes. Beer was 
being sold under the counter to around 300 barkeepers.704 A similar 
case was uncovered in Ghent where a beverage store sold beverages 
and liquor under the counter to thousands of cafés. Around 50% of 
the beverages were being sold under the counter. False invoices were 
drafted to obscure the fraud.705 In 2013, the managers of eight restaurants 
settled with the tax administration for an amount of €10 million. The 
method the restaurant owners used was quite simple: when a customer 
did not ask for a receipt and paid in cash, the money went to a “black 
cash register.” When customers paid with a credit card or did ask for a 
receipt, the money went into the legitimate cash register. This allowed 
the managers to skim off some €150,000 per month.706 In 2013, Belgian 
and Dutch inland revenue services discovered a large-scale VAT-fraud 
with mussels that amounted to several hundred thousand euros. It all 
centred around a Dutch mussel trader. In the Dutch accountancy, the 
inland revenue services discovered false identities and managed to 
find the real addressees of the traded mussels. 20 companies and 80 
individuals bought fresh mussels on a large scale from the trader, but 
failed to declare VAT in their declaration.707 In another case, in 2014 
the VAT section of the Belgian Federal Police interrogated two business 
managers of a wholesale company specialised in supplying food for pitta 
shops. Months of investigation brought to light that the managers used 
different fraud schemes to embezzle VAT revenues. They used fictitious 
traders that were established abroad in order to camouflage fictitious 
sales. This enabled them to sell products without VAT on the Belgian 
market and create a black money circuit. They also purchased non-
declared goods from suppliers and used Belgian commercial structured 
with inflated turnover to sell goods on the black market. The different 
circuits used by the two suspects had an estimated value of €20 
701 VILT, “Zaakvoerders tagex gel vrijgesproken voor BTW-Fraude [Business Managers of Tagex Gel 
Acquitted for VAT Fraud]”, 2009, http://www.vilt.be/Zaakvoerders_Tragex_Gel_vrijgesproken_
voor_btw-fraude
702 MTY, “Alfred Hoet veroordeeld voor BTW-fraude. [Alfred Hoet Sentenced for VAT Fraud]”, Het 
Nieuwsblad, December 19, 2012.
703 Federal Police, “Twee verdachten van fiscale fraude en heling opgepakt te Luik [Two suspects 
arrested for fiscal fraud and fencing in Liège]”, Press release, June 27, 2014.
704 Mceulemans, “Opschorting in plaats van celstraffen voor bierfraude [Suspension instead of 
Prison Sentence for Beer Fraud]”, Gazet van Antwerpen, March 01, 2013.
705 X, “Creve Drinks in de etalage na bierfraude [Creve Drinks for Sale after Beer Fraud]”, De Tijd, 
August 19, 2013.
706 X, “Gentse broers van Amadeus kopen fraudeproces af voor € 10 miljoen. [Ghent Brothers of 
the Amadeus Settle for € 10 Million]”, Benelux Agri Press, August 28, 2013.
707 P. Luysterborg, “Grootschalige BTW-fraude met mosselen ontdekt. [Large-Scale Fraud Discovered 
with Mussels]”, Het Laatste Nieuws, August 22, 2013.
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million. According to the police, out of the 20 million, 8 million is 
connected to fraud.708
In 2014, a criminal network of Belgian firms stood trial on charges of 
organising a VAT carousel. They exploited the zero rating of exports and 
the deferred payment regulation by exporting goods to Portugal, France, 
Germany and Austria. By using forged documents they tried to claim over 
€10 million in 2009.709 Another classic VAT carousel was dismantled in 
Brussels in that same year. Seven firms from all over Belgium moved their 
firms to the same city between 2011 and 2013 and started handing in 
similar VAT declarations. They declared purchases including VAT in Belgium 
and sales abroad excluding VAT. Between March 2011 and March 2014 
the tax administration paid €4.8 million to the seven firms. One suspect 
managed to cash €600,000 in three months’ time. Seven companies have 
been identified and three suspects have been arrested. Two of them are 
being suspected of being front men for the organisation.710
On the first of January 2005, trade in carbon emissions rights was 
enabled in the EU. This trade occurs between smoke-stack industries that 
emit a lot of hazardous fumes and is the result of the Kyoto Protocol 
that obliged countries to reduce greenhouse gases. The objective for 
Belgium was a reduction of 7.5% between 2008 and 2012.711 The Kyoto 
Protocol allowed industries to achieve its objectives by buying emission 
rights abroad. Each year, EU member states deposited the allocated 
emission rights on the accounts of the companies. When companies did 
not achieve their objectives, they had to buy emission rights from other 
companies that had realised a surplus. In most cases these rights were 
bought through trade platforms. According to the World Bank, the global 
emission trade had a value of €103 billion.712 In 2009, Europol estimated 
that due to carousel fraud with carbon emission rights, around €5 billion 
was lost. In some countries, up to 90% of the whole market volume 
was caused by fraudulent activities.713 In Belgium, there was a loss of 
€79 million. As a result, as of January 2010 the reverse charge rule was 
introduced which stipulated that it was no longer the seller but the buyer 
that had to pay VAT. After the introduction of the reverse charge rule, 
the volume of carbon emission rights sold on the Dutch exchange market 
Climex dropped by 75%.714
In 2002, some 40 criminal organisations active in organised VAT fraud 
were known to the police. The real figure is reported to be 20% to 
708 Federal Police, “BTW-fraude in een groothandel van voedingswaren voor pitazaken [VAT fraud 
in wholesale business for food for pita restaurants]”, Press release, May 20, 2014.
709 Tmas, “Acht beklaagden riskeren tot veertig maanden cel voor BTW-fraude”, Het Belang van 
Limburg, March 25, 2014.
710 Bové, “Criminelen verdienen miljoenen dankzij lakse BTW-controle [Criminals Earn Millions 
Thanks to Lax VAT Audits]”.
711 L. Barrezeele, “Fraude met broeikasgasemissierechten [Carbon Emission Fraud]”, Audit, Control 
and Governance 14(9), no. 1-3 (2011).
712 World Bank, State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2010 (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 
Carbon Finance, 2010).
713 Europol, “Carbon credit fraud causes more than 5 billion euros damage for European taxpayer”, 
Press release, December 9, 2009.
714 Barrezeele, “Fraude met broeikasgasemissierechten [Carbon Emission Fraud]”.
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40% higher.715 According to the police, in 2014, between five and ten 
active organised crime groups were involved in VAT fraud. Most of 
these groups were specialised in VAT fraud and were, in principle, only 
involved in VAT fraud. There are exceptions, however. Some groups were 
also involved in drug trafficking. According to the police, there were clear 
links between carbon emission fraud and cocaine trafficking (BE-E1).
The connection between organised VAT fraud and drug trafficking might 
not come as a surprise as organised VAT fraudsters specialised in MTIC, 
for example, are experts in customs administration and in import and 
export of goods. On April 2, 2014, a well-known organiser of VAT 
carousels was sentenced to seven years imprisonment after he had 
been caught shipping a container with 702 kg cocaine from Panama 
to Belgium.716 He was approached by two drug dealers because of his 
expertise and experience with shipping goods abroad and his knowledge 
of customs administration (CP42). In other words, the drug dealers used 
a VAT carousel organiser because of his expertise (BE-E1).
The size of criminal groups involved in organised VAT fraud depends on 
the project (BE-E1). Based on data from 2002, there was an estimate 
that within each criminal network, an average of 16 persons is involved. 
One person typically controls the activities and relies on two lieutenants. 
Besides his lieutenants, the organiser can count on an average of 13 
straw men.717 In some of the bigger cases the police had dealt with, 
there were 35 persons involved. The inner circle usually consists of three 
to four persons. Though these figures might suggest a certain sustainable 
working relationship between the fraudsters, in reality, the connections 
within these groups are flexible. Generally, there is an organiser who 
conducts a number of projects with several people. An organiser did not 
only have accountants working for him, but also two managing directors 
of bank agencies. That is, however, rather exceptional (BE-E1).
Personnel turnover is reportedly high. According to the police, the 
organisation could look completely different within two years. This is 
partially due to arguments about money (sharing of profits). Still, according 
to the police, the organisation resembles a legal business: it is all about 
business deals and projects. Management instruments are being used as 
well (BE-E1).
Sources of capital for criminal operations. Profile of financiers 
in criminal operations
Criminal groups venturing into organised VAT fraud need capital for 
establishing or creating companies and acquiring goods. However, language 
skills, knowledge, networks and expertise are far more important to 
715 C. Vanschoubroek and L. Van Eylen, “Gerecht kent veertig BTW-netwerken [Judicial Authorities 
Know Forty VAT Networks]”, De Standaard, March 19, 2002.
716 Ibo, “Celstraffen tot 7 jaar voor invoer van 700 kilo cocaïne. [Prison Sentences up to 7 Years 
for Trafficking Cocaine]”, Het Nieuwsblad, April 02, 2014.
717 Vanschoubroek and Van Eylen, “Gerecht kent veertig BTW-netwerken [Judicial Authorities 
Know Forty VAT Networks]”.
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organisers of VAT fraud schemes than money. The predominant source of 
capital are reinvestments: profits gained from previous criminal activities 
(very often VAT fraud) are invested in new projects. Organisers either 
use their own money or seek investors.
There are several ways in which organisers acquire capital for initiating 
and sustaining their criminal operations. Based on information received 
from the police a rather diverse picture can be drawn. In a recent case, 
a long-time VAT fraud organiser started a new project with old and new 
accomplices and invested money gained from an earlier project to initiate 
a new project. Sometimes, organizers have been found to have initiated 
the VAT fraud through “business loans.” In some cases legal businessmen 
granted organisers a loan in return for interests and capital repayments, 
but also for a share of the profits and the risks. A stock exchange broker, 
for example, was introduced into a fraud scheme and had decided to 
finance the operation with legal money (up to €60 million). The broker 
was largely compensated with legal and illegal profits for the services he 
had rendered. However, financing through loans occurs rarely because 
there is a lot of mistrust between and within criminal groups. Crime 
money, invested by other criminals for a share of profits was another 
source of start-up capital. Drug traffickers had been found to invest cash 
money in the fraud scheme in order to be refunded in larger bank notes. 
However, while crime money has indeed been invested in organised VAT 
fraud in some cases, criminals who are not familiar with organised VAT 
fraud very rarely step into the business themselves. Over a period of 
thirty years, the police once came across a drug dealer who had bought 
companies and had established a carousel in order to re-invest his drug 
money (BE-E1).
According to BE-E1, the investors and fraudsters are connected to 
each other through criminal links. The investors are often high-level, 
experienced organisers or organisations. Starting capital is needed to 
initiate a first operation, but soon afterwards the operation finances 
itself. In more recent fraud cases involving carbon emission rights, the 
investment schemes were more complicated. In these cases offshore 
accounts were frequently used to collect money from (offshore) investors 
(BE-E1). In one case there were temporary loans from Singapore to the 
profit taker (exporter) to cover the period of time that is needed to 
be reimbursed by the VAT administration (Ibid.). For carbon emission 
fraud, one needs to find companies that have money. One infamous 
fraudster, Alex Khan (real name Cyril Astruc), for example, targeted 
Fortis and Electrabel. The latter paid around €4 million, but was 
alarmed after ten days. It took Fortis much more time to detect danger 
and it lost €72 million as a result.718 Groupe Energie One (GEO), 
nothing more than a post office box in Brussels and led by a straw 
man, bought carbon emission rights on Blue Next, the former European 
environmental trading exchange in Paris, for around €350 million. As 
this transaction was an intra-community delivery, no VAT was paid. GEO 
sold the emission rights including VAT to another decoy company IRM. 
718 M. Eeckhaut, “Zware klap voor CO2-maffia [Heavy Blow for the Carbon Emission Mafia]”, De 
Standaard, January 12, 2013.
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In turn, IRM sought companies that were willing to buy carbon emission 
rights at very low prices. While Electrabel was suspicious about the low 
prices, Fortis bought carbon emission rights for around €400 million. 
When Fortis raised the alarm, it was too late – GEO, the company 
that had cashed the VAT had never turned over the VAT to the Belgian 
Treasury.719
The cases of the carbon emission fraud with Fortis and Electrabel 
demonstrate the important role of the end customer or retailer in 
acquisition fraud schemes (when goods or services are actually being 
sold to final customers). In the case of Alex Khan, it was important to 
sell carbon emission rights to Fortis, for example, because that way the 
initial investment could be recovered, profit made and VAT (paid by 
Fortis) embezzled. The scheme was not successful with Electrabel due to 
the quick reaction of its junior and senior staff (BE-E1). This does invite 
the question as to what extent the end users or retailers purchasing 
goods and services from fraudsters are informed about the schemes or 
even involved. During the study of the different cases, it is clear that 
both the police and the judiciary are very critical towards the role end 
customers or retailers may play in fraudulent schemes. There are indeed 
cases in which the authorities suspect retailers of having participated in 
fraud schemes. This is, however, difficult to prove. According to the law, 
if one knows or should know that the acquisition or sales of goods or 
services are part of VAT fraud he can be found accessory to organised 
VAT fraud. In one case, a computer dealer bought a large number of 
computers from a brand new supplier. The latter sold computers far 
below the market price. The authorities, however, were not able to 
prove that the computer dealer knew he was involved in a VAT fraud 
scheme. The Court of Cassation ruled that abnormally low prices do not 
indicate that one is implicated in organised VAT fraud.720 In the cases 
studied during the research, no hard evidence was presented that end 
customers or retailers invested money in VAT fraud schemes in order to 
benefit from lower prices.
Organised VAT fraud is a lucrative business. As already mentioned, 
organisers of VAT fraud schemes very often re-invest money earned from 
previous fraud schemes in new ones. In the case of Khan, it is reported 
that he was involved in cocaine trafficking and the sales of luxury goods 
such as cell phones, false papers, luxury cars, etc.721 He stood trial in 
Toulouse for VAT fraud with cell phones in 2002.722
Pay settlements are either done in cash or through bank transfers. 
Payment platforms are also being used. Banks only see the financial 
719 J. Laruelle, “Fortis, victime des fraudeurs au CO2 [Fortis, Victim of Carbon Emissions Fraud]”, 
La Libre, January 21, 2013.
720 J. Sandra and S. Vancolen, “Abnormale lage aankoopprijzen – geen bewijs medeplichtigheid 
aan BTW-fraude! [Abnormally Low Prices Are No Evidence of Complicity in VAT Fraud!]”, 2013, 
http://www.imposto.be/nl/kennisbank/nieuwsbrieven/abnormaal-lage-aankoopprijzen-geen-
bewijs-medeplichtigheid-aan-btw-fraude
721 W. Molinié, “[1er Volet] Les escrocs de la fraude à la taxe carbone: ceux qui ont été arrêtés 
[Carbon Emission Fraudsters: Those Who Got Arrested]”, 20 Minutes, March 12, 2014.
722 Laruelle, “Fortis, victime des fraudeurs au CO2 [Fortis, Victim of Carbon Emissions Fraud]”.
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movements of the payment platforms. These platforms are not located 
in Belgium. FCIB (First Curacao International Bank), which existed 
from 2004 – 2007, was a popular payment platform among criminal 
groups involved in organised VAT fraud. All known entrepreneurs/
companies involved in VAT carousel fraud had an account with the 
FCIB (BE-E1).
Bank transfers, often to foreign accounts, or payment platforms are 
being used to kick-start the organised VAT fraud scheme but also to 
cash in the profits made from the fraud. These funds are then often 
laundered in the real estate market. Cash, however, does play a role 
as well. In the case of the seven companies involved in organised VAT 
fraud, for example, the revenues (€4.8 million) disappeared through 
foreign accounts in France and Spain or were cashed in. One suspect 
withdrew €600,000 in cash in a period of merely three months.723 Cash 
comes in handy to reimburse expenses or to pay accomplices. Within 
the network, agreements are being made on how the money is split. 
There are no standard agreements: in one case the “staff” receive a 
share of the profit, in another case remuneration for the services they 
have delivered (BE-E1).
In normal circumstances, organisers and the staff stick to their agree-
ments. But in some cases violence has been used as well. In April 2010, 
a “button man” (a person doing the dirty work) who helped transport 
the millions of euros of profit made in the carbon emission fraud was 
killed in broad daylight in France. In military style, a death squad jumped 
out of a van, killed the victim and ran off on a motorcycle and a car 
after having set the van on fire in order to erase traces.724
The costs of doing business vary and depend on the nature of the VAT 
fraud project that is being set-up. In most typical VAT cases, the costs 
needed to start a VAT fraud scheme were relatively low. Shell companies 
are relatively easy to get and accounts often know people willing to take 
over a company (BE-E1). Creating a company in Belgium costs around 
€1,850.725 Additional capital is, however, needed in order to pay straw 
men, legal administration and transportation costs. The organiser will also 
have to look for a partner who is able to supply goods at a reduced 
price or even lend them. In order to initiate a VAT carousel, €50,000 is 
reportedly sufficient. Once up and running, the network sustains itself 
and no additional funds are needed (BE-E1). Of course, people need 
to be paid. Straw men and helpers usually receive a fixed amount. A 
straw man is usually entitled to one to two percent of the profit, which 
is well-paid.
723 Bové, “Criminelen verdienen miljoenen dankzij lakse BTW-controle [Criminals Earn Millions 
Thanks to Lax VAT Audits]”.
724 L. Bové, “BNPP Fortis doet België 70 miljoen cadeau un fraudezaak [BNP Fortis Gives Belgium 
a Present of 70 Million in Fraud Case]”, De Tijd, December 15, 2014; C. Cornevin and C. Louis, 
“Fin de partie pour les escrocs Franco-Israéliens du siècle [The End Game for the French-Israeli 
Fraudsters]”, Le Figaro, February 11, 2014.
725 AB Consult, “BVBA oprichtingskosten [Preliminary Flotation of Limited Liabilities Companies]”, 
2013, http://www.ab-consult.be/artikels/ondernemingen/bvba-oprichtingskosten-110/
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In the 1980s and 1990s, the profit criminal groups made from VAT fraud 
was around 3.5%, in some cases even 5%-6% (BE-E1).
The inner circle shares the net profits. There is a lot of stealing and 
cheating inside criminal groups and most of the organisations split up 
with arguments over money and the sharing of the profit. The VAT Cell 
of the Federal Police had a case in which they had found the detailed 
excel tables used by the criminal organisation to calculate the profits 
and the distribution of the profits. In general, the gross profit is the VAT 
stolen. But the sale at a loss (10%) has to be taken into account. The 
net profit is 5% to 7% of the fraudulent turnover (BE-E1).
Financers/investors make sure their share of profit or loan repayment 
is returned. They either steal from the members of the organisation or 
threaten them. Members of a VAT fraud scheme planned a raid on a 
disloyal member of the organisation who was accused of stealing money 
and who was suspected of leaking information to the police. The plot 
was uncovered through phone surveillance by the police (BE-E1).
Criminal groups involved in organised VAT fraud try to connect with legal 
activities as soon as possible. Often profits from organised VAT fraud are 
reinvested in legal businesses. One organiser, for example, started a legal 
transport company with partners from outside the criminal world. He 
also invested money in a beauty centre for his mistress which she tried 
to explain as her income from her earlier prostitution activities (BE-E1). 
In the case of the parallel circuit of the trade in trucks and trailers, in 
which 35 persons stood trial in 2012, the VAT revenues were laundered 
through the real estate market by the purchase of a villa with horse 
stables, luxury cars and horses. The other part of the money went to 
the world of jumping and horse-breeding.726 In the case of Alex Khann 
(carbon emissions fraud), the profits were spent on luxury cars, a luxury 
house in Israel (worth €20 million), four shops and a night club in Tel 
Aviv.727 These stories corroborate the findings of the police that the 
profits of organised VAT fraud are being spent on real estate (abroad) 
and the creation of new companies. Of a profit of around €300,000, 
€100,000 is being reinvested in companies. The profits of organised VAT 
fraud are also spent on personal expenses, new VAT fraud schemes, on 
other criminal businesses as a re-investment, in legitimate businesses, in 
property or are being set aside in bank accounts abroad. With regard to 
re-investments in criminal businesses, drug trafficking and swindles have 
turned up in police case files (BE-E1).
Most organisers of organised VAT fraud who had been convicted tend 
to recommence their fraudulent activities once released from prison. An 
example was given of a missing trader who worked with straw men in 
Belgium and Germany. The organiser contacted his lieutenant while the 
latter was on penitentiary leave (he was convicted for carousel fraud). On 
726 T. Verheijen, “Man opgepakt voor grootschalige BTW-оraude. Gazet van Antwerpen. [Man 
Arrested for Large-Scale VAT Fraud]”, Gazet van Antwerpen, June 28, 2011.
727 Cornevin and Louis, “Fin de partie pour les escrocs Franco-Israéliens du siècle [The End Game 
for the French-Israeli Fraudsters]”.
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his leave, the lieutenant and the organiser had several meetings (BE-E1). 
Start-up capital is found in savings or investments from previous activities 
or in cooperation with others, as indicated in the example above.
Of course, when the organiser is caught, he will need access to capital 
to refund the suppliers and pay the lawyers. However, according to 
BE-E1, the suppliers very often do not get paid and as a consequence 
their business relationships with organisers always end in arguments over 
money. Lawyers, on the other hand do get paid. In one case, the lawyer 
was paid through an offshore account. The organiser was paying the 
lawyer with the money he had earned from the carousel fraud.
In the Czech Republic, VAT fraud present one of the most serious 
organised crimes with losses of revenue reaching up to millions of euros. 
However, the estimations of the scale of tax losses and tax liability differ. 
According to Czech national authorities’ estimations, in 2013 the total 
tax loss amounted to CZK 369 million (€14,430 million). However, the 
Czech police reports that the estimated damage to the budget of the 
investigated cases related to tax frauds amounted to €249 million in 2013 
(Figure 48). VAt fraud constitutes 87% of tax frauds; the rest relates to 
corporate and personal tax, excise duty frauds etc. Other estimates put 
the VAT gap in the Czech Republic at €4,241 million in 2011, i.e. the 
VAT gap as a share of VAT Total Tax Liability reached 28%.728
In general, the roots of tax 
fraud go back to the period 
of the transition from the 
communist model to a market 
economic model in the early 
1990s. In the times of transition, 
the Czech Republic had a 
spontaneous privatisation with 
poor legislation. A number of 
entrepreneurs took advantage 
of an unclear legal environment 
and started businesses running 
tax frauds, insurance frauds, 
and intentional bankruptcies of 
privatised companies. In many 
cases the entrepreneurs used 
violence to settle disputes. 
Following the economic and 
political consolidation in the 
2000s, the use of violence 
728 The estimated VAT Tax Liability in 2011 came up to €15,235 million (CASE, Study to Quantify 
and Analyse the VAT Gap in the EU-27 Member States – Final Report, 29).
6.3. CZECH REPUBlIC: AN INCREASINGlY SOPHIStICAtED tRADE
Introduction
Figure 48. daMages to the state budget in the czech republic 
by selected types oF tax Fraud, Million czk
Source: The Corruption and Financial Crime Detection Department of the Police 
of the Czech Republic.
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subsided at the expense of fraudulent business becoming more 
sophisticated.
From a practical standpoint, the legal regulation of VAT is not difficult 
to evade due to the requirements for payments (request of quarterly 
or monthly tax payments), rapid stock rotation of some goods, and 
regulations and competencies concerning tax collection and tax refunds. 
However, most vulnerable to tax fraud are excisable goods,729 especially 
the trade in mineral oils. Profits of excisable goods fraud (EGF) are 
enormous and there is little risk of being prosecuted by state authorities. 
In the case of a violation of the tax obligation, the offender is charged 
with paying the tax and is fined in administrative proceedings.730 
However, this a crime of high latency – according to customs officers, 
the clear-up rate of tax evasion is only 10%. The profits from the other 
90% easily outweigh the losses, even when convicted to pay a fine and 
the evaded tax.
Tax fraud consists of three main 
types, each representing about 
a third in the overall volume: 
EGF with mineral oils, VAt 
fraud conceived as carousel 
frauds with goods such as 
mobile phones, metal, landfill in 
general and VAt refund fraud, 
i.e. fictitious invoice costs, (for 
example, costs for “advertising” 
when a shell company invoices 
advertisement costs).
The adoption of European Com-
mission Regulation 2719/92/
EHS and the introduction of 
the EMCS have had a positive 
impact on the detection of tax 
offences, according to customs authorities. Since 2009, the rate of de-
tected tax offences almost doubled (Figure 49).
VAT fraud in the Czech Republic has a number of characteristics:
• VAt fraud is becoming increasingly sophisticated. In the 1990s, it was 
sufficient to use only one company (one actor) or to trade in fictitious 
goods to run tax fraud. In fact, the most common method used to be 
“trial and error.” At the time of the transition to a market economy, 
the Czech tax and customs administration was not ready to face 
such criminal behaviour. Today, as the public administration became 
729 Excisable goods frauds are always connected with VAT frauds because of the tax collection 
system in the Czech Republic. The VAT and the excise duty are both collected by the tax 
administration.
730 The criminal code is applied when the damage surpasses CZK 5,000,000 (€180,000). In 
administrative or even criminal proceedings, according to the Czech tax code, the tax subject 
has to pay a fine just from the last known tax in the amount of: a) 20% if the tax is increased; 
b) 20% if the tax reclaim is lowered; c) 1% if the tax loss is lowered.
Figure 49. nuMber oF detected tax oFFences in the czech republic 
(2009 – 2013)
Source: Police of the Czech Republic, Corruption and Financial Crime Department.
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more professionalised, so tax fraud became more sophisticated. For 
example, the scheme of a tax fraud now includes a chain of several 
companies/actors (missing trader, buffer, etc.).
• Tax fraud entrepreneurs usually specialise in only one type of 
goods/services (for example, trade in mineral oils, alcohol, tobacco, 
electronics, etc.) due to the necessity of detailed knowledge of the 
sector and of important contacts with suppliers, importers (conduit 
companies).
• While in the past fraudsters had traded in fictitious goods, now they 
use actual goods. Depending on the scheme of the tax fraud, in their 
tax declarations the fraudsters declare the goods with lower/higher 
value than the actual one. Another way to make profit based on 
tax fraud with real goods is to re-export the goods through a shell 
company to a third country. The profit in such cases is 21% of the 
value of the goods.731
• Fraudsters now form exclusive social groups based on the economic 
capacity of their members, personal contacts established in the 
1990s. These are well-connected networks with links to the public 
administration. Within the network there is shared knowledge of the 
business and criminal environment, especially know-how on evading 
the law, on tax fraud schemes, on information of business sectors 
vulnerable to fraud, exchange of contacts in the public administration 
or among policy makers for corruption purposes, etc.
• Because of the financial crisis, tax fraud has spread beyond the typical 
criminal entrepreneurs. Nowadays, previously legitimate businesses 
are getting involved in tax fraud, seeking to increase their profit by 
declaring only part of their turnover, while the rest is subject of tax 
evasion.
• There is a high rate of crime latency. The latency of tax crimes 
is caused mostly by the difficulty of collecting evidence against the 
offenders because of the high sophistication of the crime, difficult 
infiltration in the criminal group and corruption (cf. different data 
about VAT gaps). Furthermore, neither witnesses nor convicted 
offenders (usually middle-level operatives in an organised criminal 
group involved in VAT fraud) are willing to testify and to uncover the 
structure of the operation.
• VAT fraud schemes are nonviolent – actors prefer to co-operate 
rather than to compete and fight.
• Organised tax fraud could not be successfully carried out without 
corruption. It thus requires the involvement of civil servants in 
financial/tax units, customs units and the police.
• VAT fraud profits are laundered with the help of foreign criminal 
groups.
In the Czech Republic, VAT frauds can be grouped under several types: 
a) according to regularity and organisation (ad-hoc or organised); b) modus 
operandi (missing trader, carousel VAT fraud, fraudulent excessive VAT 
refund); c) the type of excisable goods (mineral oil, alcohol, tobacco, 
metal, sugar, wood, etc.), d) violations of tax liability (VAT frauds, 
731 In the Czech Republic, the rate of VAT is 21% of the total value of the taxable goods.
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VAT frauds in connection with excisable goods fraud, VAT frauds in 
connection with customs fraud); e) geographical scope (national, intra-EU, 
international fraud).
VAT fraud at individual and cross-border level is based on occasional 
purchases of goods (mostly motor fuel, tobacco) in a EU member state, 
and transport to another EU member state (mostly to the domicile of 
the trader). The traders confirm the payment of the VAT by themselves 
and then reclaim it during the further purchase. Another method targets 
refunds of VAT in the country of residence. The traders utilise the 
purchased goods or sell them in small amounts at lower prices without 
invoicing. However, these are ad hoc VAT frauds which do not constitute 
the main business of the traders; they usually run the rest of their 
businesses legally.
VAt fraud as an organised crime represents a serious threat to 
the tax system of the EU member states due to: a) the size of the 
financial losses for the government budget; b) violation of the principle 
of fair competition; c) being organised by powerful economic actors 
with links to politics, not only able to gain a market advantage but 
also to influence inspections and investigations, and the process of 
decision-making and legislation. This fraud occurs at the national, intra-
EU and international levels and is the main business for the criminal 
entrepreneurs. Organised VAT fraud requires a sophisticated chain of at 
least three companies.
VAT fraud in connection with excisable goods fraud
Fraud related to the imports of mineral oil in the Czech Republic 
has a considerable effect on tax collection. This type of fraud is 
well organised, and countermeasures by the tax administration or law 
enforcement usually come with a delay. In the case of light fuel oil 
(LFO), for example, fraudsters took advantage of a legislative gap in 
the 1990s when LFO was freely interchangeable with motor fuel but 
without the excise duty. Estimates of revenue loss in the field of mineral 
oils were as high as 1,138 million CZK (€41 million) in 2012 (Table 52). 
Customs authorities had warned about the tax evasion schemes but the 
Czech legislative body reacted with a delay.732
In these cases, the tax obligation is not fulfilled within the conditional 
excise duty exemption (so called “customs procedure 42”733). Customs 
procedure 42 is “the regime a trader uses in order to obtain a 
VAT exemption when the goods imported from outside the EU into 
the member state of importation will be transported to a second 
732 According to the interviews with the criminal entrepreneurs, the actors engaged in LFO fraud 
are the same as those involved in VAT fraud in the mineral oil trade or other taxable supplies. 
In contrast to LFO fraud as a Czech phenomenon, VAT fraud with mineral oil has a Europe-
wide dimension, and not only local specifics. The parallels between LFO fraud and VAT fraud 
with mineral oils can be seen in the fact that both kinds in some way exploit legislative 
gaps.
733 This procedure is commonly known as customs procedure 42 because in such cases the 
importer of the goods must indicate in box 37 of the Single Administrative Document a code 
starting with the digits 42.
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Member State. The VAT is due in the latter, the member state of 
destination.”734
There are several models of VAT fraud with mineral oils. A common 
method is to declare import products that are not subject to excise 
duty (e.g. BASE OIL, RUST CLEANER, BIOSEPAR, FORMEX), thus 
concealing that the imported product is in fact oil from a different 
category.735 By using different types of transport (road or rail) and 
different types of packaging (e.g. 1,000 litre plastic containers) mineral 
oil is delivered to a network of petrol stations or fuel dispensing 
points for high-capacity transporters without paying the excise duty. 
Another method is mixing components which are tax-free with already 
taxed fuel. Unlawful activities are also involved in the circumvention 
and misuse of the EMCS during transports of selected products to/
from other EU member states. The tax evasion loss on one truck 
of untaxed motor fuel amounts to 361,350 CZK (€13,169). Even if 
the initial capital is low, the proceeds are parlayed into more illegal 
revenues.
Insolvent trader VAt fraud. Under this scheme, a company proclaims 
bankruptcy or insolvency thus ensuring that it will not be liable to pay 
taxes (VAT, excise duty) in such a way that in previous tax period they 
increase the volume of the imported fuel from another EU member 
state for which the tax has not been paid. Finding proof of intentional 
wrongdoing in these cases is very difficult.
Alcohol-related fraud. The main types of alcohol-related VAT fraud 
involve illegal imports of alcohol from other member states of EU or 
third countries, illegal production of alcohol in the Czech Republic, 
counterfeiting of excise stamps for labelling of spirits, infringement of 
brand owner’s rights. The wholesale warehouses are liable for holding 
goods with an illegitimate origin. When there is mix of goods with illegal 
and legal origin, the tracing and identification of the illegal goods is 
made difficult for law enforcement.
734 European Court of Auditors, Does the Control of Customs Procedure 42 Prevent and Detect VAT 
Evasion? (Speical Report No.13, 2011), 9.
735 Declaring category KN 27101999 instead of KN 27101941.
Таble 57. results oF the work oF czech custoMs with respect 
to Mineral oils control
Source: Celní správa ČR [Czech Customs Administration], Informace o výsledcích činnosti Celní správy za rok 2012 [Information on the 
Activities of the Customs Administration of the Czech Republic in 2012] (Prague, 2013).
Year 2009 2010 2011 2012 Index 2012/2011
Number of violations 75 106 172 275 159.9%
Revenue leakage (duties 
and taxes; million CZK)
862 193 284 1,138 392.9%
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After the methanol affair (2012 – 2013),736 the market for illegal alcohol 
production was suspended. Criminal groups involved in the illegal alcohol 
business have shifted their operations into other illegal acquisitions, 
especially into illegal tobacco trade. This trend is distinctive in Silesia (the 
North-Eastern part of the country).737
VAT fraud in connection with customs fraud
Illegal import of goods typically relies on declaring incorrect tariff 
data, false quantities, identity confusion with other goods, broken 
customs seals. Fraudulent imports from third countries resulting in a 
loss of customs revenue is a Europe-wide problem with a significant 
effect in the Czech Republic. In the Czech Republic, it is mostly South 
Asian organised groups that are engaged in the import of goods from 
third countries that result in reduced collection of customs duties and 
taxes. They often lessen the customs value of the imported goods by 
using shell companies, declaring false origin of the goods, including 
breaching anti-dumping rules, placing the goods under the customs 
procedure codes 4000 and 4200,738 and subsequently avoiding VAT 
payment.
The disadvantage of the tax system in the country consists in the 
fact that when importing goods the collection of taxes and duties are 
separated: goods imported into the territory of the Czech Republic are 
736 In September 2012, methanol poisonings occurred in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia. 
There were 51 dead and many others suffered from permanent health damage. The Czech 
government established a central emergency response council and there was a 20-day 
prohibition of selling liquors of more than 30% proof. The police arrested several people: 
two of them were sentenced to life imprisonment; the other eight to imprisonment for 8 to 
21 years.
737 Earlier, customs officials discovered most of the illegal distilleries in the Ostrava region. Half of 
the confiscated counterfeit alcohol comes from the Moravian-Silesian region.
738 Customs regime 4000 is the regime when goods coming from a third country with payment 
of the customs duties and VAT and/or excise. When code 40 applies goods are not subject 
of a VAT-exempt supply to another member state, however, the goods may be subject to 
other exemptions from VAT. Code 4200 is the exemption from payment of VAT and, where 
applicable, the excise duty suspension, is granted because the import is followed by an intra-
EU supply or transfer of the goods to another member state.
Таble 58. results oF the work oF czech custoMs with respect 
to alcohol control
Source: Celní správa ČR [Czech Customs Administration], Informace o výsledcích činnosti Celní správy za rok 2012 [Information on the 
Activities of the Customs Administration of the Czech Republic in 2012] (Prague, 2013).
Years 2009 2010 2011 2012 Index 2012/2011
Number of violations 381 641 1,293 1,869 144.6%
Amount involved
(million litres)
0.3 0.4 0.5 2.7 540
Revenue leakage (duties 
and taxes; million CZK)
14 25 109 709 650.6
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charged with customs duty by the customs office but the VAT is to be 
paid separately by the importers in monthly or quarterly periods. This 
separate collection is misused mainly by South Asian crime groups which 
pay customs duty, but subsequently the company importing the goods 
and liable for the taxes disappears, thus withholding VAT.
the export of goods to third countries resulting in reduced VAt 
collection (abuse of the tax refund) is carried out by declaring a 
disproportionately high value of the goods and their subsequent export, 
resulting in an excessive refund, through fictitious exports of goods, or 
by using conduit companies in a chain of taxable transactions carried 
out on an open or closed carousel.
Key actors in the criminal market
In VAT fraud, foreign criminals (Russian, Ukrainian, French) are often 
in the position of financiers, facilitators, and money launderers for 
Czech companies since they have the expert knowledge and necessary 
background and networks; they often use Czechs as straw men (e.g. 
in the case of emission allowances). Vietnamese and Chinese criminal 
groups are hard to infiltrate because they are ethnically exclusive and 
well organised with strict hierarchy. The Vietnamese groups specialise 
in drug trafficking and illegal tobacco trade. On the Czech side, there 
are a lot of companies that have exclusively Czech ringleaders and 
members. They own indirectly a set of companies with domiciles 
in other countries (e.g. the Cayman Islands, Cyprus, Liechtenstein, 
Luxembourg).
The key actors are specialised in trading in one type of goods/service 
at any one moment (e.g. mineral oils, tobacco, alcohol). They are, 
however, sufficiently flexible for moving their portfolio to another sector 
following government intervention or tightening of the legislation. The 
networks of actors include straw men, facilitators (including lawyers, 
financial experts, tax advisers, and notaries), traders, ringleaders, 
and employees. It is important to note that the actors, especially 
on the middle-level of the fraud in the missing trader scheme or 
carousel fraud, do not know each other and often do not know even 
who the ringleader is. Employees such as drivers, assistants, manual 
workers, etc., are mostly unaware of their employers’ illegal activities. 
Facilitators are rewarded for their services by the ringleader in the 
form of a fee, a share in the profits, or an opportunity to purchase 
goods at lower prices.
Besides the established players from the 1990s, the range of criminals 
involved in this type of fraud has expanded to include those who dealt 
in drugs, pimping, racketeering, etc., which often involved violence. For 
them, VAT fraud presents lower risks and higher profits than violent 
crime. There are also generational differences: the older generation with 
strong economic positions cooperate with each other, and their position 
is built on a personal reputation. The younger generation, on the other 
hand, are often not members of social elites involved in white-collar 
Market structure 
and actors
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crime and are thus more competitive with each other. Suspicion, distrust, 
security measures such as jammers of wiretapping, surveillance, limited 
use of mobile phones and internet banking are common among players 
involved in VAT fraud.
The most common VAT fraud requires at least 4 actors – conduit 
company, missing trader, buffer, and beneficiary. In an ideal case, a 
debt collection company739 is involved in the chain. Buffers are legitimate 
businesses trading in real goods and services that would purchase VAT 
free goods or services and that in many cases might not be aware of the 
fraudulent scheme. Trust is the key concept of these kinds of businesses. 
Buffers resell the goods or services to large multinational retail chains. 
739 A debt collection company can figure as the fifth actor in the supply chain. The main task 
of debt collection companies is to transfer money among actors, especially between missing 
traders and brokers/ringleaders. For example, in the Czech Republic there was a detected 
case of supply chain with a debt collection company (a virtual bank) with a domicile on the 
Comoro Islands. The virtual bank provided e-platform for fictitious money transfers via bank 
software aimed at a VAT refund. The players were able to prove the realisation of payment 
via fictitious account statement to the tax collection administration.
Figure 50. the Missing trader scheMe, key actors and Flow oF Money
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
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The model of chains looks like a spider-web: at the top there is a ring-
leader (an inner circle player,740 his name does not appear in any official 
documents and stands outside the structure), few of the middle level 
actors (conduit companies), missing traders (according to the estimations 
of states officers and interviews with convicted offenders there are 
approximately about 12 companies in one chain), buffers or directly the 
final customer (legally working business companies, such as Mittal Steel 
in the case of the illegal trade with scrap metal).
In case the ringleaders want to prevent law enforcement monitoring 
of the flow of the funds through bank account they involve another 
link in the supply chain – a cash transfer company (such as a petrol 
station) – which receives money in cash. A lot of small petrol stations 
have emerged in the Czech Republic offering fuel at a lower price but 
on the condition of cash payments only. Therefore, it is easy to launder 
money using those petrol stations.
Risk minimisation: members of supply chains do not know each other 
(unless they “need to know”). The ringleader has a lot of companies – 
missing traders and traders. The timeframe of the existence of the 
missing trader is the key: he runs the business on average one and half 
years, after which the company is dissolved and the straw men leave the 
activities; after six months or one year he is again involved in a new 
supply chain as a new missing trader.
Organised groups do not operate regionally, they are able to transfer 
their portfolio abroad, sometimes it is hard to recognise the structures, as 
they often have a domicile of the company in third countries, especially 
in tax havens. Managing directors (straw men) come from disadvantaged 
social groups.
Modus operandi
In the Czech Republic, several types of fraud of varying degrees of 
sophistication have been identified:
Carousel fraud. In the case of a carousel fraud, the goods are supplied 
abroad and then returned to the Czech Republic. Variability of goods is a 
feature of the carousel fraud. Such goods must have these characteristics: 
rapid stock rotation (the subject of the taxable supply is readily 
saleable), difficult identification (the subject of a taxable transaction 
cannot be easily distinguished from another (pieces, litres, etc., as liquid, 
oil, metal etc.), to be easily repositioned and of low value (sugar, 
metal, rapeseed oil, wood, construction materials/fabrics) or small size 
(tablets, mobile phones, gold, rechargeable coupons), and not be in the 
reverse charge system.741 The reverse charge system is already applied 
740 The ringleader is an organiser who is responsible for the design and the organisation of the 
fraud. Although he would usually get the lion’s share of the profits, in most cases their names 
would not appear on any document or in the companies involved and other actors from the 
chain do not know who he is.
741 The national authorities respond ex post. „Reverse charge” system according to the Czech 
customs and police authorities must be introduced on all commodities.
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to gold, construction industry, metal, emission allowances in the Czech 
Republic.742 Currently the Czech government is preparing amendment of 
the Tax Code to include also the acquisition of mobile phones to the 
reverse charge system.
Missing trader fraud.743 This scheme requires intra-community trade in 
actual goods, in which the first company (a limited liability company) 
is liable for the VAT as it is a registered payer of VAT, but is unable 
to meet his tax obligation for various reasons. The company buys the 
goods, resells them but fails to pay the VAT, thus creating competitive 
advantages for its goods on the market (the price of goods is lower 
by about 21%); after this, the missing trader resells the goods to the 
buffer. The mission of the buffer is to legalise the goods – provide a 
new identity for them – then create an unassailable invoice and resell 
the goods to the final customer. The task for the missing trader is to 
make a financial transaction in order to transfer the money to the 
ringleader.
Intra-community VAT fraud involving international buffer/broker. The 
export of goods to third countries is difficult to detect, especially when 
the international buffer/broker comes from countries which do not 
have agreements on mutual legal assistance with EU member states. 
A problem appears also in the case when the exported goods as are 
easy to confuse (e.g. to confuse metal for other raw material) and thus 
customs officers are not able to verify the declaration. It happens also 
that customs officers are involved in the fraud.
the insolvent trader VAt fraud. This model is equivalent to the missing 
trader model. Player A who is responsible for the VAT payment, admits 
tax obligations to the tax/financial office with the purpose of legalising 
the goods or services that are resold to player B. The VAT is not paid 
because player A declares bankruptcy and, at the same time, company 
B requests a refund of the VAT.
Frauds with fictitious invoices resulting in VAt refunds on national 
level. Shell companies are established for the purpose of scamming 
excessive refunds. One player can manage tens of companies and request 
tax refunds from the financial administration that does not have enough 
capacity to check all tax declarations. In the case of an investigation of a 
tax declaration, some of the players cease their criminal activities, while 
742 Sections 92b, 92c, 92d, 92e of the Act No 235/2004 Coll., on Value Added Tax.
743 In the Czech Republic, many missing trader frauds were detected concerning a purchase of 
emission allowances. The modus operandi with emission allowances fraud is based on the 
following model: The ringleader of the fraud delegates agents to find straw men. The agents 
describe the trade with emission allowances to the straw man as a legal business, where they 
can profit CZK 0.30 from one emission allowance, i.e. monthly CZK 200,000 (€7,000). The 
straw man gets the start-up capital for running a business with emission allowances, setting up 
the company. According to analysed sources a start-up capital comes either from international 
organised groups (see section about market players) or from legal businesses. The funds are 
transferred to the straw man in cash, at first usually an amount lower than €15,000. The 
ringleader of the fraud and the agent start to buy emission allowances abroad and resell 
them in the name of the new company in the Czech Republic, proceeds from the trade 
with emission allowances goes to the account of the ringleader, but he does not pay taxes 
because this obligation is on the new company, as a result of which the straw man could be 
imprisoned.
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others continue and through other companies issue the invoices for the 
purpose of getting VAT refunds. Prague’s financial offices are especially 
overloaded.
Unjustified requests for refunds in the Czech Republic range from 50,000 
CZK (€1,812) up to 80 million CZK (€2.9 million); in one case the 
refund amounted up to 70 billion CZK (€2.55 billion), according to one 
interviewee (CZ-E4). The fictitious invoices are listed on the accounts of 
advertising services. The construction industry is widely used for fictitious 
invoices, but other business sectors have also been identified such as car 
rentals, car services, cleaning services, locksmiths, sponsorship (national 
hockey competition, football league), and charity.744 These are primarily 
services where the actual delivery and transactions are difficult to prove. 
Advertising services or sponsorships are used also as a system for money 
laundering.
Laundering involves an entrepreneur (whose job is also to launder money 
in a chain of companies) who establishes, for example, a legal motocross 
track (i.e. the main declared business purpose of the shell company 
is running motocross tracks). The entrepreneur encloses the piece of 
land around the motocross track by a fence and offers this “fence” for 
advertisement. Other companies from this criminal chain pay significant 
amounts for advertising at the fence (e.g. over €3,000 per month). The 
real aim of the advertisement is fictitious increasing of costs of the 
companies that order the advertising service. The model of the fraud is 
based on the fact that the entrepreneur keeps just 10% of the price of 
advertising and the remaining 90% is sent back to the customer through 
a chain of companies.
Sources of capital for criminal operations. Profile of financiers 
in criminal operations
VAT fraud and financial crime in general are typical white-collar offences 
committed by business and entail a number of related problems: political 
and administrative corruption, tax evasion, clientelistic networks. In the 
Czech Republic, the source of the capital for these is often linked 
to legal or illegal business activities in the 1990s. Fraudsters started 
a business in the time of the transition from a socialist to a capitalist 
economy using: a) personal contacts to gain access to privatised property 
(social capital); b) saved money from the socialist past derived mainly 
from activities such as illegal trade in foreign currencies, sales on the black 
market, smuggling, or a business without an administrative authorisation 
(financial capital).
the social capital for initiating a criminal operation comes in the form of 
a social network as the most important requirement and gatekeeper for 
744 The law requires the provider of charity to send just 40% of collected money to the 
beneficiaries and 60% of the amount can be used for running the charity, i.e. organisational 
and personal costs. A system of fictitious invoices is sometimes misused and the main cover 
purpose of the charity is to get money for the charity provider (i.e. 60% of collected money 
on charity purposes).
Financing 
and financial 
management
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an admission to the criminal environment. It provides contacts, shared 
know-how, space for searching for business partners. This kind of social 
environment is socially and economically exclusive;745 actors create their 
own social norms, values and rules that do not always correspond to 
legal norms (circumventing the law with the purpose of self-enrichment is 
perceived as normal or even valuable). Especially valuable is the capacity 
to influence the public administration or local/national politicians (as they 
are also part of that social environment).746
A legal business is another source of financing criminal activities. 
Ringleaders involved in VAT fraud with motor fuel need to have economic 
potential747 and expert knowledge, and if they want to generate significant 
profits they need a substantial investment in the initial business. A 
VAT fraud is not only an opportunity for crime and as such attracts 
both legitimate and criminal business people. Several options have been 
identified in the Czech Republic: the entrepreneurs do not reinvest 
profits into another criminal activity; they reinvest money in the legal 
business; or they proceed with VAT frauds.
Besides traders who are clearly involved in VAT frauds as a main activity, 
there is another group of traders who run a part of their business 
in a legal way, another part of their business is connected with 
a criminal activity (breweries, illegal alcohol distilleries, tobacco). The 
illegal production is intended mostly for legal distribution (bars, pubs and 
restaurants). This group of businessmen run legal business as a cover-up 
for a criminal activity, especially Vietnamese community covers illegal 
trade with alcohol and spirits, tobacco or drugs by operating groceries, 
street stalls, etc.
VAT fraud is connected with other types of illicit activities such as 
abusing classified information in business, corruption, and forgery of 
documents. Tax fraud entrepreneurs are businessmen and according 
to the research findings they are not involved in other crimes such 
as drug smuggling, human trafficking, etc., although criminal activities 
may be a source of capital for initiating VAT fraud. Violence among 
high level tax fraudsters is minimal, while at the middle-level of 
the business there can be some violence associated with assaults, 
extortion, especially in cases when the victim is not able to pay 
his debts. For these “services” fraudsters hire foreign criminal groups 
(Serbian, Ukrainian, Russian). It is here that a connection between the 
economically powerful (white-collar) stratum and the criminal, violent 
“underworld” (blue-collar crime).
745 Especially, the social network incorporates economically strong actors who meet each other at 
social events.
746 Another situation has appeared on the territory of Eastern Moravia (Zlín region). There, strong 
social ties exist between criminal entrepreneur who are bounded by secrecy and hierarchy if 
prosecuted, and they take care of the families of fellow criminals during their imprisonment, 
and provide them with a new car, an apartment or start-up capital after their release.
747 In the case of VAT fraud with motor fuel, the petrol stations paid the goods on a pro forma 
invoice in advance. The start-up capital is around 500,000 CZK (€18,000) according to 
interviews with prosecuted criminal entrepreneurs. This means that there are no formal or 
practical barriers to securing entrepreneurial funding.
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In brief, research has revealed that the sources of the initial capital of 
VAT frauds can be distinguished as: a) own money re-invested from 
another criminal business; b) own money re-invested from another legal 
business; c) crime money invested by other criminals for a share of the 
profits; d) a loan from a criminal entrepreneur; e) a loan from a legal 
businessman.
As regards the capital for sustaining criminal activities, a successful 
carousel fraud or a missing trader fraud generates enough profits to 
sustain it if the operators want to stay in the criminal business and 
cover other costs of doing business. If customs finds legal violations, 
the amount of penalties in administrative proceedings is far less than 
the amount of profit. Furthermore, it is only the members from the 
lower levels of the organisation of VAT fraud that are sentenced. 
Thus, after the imprisonment of some in their organisation, the 
ringleaders still have their profits almost intact. The property of 
the convicted members is promptly transferred to family members, 
friends, etc., thus shielded from confiscation. All of these schemes 
make the criminal prosecution and imprisonment of fraudsters not 
very effective.
The top management of VAT fraud schemes usually consists of one or 
two people that are not formally involved in any trading, but influence 
the activity through other people formally registered as representatives 
of business entities; the latter further give other instructions to a wider 
range of people – facilitators, straw men, traders etc. The lion share of 
the profits goes to those at the top of the pyramid. Significant rewards 
are received also by people who formally represent the leaders as 
they take a significant risk. Even in the case of these people it is an 
individual rather than a larger number of people. Agents/facilitators are 
rewarded ex post for their collaboration by the ringleader in the form 
of a fee for their service, a share of the profits, or an opportunity to 
purchase goods at lower prices.
The retailers or petrol stations usually pay a deposit in advance to 
the buffer’s account. Advance payments are made just on the basis 
of trust among the traders without written contracts. The profits are 
paid in most cases in cash to prevent monitoring the flow of the funds 
and the connection among players. According to interviewed criminal 
entrepreneurs, in order to avoid detection when bank transactions are 
used they are for amounts lower than €50,000.
Apart from the uncollateralised payments among players, they use also 
legal tools. Higher amounts are transferred through debt collection 
companies: the payment arrangement is based on order of payments in 
favour of ringleader, or accounting of debt.
Settlement 
of payments
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The cost usually depends on the type of commodity that is the object 
of the fraud. For VAT fraud in connection with fuel imports from abroad 
to the Czech Republic, for example, offenders usually have to possess 
millions of CZK for the initial purchases of fuel. Significantly lower costs 
are needed in cases of fake goods exports, which either do not take 
place or only worthless/minimal value goods are exported, while the 
declared export value is significantly higher than the actual.
Designing, starting and running a VAT fraud scheme requires certain initial 
investments. The start-up capital covers costs such as: setting up shell 
Таble 59. settleMent oF payMents in vat Fraud in the czech republic
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
type of payments Source Payment arrangement
Initial capital
Own money from another 
criminal business re-invested
-
Own money from another
legal business re-invested
-
Crime money invested
by other criminals for
a share of the profits
Cash
Order of payments
Bill of exchange
Loan from a criminal
entrepreneur
Cash
Order of payments
Bill of exchange
Real estate collateral
Loan from a legal businessman
Cash
Bank transfer
(on the basis of trust or contract)
Loans See section on Initial capital
Profit sharing
Salaries
Cash
Bank transfer
Cash transfer company Cash
Debt collection company
Bank transfer
Order of payments
Accounting of debt
Capital for 
sustaining business
Revenues from VAT frauds See section on profit sharing (below)
Own sources See section on source of capital (above)
Capital in critical 
moments
Own money of fraudster -
Loans See section on source of capital (above)
Costs of doing 
business
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companies (the price for an off the shelf company is €911), purchasing 
goods, paying to VAT warehouse operators and shipping companies for the 
movement of goods across borders, corrupting tax and customs officials, 
paying for specialised services of accountants, lawyers, tax advisors, etc. A 
company involved in an emission allowance fraud starting with a turnover 
of, say, CZK 530,000 can reach CZK 700 million in 6 months.
Another significant factor for costs is the fraud method. In the case 
of fictitious goods the costs are lower than in the cases where a real 
commodity is involved in the fraud. According to a senior Czech officer 
(CZ-E6), for trading in fictitious goods the required expenses amount to 
approximately 60 thousand Czech crowns for buying fictitious off-the- 
shelf companies, some 10 thousands Czech crowns for administrative fees 
and 10% of the total amount invoiced as a reward for a straw man.
The volume of the initial capital differs also depending on the aim of 
criminal operations. If the offenders plan to reach quick enrichment and 
then withdraw, they do not need a complicated and sophisticated chain 
of companies, at least they need just 3 another actors. It means that the 
initial capital will be lower than in the case when offenders' target is to 
proceed with VAT fraud as a main activity.
The profit gained from a tax fraud depends on the commodity which 
is used. In a VAT fraud with fuels, the revenue from the fraud is about 
6 Czech crowns per one litre and our estimate is that the profit is 
between 3 and 4 Czech crowns per one litre. In the case of a volume 
of 60 million litres per month, the total revenue is about CZK 240 million 
(€8.7 million) per month. Less profitable are business with emission 
allowances, where the revenue reaches up to CZK 1 billion (€36.44 
Profits and 
profit sharing
Таble 60. annual proFit, costs, revenue per supply chain 
in the czech republic
      * Per 42,000 litres of alcohol.
     ** Per 500,000 litres of alcohol.
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on the interviews, analysis of media sources and government documents.
Commodity Annual revenue (€) Costs (€) Annual profit (€)
Advertisement 437,280
393,552 (laundered
money for clients)
3,000 (running of 
motocross business)
40,728
Alcohol 500,000-511 million 70,000-1 million 430,000*-510 million**
Emission allowance 33.44 million 20,000 33.42 million
Fuel 155.23 million 55.33 million 99.9 million
Metal 87,456
2,733 (3 shell companies)
21,600 (transport)
63,123
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million) per annum. Profits from the illegal trade with alcohol are lower 
(Table 53 above). The revenue from pure alcohol is €10 per each litre. 
The revenue of the trade with metal amounts to about CZK 200,000 
(€7,288) monthly (2 trucks loaded with 30 kg of metal) (if there are 
more missing traders, profit multiplies). In the case of an advertising 
fraud with fictitious invoices resulting in a VAT refund, the price for one 
advertisement is around CZK 100,000 (€3,644) monthly, with facilitators 
keeping 10% of that.
How profits are invested depends on the actor’s position in the supply 
chain. Low-level and medium-level actors of organised VAT frauds expend 
their profits on private costs. On the other hand, high-level actors invest 
the profit into another type of legal or illegal business.
In general, the criminal entrepreneurs invest their profit into:
Private purpose
i. Personal expenses/lifestyle. Lower level actors of organised VAT 
usually buy luxury cars, boats, yachts, designer clothes, electronics, 
or membership in sporting club as golf club, etc. They also invest 
into their hobbies, sports, or travelling. Often, the low-level actors of 
supply chains use the services of nightclubs, bars and discos.
ii. Investing in real estates or other luxury commodities. The investment 
into real estate is typical for all actors of organised VAT frauds. 
According to their share of the profits and position in the supply chain 
players proportionally purchase real estates in the Czech Republic for 
residential purposes, invest in (holiday) residencies abroad, or in real 
estate for rental or to be sold for profit. The purchase of luxury 
commodities depends on the value of the goods, price stability, and 
resale possibility with higher or stable profit. In general, they invest 
into buying gold, antiques, artworks, highly valued collections of 
coins, antique weapons, etc.
Business purpose
iii. Expanding existing or starting new VAt fraud schemes. In this case, 
there is usually a reinvestment of profits in an identical or similar area 
of organised VAT fraud where actors already have experience. The 
existence of organisational, material and human resources structure 
(e.g. interconnectedness of importers of fuel with operators of service 
stations, etc.) facilitates new organised VAT fraud, and reduces costs.
It is not common for VAT fraudster to split their interests by investing 
into other criminal fields such as drugs trafficking, human trafficking, 
gambling, or even organised VAT fraud with other goods/services.
iv. Investing in legitimate businesses. Legal traders invested in most 
cases into an activity that was previously performed illegally, or else 
the funds were invested in real estates, which were then rented and 
thus turned into a legitimate source of funds. This usually covers 
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the purchase of the real estate, primarily land for building and hotel 
facilities. The real estate is purchased in the name of companies 
controlled by the tax crime perpetrators but not involved in such 
crimes. The companies usually have a hidden ownership structure and 
established in a tax haven, in order to make it difficult or impossible 
to determine the true identity of the individuals controlling this 
property.
In the case a new legal business is started, they prefer a sector/
market where a lot of actors are involved and where there is 
low government regulation (e.g. pubs, restaurants, bakeries, pawn 
shops).
v. Capital investment. Ringleaders or brokers – the players at high levels 
of the supply chain – prefer investing in financial markets (shares, 
securities, etc.), or deposit money on bank accounts abroad in the 
name of their family members.
According to interviews with criminals convicted of VAT fraud, there 
is zero tolerance and solidarity between the actors. If sentenced, lost 
money, power or influence, they also lose contact with the business 
environment. Some of them tried to run a business again, but without 
access to capital it was impossible and could only assume the role of 
a straw man in a VAT fraud.748 Legal provisions to prevent convicted 
fraudsters from obtaining a loan are missing in the Czech legislation 
(the terms of borrowing are defined by providers – bank and non-
bank institutions). However, if middle-level actors are prosecuted 
(see Footnote 746 above), but do not incriminate other members of the 
chain, after they are released from prison they can obtain new initial 
capital from the ringleaders as a reward for their loyalty.
Since the European internal market was created in 1993, EU member 
states have had a common Value Added Tax (VAT). This means that 
goods can move freely within the internal market as border controls have 
been removed. A temporary system was introduced for VAT, whereby 
the zero rate applies to the supply of goods to another member state. 
To be eligible for this zero rate, an entrepreneur must have a valid 
VAT identification number and must be able to verify that its trading 
partner also has a valid VAT identification number. In addition to the 
748 The formal barriers for convicted fraudsters’ subsequent involvement in commerce are regulated 
in the provision 46, Act No. 90/2012 Coll. on commercial companies and cooperatives „1) [t]he 
member of the body of a business corporation cannot be one who is blameless in the sense 
of the Trade Act, and even the one in whom the occurrence of the event, which is a trade 
barrier. 2) Who has become a member body of a business corporation, previously the founder 
of the business or corporation informs about whether his property or business property of 
corporations in which they operate or worked in the past 3 years as part of an organ, was led 
by an insolvency proceeding [...], whether or not given him the other barrier function.”
Access to capital 
in critical moments
6.4. SPAIN: A GROWING IllEGAl ACtIVItY
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VAT return, entrepreneurs must file a quarterly return to their intra-
community suppliers so that they can be monitored.
VAT generates significant revenue (more than a fifth of world total tax 
revenue, including social contributions) and has been introduced in 
around 140 countries. In this regard, VAT is a relatively efficient collecting 
instrument because it has no impact on intermediary levels of production 
and does not affect their decisions. In addition, because it affects the 
final consumer, the potential for its collection is very high. It is also the 
main source of revenue in some EU member states and plays a relevant 
role in ensuring public finance stability.749
Nevertheless, for some years, the VAT system has been showing signs of 
vulnerability and no longer fits the bill for taxpayers and public authorities 
alike. Its increased complexity creates unnecessary costs and burdens, 
inhibits the functioning of the European market and the deduction 
mechanism has become a source of international fraud.750 VAT offers 
evasion and fraud opportunities, especially through abuses of the credit 
and refund mechanism. In the last few years, this type of tax fraud 
has increased, though it is not clear to what extent this rise is due to 
increased fraud or increased detection and investigation. Eurojust offers 
some figures of the last five years and VAT fraud has more than doubled 
since 2009. Eurojust registered 39 cases in 2009 and 89 in 2013.751 Thus, 
the potential impact on the economy of the reduction of VAT fraud is 
quite significant.
VAT fraud, and its different levels of complexity constitute a serious 
problem for the European Commission and member states not only 
because it entails a heavy loss in tax collection, it has a significant impact 
on trade and gives rise to considerable distortions in the economic sector 
competence, in the GDP, in employment, in labour and capital income 
and in general welfare.
In 2011, Spain suffered €15.2 billion in losses due to VAT fraud, which 
represented 1.4% of its GDP. The Spanish tax authorities estimate that 
Spanish fraud represents 10% of the VAT collection.752 Spain’s VAT 
fraud figures are below those of Italy (€26 billion), France (€32 billion), 
Germany (€26.9 billion) and the United Kingdom (€19 billion). Romania, 
Greece, Latvia and Lithuania have even higher fraud rates. However, 
losses have been on the rise since 2008, especially in Spain and other 
countries such as Greece, Latvia, Portugal and Slovakia.
Spain has traditionally been in the middle in Europe as regards to the 
tax fraud rate, with Italy and Greece comprising 15% of the VAT gap. 
The VAT gap is the difference between the expected VAT revenue and 
749 Borselli, Organised VAT Fraud: Features, Magnitude, Policy Perspectives.
750 Keen and Smith, “VAT Fraud and Evasion: What Do We Know and What Can Be Done?”
751 Eurojust, “MTIC Fraud”, Eurojust News, no. 11 (2014).
752 N. Miranda Fuertes and S. De Navascues Aybar, El fraude de IVA en operaciones intracomunitarias. 
Medidas y propuestas para combatirlo [VAT Fraud in Intra-Community Transactions. Measures and 
Proposals to Combat It] (Report for the Advanced Course III International Taxation, 2011).
Market overview
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the VAT actually collected by national authorities. It has been estimated 
that in the 1990s the level of fraud in Spain was around 26-28% of the 
potential tax collection.753 Recently, a study funded by the European 
Commission estimated that the VAT gap was in the range of 21% in 
2011, and 12% on average between 2000 and 2011. In the European 
Union, Spanish estimates are higher than the European average rate 
calculated in 2011 in the EU-26 (18%) and lower than the average rate 
between 2000 and 2011 (15%).754
Spain does not provide disaggregated data regarding tax fraud revealing 
the reported cases. The tax authorities state that they are conducted 
mainly in Madrid, Catalonia and Andalusia, one of the main economic and 
most populated areas, where most of organised crime is concentrated.
The transitional arrangement between member states was supposed to 
be replaced by a definitive system for the taxation of trade between 
member states based in principle on the taxation in the member state 
of origin of the goods or services supplied. This transitional system still 
applies today, which makes possible the missing trader intra-community 
(MTIC) fraud.
Since business-to-business intra-community acquisitions are considered 
taxable transactions, such intra-community supplies are VAT free. Actually, 
they are zero-rated which means that the supplier is entitled to a VAT 
deduction or a refund of input VAT in the exporting member state. 
The purpose of zero rates is to safeguard the principle of taxation in 
the country of destination. The intra-community supplier can therefore 
deduct or claim a refund for the amount of its input VAT regarding the 
supplied goods in the country of origin. In the country of destination the 
acquirer must account for the amount of VAT on this transaction and 
can, at the same time, deduct this amount.
MTIC fraud takes two forms, based on two key features: the VAT zero-
rating of exports and the system of deferred payment for VAT on imports 
adopted in the EU since the removal of fiscal frontiers in 1992.
Acquisition fraud or MTIC fraud
Acquisition fraud is a “commodity based fraud in which standard–rated 
goods or services are purchased zero-rated for VAT purposes form a 
supplier based in another EU Member State and sold in other EU 
country for domestic consumption. The importer, who is known as the 
‘acquirer,’ subsequently fails to account for the VAT due on the standard-
rated taxable supply to the customer’s country.”755
753 C. Díaz, A. de la Fuente, and C. Herrera, Evaluación del fraude en el impuesto sobre el valor añadido 
[Evaluation of VAT Fraud] (Madrid, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, 1990); P. Gómez de Enterría, 
F. Melis, and D. Romero, Evaluación del cumplimiento en el IVA: Revisión de las estimaciones años 
1990 a 1994 [Assessment of Compliance VAT: Revision of Estimates from 1990 to 1994] (Working Paper, 
No. 18/98, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, 1998).
754 CASE, Study to Quantify and Analyse the VAT Gap in the EU-27 Member States – Final Report.
755 Eurojust, “MTIC Fraud”.
Market structure 
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In acquisition fraud, the fraudster or missing trader supplies the goods 
in the market of final consumption. Embezzling all the VAT debited, 
it generally sells the goods at a price below their market value. This 
fraud results in a loss of revenue and a restriction of competition. In 
this case the missing trader is a front company positioned between 
the importer and the distributor. The criminal investigations carried out 
reveal that organisations use straw men to run these companies. They 
include homeless people, foreigners or professional straw men. They 
are used to incorporate the company and to open bank accounts, and 
are remunerated for their services. Occasionally, straw men would not 
be aware of the situation. However, it is the criminal organisation that 
controls the money and its movement.
Carousel fraud
Carousel fraud “is a financial fraud that is an abuse of the VAT system 
resulting in the fraudulent extraction of revenue from the EU member 
Treasury. It may involve any type of standard-rated goods or services. As 
with acquisition fraud, goods and services are acquired zero-rated from 
the EU, with the acquirer then going missing without accounting for the 
VAT due on the onwards supply. However, the goods or services do 
not become available in the EU member state for consumption, but are 
sold through a series of companies in the EU member state and then 
exported or dispatched, prompting a repayment from [the customs and 
revenue service] to the exporter/dispatcher. This process can be repeated 
over and over again using the same goods or commodities.”756
This is the most profitable type of fraud because profits are substantially 
higher and it is the tax authorities which are being defrauded. Carousel 
fraud is a more complex version of the MTIC fraud. A group of 
companies sell the same goods or services in a circle to achieve an 
illegal profit by repeating the MTIC formula over and over again. The 
same goods (whether real or fake) are repeatedly supplied in a circular 
pattern. After the missing trader’s purchase from another member state, 
goods are sold through a series of domestic companies and then re-
exported to the EU country of origin (the goods move in a “carousel”). 
Although the missing trader does not pay VAT to the tax authorities, 
the company at the end of the domestic supply chain (the “exporter”) 
claims back the input VAT paid. Therefore, with every turn, the tax 
authorities suffer a loss. As in acquisition fraud, the missing trader 
generally charges its counterparts a lower price. The main difference 
between MTIC and carousel fraud is thus that goods or tradable 
services eventually make their way back to the original seller, and the 
loop is completed.
The model in Figure 51 assumes a German missing trader (B) buying 
goods from a French company (A) without paying VAT (destination 
principle) and selling them for a VAT-included price to (C), without paying 
the corresponding tax to the tax authorities. After several transactions, 
the same goods are exported to (A) and the carousel begins again. 
756 Ibid.
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With every turn, the German broker (E) claims back the input VAT paid 
(€180,500) from the authorities. The net loss for the German government 
is €171, 000 (VAT collected by (B) and not paid to the authorities). 
Under this method, all transactions are simulated, and sometimes no 
commodity is created. Fictional transactions are created with invoices 
and paperwork but there is no product as such.
VAT carousel fraud often involves intra-community transactions. In addition 
to this type of fraud, the EU has seen a rise in cross-border carousel 
fraud where the cross-border supply comes from a non-EU country. In 
Spain, many cases of fraud involving third countries (e.g. China) have 
been reported.
Nevertheless, there are variations of the same basic fraud:
• No circulation of products, only boxes or packaging.
• No circulation, all operations are simulated by fictional invoicing and 
fake transportation documents.
• Strategic placing of several buffer companies, distancing the missing 
trader company and the final consumers even further.
Figure 51. Model oF a carousel vat Fraud (aMounts in €)
Source: International VAT Association, Combating VAT fraud in the EU. The way forward, Report to the European Commission, 
March 2007.
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4
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• A company in a country simulates an intra-community transaction but 
the commodities are in fact introduced in the same country market.
• The so-called “Belgian cross”: there is an inner channel between the 
manufacturer and the distribution company that sells correctly in the 
internal market. However, the company that should have paid most 
of the amount of tax charged has obtained tax deductions through 
another fraudulent channel, in such a way that none or very little of 
the tax due is ultimately paid.
The key players in missing trader fraud and carrousel fraud are:
i. Conduit company: This company is the source company which 
conducts the intra-community zero-rated transaction to another 
country. This company will claim the refund of input VAT from the 
treasury of the country of origin.
ii. Missing trader. This trader is usually a transitory company (it may 
exist just for several months) formally controlled by straw men. This 
company is always at the beginning of the chain and enables the VAT
Figure 52. vat carousel Fraud using a third country*
          * Figure drawn at the time of EU-25.
Source: UK National Audit Office quoted in FATF, Laundering the Proceeds of VAT Carousel Fraud (Paris: Financial Action Task Force, 
2007), 23.
1.	 The	broker	at	the	end	of	the	UK	
chain	exports	to	a	third	country	outside	
the	European	Union	and	is	entitled	to	
repayment	of	input	VAT	from	HMRC.	
Fraudsters	typically	export	to	third	
countries	with	low	duties	on	imports	
or	free	trade	zones.
2.	 within	a	few	hours,	the	fraudsters	
transport	the	goods	back	to	the	European	
Union	with	final	destination	stated	as	
the	UK.	On	entering	the	European	
Union,	import	duties	are	deferred	under	
Community	Transit	rules	until	goods	
reach	the	final	country	of	destination.
3.	 Consignments	may	be	split	and	sold	
through	a	number	of	traders	in	different	
Member	States	to	mask	the	true	identity	
of	the	goods.
4.	 Goods	emerge	as	intra-community	
supplies,	which	are	sold	free	of	VAT	to	
the	UK	missing	trader.	The	chain	can	
then	begin	again.
Key:
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fraud because it fails to ac-
count for the VAT due. The 
company is often bought 
off the shelf from compa-
ny formation agents and is 
registered under a fake or 
non-existent address. These 
companies perform no ac-
tivity and have no facilities 
or staff. The tax authori-
ties have some control at 
the initial phase when the 
authorisation is granted, at 
which stage they seem to 
have a legal appearance 
but once this phase ends 
no further activities or busi-
ness are carried out. These 
shell companies can offer 
services to more than one 
organised crime group. Fre-
quently, distributors create 
a missing trader and disap-
pear within a year.
iii. Buffer enterprise or trader. 
These are fully compliant
traders carrying out regular business. Their involvement is basically 
to make the fraud pattern more complex and to conceal the fraudu-
lent transactions within their legitimate business. They may even be 
unaware that they are part of a chain of transactions aimed at de-
frauding VAT from the tax authorities. Nevertheless, they usually do 
not pay any tax and sell products at very low prices. Even if they 
are not aware that they are part of a chain of transactions, they are 
aware that the prices are below market prices.
iv. logistical platform in Spain: if the real products are sold to consumers, 
they are usually sold by a logistical platform in Spain which is in 
contact with the end consumer.
v. lawyers or other professionals providing support to set up new 
and shell companies. There are plenty professionals who have 
dormant companies ready to be sold to criminal organisations. The 
cost of incorporating a company in Spain is around €3,000 and the 
sellers provide support and assistance to change the management, to 
substitute shareholders, etc.
At the infrastructure level of the general illegal market, there are 
plenty of unspecialised and versatile organisations that search for 
a business opportunity and offer their services to those who pay. 
They are not differentiated between organisations involved in drug 
trafficking (cocaine) and organisations involved in VAT fraud: if a 
Figure 53. Model oF the Most coMMon vat Fraud Method in spain
Source: The Spanish tax authorities (Operation “Marcianitos”).
Conduit	2	in	Romania
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VAT fraud opportunity arises because of the absence of control and 
supervision, they will enter this market. Initially, their organisers will be 
inexperienced, but they will develop and become more sophisticated 
and specialised. Lawyers, transport organisations, groups with contacts 
in borders and ports, and other types of groups offer infrastructure 
both for VAT fraud and for drug traffickers. “During the economic 
crisis in Spain, some individuals coming from the construction sector 
have been involved in organised crime, specifically in organisations 
providing logistics” (ES-E3).
The sectors most vulnerable to VAT fraud include:
• Computer products;
• Mobile phones and technology;
• Luxury vehicles;
• Scrap, to be sold to the metallurgical industry;
• Carbon emission certificates;
• Alcohol;
• Fuel and hydrocarbons;
• Silver.
Sources of capital for criminal operations. Profile of financiers 
in criminal operations
The funds required to start up a legal business in Spain are not particularly 
significant. Under Spanish law a company can be incorporated for 
€3,000, thus a company can be created relatively easily. Usually, there 
are entrepreneurs who know that there are opportunities to defraud in 
a particular economic sector and they are able to offer products with 
profit margins of 21% or less in case of real goods.
The funds to start up a business can come from legitimate or illegal 
sources:
• legal sources: fraudsters can obtain money from local government or 
entrepreneur subsidies. An example was provided of a fraud that was 
funded initially with European funding for fishing companies.
• Illegal sources: the initial amount can come from previous illegal 
activities. Investors can also help fund a type of fraud in a sector that 
is less monitored and that generates large amounts of money. The 
income can come from fraud facilitators, who in turn start up their 
own fraud operations, often through “business loans” from those who 
are already established in the business chain. The initial funds can 
also come from other types of illegal activities (drugs, etc.).
• In the case of carousel fraud, funds generally come from the tax 
authorities (legal funds). The illegal activity is funded by the tax 
authorities because fraudsters claim tax refunds.
Some lawyers and business centres have many dormant companies 
which are sold to these types of organisations. The fraudsters would 
buy a company, change its management, its shareholders and its field 
Financing 
and financial 
management
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of activity to enable them to run the business smoothly. In addition, 
since VAT does not have to be paid until the end of the year, they 
have a period of time to close up shop and disappear, or buy another 
company.
Some criminal entrepreneurs have a more professional profile, with 
vast experience in this type of fraud, and can therefore move from 
one sector to another when evading law enforcement because fraud 
mechanisms are similar. They usually start a company in a vulnerable 
sector, selling the product at a lower price than their competitors; 
this has a contaminating effect on the rest of the sector which must 
follow suit if they want to compete. They have a margin of 21% (the 
current VAT rate in Spain) to reduce the price of the product in the 
market.
Criminal organisations in this type of fraud act as legitimate companies. 
In the case of acquisition fraud, the missing trader is a shell company that 
needs to appear legitimate in order to obtain the compulsory inclusion 
in the Register of Intra-Community Operators or the VAT Information 
Exchange System (as intra-community trader). It provides all the documents 
and invoices as a legitimate company but the amount owed to the tax 
authorities is ultimately not paid.
The profits of carousel fraud are very high, especially, in certain sectors 
such as fuel. Even if the initial required investment is very high (e.g. €3 
million), organised crime groups can get hold of the amounts to obtain 
the legal permits to start the business but then rapidly divert these 
amounts to other activities. Profits can reach €600,000 per month.
A consequence of the circular nature of the fraud is that the goods become 
increasingly expensive as they are “traded”, which – if unchecked – would 
lead to out of control prices. This means that in every carousel, the 
goods are undervalued before they are circulated again. This often occurs 
when the goods are in third countries (China, etc.). This undervaluation 
has the added advantage that it reduces the import tax/levy due in the 
third country. The VAT repaid by the EU member state more than covers 
the financial loss to the organisation.757
Fraudsters will frequently use accounts in the same off-shore bank.758 
These accounts conceal the money flows in the transactions from member 
state law enforcement agencies and obscure the onward movement of 
money to other jurisdictions. Additionally, using accounts held in the 
same bank speeds up money transfers and reduces the chances of 
mistakes being made and maintains the secrecy of the operations. It 
also enables traders to transfer money online, which helps the criminals 
remain anonymous and operate from the comfort and safety of their 
own computer.759
757 FATF, Laundering the Proceeds of VAT Carousel Fraud.
758 There are two off-shore zones around Spain: Gibraltar and Andorra.
759 Ibid.
Settling payments. 
Profits and profit 
sharing
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Money laundering strategies
Carousel fraud provides the highest number of money laundering strategies 
because of the illegal income generated. According to a study by the 
FATF,760 most of the money is laundered through the banking sector. The 
same study reveals some factors that explain why a specific destination 
is used for money laundering:
• Speedy availability of funds (online banking facilities or other features 
of advanced financial systems);
• Deep-rooted money laundering expertise and experience;
• Availability of legitimate investment opportunities (e.g. opportunities to 
invest in construction projects);
• Low level international cooperation and regulatory enforcement;
• Country of origin of criminals (related to influence on the movement 
of laundered money);
• The amount of legitimate trade that already occurs which can conceal 
illegal transactions;
• Close cultural and commercial links with other parts of the world;
• Lack of formal agreements in relation to legal assistance and 
extradition.761
When asked about the most common money laundering strategies, 
officers in of tax fraud investigation units stated the following:
• Sending money to tax haven jurisdictions;
• International transfers to third countries;
• Ghost companies;
• Local investments are less common due to exposure to detection;
• Compensation systems: typical compensation systems such as the 
hawala involve two intermediaries (hawadalars) at the locations of 
origin and destination. Under this type of system, if a subject in 
one country wishes to send an amount of money to another subject 
(living in the country of destination) this transfer is made through 
intermediaries in each country in order to avoid traceability. In 
country A, the intermediary receives the money from subject A, and 
in the country of destination the money is sent to subject B by the 
intermediary in this country. The money is then exchanged between 
intermediaries.
760 Ibid.
761 Ibid., 10.
The current report has provided a different viewpoint on criminal 
finances and an alternative approach for researching the subject. In 
light of this it suggests possible steps toward the introduction of novel 
approaches to tackle organised crime. Criminal investments attracted 
academic attention as early as the 1980s,762 however interest in the 
topic has remained largely theoretical. This is largely due to a number 
of impediments that continue to deter empirical research on the topic. 
Most important among these are the lack of interest in the issue 
of criminal financing by most law enforcement institutions and the 
reluctance of criminal entrepreneurs to discuss their methods of 
financial investment in any detail. Indeed, these deterrents also posed 
certain limitations to the findings of the current study.
The method of gathering data from criminal entrepreneurs used in the 
development of the current report proved to be quite challenging. In 
most countries, researchers succeeded in reaching a number of small 
to medium-scale entrepreneurs operating at retail or wholesale level. In 
most cases the work of these criminals needed little or no financing 
and they appeared to have fragmentary knowledge about the financial 
aspects of the upper levels.
The empirical evidence collected within the study confirmed that 
intelligence gathering by law enforcement agencies has typically been 
focused on identifying members of criminal groups and tracing illicit 
goods or services they sell, whereas their financial transactions have 
rarely been traced. The reason for this is that criminal prosecution in all 
member states is entirely focused on collecting evidence that related to 
the possession, transporting, manufacturing or sale of illicit products or 
services. Therefore information on the financial aspects of organised crime 
has been regarded as irrelevant and no deliberate efforts to collect and 
analyse such data have been made. The quality of financial information 
collected (when it is collected) is fragmented and compromised because 
law enforcement agents operating at the local level lack knowledge and 
experience in financial matters.
762 See, for example, P. Reuter, The Organisation of Illegal Markets: An Economic Analysis (Washington, 
D.C.: National Institute of Justice, 1985).
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The initial objective of this report was to map and describe the existing 
sources, mechanisms and approaches being used to finance organised 
crime activities and, therefore, to contribute to different and more 
effective approaches to investigations of organised crime and money 
laundering. The analysis covered three major organised crime activities – 
drug trafficking, the illicit tobacco trade and organised VAT fraud – which 
were selected as they represented three types: an illicit product market, a 
licit product traded illegally, and a predatory criminal activity. Therefore, 
the main findings and conclusions can be extrapolated to other criminal 
activities.
One of the main conclusions of the current study is that the social 
capital of criminal entrepreneurs – their trusted connections and 
reputation – is very often more important than the financial capital 
for entering, operating and succeeding in a given criminal market. 
Social capital appears to be a precondition for access to all levels in 
any criminal market. It could also act as a substitute for the financial 
capital needed to start and operate in a given market, insofar as it 
can secure access to advance payments from customers or revolving 
credit agreements from a supplier. This is particularly apparent in drug 
markets, where revolving lines of credit seem to be commonplace 
in many countries, especially at retail level and wholesale level. The 
relatively high profit margins and low production costs may encourage 
this, since failures hurt opportunity costs rather than fixed costs. The 
empirical evidence collected suggests that the bigger the level of risks 
associated with a given criminal activity, the greater the role social 
capital plays in entering the market. Within this context, the presence 
of brokers is paramount for the creation of social capital, since they are 
the link between two or more disconnected parts of a criminal network. 
In addition, social capital is embedded in occupations, activities and 
relationships within legal businesses which act as a platform upon 
which legal relationships (i.e. business partners, employer-employee, 
etc.) transform into illegal relationships.763
Likewise, upward mobility in criminal markets is not merely a matter 
of accumulating financial capital. Social capital is of utmost importance 
in terms of building a customer base of trusted clients and establishing 
trusted relationships with suppliers from upper levels. Furthermore, the 
operations of large-scale importers of drugs, illicit tobacco traders or big 
VAT fraud ring leaders are also dependent on their corrupt relationships 
with government officials, without which they would not be able to 
operate on that level and scale. Corruption links can also be viewed as 
a form of social capital, although obviously they cannot thrive without 
steady financial incentives.
763 E.R. Kleemans and H. van de Bunt, “The Social Embeddedness of Organised Crime”, Transnational 
Organized Crime 5, no. 1 (1999): 19-36; E.R. Kleemans and H. Van de Bunt, “Organised Crime, 
Occupations and Opportunity”, Global Crime 9, no. 3 (2008): 185-97; K. von Lampe and 
P.O. Johansen, “Organised Crime and Trust: On the Conceptualization and Empirical Relevance 
of Trust in the Context of Criminal Networks”, Global Crime 6, no. 2 (2004): 159-84.
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As largely expected, reinvestment of criminal proceeds is reported as 
the main form of financing for the criminal operations in all 3 criminal 
activities studied. However, numerous other forms of financing – both 
from legal and illegal sources – were reported. In general, the research 
has found that purely criminal forms of financing can be classified 
according to the following three categories: investing proceeds from 
other crimes or criminal businesses, shared investment schemes and 
borrowed capital.
The study results suggest that, although criminal entrepreneurs do 
accumulate expertise and specialise in certain criminal markets, they 
also readily move their criminal funds to other prospective and more 
profitable activities, thereby taking opportunities that might bring higher 
returns. Examples include proceeds from extortion or loan sharking used 
to finance drug trafficking, drug trafficking revenues invested in the 
illegal tobacco trade or VAT fraudsters moving into the illegal tobacco 
trade. Furthermore, conventional crimes such as burglaries or robberies 
might be used to secure start-up capital in order to enter drug markets, 
especially at retail and wholesale level. This is not to suggest, however, 
that all criminals can and do move flexibly between markets; but if there 
are no major “discomfort zones” or technical/social obstacles, some do 
so.764 Where there are no organisational links available, personality traits 
or cultural preconditions may play a role, however, they are yet to be 
explored in detail.
Shared investment schemes seem to be common for all supply chain 
levels across different markets. This form of financing not only allows 
criminal entrepreneurs to kick-start a given project when they cannot raise 
the necessary financial resources on their own, but more importantly it 
is a tool for sharing business risks. Therefore, it appears to be practised 
even at very high levels of the supply chain, although the entrepreneurs 
at that level can easily provide their own financing for a given project.
Borrowing capital from other criminal entrepreneurs appeared to be 
the least practiced form of financing, that was usually only used in 
critical moments. Although the research team hypothesised the existence 
of “black” bankers, the study results suggested a more nuanced reality 
in which the existence of such specialised financiers is an exception. 
Such illicit lending rather could be obtained by other well-established, 
career criminals in their wider network in virtue of established trusted 
relationships or through a trusted surety. Further on, it usually requires 
certain collaterals; these range from valuable assets to giving family 
members as hostages. In some of the countries studied, loan sharks 
appear to act as illegal criminal lenders, but only for smaller sums and 
usually at lower levels of the criminal market.
A significant finding was that along with the criminal proceeds, legitimate 
sources also play an important role in the financing of criminal 
undertakings. While this is widely contended with regards to terrorist 
764 E.R. Kleemans and C. J. de Poot, “Criminal Careers in Organised Crime and Social Opportunity 
Structure”, European Journal of Criminology 5, no. 1 (2008): 69-98.
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financing, little if anything is known about the use of legitimate funds 
for organised crime purposes. The study results presented in this report 
show that legitimate money is invested in criminal markets and this takes 
place from the retail level up to importation and manufacturing levels. 
The analysis of the organised VAT fraud also revealed that investment 
of legitimate funds in tax evasion schemes is common. As the scale of 
this financing is obviously bigger at the upper levels, this necessitates 
specific efforts to conceal the origin of the funds. Therefore, various 
methods for “reverse money laundering”765 are employed, whereby the 
legitimate funds are turned into cash or channelled through a number 
of companies in order to obscure their origin. This is most apparent in 
cases of large-scale organised VAT fraud schemes, where various bogus 
and offshore companies and straw persons are introduced into the 
fraudulent chain to obscure the origin of the funds.
At the retail or wholesale level of drug and illicit tobacco markets, these 
legitimate funds might come from personal savings, revenues from a 
legal business of the criminal entrepreneur, loans from family or friends, 
payday loans, and small bank credits. At higher levels of drug trafficking 
or illicit tobacco markets, as well as with large scale VAT frauds, such 
legitimate funds may originate from legal business revenues, EU or national 
subsidies, and bank loans. Certainly, in some of the cases analysed, 
obtaining bank loans for initiating or perpetuating criminal operations 
was linked to corrupt bank officials. At this level also, already laundered 
funds were reported as possible sources of financing, thus blurring the 
line between legitimate and criminal funds (and, logically, requiring the 
reverse laundering of the funds, de-integrating them in the still officially 
employed but outdated methodology of placement-layering-integration). 
Shared investment schemes in which other legitimate businessmen invest 
their own legitimate funds for a share of profit were also reported.
In most Eastern European countries the so called “oligarchs” are an example 
of entrepreneurs with legitimate businesses that invest legal revenues in 
the criminal economy; such examples were provided for Bulgaria and the 
Czech Republic. Typically, these oligarchs enjoy strong political protection 
over their business. Given their apparent unscrupulousness, it may not be 
a surprise that the overlap of legitimate and criminal businesses for this 
group is the rule rather than the exception, so they often move capital 
from their licit to their illicit activities and vice versa. They are also a 
fine example of how political corruption is an important mechanism 
for funnelling legitimate public resources to criminal businesses 
through privatisation, public procurement or national or EU subsidies. 
A somewhat similar example in the older member states can be found 
in Italy, where the mafia families have acquired – through extortion or 
political corruption – various legitimate businesses, but at the same time 
continue to invest in organised crime activities.
legitimate funds are also provided for criminal purposes by established 
legal entrepreneurs who resort to criminal practices in order to 
765 S.D. Cassella, “Reverse Money Laundering”, Journal of Money Laundering Control 7, no. 1 (2003): 
92-94.
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maximise their profits or survive harsh times. This appeared to be 
more common in the illicit tobacco trade and organised VAT fraud, where 
it is easier to conceal such financial operations through manipulation 
of tax receipts, although such examples were also provided for the 
drug trafficking business. In this respect, it is interesting to compare 
typical money laundering with reverse money laundering. Classic money 
laundering usually aims at full legitimation of criminal proceeds in order to 
prevent subsequent confiscation in case of investigation and prosecution. 
Therefore, the process usually involves three stages – placement, layering 
and integration. Reverse money laundering simply aims at obscuring 
the link between the origin of the money and the criminal project: 
therefore, it comprises of placement and layering. There is a need for 
“full laundering” only when there is a risk that someone would investigate 
and act vigorously following that investigation.
The empirical evidence collected within the study showed that grey 
revenues resulting from undeclared labour and various forms of tax 
avoidance are among the important sources of financing, specifically in 
regards to organised VAT fraud. The findings suggest that a larger share 
of the grey economy is conducive to greater availability of financing 
to organised crime: undeclared income can readily be invested even 
without undergoing any reverse money laundering.
The methods used to access capital in critical moments – such as 
following police arrests of key actors in the criminal network, seizing or 
loss of merchandise, freezing or seizing of funds or assets – do not differ 
much from those used to raise capital for initiating or sustaining criminal 
operations. However, two interesting forms deserve special attention. The 
analysis across all countries studied showed that in many cases criminal 
entrepreneurs put aside money in contingency or “rainy day” funds 
which are supposed to cover such unanticipated losses and one-time 
expenses. Such funds are usually kept in cash in safety deposit boxes 
or deposited in offshore accounts, since quick liquidity is a priority in 
critical moments. A somewhat similar form, typical for Russian organised 
criminals, is the criminals’ mutual fund, also known as “obschak.”766 This 
fund is a collective contingency form; money from it covers support for 
imprisoned criminals and their families, which has the additional benefit 
(and perhaps intention) of also binding them to the group.
loan sharks also appear to play a role as providers of quick bridging 
loans to criminal entrepreneurs in critical moments, especially at the 
retail and wholesale levels. However, the analysis showed that in most 
countries their role was confined predominantly to ethnic minorities, 
whether to reduce the visibility of their operations or as a by-product of 
strong trust and fear relationships.
In terms of how payments are settled, various methods were identified. 
Contrary to the widespread opinion about the criminal economy as 
predominantly cash driven, the outcomes of the study suggest that this 
is valid mostly for the retail and wholesale levels, whereas at importation 
766 Described in more detail in the chapter on Estonia in the current report.
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level the picture is reversed. Even with drug trafficking, where both the 
product and the its distribution are illegal, a great deal of the payment 
is carried out through the legitimate financial system – either through 
money order services, or bank transactions and recently through virtual 
platforms and the use of cryptocurrencies, which are gaining momentum 
from a low base rate. Straw persons, front and bogus companies are 
used to conceal the source and nature of the financial transactions.
In the beginning of the chain of organised VAT fraud there is a usually 
a legal purchase of some goods or services from a large wholesaler or 
manufacturer and, therefore, all payments must be carried out through 
the bank system. This is also the case with the “illicit whites” – cigarettes 
legally manufactured in one country only to be smuggled and sold in 
another country without excise tax being paid – and with the import of 
raw tobacco from legal tobacco manufacturers producing cigarettes for 
the illegal market. Some drug trafficking cases also indicate that importers 
pay their South American counterparts through front companies using the 
legitimate financial system. This inevitably necessitates criminal organisations 
operating at these levels to use a variety of money laundering techniques 
and simple cash couriering in order to avoid detection of the flows of 
criminal money. The settlement of payments involves both (a) reverse 
money laundering aiming at introduction of the “black” cash revenues 
into the banking system to initiate new criminal projects and (b) classic 
money laundering, whereby criminal entrepreneurs cash out and invest 
the proceeds of their criminal operations in the legal economy. These 
cash-in and cash-out flows are often streamed through offshore branches 
of international companies, or largely offshore companies that have 
correspondent banking facilities with major banks. This is especially the 
case with Western European countries. In some countries malpractices or 
negligent due diligence of bank institutions in the EU involving corrupt 
bank officers were also reported. However, the analysis suggests that in 
general, law enforcement efforts are mainly focused on the cash-out 
flows, whereas the cash-in flows are largely neglected.
The analysis of the costs and profits of doing criminal business also 
pointed out several interesting implications. First of all, the study 
demonstrated that costs can be used as an indicator of market entry 
thresholds and provide useful information about the start-up capital 
needed by criminal entrepreneurs to operate at a given level. Given 
that all countries seemed to experience co-existence of different modi 
operandi, as well as both large-scale and small-scale players at all levels 
of the supply chain, the market entry thresholds also differ depending 
on the modus operandi.
Furthermore, the analysis suggests that cost and profit analysis might be 
useful in estimating the financial and corruption potential of a given 
criminal group. Thus it could be instrumental in threat assessments 
and in setting up operational priorities of law enforcement bodies. It 
can be also used to predict the effect of increased law enforcement 
pressure on a specific organised crime activity, since changing risks and 
opportunity costs prompt criminal entrepreneurs to consider switching to 
other modus operandi or shifting to other criminal activities.
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The currently well-developed methodologies for macroeconomic assess-
ments of the size of criminal markets – drugs, prostitution, illicit 
tobacco, missing trader fraud – already provide good estimations of the 
number of consumers, size of demand and supply, and average prices 
at the different levels of the supply chain. Finding the right number 
of price points is a problem for researchers in highly differentiated 
drug markets. Comparing such macro data with intelligence data 
collected by law enforcement about investments, costs and profits of 
criminal groups or networks from different levels of the supply chain 
could provide a clearer picture of the number of criminal actors and 
groups in a given local or national market, and thus help detect yet 
unidentified criminal players. Furthermore, it can provide more precise 
estimation of the operational and financial capacities of the criminal 
players at each level of the supply chain, even at the hard-to-trace 
higher level actors.
Building on the key findings from the study a set of recommendations 
at the EU and national level could be proposed.
Policy proposals at the EU level
• The European Commission should consider developing and adopting 
an EU strategy on financial investigations. The strategy should invite 
member states to make parallel financial investigations a routine 
component of all serious and organised crime investigations and 
thus complement the existing money laundering investigations and 
confiscation of criminal proceeds. This would require an upscaling 
of financial investigation resources and in the current age of 
austerity, this might mean some reallocation from other current 
activities.
• The strategy should recognise that the investigation of finances – 
including the financing of crime – is a basic tool for tackling organised 
and cross-border crime. The term “financial investigation”’ should be 
used in its widest sense including the purposes of Article 6(1a) and 
6(1b) of the UN Convention on Transnational Organised Crime (the 
“Palermo Convention”). The assumption that the standard model for 
proceeds is layering, placement and integration is an obstacle to a 
clearer focus on the financing of crime.
• The EU strategy should recognise the important role of grey economy 
practices, including those by otherwise legitimate businesses, as well 
as political corruption and protection in financing crime. 
• The definition of money laundering as laid down in Article 2 of 
the 3rd Anti-Money Laundering Directive should be extended to 
criminalise “reverse money laundering” (i.e. provision of legal funds by 
any means, either directly or indirectly) with the purpose to finance 
organised crime activities.
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Policy proposals at the level of member states
• Member states should consider developing national financial investigation 
strategies to counter the finances of organised and cross-border crime 
which aim, inter alia, at ensuring equal status to the investigations of 
predicate crimes and the investigation of finances that motivate and 
pay for these crimes.
• National strategies should acknowledge that dedicated trained financial 
investigators should be assigned to tackle organised and cross-border 
crime alongside ordinary criminal investigators, rather than as an 
afterthought to see if proceeds are available for confiscation.
• National strategies should recognise the role of grey economy practices 
(including those by otherwise legitimate businesses), as well as political 
corruption and protection in financing crime.
• Member states should take steps to insure that offences such as 
conspiracy and “conduct related to a criminal organisation” as laid 
down in article 1 (a) of Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA of 
24 October 2008 on the fight against organised crime, be considered 
more commonly for cases where prosecutors can show how crime is 
financed.
• Member states should ensure mechanisms for effective and flexible 
cooperation among revenue authorities, customs services and law 
enforcement agencies for financial investigations in organised crime 
cases.
Proposals to law enforcement agencies
• Law enforcement agencies should consider more effective use of 
intelligence for systematic gathering of financial information about the 
organised crime groups such as financial flows, investments, costs, 
profits and settlement of payments with the aim of more effective 
prevention and investigation of criminal activities.
• Law enforcement agencies should employ criminal financial analysis 
more actively by drawing on the financial data collected and in 
combination with publicly available macro and microeconomic data 
and social research data.
list oF interviewees in the section on cocaine traFFicking
Code Position Country/Institution/Role
BG-E1 Officer, Drug trafficking unit
State Agency for National Security-Bourgas office, 
Bulgaria
BG-E2 Officer, Drug trafficking unit
State Agency for National Security-Sofia office, 
Bulgaria
BG-E3 Officer, Drug trafficking unit
State Agency for National Security-Pazardzhik 
office, Bulgaria
BG-E4 Officer, Drug trafficking unit
State Agency for National Security-Varna office, 
Bulgaria
BG-E5 Officer, Drug trafficking unit
State Agency for National Security-Plovdiv office, 
Bulgaria
BG-E6 Retired police officer Drug Trafficking Unit, Ministry of Interior, Bulgaria
BG-C1
Criminal entrepreneur 
(male, Bulgarian, prisoner)
Retail level cocaine dealer in Plovdiv
BG-C2
Criminal entrepreneur 
(male, Bulgarian, prisoner)
Retail level cocaine dealer in Plovdiv, track 
record in selling various kinds of drugs 
BG-C3
Criminal entrepreneur 
(male, Bulgarian, prisoner)
Retail level cocaine dealer in Plovdiv, track 
record in selling heroin 
BG-C4
Criminal entrepreneur 
(male, Bulgarian, prisoner)
Retail level heroin dealer in Pazardzhik
BG-C5
Criminal entrepreneur 
(male, Bulgarian, prisoner)
Retail level heroin dealer in Sofia (also selling 
amphetamines and cannabis)
BG-C6
Criminal entrepreneur 
(male, Bulgarian, prisoner)
Retail level heroin dealer in Sofia (also selling 
amphetamines and cannabis)
EE-E1
Head of Estonian Financial 
Intelligence Unit
Estonian Police and Border Guard Board
ANNEx: lISt OF INtERVIEWEES
In-depth interviews provided valuable information on the issues analysed 
in this report. In order to preserve the anonymity of the sources who 
are frequently referenced throughout the text each respondent has 
been assigned a code and in the tables below is described by his/her 
position, institution and country. The first two letters of the code signify 
the country, “E” identifies an expert, while “C” identifies a criminal 
entrepreneur.
428 Financing	oF	organised	crime
list oF interviewees in the section on cocaine traFFicking (continued)
Code Position Country/Institution/Role
EE-E2 Head of Drug Crime Department Northern Police Prefecture, Estonia
EE-E3 Head of Criminal Assets Unit Central Criminal Police, Estonia
EE-E4 Head of Drug Crime Unit Central Criminal Police, Estonia
EE-E5
Head, Department of Serious 
and Organised Crime
Northern Police Prefecture, Estonia
EE-E6
Senior (Leading) Investigator, 
Department of Serious and 
Organised Crime
Northern Police Prefecture, Estonia
EE-E7 Head of Drug Unit Estonian Tax and Customs Board
EE-C1
Criminal entrepreneur (male, Russian 
speaking, prisoner) 
Imprisoned for the second time, both times for 
drug crimes. Operates at retail level. Estonia
EE-C2
Criminal entrepreneur (male, 
prisoner)
Operates at large scale level, cross-border;
third time in prison, Estonia
EE-C3
Criminal entrepreneur (male, 
prisoner)
Operated at mid-market level, Estonia 
EE-C4
Criminal entrepreneur (male, Russian 
speaking, prisoner) 
Dealt in fentanyl and marijuana, Estonia
FR-E1 Police officer, Drug Trafficking Unit
National Antinarcotic Department (OCRTIS) – 
Marseille unit, France
FR-E2 Head of Drug Trafficking Unit
National Antinarcotic Department (OCRTIS) – 
Marseille unit, France
FR-E3 Police officer, Drug Trafficking Unit
National Antinarcotic Department (OCRTIS) – 
Paris unit, France
FR-E4 
Customs officer, Drug Trafficking 
Unit
National Intelligence Unit (DNRED) – Paris unit, 
France
FR-E5
Customs, Head of Drug Trafficking 
Unit
National Intelligence Unit (DNRED) – Paris unit, 
France
FR-E6
Police liaison officer, French 
embassy in Spain
National Cooperation Direction (DCI)- Madrid
FR-E7
Police liaison officer, French 
embassy in Netherlands
National Cooperation Direction (DCI)- The Hague
FR-E8
Customs officer, French Asset 
Recovery Office
National Asset Recovery Office (AGRASC), Paris,
France
FR-E9
Magistrate, Head of French Asset 
Recovery Office
National Asset Recovery Office (AGRASC), Paris, 
France
FR-E10 Head of Unit 
Police Patrimonial Investigation Unit (OCRGDF), 
Paris, France
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list oF interviewees in the section on cocaine traFFicking (continued)
Code Position Country/Institution/Role
FR-E11 Officer
Police Patrimonial Investigation Unit (OCRGDF), 
Paris, France
FR-E12 Officer
Identification Asset Platform Unit (PIAC), Paris, 
France
FR-E13 Officer 
National Criminal Investigation (BAC) of 
Gendarmerie Nationale, Paris, France
FR-E14 Head of Unit
National Criminal Investigation (BAC) of 
Gendarmerie Nationale, Paris, France
FR-C1
Criminal entrepreneur (male, 
prisoner)
Retail level, France
GR-E1 Head 
Sub-Directorate of Drug Enforcement – Hellenic 
Police, Ministry of Public Order and Citizen 
Protection, Greece
GR-E2 Sub-Director 
Sub-Directorate of Drug Enforcement – Hellenic 
Police, Ministry of Public Order and Citizen 
Protection, Greece
GR-E3
Deputy Public Prosecutor, Vice 
President of the Association of 
Judges and Prosecutors
Court of Appeal (Piraeus) – Ministry of Justice, 
Transparency and Human Rights, Greece
GR-E4 Expert
Department of Drug Enforcement -Financial 
and Economic Crime Unit, Ministry of Finance, 
Greece
GR-E5 Expert
Department of Drug Enforcement – Financial 
and Economic Crime Unit, Ministry of Finance, 
Greece
IT-E1 Senior police official State Police, Region of Trentino-Alto Adige, Italy
IT-E2 Officer 
Guardia di Finanza, Excise and Revenue Police – 
Group on Investigation of Organised Crime, 
Region of Trentino-Alto Adige, Italy
IT-E3 Officer
Guardia di Finanza, Excise and Revenue Police – 
Group on Investigation of Organised Crime,
Region of Trentino-Alto Adige, Italy
IT-E4 Head 
Special Operations Team, Carabinieri,
Region of Trentino-Alto Adige, Italy
IT-E5 Police officer State Police, Region of Trentino-Alto Adige, Italy
IT-E6 National prosecutor Region of Trentino-Alto Adige, Italy
IT-E7 Prosecutor
Anti-Mafia District Directorate (DDA),
Region of Trentino-Alto Adige, Italy
430 Financing	oF	organised	crime
list oF interviewees in the section on cocaine traFFicking (continued)
Code Position Country/Institution/Role
IT-E8 Head of Mobile Squad
Anti-drug Crime Unit, State Police,
Region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Italy
IT-E9 Head of Mobile Squad
Anti-drug Crime Unit, State Police,
Region of Veneto, Italy
IT-E10 Prosecutor 
Anti-Mafia District Directorate (DDA),
Region of Piedmont, Italy
IT-E11 Prosecutor
Anti-Mafia District Directorate (DDA),
Region of Liguria, Italy
IT-E12 Head 
Investigative Division, Carabinieri,
Region of Liguria, Italy
IT-E13 Head of Mobile Squad
Anti-drug Crime Unit, State Police,
Region of Tuscany, Italy
IT-E14 Commander in chief
Investigative Unit, Carabinieri,
Region of Tuscany, Italy
IT-E15 Senior police official State Police, Region of Emilia-Romagna, Italy
IT-E16 Head of Mobile Squad
Anti-drug Crime Unit, State Police,
Region of Marche, Italy
IT-E17 Head of Mobile Squad 
Anti-drug Crime Unit, State Police,
Region of Abruzzo, Italy
IT-E18 Head of Mobile Squad 
Anti-drug Crime Unit, State Police,
Region of Latium
IT-E19 Police Director 
Central Antidrug Bureau (DCSA), Ministry of the 
Interior, Region of Latium, Italy
IT-E20 Prosecutor
Anti-Mafia District Directorate, Region of Latium, 
Italy
IT-E21 Police officer
Anti-drug Unit, State Police, Region of Latium, 
Italy
IT-E22 Senior police officer 
Central Antidrug Bureau (DCSA), Ministry of the 
Interior, Region of Latium
IT-E23 Head of Police Administration State Police, Region of Latium, Italy
IT-E24 Head of Mobile Squad 
Anti-drug Crime Unit, State Police,
Region of Campania, Italy
IT-E25 Head of Investigative Division Carabinieri, Region of Calabria, Italy
IT-E26 Lieutenant colonel 
Judicial Police Division at the Prosecutor Office, 
Region of Puglia, Italy
IT-E27 Investigative journalist Balkan area
IT-E28 Journalist Central Italy area
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list oF interviewees in the section on cocaine traFFicking (continued)
Code Position Country/Institution/Role
ES-E1 Chief of Money Laundering Section Unit on Organised Crime, Guardia Civil, Spain
ES-E2 Chief of Cocaine Section 
Drugs and Organised Crime Unit (UDYCO),
Cuerpo Nacional de Policía, Spain
ES-E3 Deputy Director of Operations 
Judicial police from Tax Administration (Vigilancia 
Aduanera), Spain
ES-E4 Chief of Money Laundering Unit
Economic and Tax Crimes Unit (UDEF), Cuerpo 
Nacional de Policía, Spain
ES-E5 Chief of Unit on Organised Crime Guardia Civil, Spain
UK-E1 Police Officer Cleveland Police, United Kingdom
UK-E2 Retired Head of Detection Border Agency/HMRC, United Kingdom
UK-E3
Operations Manager with previous 
experience in the National Drugs 
Intelligence Unit
National Crime Agency, United Kingdom
UK-E4
Academic with expertise in drug 
use and markets, especially retail 
level cocaine dealing and drug 
importation. Past experience and 
personal contacts in the illegal 
drug trade.
Teesside University, United Kingdom
UK-E5
Academic with expertise in the 
international cocaine trade, drug 
mules and female dealers
The University of Leicester, United Kingdom
UK-C1
Criminal Entrepreneur (male, British, 
based in the UK)
Various experiences as a runner/transporter and 
retail level dealer, United Kingdom
UK-C2
Criminal Entrepreneur (male, British, 
based in the UK)
Previously a retail level dealer, now an online 
dealer, United Kingdom
UK-C3
Criminal Entrepreneur (male, British, 
based in the UK)
Retail-level dealer, United Kingdom
UK-C4
Criminal Entrepreneur (male, British, 
based in the UK)
Middle-level dealer, United Kingdom
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list oF interviewees in the section on illicit tobacco trade
Code Position Country/Institution/Role
BE-E1
Attaché, Directorate of National 
Investigations
Belgian Customs 
BE-E2 Police officer 
Directorate of Combating Economic and Financial 
Crime, Belgian Federal Police
BE-E3 Police officer
Federal Police Antwerp, Economic and Financial 
Crime Unit, Belgium
BE-E4 Legal Counsel BeLux British American Tobacco Belgium
BG-E1 Former Senior Police Officer 
Internal Security Department, Ministry of Interior, 
Bulgaria
BG-E2 Senior Police Officer 
Internal Security Department, Ministry of Interior, 
Bulgaria
BG-E3 Former Director 
Directorate General Combating Organized Crime, 
Ministry of Interior, Bulgaria
BG-E4
Former Director of a Regional 
Directorate
Ministry of Interior, Bulgaria
BG-E5
Former Director a Regional 
Directorate 
Ministry of Interior, Bulgaria
BG-E6
Deputy Director of a Regional 
Directorate
Ministry of Interior, Bulgaria
BG-E7 Senior Police Officer Ministry of Interior, Bulgaria
BG-E8 Senior Police Officer Ministry of Interior, Bulgaria
BG-E9
Director of a Regional Police 
Department
Ministry of Interior, Bulgaria
BG-E10
Director of a Regional Police 
Department
Ministry of Interior, Bulgaria
BG-E11 Senior Prosecutor Bulgaria
BG-E12 Prosecutor  Bulgaria
BG-E13
Former Director of Customs 
Intelligence and Investigation
Customs Agency, Bulgaria
BG-E14 Senior Officer National Revenue Agency, Bulgaria
BG-E15 Director of Integrity Department Multinational tobacco company, Bulgaria office
BG-E16 Director of Integrity Department Multinational tobacco company, Bulgaria office
BG-E17
Former Director of Integrity 
Department
Bulgarian tobacco company
BG-E18 Officer of Integrity Department Multinational tobacco company, Bulgaria office
BG-E19 Officer Multinational tobacco company, Bulgaria office
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list oF interviewees in the section on illicit tobacco trade (continued)
Code Position Country/Institution/Role
BG-E20 Former Deputy Director
Directorate General Combating Organized Crime, 
Ministry of Interior
BG-E21
Former Bulgarian State Security 
Officer 
Agent in the Arab countries, Bulgaria
BG-E22 Director Customs Agency, Bulgaria
BG-C1 Criminal entrepreneur 
High level importer of illegal cigarettes from 
Greece, indicted (Bulgaria)
BG-C2 Criminal entrepreneur Middle level trader of illegal cigarettes (Bulgaria)
BG-C3 Criminal entrepreneur 
Served sentence for organised illegal tobacco 
trading (Bulgaria)
BG-C4 Criminal entrepreneur 
Served sentence for organised illegal tobacco 
trading (Bulgaria)
BG-C5 Money-lender Independent agent (Bulgaria)
CZ-E1 Senior Officer
General Directorate of Customs, 
Czech Republic
CZ-E2 Senior Officer Ministry of Finance, Czech Republic
CZ-E3 Methodologist
Corruption and Financial Crime Detection 
Department, Police of the Czech Republic
CZ-E4 Senior Officer
The Customs Office for the Moravia-Silesian 
region, Czech Republic
CZ-E5 Prosecutor Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office
CZ-E6 Law Specialist
The Customs Office for the South-Moravian 
region, Czech Republic
CZ-E7 Law Specialist
The Customs Office for the Moravia-Silesian 
region, Czech Republic
CZ-C1 Criminal entrepreneur Czech Republic
CZ-C2 Criminal entrepreneur Czech Republic
CZ-C3 Criminal entrepreneur Czech Republic
CZ-E8 Security expert Phillip Morris International, Czech Republic
CZ-E9 Security expert Phillip Morris International, Czech Republic
CZ-E9 Journalist
Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting 
Project, Czech Republic
FR-E1
Customs Officer, Office D3,
Fraud Control
Directorate-General of Customs and Indirect 
Taxes
FR-E2
Director, National Customs Judicial 
Enquiries Department
Directorate-General of Customs and Indirect 
Taxes
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list oF interviewees in the section on illicit tobacco trade (continued)
Code Position Country/Institution/Role
FR-E3 Customs Officer, Cyberdouane
Directorate-General of Customs and Indirect 
Taxes
FR-E4
Customs Officer, Cigarettes 
Observatory
Directorate-General of Customs and Indirect 
Taxes
FR-E5
Customs Officer, Cigarettes 
Observatory
Directorate-General of Customs and Indirect 
Taxes
FR-E6
Former Director, Inter-Regional 
Directorate of Customs in Marseille
Directorate-General of Customs and Indirect 
Taxes
FR-E7
Customs officer, Division of 
Marseille-Fos
Directorate-General of Customs and Indirect 
Taxes
FR-E8
Regional Director, Regional 
Directorate of Customs in Perpignan
Directorate-General of Customs and Indirect 
Taxes
FR-E9 Head of Division in Cerdagne
Directorate-General of Customs and Indirect 
Taxes
FR-E10 Head of Judicial Investigations
Police headquarters of la Goutte d’or
(18th district of Paris)
FR-E11 Head of Transversal Investigation Police headquarters of 4th district of Paris
FR-E12
Deputy Head of Transversal 
Investigation
Police headquarters of 4th district of Paris
FR-E13 Police officer Police headquarters of Marseille, 1st district
GR-E1 Deputy Public Prosecutor Court of Appeal (Piraeus), Greece
GR-E2
Civil servant, Department of Drug 
Enforcement
Financial and Economic Crime Unit, Greece
GR-E3
Civil servant, Department of Drug 
Enforcement
Financial and Economic Crime Unit, Greece
GR-E4
Civil servant, Enforcement 
Department
Customs Office (Piraeus Port), Greece
GR-E5 Director of Corporate Affairs Papastratos SA company, Greece
GR-E6 Communications Director Papastratos SA company, Greece
GR-E7 Police officer
Department of Protection of Property Rights – 
Directorate of Security (Attica), Greece
GR-E8 Police officer
Department of Protection of Property Rights – 
Directorate of Security (Attica), Greece
IT-E1 Head of Group on Investigation 
of Organised Crime – Excise and 
Revenue Police, Guardia di Finanza
Region of Trentino-Alto Adige
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list oF interviewees in the section on illicit tobacco trade (continued)
Code Position Country/Institution/Role
IT-E2 Head of Group on Investigation 
of Organised Crime – Excise and 
Revenue Police, Guardia di Finanza
Region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia
IT-E3 Head of Investigative Unit, Provincial 
Command – Guardia di Finanza
Region of Lombardy
IT-E4 Head of Investigative Unit – 
Central Directorate Local Police 
and Security, Local Police
Region of Lombardy
IT-E5 Prosecutor at DDA – Anti-mafia 
District Directorate
Region of Piedmont
IT-E6 Officer at Airport Customs Region of Piedmont
IT-E7 Head of Prevention Unit – Group 
on Investigation of Organised 
Crime – Excise and Revenue Police 
Guardia di Finanza
Region of Liguria
IT-E8 Custom officer – Intelligence and 
Anti-fraud Unit
Region of Liguria
IT-E9 Head of Group on Investigation – 
Airport Customs, Guardia di Finanza
Region of Emilia-Romagna
IT-E10 Head of Investigation Unit, Guardia 
di Finanza
Region of Tuscany
IT-E11 Head of Investigation Unit, Guardia 
di Finanza
Region of Marche
IT-E12 Official – Aeronaval Section, 
Guardia di Finanza
Region of Latium
IT-E13 Head of Investigation Unit – Airport 
Customs, Guardia di Finanza
Region of Latium
IT-E14 Head of Intelligence Unit – 
National Anti-fraud and Control 
Directorate, Customs and 
Monopolies Agency
Region of Latium
IT-E15 Head of Group on Investigation 
of Organised Crime – Excise and 
Revenue Police, Guardia di Finanza
Region of Campania
IT-E16 Head of Excise and Revenue Police Region of Basilicata
IT-E17 Prosecutor at DDA – Anti-mafia 
District Directorate
Region of Apulia
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list oF interviewees in the section on illicit tobacco trade (continued)
Code Position Country/Institution/Role
IT-E18 Head of Prevention Unit – Group 
on Investigation of Organised 
Crime – Excise and Revenue Police 
Guardia di Finanza
Region of Apulia
IT-E19 Head of Group on Investigation 
of Organised Crime, Guardia di 
Finanza
Region of Apulia
SE-E1 Senior official
Tobacco company involved in an umbrella 
organisation for the sector, Sweden
SE-E2 Senior officer Swedish Customs
SE-E3 Tobacco administrator
County Administrative Board, Sweden. Advisor
to other tobacco administrators in the Boards. 
SE-C1 Former criminal entrepreneur Middle level, smuggling OCG, Sweden
SE-C2 Former entrepreneur Currently imprisoned, used by an OCG, Sweden 
SE-C3 Former criminal entrepreneur 
Active participant in tobacco trade 10-20 years 
ago, Sweden 
UK-E1 Investigative journalist United Kingdom
UK-E2 Officer (investigation) HMRC, United Kingdom
UK-E3
Academic researching illicit trade 
in tobacco
United Kingdom
UK-E4
Academic researching illicit trade 
in tobacco
United Kingdom
UK-E5
Head of Division, Detection, 
North East
HMRC, United Kingdom
UK-C1
Criminal entrepreneur 
(male, British, active)
United Kingdom
UK-C2
Criminal entrepreneur 
(male, British, active)
United Kingdom
UK-C3
Criminal entrepreneur 
(male, Kurdish, active)
United Kingdom
UK-C4
Criminal entrepreneur 
(male, British, active)
United Kingdom
UK-C5
Criminal entrepreneur 
(male, British, active)
United Kingdom
UK-C6
Criminal entrepreneur 
(male, British, active)
United Kingdom
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list oF interviewees in the section on organised vat Fraud
Code Position Country/Institution/Role
BE-E1 Head of VAT Cell CDGEFID Belgian Federal Police
BE-E2 Public Prosecutor Public Prosecutor’s Office, Belgium
BG-E1
Officer, Risk Management 
Directorate
National Revenue Agency, Bulgaria
BG-E2 Officer, Economic Crimes Unit General Directorate Criminal Police
BG-E3 Officer, Tax Crimes Unit State Agency for National Security, Bulgaria
BG-E4 Former senior official National Revenue Agency, Bulgaria
BG-E5 Judicial expert Bulgarian Association of Judicial Experts
BG-E7 Officer, Economic Crimes Unit Criminal Police – Pazardjik, Bulgaria
BG-E8
Officer, Customs Intelligence
and Investigations Unit
Customs Agency, Bulgaria
BG-E9 Officer, Economic Crimes Unit Criminal Police, Bulgaria
BG-E10
Officer, Customs Intelligence
and Investigations Unit
Customs Agency, Bulgaria
BG-E11 Retired police officer
Internal Security Directorate, Ministry of Interior, 
Bulgaria
BG-E13 Prosecutor Prosecution’s Office, Bulgaria
BG-E14
Officer, Customs Intelligence
and Investigations Unit
Customs Agency, Bulgaria
BG-E15 Officer, Economic Crimes Unit Criminal Police, Bulgaria
BG-E16 Former managing director Large sugar wholesale company, Bulgaria
BG-E17 Officer Customs Agency, Bulgaria
BG-E18 Retired officer State Agency for National Security, Bulgaria
BG-E19 Former managing director Large sugar wholesale company, Bulgaria
BG-E20 Officer, Tax Crimes Unit
State Agency for National Security – Bourgas, 
Bulgaria
BG-E21 Officer, Tax Crimes Unit
State Agency for National Security – Plovdiv, 
Bulgaria
BG-E21 Officer, Tax Crimes Unit
State Agency for National Security – Varna, 
Bulgaria
BG-C1 VAT fraud offender Served sentence for organised VAT fraud, Bulgaria
BG-C2 VAT fraud offender Served sentence for organised VAT fraud, Bulgaria
CZ-E1 Senior Officer General Directorate of Customs, Czech Republic
CZ-E2 Law Specialist
Customs office for the Moravia-Silesian region, 
Czech Republic
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list oF interviewees in the section on organised vat Fraud (continued)
Code Position Country/Institution/Role
CZ-E3 Law Specialist
Customs office for the South-Moravian region, 
Czech Republic
CZ-E4 Methodologist 
Corruption and Financial Crime Detection 
Department, Police of the Czech Republic
CZ-E5 Prosecutor Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office
CZ-E6 Senior Officer Ministry of Finance, Czech Republic
CZ-C1 Criminal entrepreneur
Serves 7 years prison sentence for tax evasion, 
Czech Republic
CZ-C2 Criminal entrepreneur
Serves 5 and half years prison sentence for tax 
evasion, Czech Republic 
CZ-C3 Criminal entrepreneur
Serves 7 years prison sentence for tax evasion, 
Czech Republic 
CZ-C4 Criminal entrepreneur
Serves 5 and half years prison sentence for tax 
evasion, Czech Republic
ES-E1 Chief of Tax Fraud Section Policia Nacional, Spain
ES-E2 Officer
Tax Administration, Section of Intra-community 
VAT frauds, Spain
ES-E3
Deputy General Director
of Operations
Judicial Police of the Tax Administration, Spain
ES-E4 Police officer Judicial Police of the Tax Administration, Spain
ES-E5 Police officer Judicial Police of the Tax Administration, Spain
ES-E6 Chief of Economic Crimes Section Organised Crime Unit, Guardia Civil, Spain
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